Care of patients with suspected or confirmed Influenza A subtype H1N1 virus infection in 2009: experience of a university hospital



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Original Article Care of patients with suspected or confirmed Influenza A subtype HN virus infection in 009: experience of a university hospital Atendimento aos pacientes suspeitos ou confirmados de infecção pelo vírus da influenza A, subtipo HN, no ano de 009: experiência de um hospital universitário Maria Letícia Braga, Viviane Rosado, Janita Ferreira, Rosane Luiza Coutinho, Lenize Adriana de Jesus, Stella Soares Sala Lima, Aline Martins Braga, Elci Souza Santos, Flávia Alves Campos, Maria Aparecida Martins 5, Sônia Márcia Silva 6, Wanessa Clemente 7 DOI: 0.595/8-8.00009 ABSTRACT The present report addresses the planning and actions taken by the Hospital of the Federal University of Minas Gerais to confront and control the Influenza A virus subtype HN pandemia, which occurred between the months of March and April 009. We describe patient triage, the precautions established in the care of suspected or confirmed cases, the evolution of these patients, the associated mortality and the destination of the waste generated in care. Key words: Influenza A Virus, HN Subtype; Cross Infection; Infection Control; Pandemic. RESUMO Committee on Hospital Infection Control (CCIH), Hospital das Clínicas, Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais HC-UFMG. Belo Horizonte, MG Brazil. Nursing student at the School of Nursing, UFMG. Belo Horizonte, MG Brazil. Waste Sector Manager at the HC-UFMG. Belo Horizonte, MG Brazil. Pediatrician specialized in Pediatric Infectology at the HC-UFMG. Belo Horizonte, MG Brazil. 5 Adjunct Professor of the Department of Pediatrics, School of Medicine, UFMG. Belo Horizonte, MG Brazil. 6 Occupational medicine nurse at the HC-UFMG. Belo Horizonte, MG Brazil. 7 President of the CCIH HC-UFMG. Belo Horizonte, MG Brazil. O presente relato aborda o planejamento e as ações tomadas pelo Hospital das Clínicas da Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais para o enfrentamento e controle da pandemia pelo vírus Influenza A subtipo HN, ocorrida entre os meses de março e abril de 009. São descritos os fluxos de pessoas, as precauções estabelecidas no atendimento dos casos suspeitos ou confirmados, a evolução para gravidade desses pacientes, a mortalidade associada e o destino dos resíduos gerados no atendimento. Palavras-chave: Vírus da Influenza A Subtipo HN; Infecção Hospitalar; Controle de Infecções; Pandemia. Introduction Between the months of March and April 009 the outbreak of a respiratory disease caused by a new Influenza virus was first identified in Mexico and in the United States. The new virus was made out of sequences of Influenza virus of human, swine, and avian origin. On April 5, 009, the World Health Organization (WHO) declared the infection by the pandemic virus HN as public health emergency of international importance. The Brazilian Ministry of Health issued alerts to the national ports and airports in April 009, while the National Health Surveillance Agency (ANVISA) coordinated surveillance and blocking actions that were recommended in order to identify symptomatic and suspect passengers, who were followed up from home or transferred to reference centers. - Submitted: 07/09/00 Approved: /9/0 Institution: Hospital das Clínicas, Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais HC-UFMG. Belo Horizonte, MG Brazil Corresponding Author: Maria Aparecida Martins E-mail: mariaamartins@gmail.com Rev Med Minas Gerais 0; (): 5-56 5

The Hospital das Clínicas at the Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais (HC-UFMG), in Belo Horizonte, was recommended as reference center for suspected cases of infection by Influenza A virus subtype HN in the state of Minas Gerais. The hospital had taken part in the contention plan for virus H5N years before and had six rooms available with proper respiratory isolation. The HC-UFMG is a large general university hospital that admits patients in all levels of health care primary, secondary, and tertiary from the Unified Health System (SUS). EXPERIENCE REPORT The present work is an experience report on the care of patients with or suspected of infection by Influenza A virus subtype HN, in the Hospital das Clínicas, Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais (HC- UFMG), in 009, as submitted and approved by the Board of Education, Research and Extension of the HC-UFMG. The confidentiality of data and the privacy of patients were preserved. On April 7, 009, the Hospital das Clínicas at the Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais received the first two patients suspected of infection with Influenza A virus subtype HN, coming from Cancún, Mexico. They were initially hospitalized in separate, private rooms, and precautions were taken regarding air flow and physical contact, including the use of High Efficiency Particulate Air (HEPA) filters. As modes of transmission were little known at the time (it is currently known that transmission occurs mainly through direct contact and airborne droplets), use of full personal protective equipment (gloves, N95 single-use masks, surgical cap, goggles and gowns) was mandatory during patient care. 5 Gloves, N95 single-use masks, surgical cap, and gowns were disposed of after patient care and goggles were placed in a container with % sodium hypochlorite for disinfection purposes. As the epidemics evolved, hospitalization demands became greater than the number of rooms with respiratory isolation, and an additional three nurses were allocated to the ward where these rooms were found. Faced with the possibility of severe outcomes for infected patients, mainly from the respiratory standpoint, eight intensive care unit (ICU) beds were made available. According to ANVISA (Brazilian Health Surveillance Agency) recommendations, the waste gener- ated in the care of patients with suspected/confirmed Influenza A virus (HN) was classified as belonging to the A group (RDC n 0 06, of 07//00) 6, and sent for incineration at the Waste Treatment Sector in the HC-UFMG. On July 8, 009, ANVISA issued the Clinical Handling and Epidemiological Surveillance Protocol for Influenza describing the Influenza A (HN) virus as a Class biological agent, which meant that all waste resulting from the care of patients with suspected/confirmed infection was included in the A group (RDC n 0 06, of 07//00) 6. Waste was sent to a licensed sanitary landfill, similar to other biohazardous waste produced in all health care institutions. From April to July 009, 70. kg of A waste were sent to incineration, with a cost of R$.78,0 to the institution. During the epidemic,,08 patients were admitted,,79 of which were adults and 55 children. A total of 595 suspect cases were notified and 77 were hospitalized, of which occurred in the ICU, with six associated deaths. The main signs/symptoms for all patients were fever, defined as axillary temperature (Tax) 7.8 (9.%), and cough (88.8%) (Figure ). There were 0 (0.8%) patients aged less than two years and 7 (89.%) aged between two and 60 years. Among patients in intensive care (n=7) distribution per age group went downwards from 0 to 9, 0 to 9, and 0 to 9 years of age, with 6.6, 5.9 and,%, respectively. Distribution between males (5.8%) and females (8.%) was uniform (Figure ). ICU Patients developed severe clinical manifestations, with consequent exacerbation of respiratory symptoms, requiring mechanical ventilation, and in some cases, presenting acute renal failure and hemodynamic instability. Among ICU patients (n=7),.% died and 5.9% underwent kidney replacement therapy (Figure ). Among the patients admitted to the HC-UFMG, 6 were checked for Influenza A, subtype HN. For 8 (78%) of those, results remain have unknown, whereas (0.7%) tested positive for Influenza A, subtype HN virus and two (,%) negative. In July 009, the Influenza A HN Clinic was inaugurated as an annex to the HC-UFMG and allowed suspect cases to be screened, reducing the number of hospitalized patients. Opening the Influenza A HN Clinic also contributed to the decrease spontaneous demand and patient agglomeration in the Emergency Care (EC) sector of the HC-UFMG. Later, with the increased incidence of the disease among pregnant women, a specific flow for screening this group of patients was created. 5 Rev Med Minas Gerais 0; (): 5-56

00 90 80 9, 88,8 70 60 59,6 Percentage 50 0 0 0 0,8,6, 7, 0,8 8,7 6,5 5, 0 Fever Coughing Dyspnea Myalgia Coryza Headache Sore throat Shivers Diarrhea Arthralgia Conjunctivitis Symptoms and symptoms Figure - Frequency of signs and symptoms in patients treated at the HC-UFMG, with suspected or confirmed influenza A HN infection in 009. 5 5 Female Number of patients Male 0 < 0 0-9 0-9 0-9 0-9 Influenza A HN per age group 0 0 0 50-59 Figure - Distribution of suspected or confirmed cases of Influenza A HN, per gender and age, in the ICU of HC/UFMG in 009. >= 60 Rev Med Minas Gerais 0; (): 5-56 5

Unknown Hemodialysis No Yes 0 5 0 5 0 Number of patients who underwent hemodialysis Figure - Number of patients with suspected or confirmed HN influenza infection, ICU hospitalized who underwent hemodialysis, at HC-UFMG in 009. Notifications for this new (pandemic) human influenza subtype were submitted after medical care and collection of materials for diagnosis. Due to the high number of swab and tracheal aspirate samples taken, much above the processing capacity of the Central Public Health Laboratories (LACENs), the amount of positive cases treated at the HC-UFMG remains undefined. In 00 a vaccination program was implemented as part of the strategies adopted by the Ministry of Health for containing and combating the new 009 Influenza HN pandemic. The vaccine, produced from weakened strains of the virus, had been used in countries in the northern hemisphere in the latter half of 009. In Brazil, mass vaccination began in March 00, in the following order of priority: pregnant women, the elderly, children under the age of two, individuals aged 0 to 9, and those aged 0 to 9 years. In the HC-UFMG, during the months of March to April, the Specialized Service in Safety Engineering and Occupational Medicine (SESMT-HC) sponsored a vaccination campaign for staff, vaccinating,00 (7%) professionals, with no record of severe adverse reactions. 7,8 CONCLUSION Establishing a flow for patient care and collecting biological specimens for workup and treatment of infectious diseases in health care institutions were crucial for tailoring strategies to address suspected/ confirmed cases of this particular disease, whose mode transmission was at first little known. The experience of the HC-UFMG with the pandemic HN virus may be repeated for other diseases with unknown modes transmission that may appear in the near future. 5 Rev Med Minas Gerais 0; (): 5-56

Suspected/sick patient at Airport; other location SES-MG is communicated by phone Report to HC: ER Emergency Coordinator (PA) Report to Infrastructure (day) or on-call Adm if at night, weekend, holiday If child, warn Pediatrics. Parents sign Commitment Term Warn physician; nurse hospitalization sector Report to: Access Gate Control, Sectors: Nursing Head, Hospital Infection Control Commission, Hospitalization Sector Open Abrir Access a Portaria Gate e and interditar interdict elevador patient de elevator paciente Warn Sanitation Sector for immediate cleaning/disinfection Elevator interdicted immediately after use by the administration on-duty Receive patient at Access Gate (duly PPE-dressed) Pharmacy (Oseltamivir ) DNS (Diet and Nutrition Service) QUARANTINE (Air and Contact) "Waiting room" Medical and hospital props Urgency Lab (collection): Takes fetches identified material Assistant Physician fulfill Notification Form Authorization for Hospitalization Laundry Infected Area Incineration Nurse collect material Figure - Flowchart of initial approach to patients suspected or diagnosed with infection by the virus Influenza A - HN forwarded to the HC/UFMG. Source: Influenza A HN Commission. NEPI / HC-UFMG. 0/05/09. Rev Med Minas Gerais 0; (): 5-56 55

Patient is discharged from hospital Tested negative: usual exit Patient follows to the elevator which use had been interrupted, to leave Tested positive/ongoing*: report to SAMU/SES and Infrastructure Adults must leave wearing N95 mask, accompanied by a nursing professional (duly protected). Children must leave accompanied by either parent, plus lift attendant duly protected The elevator taking the patient must be submitted to cleaning/disinfection and disposal of materials Patient enters in a SAMU ambulance, intended for him, with professionals protected Ambulance follows to patient's house, where he will be left, for counseling and monitoring of the Homecare Therapy Service (HTS) Patent monitored by the HTS SAMU Ambulance follows for cleaning/disinfection in location appointed by SES HTS discharge * Release following socioeconomic and cultural criteria Figure 5 - Flowchart of conduct in patients suspected or diagnosed for Influenza A - HN hospital discharge at HC/UFMG. Source: Influenza A HN Commission. NEPI / HC-UFMG. 0/05/09. REFERENCES. Minas Gerais. Secretaria de Estado da Saúde de Minas Gerais, Plano Estadual de enfrentamento da ameaça da Influenza A (HN). Belo Horizonte: SES-MG; 009.. World Health Organization. Infection prevention and control during health care for confirmed, probable, or suspected cases of pandemic (HN) 009 virus infection and influenza-like illnesses. Geneve: WHO; dec. 009.. Hajjar LA, Schout D, Galas FRBG, et al. Guidelines on management of human infection with the novel virus influenza A (HN) a report from the Hospital das Clínicas of the University of São Paulo. Clinics. 009; 6:05-. 5. Brasil. Ministério da Saúde. Secretaria de Vigilância em Saúde. Gabinete Permanente de Emergência de Saúde Pública. Protocolo de manejo clínico e vigilância epidemiológica da Influenza. versão III. Brasilia: MS; ago. 009. 6. Brasil. Ministério da Saúde. ANVISA. Resolução da Diretoria Colegiada RDC n 06/00. Brasilia: MS; dez. 00. 7. Brasil. Ministério da Saúde, Secretaria de Vigilância em Saúde, Programa Nacional de Imunizações. Estratégia Nacional de vacinação contra o vírus Influenza A (HN), Brasilia: MS; fev. 00. 8. Minas Gerais. Secretaria do Estado de Saúde. Nota técnica n 05/00 DEVEP/SES/MS. Estratégia de Vacinação contra o vírus de influenza A (HN) 009 Pandêmico e sazonal. Belo Horizonte: SES/MG; fev. 00.. Brasil. Ministério da Saúde. Secretaria de Vigilância em Saúde. Informe técnico de Influenza. Ed n 0, jan. 0. 56 Rev Med Minas Gerais 0; (): 5-56