Global Nuclear Power Developments Asia Leads The Way Edward Kee Nuclear Energy Asia 2010 - Hong Kong (1400 1430) Global Nuclear Power Developments - Asia Leads The Way What is the competitive global position of nuclear power plant designs and vendors? How will China s large new nuclear build programme impact the global industry? Implications of South Korea s entry into the nuclear power export market How will the nuclear power plant industry in Japan, the US and Europe compete with Chinese and South Korean nuclear power plant vendors? How does the role of government in the Asian nuclear power industry enable nuclear power plant development?
Disclaimer The slides that follow are not a complete record of the presentation and discussion. The views expressed in this presentation and discussion are mine and may not be the same as those held by NERA s clients or my colleagues. 7 December 2010 Nuclear Power Asia 2010 2
Global markets Reactor design evolution 7 December 2010 Nuclear Power Asia 2010 3 Gen II (most existing units, these work well); Gen III/III+ (moving to FOAK, size increase); Gen IV (R&D/SMA) Areva explained the UAE loss - as the result of cheap Generation II reactor design from Korea However, the Korean APR1400 (based on System 80+) is similar to the EPR, with active reactor safety No substantive definition of Generation III/III+; Graphic source: DOE (http://nuclear.energy.gov/geniv/negeniv1.html)
Global markets Gen III & III+ attributes Attributes of Gen III, III+ designs Large size Aircraft crash resistance Lower Core Damage Frequency (CDF) Passive safety (e.g. AP1000, ESBWR) Longer refueling cycle & higher fuel burnup Modular, top-down construction (e.g., ABWR, AP1000) 60 year operating life Load-following & part-load capability 7 December 2010 Nuclear Power Asia 2010 4 This is a list of Gen III attributes; Key issues: Who decides if a unit is Gen III? Or something else? How safe is safe enough? Are extra safety features (e.g., core catcher) worth the additional cost? Some Gen II or Gen II+ designs may be much better value for money Will passive safety designs dominate active safety designs?
Global markets Gen II+, III & III+ reactor designs AP1000 VVER-1200 CPR 1000 ABWR EPR VVER-1000 OPR 1000 APR1400 APWR ESBWR 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 In operation Under construction Planned Proposed 7 December 2010 Nuclear Power Asia 2010 5 Big stories here: AP1000, selected by China, has potential to be the most popular design in the world Russians are also moving fast on market, according to announcements Big reactor vendors, including Areva and GE and Japanese, are trailing South Korea was NOT in the export market until the end of 2009 In operation = connected to grid and producing power Under construction = at first nuclear concrete pour Planned = units that typically have vendor, site, and other details firmed up; range from preconstruction to only a little more advanced than proposed unit Proposed = units that have been mentioned, but not yet planned; ranges from detailed project plans to press release/news story
Global markets Gen II+, III, III+ by country China Russia India USA ROK Non-government utilities Japan UAE Turkey Vietnam 0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 In operation Under construction Planned Proposed 7 December 2010 Nuclear Power Asia 2010 6 Big stories here: China s nuclear build programme is huge has the potential to shape world nuclear industry for many decades Russia internal build of VVER designs will build credibility for export market India s potential buy of imported LWR designs may change the competitive picture, if EPR, ESBWR, or ABWR (or all of these) get orders As new nuclear countries make selections, the aggregate world league table will be important countries will look for proven designs with real experience and low costs will seek a range of support from vendors (government vendors have edge) In operation = connected to grid and producing power Under construction = at first nuclear concrete pour Planned = units that typically have vendor, site, and other details firmed up; range from preconstruction to only a little more advanced than proposed unit Proposed = units that have been mentioned, but not yet planned; ranges from detailed project plans to press release/news story
Strategic issues Industry Consolidation 1980s 1990s 2000s 2006 2010 MinAtom MinAtom MinAtom MinAtom Rosatom Siemens Siemens Siemens Framatome Babcock & Wilcox (USA) Mitsubishi Heavy Ind. Framatome Mitsubishi Heavy Ind. Framatome ANP Mitsubishi Heavy Ind. AREVA NP Mitsubishi Heavy Ind. AREVA Mitsubishi Heavy Ind. Combustion Engineering BWR ASEA Asea Brown Boveri (ABB) BNFL PWR Brown Boveri et cie Both Westinghouse Westinghouse Westinghouse Toshiba Toshiba Toshiba Westinghouse Toshiba Westinghouse Toshiba Hitachi GE Hitachi GE Hitachi GE GE-Hitachi GE-Hitachi 7 December 2010 Nuclear Power Asia 2010 7 While the government-owned Areva and Rosatom are on this page, the new government vendors in China and South Korea are not.
Strategic issues New industry competitors South Korean companies offering APR1400 to export market Chinese nuclear companies talking about selling Chinese version of AP1000 and CPR1000 into export market India looking to sell its PHWR to smaller countries with new nuclear programs New companies with small and innovative reactor designs (e.g., B&W, Hyperion, NuScale) 7 December 2010 Nuclear Power Asia 2010 8
Strategic issues Overnight capital costs $6,000 $5,000 $4,000 $3,000 2.5 times! $2,000 $1,000 $0 Swiss PWR Belgian PWR French EPR USA Gen III+ Japan ABWR China AP1000 China CPR1000 ROK APR1400 Source: OECD 2010, Table 3.7a, overnight costs in USD/kWe 7 December 2010 Nuclear Power Asia 2010 9 This is from the OECD 2010 generating cost report Very large range of overnight capital costs French EPR is 2.5 times as much as ROK APR1400 Many reasons for this difference This differential cannot be sustained If government vendors can build in the export market at comparable prices, and meet local safety regulations, traditional vendors will not be able to compete Comment from UK: Why can t we get some of these low-cost Korean reactors in the UK?
Strategic issues Product development cycle Concept FOAK Learning Mature Actual cost first unit Unit Cost Conceptual cost estimates EPC contracts Detailed engineering & licensing Learning on additional units reduces time and cost Long production lines for standard unit components Years 7 December 2010 Nuclear Power Asia 2010 10 For some reactor designs, the industry is only now moving from high-level conceptual cost estimates to real contracts to build the first new units. FOAK units are always more expensive and in the current environment, no vendor or builder will take a lot of cost risk (the total cost might make this exposure larger than the market value of some vendors). As more units are built, the costs will be lower (some data show that the 5 th or 6 th unit of a kind are 40% less expensive than the first unit). As many units are built, the low costs become more certain and buyers will face lower project risk. Problem is in how to get down the learning curve In the US market, may not be enough units built to do this In economies with growing demand and a strong commitment to nuclear (e.g., China, South Korea), real economies of scale and learning curves may be achieved.
Strategic issues Commercial approach (e.g., USA) First Wave Buyers Second Wave Buyers Later Buyers Concept FOAK Learning Mature Actual cost first unit Unit Cost Conceptual cost estimates EPC contracts Detailed engineering & licensing Learning on additional units reduces time and cost Long production lines for standard unit components Years 7 December 2010 Nuclear Power Asia 2010 11 When there is a commercial approach, there is a difficult issue of who gets the gains from learning curves and experience. While there are some Intellectual Property issues here, many of the gains from learning may not be captured by the buyer who pays for them When buyers share (or take) the risk of early unit costs and delays, shouldn t these buyers also share some of the upside in future units? Hard to do this in a commercial arrangement The difficulty is also convincing a buyer to be a first mover, taking high costs and risks for early units, when the learning from these early units may well benefit other buyers who move later (or perhaps vendors who keep prices higher)
Strategic issues National approach Build capability Build fleet Concept FOAK Learning Mature Actual cost first unit Unit Cost Conceptual cost estimates EPC contracts Detailed engineering & licensing Learning on additional units reduces time and cost Long production lines for standard unit components Years 7 December 2010 Nuclear Power Asia 2010 12 However, when the units are all in one government build programme, the learning curve benefits and capability building may be more fully captured. Investing in FOAK units provides benefits in lower costs for the fleet build. These benefits may be captured even more completely if the vendors, builders, and suppliers are part of the overall government nuclear effort. Later, if the national supplier decides to sell to the export market, this may be profitable for both outside buyers and for the supplier Areva seems to have a strategy that turns this approach upside down using export sales to get down the learning curve for the EPR, with an eventual plan to use the mature costs and risks of the EPR in future French nuclear fleet replacement.
Strategic issues French nuclear fleet 8,000 80,000 MWe (by COD) 7,000 6,000 5,000 4,000 3,000 2,000 1958 - Framatome founded; obtains Westinghouse PWR license 1974 - OPEC oil crisis; Sixteen 900 MWe units ordered 1968 - Seven 900 MWe units ordered 1976 - Ten 900 MWe units and twenty 1,300 MWe units ordered Four 1,500 MWe N4 units 70,000 60,000 50,000 40,000 30,000 20,000 1,000 0 1958 1961 1964 1967 1970 MWe 1973 1976 1979 1982 1985 1988 1991 1994 1997 2000 10,000 0 Annual Cumulative 7 December 2010 Nuclear Power Asia 2010 13 The earlier French nuclear build programme is a model for the current government nuclear build strategy. This is the capacity (in MWe) of new LWR nuclear plants that were placed into commercial operation in France from 1958 to 2002. The French linked the nuclear power plant build programme to an internal nuclear industrial development strategy. More recent French strategy seemed to depend on sales of EPR in export market to support eventual French nuclear fleet replacement
Strategic issues New nuclear countries High growth rate in developing world, but Multiple smaller countries = multiple reactor sales Physical and administrative infrastructure lacking Financial viability Nuclear power development models IAEA slow build infrastructure, then NPP UAE fast buy infrastructure and build NPP Russia faster build and operate nuclear IPP 7 December 2010 Nuclear Power Asia 2010 14 Developing countries have a high and growing need for power this might seem to make them ideal candidates for nuclear power. However, there are some hurdles. One nuclear power vendor strategy is to help overcome these hurdles to accelerate nuclear industry in developing countries as a means of facilitating reactor sales.
Strategic issues Size of nuclear build programmes Low costs come from large fleet/build programme High demand growth = high nuclear potential China, India, etc Lower demand growth = lower nuclear potential USA, Europe High cost to shift from fossil to nuclear Shut down existing coal units? Impose significant carbon tax? 7 December 2010 Nuclear Power Asia 2010 15 If low and more certain costs are linked to a large and active build programme then some countries will have a natural advantage. Other countries will have trouble getting nuclear to work
Strategic issues Nuclear fleet benefits Nuclear Fleet Concept Organization & Management Multiple Identical Units Learning Curve Effects Volume Orders Mobilize Teams Industry & Employment A single organization with a unified approach and economies of scale to accomplish: Training Purchasing Management Engineering Regulatory affairs Training Simulator Operators and management Refueling outage skills & equipment New procedures & equipment modifications Shared spare parts, special tools, and strategic spares Learning from: People involved in construction and operation of multiple units Modification of the design or the construction approach and schedule Documenting and sharing lessons learned Vendors build in learning for later bids Volume orders may allow upstream component suppliers to invest in longer production lines due to bulk procurement Volume orders may bring discounts from NPP vendors that reflect expected learning curve benefits and upstream component savings Sequencing of construction is key Teams move from one project to the next without interruption (also may allow simultaneous work on multiple units) Teams could work on similar tasks for many units, allowing significant commitment to hiring & training French nuclear industrial development is model Investment in new production facilities Over time, such local suppliers should be able to use their experience (and their own learning curve benefits) to become competitive suppliers in the export market 7 December 2010 Nuclear Power Asia 2010 16 This chart shows some of the benefits of a nuclear fleet. Many of these nuclear fleet benefits are available without the full French national fleet approach. One example are the US nuclear fleet operators. These companies have built or acquired nuclear fleets with units of differing designs and vintages, yet have achieved many nuclear fleet benefits by adopting effective Organization and Management approaches.
Strategic issues Nuclear fleet development No fleet Multiple units Multiple identical units China s approach Single nuclear unit/plant owner Some multicompany efforts to gain fleet benefits through cooperation US nuclear management companies a more formal approach to multi-company efforts Some ability to share learning through industry groups Smaller fleet operators Nuclear fleets, composed of multiple reactor types (BWR and PWR and other), reactor designs, constructors, and vintages A mix of units built by owner and acquired Benefits from single overhead, purchasing, engineering, and management Single owner Common simulators, special tools, training Co-ordination of upgrades, maintenance, outages Fungible operators, maintenance teams, outage teams Operational improvement through learning across fleet Sequential purchase Multiple procurements Potentially coordinated construction Learning curve benefits may not be captured by owner Financial flexibility, vendor market power, fewer options for buyer Bulk build Owner is builder Coordinated construction, mobilization benefits Learning curve benefits captured Large build allows upstream infrastructure Large financial commitment, large benefits 7 December 2010 Nuclear Power Asia 2010 17 This picture provides a simplified version of the framework for examining different approaches to nuclear fleets. A key insight is that there are significant nuclear fleet benefits that do not directly depend on the procurement approach. China has embarked on a strategy to build large fleets of identical units. Adding to the benefits of a fleet, there are the benefits of building the nuclear industrial capacity that comes from a large nuclear build programme.
Role of Government Range of approaches State Capitalism Mixed Electricity markets India China Russia France South Korea US public power Japan US regulated states US market regions UK 7 December 2010 Nuclear Power Asia 2010 18 Electricity Markets merchant nuclear plants the limited experience with true merchant nuclear plants in the US and UK suggest that this will be difficult and may require some level of government support. Mixed while the utility purchaser or owner of a nuclear power plant may be government or publicly supported (ie, a regulated utility), the industry that builds that nuclear power plant is private and the procurement is a commercial contract. Depending on the industry model, the utility buyer may be a publicly-traded corporation. State Capitalism in the purest form of state capitalism, the owner, buyer, seller, financer, builder, supplier, etc are all government owned.
Role of Government State Capitalism Strategic and long-term state domination of markets National Corporations & State- Owned Enterprises Strategic goals above profits Inside & outside host country China and Russia leading examples 7 December 2010 Nuclear Power Asia 2010 19 Published in 2010 Bremmer s book does not mention nuclear power, but he could have used nuclear power as an example of state capitalism.
Role of Government State capitalism - nuclear power Outside vendors? Nuclear industrial capacity developed Fully integrated nuclear supply chain Export market sales? Gov t orders large reactor fleet Gov t captures significant learning curve benefits Gov t longterm strategy for nuclear power Nuclear is low cost energy option 7 December 2010 Nuclear Power Asia 2010 20 This is an animated slide starts at the bottom left box ( Gov t long-term strategy ), then goes around the circle Government plans for nuclear large nuclear fleet purchase may involve outside vendors, but drives industrial development results in integrated supply chain may involve export sales allows the government to capture the benefit of learning curves and experience result is low cost for nuclear option Government nuclear strategy is confirmed and supported Query is nuclear too expensive to work outside this model (ie, in the commercial model)?
Role of Government Integrated nuclear power industry Financing Engineering Components and construction R&D Operation and maintenance Licensing Training and education Front and back - Nuclear fuel cycle 7 December 2010 Nuclear Power Asia 2010 21 When a government is able to build its own integrated nuclear supply industry around a government-ordered large nuclear fleet build, it is possible to achieve significant cost reductions. Also possible are reductions in risk and in schedule, as the integrated supply chain is managed as a single economic entity. The normal commercial approach involves subcontracts and other agreements to bring a team of unrelated commercial entities together. If financing and operation is a part of the package, financial entities and utilities with nuclear operations expertise must be included in the team. Just getting a winning team in place is a major challenge. This portfolio of project agreements adds cost (to meet risk premiums and profit margins of subcontractors), risk (as responsibility is shared between multiple commercial entities), complexity (project management is more difficult due to multiple entities with multiple interests and contractual rights), and the need for effective project management.
Summary Pivotal time for nuclear power industry, with high capital costs and project risk Large nuclear fleet build by governments Capture learning curve benefits of large orders Build confidence through completed projects Build integrated national nuclear infrastructure Will commercial vendors be able to compete with state nuclear suppliers? 7 December 2010 Nuclear Power Asia 2010 22 We may be seeing a shift from the large nuclear vendor/constructor model (where a single company or a group of companies dominated the industry because they held the learning from building multiple units for multiple buyers) to the State Capitalism vendor model. Now governments can be both suppliers and buyers and build their own capability through their own purchases a very different model of the industry. When these government reactor vendors enter the export market, they will be (are!) strong competitors. Motivations for export market vary Political influence (e.g., China in Pakistan, Russia in Turkey) -Build experience (Areva in Finland and China) -Drive industrial activity in home market (South Korea)
Contact Us Edward Kee Vice President Washington, DC +1 (202) 370-7713 edward.kee@nera.com Copyright 2010 National Economic Research Associates, Inc. All rights reserved.