Optimization-based analysis of slot allocation strategies for EU airports



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airports, 0 Congestion Management of Transportation Systems on the Ground and in the Air Asilomar, California, USA June 27-29, 2011 Optimization-based analysis of slot allocation strategies for EU airports João P. Pita António P. Antunes Comments and suggestions from Profs Amedeo Odoni and Cynthia Barnhart (MIT) are thankfully acknowledge

airports, 1 Summary 1. Motivation 2. Problem 3. Optimization Model 4. Application 5. Conclusion 6. Future Work

airports, 2 Motivation [1/2] 1. The increase in passenger demand and airport utilization has led to airport congestion a. 33 minutes was the average delay time per delayed flight in Europe (2010) b. 23% of flights in Europe (2010) were delayed > 15 min (CODA,2011) c. $ 28.9 billion was estimated as the direct cost of delays in the US (2007) d. $ 4.0 billion was estimated as the impact in the US GDP of air transportation delays (2007) 2. Airport slots are needed to control airport usage a. Limit airport capacity using administrative measures b. Slot allocation is based on grandfather rights and the lose it or lose it rule

airports, 3 Motivation [2/2] 3. Congestion increases exponentially when airport utilization is above 80% / 85% a. Several European airports operate at capacity throughout the day b. At peak periods a greater number of airports operate at capacity c. Average utilization rate is much lower than peak utilization rate

airports, 4 Problem [1/4] Initial Research Questions 1. Is it possible to satisfy the current passenger demand with less cost to the air transportation system (including passengers) without compromising the airline competition and profitability? 2. Is it possible to reduce and/or reorganize the number of slots at the airports to reduce the delay time without losing a big portion of passenger demand? Possible contributions of this research 1. Give insights about the use of airport capacity in congested airports 2. Help strategic decisions regarding slot allocation process

airports, 5 Problem [2/4] Initial Assumptions 1. A set of airlines compete in an air transportation network; 2. Each airline has a given number of slots per airport (can be time fixed or not) 3. Airport and vehicle costs per aircraft type are known 4. Unit delay costs per aircraft and passenger are known 5. Demand per leg, airline, and demand period is known 6. Demand that is not satisfied can be recaptured by other airlines 7. The expected delay time per airport and time period is known

airports, 6 Problem [3/4] Airport Capacity and Slot Allocation Airport Capacity Runway Terminal Air traffic control Slots per Unit of Time Slots are used to regulate the airport capacity FRA Old flag carriers still have a dominant position in home airports Even when demand for slots is above capacity, airport capacity is not totally used

airports, 7 Problem [4/4] Airport Utilization and Expected Delay Time Minutes 12 10 8 6 Average Delay per Hour DELAYS is a stochastic and dynamic queuing model developed at MIT (Odoni and Malone) 4 2 0 0:00 0:45 1:30 2:15 3:00 3:45 4:30 5:15 6:00 6:45 7:30 8:15 9:00 9:45 10:30 11:15 12:00 12:45 13:30 14:15 15:00 15:45 16:30 17:15 18:00 18:45 19:30 20:15 21:00 21:45 22:30 23:15 Available Slots Avg Delay < 10 min MAX 21 slots/15min LHR Airport Current Slots Avg. Delay <10min Max 21 slots/ 15 min Demand 1367 1362 0,37% 1352 1,10% Capacity 2112 2112 0,00% 2112 0,00% TotalDelay 8625,92 8044,73 6,74% 6880,25 20,24% Maximum Delay (min) 11,29 9,57 15,23% 7,39 34,54% Average Delay (min) 6,31 5,91 6,34% 5,09 19,33% 5 min 614,55 585,78 4,68% 523,41 14,83% % flights 10 min 321 292,38 8,92% 232,01 27,72% delayed 15 min 153,87 132,92 13,62% 90,88 40,94% more than 20 min 81,73 67,57 17,33% 40,7 50,20% Small slot reduction/reallocation can reduce significantly the delay time Reduction/reallocation of slots needs to be done in a fair way to airlines If airport capacity was limited below current value would be possible to satisfy the current demand?

airports, 8 Optimization Model [1/2] Objective Function minimize network costs min Cost j, ka cc ff tt j, ka tt cc c j, ka cc pp vv j, ka cc ff tt Tjk q c Dj jkcp j, ka pp cc tt c Sjk d d Tjkt Tjkt P p s p x jkct Tjkcpv Pjkc c Vjk jkcft a s Dv x s p Fjk Vf jkct jkcft c Aj x kjcft s Vf Vehicle / Airport Costs per flight leg Aircraft delay cost Passenger delay cost Spill costs Schedule delay costs Capacity Constraints airline movements per airport cannot exceed airline slots ka f F x jkcft xkjfc, t t s jct, j A,c C t T kj,

cc tt tt P tt P p p P jkct jkct p jkct q q jkcp jkcp Congestion Management of Transportation Systems on the Ground and in the Air airports, 9 q Optimization Model [2/2] Demand Equations passengers per leg cannot exceed demand cc jkcp 1-, j,k jk, j,k A,c C, p P 1, j,k A,c C, p P jk A,p P Schedule Delay frequency per leg is used as proxy of average schedule delay time f F p x a jkct jkcft Sjkcpf a f F 1, j,k Sjkcpf Sjkcpf s A,c C, p Vf, j,k P A,c C, p P, t T a, j,k A,c C, f F, p P, t T α maximum variation from current airline demand per leg α=5% airline can gain/lose up to 5% of passenger demand in that leg P P

airports, 10 Application [1/6] Network 10 busy European Airports Airlines Slots per airline and airport Airports AMS BCN CDG FCO FRA LHR MAD MUC VIE ZRH Total AF 14 16 126 12 16 14 20 14 8 12 252 BA 12 10 16 10 12 104 10 14 8 12 208 IB 8 84 0 10 8 22 138 8 4 6 288 KL 104 12 14 10 8 16 12 12 8 12 208 LH 28 22 36 24 132 36 16 120 20 22 456 LX 8 6 12 8 10 12 6 8 8 78 156 OS 8 4 6 4 8 8 0 8 54 8 108 U2 0 4 8 0 0 0 4 0 0 0 16 Other 31 80 22 67 20 17 65 11 38 7 358 Total 213 238 240 145 214 229 271 195 148 157 2050 Airport Demand, Capacity, and Average Delay Indicators Airports AMS BCN CDG FCO FRA Origin (pax/day) 15168 15878 16747 12511 12551 Destination (pax/day) 14149 15560 15259 13327 13226 Declared Cap. (mov/h) 106 60 112 88 80 Average Delay (min) 0.67 0.51 2.09 0.79 3.36 LHR M AD MUC VIE ZRH Origin (pax/day) 17670 16940 9670 8239 9401 Destination (pax/day) 18018 18111 10294 8296 9143 Declared Cap. (mov/h) 88 90 90 66 68 Average Delay (min) 4.38 0.62 2.07 1.18 2.56 10 airports for Friday 17th July 2009 8 airlines + 1 (other airlines) Total flights 1025 Total passengers 99446 Average seat per leg and airline flight database Demand per leg EUROSTAT data for July 2009; The model assumes that the flights outside the network stay the same

Daily Demand ( per leg) Congestion Management of Transportation Systems on the Ground and in the Air airports, 11 Application [2/5] Daily demand per leg (July 2009) Origin Destination AMS BCN CDG FCO FRA LHR MAD MUC VIE ZRH AMS 0 1599 1624 813 987 1836 1315 888 748 786 BCN 1474 0 1251 1007 754 1017 4375 675 387 415 CDG 1638 1326 0 2140 1608 1678 1261 1229 1045 1154 FCO 786 1005 1458 0 774 1248 1325 520 394 432 FRA 776 721 1261 793 0 1944 1453 1364 1219 772 LHR 1682 981 1605 1301 1978 0 1582 1398 800 1494 MAD 1141 3909 1491 1261 1388 1569 0 726 205 707 MUC 809 611 1089 459 1334 1360 707 0 662 437 VIE 717 400 983 408 1217 818 222 711 0 946 ZRH 896 429 1060 495 861 1207 647 512 991 0 c F Passenger Delay Cost 0.77 ( /min/pax) c P Flight Delay Cost 8 0,75( sv - 40) ( /min/flight) Vehicle and Airport Costs Landing fees are used as airport costs Vehicle costs were addapted from literature: c V ( d 722) ( s 104) 0,019 ( /flight) jk v Landing Fees ( ) 800 700 600 500 400 300 200 100 0 Brussels Airport - landing fees - 0 50 100 150 200 250 300 Aircraft seat capacity

airports, 12 Application [3/5] Type of results to compare from current situation Number of flights (leg and airline) Delay time and cost Demand transfer between airlines Airport costs Passenger schedule delay Several situations will be tested Fixed number of slots (current situation) Changes in the number of slots ( pick the best ) Limited pax demand transfers Free pax demand transfers Variable avg seat Base Scenario Fixed avg seat LOWER DELAY LEVEL INCREASE AVG SEATS AIRLINE EQUITY AIRLINE COMPETITION LOAD FACTOR DECREASE FREQUENCY

airports, 13 Application [4/5] Results base scenario [α = 5% ; fixed slots] Percentage 70% 60% 50% 40% 30% 20% Cost Reduction Total cost decreases 13,12% LH 16,59%(biggest) U2 7,52%(lowest) Delay cost decreases 56,36% 10% 0% AF BA IB KL LH LX OS U2 OTHER Delay Cost Total Cost Airlines α = 5% LH 61,85% (biggest) OS 50,32% (lowest) 1,20% 1,00% 0,80% 0,60% Passenger Variation Passenger variation is nil (all demand must be satisfied) U2 1,08% (biggest) / IB 0,34% (lowest) Pergentage 0,40% 0,20% 0,00% 0,20% AF BA IB KL LH LX OS U2 OTHER 0,40% 0,60% Airlines Variation

airports, 14 Results different maximum passenger variation Total cost decreases with the increase in α Percentage Percentage 20% 15% 10% 5% 0% 1,50% 1,00% 0,50% 0,00% 0,50% 1,00% 1,50% Application [5/5] Cost Reduction AF BA IB KL LH LX OS U2 OTHER Airlines Total (α=5%) Total (α=10%) Total (α=20%) Passenger Variation AF BA IB KL LH LX OS Other Airlines α = 5% α = 10% α = 20% Note: without U2 Cost drops 10% from α = 0% to α = 5% But only 2,5% from α = 5% to α = 20% Delay cost decreases 6,7 % (α=0% to α=20%) α = 0% 50,56% decrease α = 20% 57,33% decrease Average seat per flight increases 4% 5% Except for α = 20% + 7,08% Passenger variation between airlines always below 1,5% except for U2 very small number of passengers U2 1,08% (α = 5%) ; 4,73% (α = 10% ) ; 9,21% (α = 20% ) Free variation gives thesame resultsthat α=20%

airports, 15 Conclusions Total cost in the system can be reduced mainly by decreasing delay costs a. Delay cost can be reduced to 6% of total costs (from 9%) b. This reduction is achieved without passenger spilling c. Delay cost decrease is well distributed between the airlines Reduction in flights is much lower than reduction in total cost a. Flight reduction is higher in busiest periods and at the busiest airports b. Passenger transfer between airlines is small not compromising airline market power c. Average seat per flight increases, in most of cases, by margin up to 5%; Biggest airlines have biggest reduction in delay costs a. More slots in each airport, more capacity to change flight time; b. Influence of delay cost is higher for the biggest airlines thus greater reduction in delay cost c. Passenger variation is negative to the biggest airline better to promote competition

airports, 16 Future Work Changing Slots limiting max utilization to 90% current slots Utilization Rate (% / 15min) 140% 120% 100% 80% 60% 40% 20% 0% Comparison of Utilization Rate and Avg Delay CDG 07:00 08:00 09:00 10:00 11:00 12:00 13:00 14:00 15:00 16:00 17:00 18:00 19:00 20:00 21:00 22:00 23:00 Hour Avg Delay 100% Avg Delay 90% Demand 100% Demand 90% Slots per airline and airport Parameters Airports AMS BCN CDG FCO FRA LHR MAD MUC VIE ZRH Capacity 100% 28 23 28 23 21 22 30 23 18 15 (slot/15m) 90% 25 20 25 20 18 19 27 20 16 13 Periods > 90% 5 1 16 4 29 31 3 19 1 17 Reassigned Slots 11 3 65 7 96 135 12 71 1 35 Avg Delay Max Delay 100% 100% 0,67 2,67 0,51 2,23 2,09 6,32 0,79 2,43 3,36 7,65 4,38 8,8 0,62 2,57 2,07 6,86 1,18 2,83 2,56 8,01 90% 90% 0,63 1,9 0,5 1,57 1,57 2,54 0,56 2,09 2,29 2,45 2,47 2,47 0,57 1,61 1,59 2,44 1,18 2,83 1,95 3,57 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 Minutes of Avg delay 1. Slots are changed by minimizing the total changing time in each airport; 2. Modification in the optimization model: cc s s jct jct S MAX jt is_free s, j A,t T 3. Each airline retains the same number of slots ; 4. Demand still needs to be satisfied in the corresponding demand period; 5. Expected delay times are updated to the new values; jct

airports, 17 Congestion Management of Transportation Systems on the Ground and in the Air Asilomar, California, USA June 27-29, 2011 Optimization-based analysis of slot allocation strategies for EU airports João P. Pita António P. Antunes Financial support from Fundação para a Ciência e Tecnologia through the MIT Portugal Project AirNets Project and scholarship SFRH/BD/43060/2008

airports, 18 Motivation [] 5. Demand is higher than capacity in the busiest airports a. Requests for slots are above capacity at peak periods b. In those cases, assigned slots do not correspond to airline requests c. Airport capacity is lost even in airports where demand is higher than capacity ACL, 2009 Aachen University, 2007

airports, 19 Motivation [] 6. Market concentration is very strong in most of the busiest airports in Europe a. More than half (20) of the 34 biggest airports in Europe can be seen as market concentrated b. Top 5 airlines have more than 70% of slots in all airports c. Biggest airline in 30 of the 34 airports is a country based airline d. In those 4 airports the leading carrier is a low cost carrier

airports, 20 Problem [5/5] Possible contributions of this research 1. Give insights about the use of airport capacity in congested airports 2. Help strategic decisions regarding slot allocation process 3. Analyze the impact of a change in the landing fee scheme

airports, 21 Application [] Delay time and cost DELAYS was used to get the average primary delay per flight and airport in each 15 minute time period Average primary delay is used as input to the optimization model To account for delay propagation we use multipliers Airport Demand, Capacity, and Average Delay Indicators Airports AMS BCN CDG FCO FRA Origin (pax/day) 15168 15878 16747 12511 12551 Destination (pax/day) 14149 15560 15259 13327 13226 Declared Cap. (mov/h) 106 60 112 88 80 Average Delay (min) 0.67 0.51 2.09 0.79 3.36 LHR M AD M UC VIE ZRH Origin (pax/day) 17670 16940 9670 8239 9401 Destination (pax/day) 18018 18111 10294 8296 9143 Declared Cap. (mov/h) 88 90 90 66 68 Average Delay (min) 4.38 0.62 2.07 1.18 2.56 Delay cost values were adapted from Cook et al. (2011): Passenger Delay Cost 0.77 ( /min/pax) c F c P Flight Delay Cost 8 0,75( sv - 40) ( /min/flight)

airports, 22 Pergentage Percentage 20% 15% 10% 5% 0% 3,0% 2,5% 2,0% 1,5% 1,0% 0,5% 0,0% 0,5% 1,0% 1,5% Application [] Results optimization without delay cost Cost Reduction AF BA IB KL LH LX OS U2 OTHER Airlines Total (α=5%) Total (α=10%) Total (α=20%) Passenger Variation AF BA IB KL LH LX OS U2 OTHER Airlines No delay With Delay α = 5% Total cost decreases but less than when optimizing considering delay costs average decrease is 4,67% lower than with delay costs highest difference is with α = 20% (5,20%) Delay cost decreases up to 10 % comparing with > 50% very close to total cost decrease related with the decrease in flights (same decrease) Passenger (flight) variation between airlines is higher α = 5% average variation 0,76% (0,32%) α = 10% average variation 1,26% (1,04%) α =20% average variation 2,54% (1,62%)

airports, 23 Percentage Pergentage 30% 25% 20% 15% 10% 5% 15,0% 10,0% 5,0% 10,0% 15,0% 20,0% Cost Reduction AF BA IB KL LH LX OS U2 OTHER Airlines Total (α=5%) Total (α=10%) Total (α=20%) 5,0% 0,0% Passenger variation With demand spill AF BA IB KL LH LX OS U2 OTHER α = 20% α = 10% α = 5% Application [] Results demand can be spilled up to a limit [5% ; 10% ; 20%] Airlines Total cost is reduced between 13.67% and 19.46% Highest difference is with α = 20% Decrease from base scenario is only 0,54% [α = 5% ] Demand spill is much lower than the limit value [α] 2,95% with 5,85% flight reduction (α = 5%) 6,13% with 7,02% flight reduction (α = 10%) 12,98% with 13,05% flight reduction (α = 20%) Delay cost decreases between 57,68% and 63,83% Average decrease is 7% higher than in the base scenario (for equal α) Passenger variation is negative for all airlines except U2 Highest drops for the biggest airlines [AF, LH, and KL]

airports, 24 Total Cost (%) Percentage 25% 20% 15% 10% 25% 20% 15% 10% 5% 0% 5% 0% Application [] Results overview of the impact to the airports Cost and Flight Reduction Demand Spilled Flight and Pax reduction 12% 10% AMS BCN CDG FCO FRA LHR MAD MUC VIE ZRH Airports α = 20% α = 5% α = 0% α = 20% (flight) α = 5% (flight) α = 0% (flight) AMS BCN CDG FCO FRA LHR Airports MAD MUC VIE ZRH α = 5% α = 10% α = 20% α = 5% (PAX) α = 10% (PAX) α = 20% (PAX) 8% 6% 4% 2% 0% Flights (%) Decrease in cost is higher in the busiest airports Highest drop is with α = 20% FRA (20,75%) BCN and MUC cost decrease are related with flight reduction (high frequency is internal legs) Delay cost can represent more than 10% of airport costs Values vary very significantly between airports Lowest values for BCN, AMS, and FCO; Highest values for LHR, FRA, ZRH, and CGD; When demand can be spilled: Busiest airports with higher losses in flights and passengers; Flight reduction with α = 20% is very significant;