Fresh Start for a Stale Policy: Can Obama Break the Stalemate in U.S.-Cuban Relations?

Fresh Start for a Stale Policy: Can Obama Break the Stalemate in U.S.-Cuban Relations? by William M. LeoGrande School of Public Affairs American University Washington, DC 20016 wleogrande@american.edu Paper prepared for presentation at the conference, "Proyecciones, tendencias y perspectivas de las relaciones Cuba - Estados Unidos en el contexto del mandato Presidencial 2013-2017,"17-18 de Diciembre de 2012, La Habana, Cuba.

Fresh Start for a Stale Policy: Can Obama Break the Stalemate in U.S.-Cuban Relations? by William M. LeoGrande American University After a long, nasty campaign in which the candidates and assorted super PACs spent upwards of $6 billion, voters re-elected President Barack Obama, increased the Democrats' control in the Senate by two seats, and left Republicans in control of the House, albeit by a smaller majority. Thus the balance of power in Washington was not much changed by the 2012 election. It was logical to conclude, therefore, that U.S. policy toward Latin America, and Cuba in particular, might not change dramatically in the second Obama administration. Four years earlier, President Obama took office promising a "new beginning" in U.S. relations with Cuba. During the 2008 campaign, he acknowledged that 50 years of the policy of hostility had failed, and argued that it was time to try something new. During his first term, he expanded people-to-people programs significantly, not just reversing the restrictions placed on them by President George W. Bush in 2003 and 2004, but going beyond what President Bill Clinton had put in place in 1998-1999. Obama lifted virtually all restrictions on Cuban-American travel and remittances in 2009, and then expanded educational travel in 2011, restoring the broad people-to-people category that Bush had abolished. 1 But the Obama administration made very little headway in expanding government-togovernment ties with Cuba. It resumed the semi-annual immigration consultations Bush had suspended, but then suspended them again in January 2011. Initial talks on counter-narcotics cooperation, joint medical assistance to Haiti, and Coast Guard search and rescue seemed to offer some promise of progress, but they stalled before reaching any new agreements. Only talks on cooperation to mitigate oil spills in the Caribbean made any real progress, and even then Washington insisted on conducting them multilaterally rather than bilaterally. The proximate cause of the failure to move bilateral relations ahead was the arrest of USAID subcontractor Alan Gross in December 2009. But there were deeper causes for the loss of momentum in Obama's new Cuba policy. One was the low priority given to it in the face of the

2 multiple foreign policy problems facing the president wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, nuclear proliferation in Iran and North Korea, revolutions sweeping North Africa. Even in Latin America, the administration faced more pressing problems the coup in Honduras, drug war in Mexico, and earthquake in Haiti. Another reason for the lose of momentum was the political resistance the president faced in Congress, not just from Florida Republicans like Ileana Ros- Lehtinen and Mario Diaz-Balart, but from powerful Democrats like Senator Robert Menendez (NJ) and Congresswoman Debbie Wasserman Schultz (Fla.). Nor was Obama willing to make the dramatic change in policy direction that his campaign promises seemed to portend. He continued funding the "democracy promotion" programs Bush had funded lavishly, including one to create an independent, satellite-based digital network in Cuba, outside the government's control the project that got Alan Gross arrested. More fundamentally, Obama adopted the basic outlook of every U.S. president since George H. W. Bush that Cuba would have to change its political and economic system before the United States would change its policy in any fundamental way. Consequently, for the last three years, U.S. policy has been essentially frozen as regards state-to-state relations. Has anything changed that would lead us to expect that U.S. policy will be any different in the next four years? The Presidential Campaign Cuba has been an issue in U.S. elections with surprising frequency certainly more often than any other Latin American country. In 1960, John F. Kennedy pilloried Vice-President Richard Nixon, blaming the Eisenhower administration for having lost Cuba. In the 1962 midterm campaign, Republicans turned the tables, attacking Kennedy for allowing a Soviet military buildup on the island, only to have Kennedy trump their argument in October by ending the Missile Crisis with the withdrawal of Soviet missiles. In 1976, challenging President Gerald Ford for the Republican nomination, Ronald Reagan criticized Ford for not doing more to keep Cuban troops from intervening in Angola. Four years later, Reagan blasted President Jimmy Carter for failing to force the Soviets to withdraw their so-called "combat brigade" from Cuba and for his

inability to halt the Mariel refugee crisis. "Carter couldn't get the Russians to move out of Cuba," Reagan quipped, "so he's moving out the Cubans." 2 In the 1992 campaign, Bill Clinton tried to outflank President George H. W. Bush on the right by endorsing the Cuban Democracy Act (know as the Torricelli bill, for sponsor Congressman Robert Torricelli, D-NJ), which Bush had opposed because its extraterritorial provisions would inflame U.S. relations with Latin American and European allies. Clinton's endorsement of the law forced Bush to flip-flop and sign the bill into law. Four years later, Clinton signed the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act (Helms-Burton), surrendering to Congress presidential authority over policy toward Cuba, but strengthening Clinton's prospects among Cuban-American voters in the upcoming election. In 2000, however, the Clinton administration's decision to return six year old Elián González to his father in Cuba doomed Vice-President Al Gore's chances of a decent showing among Cuban-American voters in Florida. He lost the state and the election to George W. Bush by 537 votes. Four years later, Bush himself was the target of criticism from those same voters for not doing enough to keep his pledge to bring about regime change on the island, leading him to tighten regulations limiting travel and family remittances. Foreign policy played a minor role in the 2012 presidential campaign, however, and Cuba was nearly invisible. Even during the presidential debate devoted to foreign policy, held in Florida, there was not a single question about Cuba and neither candidate mentioned the island. Nevertheless, the Romney campaign tried to rally its Cuban-American base in Florida by 3 accusing Obama of "appeasement" for his policies on travel and remittances. "If I'm fortunate enough to become the next president, it is my expectation that Fidel Castro will finally be taken off this planet," Romney told Cuban-American civic leaders at a political rally in Miami. "We have to be prepared, in the next president's first or second term, it is time to strike for freedom in 4 Cuba." Just days before the election, the Romney campaign ran a controversial television spot in Spanish featuring Mariela Castro, Cuban President Raúl Castro's daughter, and Venezuelan 5 President Hugo Chávez, saying they would vote for Obama. As a result of Cuba's absence as a campaign issue, Obama begins his second term unconstrained by any campaign promises. 3

The 2012 Election Perhaps the most surprising result of the election was that, despite Romney's efforts to appeal to the community's traditional anti-communism, Obama won almost half the Cuban- American vote in Florida. Two statewide exit polls showed Obama winning the Cuban-American vote, 49% to Romney's 47% (Edison Research National Election Pool), or losing it narrowly, 48% to Romney's 52% (Bendixen & Amandi International). No Democrat had ever done so well among this solidly Republican constituency. * Conventional wisdom among Democratic political operatives had been that a presidential 6 candidate needs to win 30% of the Cuban-American vote to carry Florida. The only Democrats since 1980 to meet that threshold and carry the state were Bill Clinton in 1996 (35% of the Cuban-American vote) and Barack Obama in 2008 (35%). Clinton was the first Democrat to actively campaign for the Cuban-American vote, beginning in 1992 with his endorsement of the Cuban Democracy Act. Although Clinton carried just 22% of the Cuban-American vote in 1992, 4 * The polling results were not uncontested. The conservative anti-castro lobbying group, U.S.-Cuba Democracy PAC, attacked Bendixen as "infamously known for the inaccuracy of his polls," and "once again peddling inaccurate exit polling data about Cuban-American voting trends." ("Bendixen Peddles Exit Poll Fiction (Again)," Capitol Hill Cubans, November 8, 2012, http://www.capitolhillcubans.com). It did not comment on the poll by Edison Research, which since 2003 has done the exit polling for the National Election Pool used by all the major television networks. Professors Dario Moreno and Kevin Hill conducted a statistical analysis of the vote in the most heavily Cuban-American precincts in Miami-Dade county. They estimated the Romney vote at somewhere between 55% and 59%, and then generalized that finding state-wide. The Bendixen poll found that in Miami-Dade, Romney won the Cuban-American vote, 56%-44%, a result consistent with Moreno and Hill, but lost to Obama 59% to 41% among Cuban-Americans elsewhere in the state, who represent about 25% of the Cuban-American electorate. (Juan O. Tamayo, "Did Obama or Romney Win the Cuban-American Vote?" Miami Herald, November 12, 2012; Sergio Bendixen, Comment on Brian E. Crowley, "Little Havana Turns Blue (Or Maybe Not)," Columbia Journalism Review online, November 14, 2012).

that was a better showing than any Democrat since Jimmy Carter (Table 1). Clinton's success in 1996, after signing the Helms-Burton legislation tightening the embargo, convinced Democrats that a tough policy toward Cuba was the right electoral strategy to win enough Cuban-American votes to carry Florida. If a Democratic candidate was just as bellicose as his Republican opponent, a significant number of Cuban-Americans would decide their vote based on other issues issues on which their policy preferences tended to be closer to those of other Latinos, and to Democrats. In 2008, Hillary Clinton and John McCain followed the tried and true path of lambasting Cuba to appeal to conservative Cuban-American voters, but Obama adopted an alternative strategy. He sought to cut into the Republicans' traditional electoral advantage by winning over moderates-- a growing segment of the community according to opinion polls. He promised to end restrictions on remittances and family travel for Cuban Americans, resume "people-to-people" educational and cultural exchanges, and engage Cuba in bilateral talks on issues of mutual interest. Engagement, he argued, offered the best hope for promoting "a democratic opening in 7 Cuba." Advocating engagement proved to be a winning strategy. By carrying Florida in 2008 with 35% of the Cuban-American vote, Obama proved that a Democrat could take a moderate stance on Cuba and still make inroads with this solidly Republican constituency. His even stronger showing in 2012 proved that the 2008 result was not just an anomaly. Having defied conventional wisdom that only a "get tough on Cuba" platform would sell in south Florida, Obama changed the domestic political dynamics of the issue, making new thinking about Cuba politically feasible. But was Obama's success a harbinger of structural realignment in the Cuban-American community or merely a conjunctural product of Romney's flawed candidacy? The Republican ticket had its shortcomings. In 2007, candidate Romney famously ended a speech to stunned Cuban-Americans with Fidel Castro's signature closing, "Patria o muerte! Venceremos!" 8 (Homeland or death! We shall overcome!). Vice presidential candidate Paul Ryan had a record of repeatedly voting in the House of Representatives to end the embargo against Cuba (on the libertarian grounds that the government should not impede free trade). "That did their ticket a lot 5

Table 1: Cuban American Presidential Election Vote in Florida, 1980 2012 Statewide Miami Dade Exit polls (%) Precincts (%) 1980 Reagan 80 Carter 20 90 1984 80 Reagan 88 70 Mondale 12 60 1988 50 Bush 85 85 40 Dukakis 15 15 30 1992 20 Bush 71 70 10 Clinton 22 22 0 Perot 7 8 1996 Dole 65 62 Clinton 35 38 2000 Bush 75 75 Gore 25 25 100 2004 80 Bush 71 69 Kerry 29 31 60 2008 McCain 65 64 Obama 35 36 2012 Romney 52 58 Obama 48 42 tage percent percen ntage 40 20 0 Republican and Democratic Shares of the Presidential Vote by Cuban Americans in Florida, 1988 2012 (exit polls) 1988 1992 1996 2000 2004 2008 2012 Republican and Democratic Shares of the Presidential Vote by Cuban Americans in Florida, 1980 2012 (precinct analysis) 1980 1984 1988 1992 1996 2000 2004 2008 2012 R D R D Sources: Polls: 1988, 2000 2012, Bendixen and Amandi International, Exit Poll of Hispanic Voters in Florida, November 8, 2012 1992, Schroth quoted in "Dole Can't Count on Cuban American Vote," Ocala Star Banner, October 13, 1996 1996, Ana Maria Merico Stephens and John P. Schmal, "Voting" in Encyclopedia Latina: History, Culture, And Society In The United States, ed. Ilan Stavans and Harold Augenbraum, Vol 2, pp. 270 276. Precincts: 1980 2004, Dario Moreno, Maria Ilcheva, and Juan Carlos Flores, "The Hispanic Vote in Florida," in Beyond the Barrio: Latinos in the 2004 Election, ed. Rodolfo O. de la Garza, Luois DeSipio, and David L. Leal, pp. 251 270. 2008, Moreno quoted in Juan O. Tamayo, "Did Obama or Romney Win the Cuban American Vote?" Miami Herald, 12, 2012. 2012, Moreno quoted in Mary Ellen Klas, "Who Really Won Florida's Cuban Vote?" Naked Politics Blog, Miami Herald, November 13, 1012.

of harm with Cubans, and allowed us to at least get a hearing with them about many other 9 economic issues," an Obama campaign official said. Moreover, the Republican Party's anti-immigrant posture, which hurt it with Latino voters nationwide, hurt it with Cuban-American voters as well. The state's most prominent national Republican elected officials Senator Marco Rubio, and Representatives Ileana Ros-Lehtinen and Mario Diaz-Balart, all distanced themselves from their Party's hardline on immigration 10 reform. In 1996, when Bill Clinton won 35% of the Cuban-American vote against Bob Dole, the Republican Party was also hurt by its anti-immigration policy. That year, the Republican Platform supported making English the official language, advocated cutting off welfare for non- 11 citizens, and deny citizenship to the U.S.-born children of illegal aliens. Yet despite these problems, there was growing evidence that Obama's gains might represent more than just Romney's weakness. Polling by Florida International University since 1991 has chronicled gradual changes in the Cuban-American community in south Florida, both demographically and attitudinally changes that, as they begin to manifest themselves in voting behavior, do not bode well for the Republican Party. 6 The Cuban-American Electorate When FIU began polling Cuban-Americans south Florida in 1991, 87% favored continuation of the U.S. embargo. By 2011, support had fallen to 56%. In 1993, 75% of respondents opposed the sale of food to Cuba and 50% opposed the sale of medicine. By 2011, solid majorities (65% and 75% respectively) supported both. In 1991, 55% opposed unrestricted travel to Cuba, whereas in 2011, 57% supported unrestricted travel for all Americans and 66% supported unrestricted travel for Cuban-Americans (Table 2). These changes in Cuban-American opinion were clearly linked to demographic changes in the community. Exiles who arrived in the United States in the 1960s and 1970s came as political refugees, motivated principally by their opposition to the socialist course of the revolution. Those who arrived in the Mariel exodus in 1980 and afterwards were more likely to have left for economic reasons. Recent arrivals, especially those who arrived in the post-cold war era, were far more likely to have maintained ties with family on the island. A 2007 poll of

Table 2: Florida International University Cuba Polls, 1991 2011 US EMBARGO WORKS? Overall, do you think the U.S. embargo of Cuba has worked very well, well, not very well, or not March 1991 Oct 1991 June 1993 March 1995 June 1997 Oct 2000 March 2004 March 2007 Dec 2008 Sept 2011 Very Well 7% 8% 9% 9% 9% 7% Well 17% 17% 17% 14% 12% 12% Not Very Well 42% 33% 28% 31% 23% 27% Not at All 33% 41% 46% 45% 56% 57% CONTINUING THE EMBARGO? Do you favor or oppose continuing the U.S. embargo of Cuba? March 1991 Oct 1991 June 1993 March 1995 June 1997 Oct 2000 March 2004 March 2007 Dec 2008 Sept 2011 Strongly Favor 74% 78% 73% 74% 78% 62% 66% 58% 45% 56% Mostly Favor 13% 9% 12% 9% Mostly Oppose 6% 5% 6% 5% 22% 38% 34% 43% 55% 44% Strongly Oppose 8% 7% 10% 11% Not with Fidel/Raul 0% 1% 0% 1% Favor 87% 87% 85% 83% 78% 62% 66% 58% 45% 56% Oppose 13% 13% 15% 17% 22% 38% 34% 43% 55% 44% Allowing companies to sell medicine to Cuba. Do you strongly favor, mostly favor, mostly ALLOW MEDICINE SALES TO CUBA? oppose, or strongly oppose this? March 1991 Oct 1991 June 1993 March 1995 June 1997 Oct 2000 March 2004 March 2007 Dec 2008 Sept 2011 Strongly Favor 31% 36% 29% 44% 50% 56% 48% Mostly Favor 19% 25% 27% 22% 19% 16% 27% Mostly Oppose 8% 8% 12% 7% 6% 7% 9% Strongly Oppose 33% 26% 33% 27% 25% 21% 16% Not with Fidel/Raul 9% 5% Favor 50% 62% 56% 66% 70% 72% 75% Oppose 50% 38% 45% 34% 31% 28% 25% Allowing U.S. companies to sell food to Cuba. Do you strongly favor, mostly favor, mostly ALLOW FOOD SALES TO CUBA? oppose, or strongly oppose this? March 1991 Oct 1991 June 1993 March 1995 June 1997 Oct 2000 March 2004 March 2007 Dec 2008 Sept 2011 Strongly Favor 15% 17% 21% 38% 39% 49% 42% Mostly Favor 8% 11% 19% 18% 16% 13% 23% Mostly Oppose 10% 12% 17% 9% 10% 11% 11% Strongly Oppose 55% 53% 43% 35% 35% 27% 24% Not with Fidel/Raul 12% 7% Favor 23% 28% 40% 56% 55% 62% 65% Oppose 77% 72% 60% 44% 45% 38% 35%

ALLOW UNRESTRICTED TRAVEL? Should unrestricted travel from the US to Cuba be allowed or not? Would you favor or oppose ending current restrictions on travel to Cuba for all Americans? (2008) March 1991 Oct 1991 June 1993 March 1995 Oct 2000 March 2004 March 2007 Dec 2008 Sept 2011 Strongly Favor 31% 34% 23% 22% 53% 46% 55% 67% 57% Mostly Favor 14% 16% 18% 15% Mostly Oppose 6% 5% 5% 9% 47% 54% 45% 33% 43% Strongly Oppose 41% 34% 46% 49% Not with Fidel/Raul 8% 11% 9% 5% Favor 45% 50% 40% 37% 53% 46% 55% 67% 57% Oppose 55% 50% 60% 63% 47% 54% 45% 33% 43% Source: Cuban Research Institute, Florida International University, Cuba Polls, 1991-2011, <cri.fiu.edu/research/cuba-poll/> Favor 80% 60% 40% 20% 0% Cuban American Attitudes on Commerce with Cuba, 1991 2011 Sell medicine Sell food End embargo Favor 80% 70% 60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 0% Cuban American Attitudes on Travel to Cuba, 1991 2011 Unrestricted

Cuban-Americans in south Florida found that 58.3% were sending remittances to Cuba, but fewer than half of those who arrived before 1985 were sending money, whereas three quarters of 12 more recent arrivals were. The differences in age and experience among different waves of migrants produced sharply different opinions about relations with the island, with more recent arrivals being far more likely to favor policies that reduce bilateral tensions and barriers to family linkages, especially the ability to travel and send remittances (Table 3). Although these attitudinal differences have been clear for some time, they have not manifested themselves in Cuban-American voting behavior, principally because a far higher proportion of the early arrivals have obtained U.S. citizenship (Table 4), and thus still comprise a larger share of the Cuban-American electorate than more recent arrivals (although by 2010, Cuban-Americans born in the United States were a larger voting bloc, comprising almost half the Cuban-American electorate) (Tables 5 and 6). In addition, earlier arrivals are far more likely to be registered to vote than more recent arrivals. Registration rates for those who arrived before 1985 are over 90%, whereas for post-cold war arrivals who are citizens, the rate is only 60%. 13 But, of course, the early wave of exiles is becoming a smaller and smaller proportion of the community as new immigrants arrive every year and as natural mortality takes its toll on the aging exiles. And with the passage of time, more and more of the post-1980 immigrants obtain citizenship and begin to vote. In addition to generational differences, an important reason for the gradual change in Cuban-American opinion has been the deepening ties between Cuban-Americans and their families on the island. During the 1960s and early 1970s, it was difficult if not impossible for families to maintain contact across the Florida Strait. Travel to Cuba was prohibited by the U.S. embargo, and the Cuban government would not allow "gusanos" to return to visit. Direct mail service was cut off, and telephone connections were notorious poor. Moreover, the prevailing opinion in both communities was one of hostility. To Cubans who left, those who stayed behind 14 were communists. To Cubans who stayed behind, those who left were traitors. The first cracks in this "sugarcane curtain" opened when President Carter legalized family remittances and travel to Cuba. The Cuban government, in its 1978 dialogue with representatives of the Cuban-American community, agreed to allow exiles to return for brief family visits. In the 7

Table 3: Cuban-American Opinion in 2007, by Year of Arrival 1959-1964 1965-1973 1974-1984 1985-1994 1995-2007 US born All Continue the embargo? Favor 78% 79% 68% 48% 41% 54% 58% Oppose 22% 21% 32% 52% 59% 47% 43% Sale of Food? Favor 37 46 56 62 78 69 62 Oppose 63 54 44 38 22 31 38 Sale of Medicine? Favor 59 63 69 69 85 68 72 Oppose 41 37 31 31 15 32 28 Unrestricted travel? Favor 23 33 34 67 80 57 55 Oppose 77 67 66 33 20 43 45 Establish diplomatic relations? Favor 30 39 47 61 73 70 57 Oppose 70 61 53 39 27 30 43 Do you send money to relatives? Yes 31 45 51 76 77 47 58 No 69 53 49 23 22 51 41 Refused to answer 2 1 1 2 1 Source: Cuban Research Institute, Florida International University, 2007 Cuba Poll, <cri.fiu.edu/research/cuba-poll/> (The 2007 poll has the most detailed breakdown by years of arrival and results in the 2011 poll are comparable)

Table 4: Naturalization of Cuban Americans in Florida, 2010, by Year of Arrival Year of Entry Naturalized Unnaturalized Before 1980 248,342 90.5% 25,959 9.5% 1980 1989 77,349 66.2% 39,542 33.8% 1990 1999 75,087 43.2% 98,571 56.8% 2000 or later lt 23,677 12.0% 173,346346 88.0% Source: U.S. Census American Community Survey, 2010. 100% Cuban American Naturalization in Florida, 2010, by Year of Arrival 80% 60% 40% Unnaturalized Naturalized 20% 0% Before 1980 1980 1989 1990 1999 2000 or later

Table 5: Cuban Americans in Florida, by Year of Arrival Year of Entry 1980 Census 2000 Census 2010 ACS Entered before 1980 366,057 81.1% 317,842 37.6% 274,301 23.8% Entered 1980 to 1989 135,183 16.0% 116,891 10.1% Entered 1990 to 1999 181,256 21.4% 173,658 15.1% Entered d2000 or later lt 197,023 17.1% 1% US born 85,246 18.9% 211,799 25.0% 391,633 34.0% Total 451,303 100.0% 846,080 100.0% 1,153,506 100.0% 1980 Census includes 1980 entries 2000 Census includes thru March 2000 in 1999 entries 1990 Census does not provide data on year of entry Sources: U.S. Decennial Census, Florida, 1980 and 2000; U.S. Census American Community Survey, 2010. 100% Cuban Americans in Florida, by Year of Arrival 90% 80% 70% 60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 2000 or later 1990 99 1980 89 Before 1980 US born 10% 0% 1980 2000 2010

Table 6: Cuban American Citizens in Florida by Year of Arrival, 1980 2010 1980 Census 2000 Census 2010 ACS Number Percent Number Percent Number Percent Cuban origin citizens 239,938 100.0% 582,925 100.0% 816,088 100.0% Naturalized Entered before 1980: 154,692 64.5% 279,066 47.9% 248,342 30.4% Entered 1980 to 1989: 68,324 11.7% 77,349 9.5% Entered 1990 to 1999: 23,736 4.1% 75,087 9.2% Entered 2000 or later: 23,677 2.9% Native 85,246 35.5% 211,799 36.3% 391,633 48.0% 1980 Census includes 1980 entries 2000 Census includes thru March 2000 in 1999 entries 1990 Census does not provide data on year of entry Sources: U.S. Decennial Census, Florida, 1980 and 2000; U.S. Census American Community Survey, 2010. 100% Cuban American Citizens i in Florida, by Year of Arrival 90% 80% 70% 60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 2000 or later 1990 99 1980 89 Before 1980 US born 10% 0% 1980 2000 2010

first year, over a hundred thousand visited, bringing lavish gifts at a time of economic austerity on the island, and sparking the 1980 Mariel refuge crisis. After that, the Cuban government put strict limits on the number of visitors allowed annually, and Ronald Reagan imposed tighter restrictions on remittances. 15 The end of the cold war opened new opportunities for the two communities to re-connect. The collapse of European communism plunged Cuba into deep economic crisis. The loss of Soviet economic assistance-- between three and four billion dollars a year meant shortages of key raw materials like fuel and fertilizer, causing huge production losses in both manufacturing 16 and agriculture. From 1989 to 1993, Cuba s GDP fell by at least 35%. Consumer goods of all types became extremely scarce, unemployment rose, and the standard of living contracted abruptly. Food shortages appeared, because the government could no longer afford to import it. The suffering endured by ordinary Cubans during this crisis prompted a significant humanitarian response in the United States. The 1992 Cuban Democracy Act legalized private humanitarian assistance of food and medical supplies, prompting a number of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to launch relief projects. From 1992 to 1998, the Treasury Department 17 granted licenses for $2.9 billion in humanitarian assistance. Despite their undiminished hatred of Fidel Castro, Cuban-Americans were moved by the plight of their brethren, and responded by increasing the flow of both in-kind assistance and cash remittances. Cuban-Americans had been sending such aid ever since 1978. The growth of cash and in-kind assistance slowed during the 1980s, however,when the two governments reimposed travel restrictions. Until 1993, it was illegal for Cubans to hold U.S. currency, so dollars could only be used on the black market. Nevertheless, by 1990, rough estimates of the cash remittances being sent to Cuba totaled about $150-200 million annually. 18 As the standard of living in Cuba plunged in the early 1990s, access to dollars became a critical determinant of people s quality of life. A few dollars equaled a month s wages in pesos, and many basic consumer goods were available only in dollar stores. Remittances began to climb. Desperate to acquire hard currency, the government legalized the holding of dollars in 1993 so that it could capture part of the remittances stream. By 1995, the estimated value of private cash transfers to Cuba had risen to some $500 million a year (Table 7). 8

Table 7: Remittances to Cuba, 1995 2011 (millions of US$) CEPAL Havana Consulting Grp 1995 537 1996 630 1997 670 1998 690 1999 700 2000 740 987 2001 730 1011 2002 1072 2003 915 1100 2004 1031 2005 1144 2006 1251 2007 1363 2008 1447 2009 1759 1653 2010 2000 1920 2011 2295 Sources: CEPAL, 1995 2001, Comisión Económica para América Latina y el Caribe, Cuba: Evolución económica durante 2001 ; CEPAL 2003, Carmel Mesa Lago, "Social and Economic Problems in Cuba During the Crisis and Subsequent Recovery," CEPAL Review 86, (August 2005):177 200; CEPAL 2009 2010, CEPAL, Economic Survey of Latin America and the Caribbean, 2010 2011. Emilio Morales and Joseph L. Scarpaci, "Opening up on both shorelines helps increase remittances sent to Cuba in 2011 by about 20%," Havana Consulting Group <thehavanaconsultinggroups.com> 2500 Remittances to Cuba, 1995 2011 2000 Millions $US 1500 1000 500 CEPAL Havana Consulting 0 1995 95 1996 96 1997 97 1998 98 1999 2000 2001 01 2002 02 2003 03 2004 04 2005 05 2006 06 2007 07 2008 08 2009 09 2010 2011

In 1994, to punish Cuba for the balsero migration crisis, President Clinton cut off cash remittances and ended most charter flights, making family visits more difficult. Such measures were not universally supported among Cuban-Americans, many of whom were more immediately 19 concerned with the well-being of their families than with punishing Fidel Castro. In practice, Clinton s effort to limit remittances failed. Family ties between Cubans in the United States and Cubans on the island had become too well established and too important to be so easily severed. Cuban-Americans simply sent funds through third countries or carried them by hand, traveling through Mexico, Jamaica, or the Bahamas. In 1998, after the Pope s visit to Cuba, Clinton lifted the restrictions on remittances, and by the end of the decade, they reached between $800 million and a billion dollars annually. 20 In 2004, President George W. Bush imposed tough new restrictions on Cuban-American travel and remittances, hoping to reduce the stream of hard currency flowing into the island from the Cuban community abroad. Bush cut Cuban-American travel from one trip annually (supplemented by additional trips for family emergencies), to only one trip every three years, with no emergency trips allowed. The new regulations also restricted the support Cuban- Americans could provide to family on the island through remittances and gift packages. The cumulative effect was to cut travel by U.S. residents in half, reduce humanitarian assistance from some $10 million annually to $4 million, and shrink remittances from $1.25 billion to about $1 billion annually. 21 Although hardliners in Miami applauded the tough new sanctions, they were not popular in the broader Cuban community. In 2007, 55% of Cuban-Americans told pollsters they favored unrestricted travel to Cuba. Moreover, 64% wanted to see Bush's 2004 restrictions on travel and 22 remittances lifted, and 41% reported that the restrictions had an impact on them personally. In late 2006, twenty Cuban-American organizations, including the Cuban-American National Foundation, called for Bush to relax restrictions on Cuban-American travel and humanitarian assistance. 23 Since President Obama lifted the Bush-era restrictions in April 2009, Cuban-Americans have been able to travel to visit family under a general license and send unlimited remittances. 24 9

10 As a result, family visits increased from fewer than 50,000 in 2004 to almost 400,000 in 2011. Remittances jumped from an estimated $1.4 billion in 2008 to $2.3 billion in 2011 (Table 7). 25 When Cuban-Americans in south Florida were polled in 2011 about Mario Diaz-Balart's proposed legislation to rollback Obama's policy, thereby curtailing travel and remittances once again, opposition was overwhelming: 61% of all respondents were opposed, and 76% of those who arrived in the United States after 1994. 26 The 113th Congress Congress has held a central role in U.S. policy toward Cuba ever since it codified the U.S. embargo into law in the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996 (Helms-Burton). To move beyond limited improvements in relations on issues of mutual interest or limited commercial activity that is, to move toward the full normalization of diplomatic and economic relations the president would have to win congressional approval to change the law. In 2000, the Congress passed the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act of 2000, which legalized the sale of food products to Cuba, albeit on a cash-only basis, but at the same time prohibited tourist travel by U.S. residents. For the next four years, the bipartisan Cuba Working Group in the House of Representatives worked to end all prohibitions on travel to Cuba. In 2001, Jeff Flake (R-Ariz.), the founder along with Bill Delahunt (D-Mass.) of the Cuba Working Group, introduced an amendment to the Treasury appropriation bill prohibiting enforcement of the travel ban. The House approved it in July by a wide margin (240-186), but it was dropped in conference committee by the Republican House leadership in response to Bush s 27 veto threat. For the next three years, this scenario was replayed annually. The House (and the Senate in 2003 and 2004) voted to end enforcement of the travel ban, but congressional Republicans conspired with the White House to prevent it from becoming law by repeatedly dropping the provision from the final bill. People are wrong to underestimate what it means to 28 have President Bush on our side, Lincoln Diaz-Balart (R-Fla) said with satisfaction. By 2005, a sense of futility had eroded the Cuba Working Group. Aided by campaign contributions to key members of the House from the new pro-embargo U.S.-Cuba Democracy PAC, Republicans

were able to defeat amendments easing restrictions on travel to Cuba and block consideration of 29 others in 2005 and 2006. With President Obama promising a new policy of engagement toward Cuba and having lifted travel restrictions on Cuban Americans in 2009, freedom-to-travel advocates launched a new congressional campaign to lift the travel ban. With large Democratic majorities in both the House and Senate, hopes ran high for success. Over 170 cosponsors quickly signed on in the House. A broad coalition of some 130 business groups and foreign policy NGOs formed behind the campaign, including the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, American Farm Bureau Federation, National Farmers Union, American Society of Travel Agents, Amnesty International, the American Civil Liberties Union, and the U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops. The travel web site Orbitz collected over 100,000 signatures on a petition to lift the travel ban. As a measure of its commitment, the Chamber of Commerce warned legislators that their vote on Cuba would be scored as a key business vote included in the Chamber s annual How They Voted scorecard. 30 Public opinion, even among Cuban-Americans, favored the freedom to travel. A 2008 poll in south Florida by Florida International University found that 67% favored ending current travel restrictions for all Americans. A national poll of Cuban-Americans the following year by Bendixen and Associates found the same result, and a 2010 poll by a faculty member at the 31 University of Miami found support at 64%. The general public s view was even more lopsided: 70% favored unrestricted travel to Cuba, and even 62% of Republicans agreed. 32 Opponents blasted the freedom-to-travel coalition as venial for putting dollars ahead of human rights. Senator Robert Menendez (D-NJ), who pledged to filibuster the bill if it ever got to the Senate, denounced businessmen who only care about padding their profits by opening up a 33 new market, even though it meant enriching the Castro regime. Congresswoman Ros Lehtinen attacked proponents of free travel for, seek[ing] to reward the Cuban regime with 34 tourism cash flows as the dictatorship tightens its stranglehold on the Cuban people. The legislative vehicle for opening travel and facilitating agricultural sales was House Resolution (H.R.) 4645, the Travel Restriction Reform and Export Enhancement Act, cosponsored by House Agricultural Committee Chair Collin Peterson (D-Minn) and Jerry Moran 11

(R-Kan.). It cleared the Agricultural Committee on July 1, 2010, by a narrow 25-20 margin, and was referred to the Foreign Affairs Committee. For weeks, Committee Chair Howard Berman (D-Calif.) tried to collect the votes needed to report the bill out to the House floor. In September, still one or two votes short, with Congress drawing to a close for the election campaign, he gave up. The bill died in committee. The principal obstacle faced by supporters of the travel bill was not the opposition of Republicans like Ros-Lehtinen and the Diaz-Balart brothers, but opposition from moderate and conservative Democrats. In the Senate, not only did Menendez promise to block any travel bill, Majority Leader Harry Reid (D-Nev) also opposed unfettered travel, and he controlled the flow of legislation to the Senate floor. In the House, Debbie Wasserman Schultz, a rising star of the party from south Florida, took it upon herself to organize opposition to the travel bill within the Democratic caucus. Wasserman Schultz was in charge of the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee's Red to Blue project in the 2008 election cycle, aimed at unseating Republican incumbents (though not in south Florida, where Wasserman Schultz refused to campaign against her three Republican friends Ros-Lehtinen and the Diaz-Balarts). Many freshman Democrats especially those from relatively conservative districts were in her debt. A vote on Cuba, which was not a salient or popular issue in their constituencies, was a small price to pay to stay in Wasserman Schultz s good graces. When supporters of the travel bill first rolled it out with 178 cosponsors, Wasserman Schultz recruited 53 House Democrats to write a letter to Speaker Nancy Pelosi declaring their determination to vote against it a formidable number that foreshadowed a nasty battle inside the Democratic caucus if the bill went to the House floor, and 35 put final passage in doubt. In 2011, President Obama selected Wasserman Schultz to chair the Democratic National Committee. Money played a role as well. The U.S. Cuba Democracy PAC handed out $2.2 million in campaign contributions up through the 2010 election cycle. Conservatives associated with the group gave another $9 million individually or through Lincoln Diaz-Balart s Democracy Believers PAC. Beginning with the 2006 election cycle, these donors directed their money increasingly to Democratic candidates from just 29% in 2004 to 43% in 2006, 59% in 2008, and 36 76% in 2010 (despite the Republicans success in the 2010 mid-terms). The impact was 12

immediately apparent. In 2007, the House voted down (245-182), a proposal by Charlie Rangel (D-NY) to relax restrictions on Cuban purchases of food from the United States. Of the 66 Democrats voting against, 52 had received money from the U.S. Cuba Democracy PAC. The PAC focused special attention on freshmen members, often contributing to their campaigns as 37 challengers. Of the 22 Democratic freshman it funded, 17 voted against Rangel. PAC money also changed votes; seventeen House members who received contributions from the PAC switched from being consistent supporters of measures to relax sanctions on Cuba, to opposing them. Of the 53 Democrats who signed Wasserman Schultz s letter to Nancy Pelosi opposing travel liberalization, 51 were recipients of the U.S.- Cuba Democracy PAC s largesse. 38 The Republicans' sweeping victory in the 2010 mid-term elections put the House back under their control and ended any hope of a progressive initiative on Cuba coming from Congress. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen became chair of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, a post from which she could hold Obama's foreign policy hostage over the issue of Cuba. Mario Diaz- Balart introduced legislation to roll back Obama's 2009 relaxation of restrictions on Cuban- 39 American travel and remittances, but it was dropped when President Obama threatened a veto. Tea Party darling Marco Rubio was elected to the Senate from Florida in 2010, and joined the Foreign Relations Committee. In 2011, he put a hold on Obama's nominee for Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs until the administration promised to tighten regulations on academic and educational travel that Obama had authorized in January. 40 Although the Democrats made significant gains in both the House and Senate in 2012, Republicans retained control of the House and enough votes in the Senate to block any measure by filibuster. Nevertheless, the election produced some important personnel changes that could have a bearing on Cuba policy. In the House, Ros-Lehtinen will step down as chair of the Foreign Affairs Committee because of Republican rules on term limits for chairs. Her likely replacement is Ed Royce (R-Calif), who criticized Obama in 2009 for turning off the electronic billboard on the U.S. Interests Section in Havana, but who has not been especially engaged in the debate over 41 Cuba policy otherwise. Howard Berman (D-Calif), who had been the ranking Democrat on the Committee and a vocal critic of U.S. democracy promotion programs in Cuba, lost his bid for reelection. His successor as ranking member, Eliot Engel (D-NY), was ranking member of the 13

14 Western Hemisphere Subcommittee in the previous Congress. In recent years, Engel has voted consistently against Democrats' attempts to ease restrictions on travel and food sales to Cuba, and the U.S.-Cuba Democracy PAC has been among his top 20 campaign contributors since the 2008 election cycle. In short, although the exact composition of the Foreign Affairs Committee is in flux, it seems clear that conservative Republicans and Democrats together will retain a sufficient majority to block any progressive initiatives on Cuba emerging from the committee. David Rivera (R-Fl.), one of the most extreme anti-cuban voices in the House, was defeated by Joe Garcia, a moderate Cuban-American who defended Obama's Cuba policy. Jeff Flake (R-Ariz), a perennial voice for opening up to Cuba, traded his House seat for one in the Senate. In the Senate, Tea Party favorite Ted Cruz, won a seat from Texas. Although his father came from Cuba in 1957, Cruz did not identify himself as Latino or show any special interest in Latino issues or in Cuba. Democratic gains in the Senate did not produce a filibuster-proof majority, and the determined opposition of Rubio and Menendez will probably be sufficient to prevent any progressive legislation on Cuba from making it through the Senate. Most likely, the next four years will reprise the last two, with conservatives fighting a legislative guerrilla war against Obama's Cuba policy by holding up nominations and threatening to filibuster must-pass legislation in an effort to brow-beat the administration into policy concessions. If there are to be any new initiatives on Cuba, they will have to come from the White House. Despite Helms- Burton's constraints, the president retains substantial executive authority to selectively loosen the embargo for both commerce and travel. 42 The Second Obama Administration Where in the executive branch will control over Cuba policy lie? Political considerations played a major role in Obama's Cuba policy during the first term, albeit not as preeminent a consideration as they were during the Clinton years. In 2009, Obama's new foreign policy team got off to a bad start when they promised Senator Menendez that they would consult him before changing Cuba policy. That was the price he extracted for providing Senate Democrats with the 60 votes needed to break a Republican filibuster on a must-pass omnibus appropriations bill to keep the government operating. For the next four years, administration officials worked more

15 closely with Menendez, who opposed the sort of major redirection of policy Obama had promised, than they did with senators like John Kerry (D-Mass.), chair of the Foreign Relations Committee, whose views were more in line with the president's stated policy goals. At the Department of State, Assistant Secretary Arturo Valenzuela favored initiatives to improve relations with Cuba, but he was stymied by indifference or resistance elsewhere in the bureaucracy. Secretary Hillary Clinton, having staked out a tough position Cuba during the Democratic primary campaign, was not inclined to be the driver for a new policy. At the NSC, Senior Director for the Western Hemisphere Dan Restrepo, who advised Obama on Latin America policy during the 2008 campaign, did his best to avoid the Cuba issue because it was so fraught with political danger. When the president finally approved the resumption of people-to-people travel to Cuba, which Valenzuela had been pushing, the White House political team delayed the announcement for several months at the behest of Debbie Wasserman Schultz. Any easing of the travel regulations, she warned, would hurt Democrats' prospects in the upcoming mid-term elections. 43 The White House shelved the new regulations until January 2011, and then announced them late Friday before a holiday weekend. Then, just a year later, the administration surrendered to Senator Rubio's demand that it limit the licensing of travel providers in exchange for him dropping his hold on the appointment of Valenzuela's replacement. 44 With Obama in his final term and Vice-President Joe Biden unlikely to seek the Democratic nomination in 2016 (unlike the situation Clinton and Gore faced in their second term), politics will presumably play a less central role in deciding Cuba policy over the next four years. There will still be the temptation, however, to sacrifice Cuba policy to mollify congressional conservatives, both Democrat and Republican, who are willing to hold other Obama initiatives hostage to extract concessions on Cuba. And since Obama has given in to such hostage-taking previously, the hostage-takers have a strong incentive to try the same tactic again. The only way to break this cycle would be for the president to stand up to them and refuse to give in, as he did when they attempted to rollback his 2009 relaxation of restrictions on Cuban- American travel and remittances.

16 Much will depend on who makes up Obama's new foreign policy team, especially at the Department of State. John Kerry has been a strong advocate of a more open policy toward Cuba, and worked behind the scenes with the State Department and USAID to clean up the "democracy promotion" program targeting Cuba, as a way to win the release of Alan Gross. A new secretary is likely to bring new assistant secretaries, providing an opportunity to revitalize the Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs, which has been thoroughly cowed by congressional hardliners. But even with new players in place, does Cuba rise to the level of importance that would justify a major new initiative and the bruising battle with conservatives on the Hill? Major policy changes that require a significant expenditure of political capital rarely happen unless the urgency of the problem forces policymakers to take action. Latin America Weighs In Since the end of the cold war, Cuba simply hasn't been very important to U.S. national security or foreign relations. Without its Soviet patron, Cuba poses no threat to the United States, and with just 11 million people, Cuba (unlike China or even Vietnam) doesn't offer much of a market for U.S. exports. Nothing compels a president to re-examine policy toward Cuba, even though that policy has been an abject failure for decades-- which is why relations with Cuba became a domestic political issue driven by the Cuba Lobby, rather than a foreign policy issue. To be sure, Washington has paid some diplomatic price for its inflexibility. At the UN in November 2012, the General Assembly voted to condemn the U.S. embargo, 188 to 3 (with the United States, Israel, and Palau in opposition). That marked the 21st year in a row that the United States has lost this vote by lopsided margins. But over the years, other governments have not been willing to put their bilateral relations with Washington at risk over the issue of Cuba, so the cost to the United States has been symbolic rather than substantive. Just in the past year, however, there have been signs that Latin America's frustration with U.S. Cuba policy may be taking a real toll on U.S. relations with the Hemisphere. When Obama took office, hopes ran high in the region that the new president would finally tackle this anachronistic cold war policy that symbolized a bygone era of U.S. hegemony. Several heads of state foremost among them Brazilian President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva called for ending

45 U.S. sanctions against Cuba, even as they congratulated Obama on his victory. Just days before the Hemisphere s heads of state convened at the Fifth Summit of the Americas in Trinidad and Tobago in April 2009, Obama fulfilled his pledge to lift travel and remittance restrictions on Cuban-Americans. Latin American presidents applauded Obama s actions, but pressed him on the issue regardless, making Cuba a litmus test of Obama s declared desire to forge a new "equal partnership" with the region. One after another they spoke in the plenary session of the need to reintegrate Cuba into the inter-american community. Obama tried to assuage their concerns, reiterating his commitment to engagement. The United States seeks a new beginning with Cuba, he promised, but his pledge was short on specifics. 46 th Two months later, at the 39 General Assembly of the Organization of American States in June, Latin American states moved to repeal the 1962 resolution that suspended Cuba s membership the symbolic cornerstone of Washington s policy of excluding Cuba from the hemispheric community. At first, the Obama administration opposed the repeal, but faced with the prospect of an humiliating defeat, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton agreed to compromise. The United States supported repeal in exchange for language that required Cuba to accept the practices, purposes, and principles of the OAS, including, implicitly, the commitment to democracy embodied in the Santiago Declaration of 1991. 47 When the Sixth Summit of the Americas convened in Cartagena, Colombia, in April 2012, U.S. policy toward Cuba was essentially unchanged from what it had been in 2009. Obama faced a solid phalanx of Latin American presidents no longer willing to passively accept Washington's intransigence. "There is no justification for that path that has us anchored in a Cold War overcome now for several decades," declared Colombian President Juan Manuel Santos, one of Washington's closest allies in the region. "It is the hour to overcome the paralysis produced by 48 ideological stubbornness." Daniel Ortega of Nicaragua and Rafael Correa of Ecuador refused to attend the summit because Cuba was not invited; Santos and Brazilian President Dilma Rousseff both declared that they would skip the next summit if Cuba was excluded again. The Cartagena summit ended inconclusively, with no major agreements and no final communique because the United States and Canada objected to extending an invitation for Cuba to attend the Seventh Summit in 2015. 49 17

Obama was reportedly taken aback by the vehemence of the Latin Americans' objection to Cuba's exclusion. On the eve of the summit, when reporters asked NSC Senior Director for the Western Hemisphere Dan Restrepo about the Cuba issue arising at the meeting, Restrepo replied that the United States and Latin America were fundamentally in agreement that Cuba could not rejoin the hemispheric community until it became a democracy. "Unfortunately, Cuban 50 authorities haven't decided to go down that path." The Cuba issue, he implied, was much ado about nothing. At the summit, even as the Latin American presidents insistently expressed their opposition to U.S. policy, a senior Obama official dismissed their concerns. "We've had disagreements on those issues for decades," the aide said. "They are built into the equation. They 51 are about theater, not substance." The president's aides clearly underestimated the anger building in Latin America over the Cuba issue. The willingness of key U.S. allies like Colombia and Brazil to scuttle the whole summit process suggested that although Cuba may be a symbolic issue, it has nevertheless become a serious threat to U.S. relations with the rest of the hemisphere. Shortly after the summit, Restrepo stepped down and was replaced by Ricardo Zuniga, a career Foreign Service 52 officer with extensive experience working on Cuba. If Obama hopes to repair the deterioration in U.S. relations with Latin America, he will have to direct his new secretary of state to make the region a priority. And the only path forward goes through Havana. 18 Alan Gross Even if the president decided that improving relations with Latin America demanded a new U.S. initiative on Cuba, there remains the problem of Alan Gross. The Obama administration has declared that no progress can be made on state-to-state relations so long as Gross remains imprisoned, and has refused to discuss deeper cooperation even on issues of 53 mutual interest such as counter-narcotics cooperation and immigration. It would be a stark and unlikely reversal of policy for the White House to launch any major new initiative on Cuba until Gross is released. From the time Gross was arrested, the U.S. government's position has been that he did nothing wrong, was imprisoned unjustly, and therefore should be released unconditionally. The

Cuban position has been that by setting up wireless digital networks for select groups of Cubans to connect to the internet by satellite, independently of Cuba's national internet connectionsgross engaged in an illegal effort to bring about regime change in Cuba the stated policy goal of the Helms-Burton legislation authorizing USAID's "democracy promotion" program. In initial discussions, facilitated by congressional intermediaries, Havana indicated that it might free Gross if the USAID program was downsized and revamped to promote authentic people-to-people projects rather than regime change. The Obama administration was unresponsive, however, maintaining the program's funding levels and objectives unchanged from the Bush administration. When it became clear that the USAID program would not be revised, the Cubans began to suggest that Gross be exchanged for the Cuban Five intelligence agents imprisoned in the United States on various charges since the late 1990s. Cuban officials have been careful not to equate the two cases, simply saying that if the United States wanted Gross to be released on humanitarian grounds, it would have to recognize Cuba's humanitarian concerns 54 regarding the Five, and there would need to be some reciprocity. Cuba has repeatedly offered to open a dialogue with the United States about the two cases, but the State Department has remained adamant that there is nothing to discuss; Gross must be released unconditionally. The administration has rejected any equivalency between Gross and the Cuban Five, and hence any exchange. Nevertheless, there may be some room for maneuver. In September 2011, The State Department used former New Mexico Governor Bill Richardson to carry a proposal to Havana. Richardson was given a list of ten things the United States was prepared to do to improve relations if Gross was pardoned. While the list covered a range of issues of interest to Havana, most were framed as possibilities rather than pledges: Washington would review Cuba's inclusion on the State Department's list of state sponsors of terrorism; it would reduce (but not eliminate) USAID's democracy promotion program and "change" it in unspecified ways; it would look at the possibility of allowing U.S. companies to invest in Cuba's telecommunications infrastructure; it would seek to restore Cuba's ownership of the Havana Club trademark, which U.S. courts had awarded to Bacardi; it would seek the extradition of Luis Posada Carriles, wanted in Venezuela and Cuba for terrorist bombings; and it would encourage the Department of 19

20 Justice to allow René González, the one member of the Cuban Five who had completed his prison sentence, to return home rather than forcing him to stay in Florida on parole for three more years. The items on Richardson's list that were promised unequivocally were, for the most part, things the administration had already publicly announced as U.S. policy: restore postal relations; allow U.S. companies to provide spill-mitigation services to Cuba's off-shore oil drilling rigs; and veto Congressional efforts to rollback Obama's policy of allowing unlimited Cuban American family travel. The one new item was a pledge to end the program encouraging Cuban doctors abroad to defect. Richardson was aware of the tenuous nature of the U.S. list. "There was no deal that if Gross is released, we will do these things," he acknowledged. Rather, what Washington was offering was "not a commitment but a process. You give us Alan Gross and we can talk about a number of issues." 55 Richardson's trip failed because he could not commit the Obama administration to any specific actions, but the willingness of the administration to offer a preliminary agenda for discussions and a broad one, at that was positive. On their side, the Cubans have never been willing to specify precisely what they want in exchange for the release of Alan Gross, despite both official and unofficial inquiries. That, too, may be a positive indicator, because it suggests that the Cuban position is flexible. The only way Alan Gross is likely to be released before serving his full sentence is through some sort of dialogue between the U.S. and Cuban governments. That dialogue will have to be a direct one, between officials who can speak for their respective governments, not through private intermediaries who can only make non-binding proposals. To assuage Washington's sensitivity over any suggestion that Gross and the Cuban Five are comparable cases, the agenda for such a dialogue could and should be broader, encompassing a range of humanitarian issues on which the two governments have a common interest: updating the migration agreement of 1995 to better reflect contemporary circumstances; improving Coast Guard-Border Guard cooperation on search and rescue; forging a cooperative accord to combat human trafficking; and discussing a humanitarian exchange of prisoners, including not just Alan Gross and the Cuban Five, but other U.S. citizens imprisoned in Cuba as well.

21 Can Obama Break the Stalemate? Many of the same forces that prevented Obama from a taking truly new approach to U.S.- Cuban relations during his first term will still be operative during his second. Seemingly more urgent issues will demand his time, pulling his attention away from Cuba. He will still face fierce congressional resistance to any Cuba initiative, some from within his own party. Without pressure from above, the foreign policy bureaucracy, especially the Department of State, will remain paralyzed by inertia and fear. And, for the time being, Alan Gross is still in prison. If Obama is going to finally keep the promise of his 2008 campaign to take a new direction in relations with Cuba, he will need to give the issue more sustained attention than he did in his first term. The damage being done to U.S. relations with Latin America because of U.S. intransigence on Cuba justifies moving Cuba higher up on the president's foreign policy agenda. Only sustained attention from the White House and a willing secretary of state will be able to drive a new policy through a reluctant bureaucracy. Obama will also need to be willing to marshal his forces on Capitol Hill to confront those who have developed a vested interest in sustaining the policy of the past. Finally, the president will need the courage to take the first step, proposing a humanitarian initiative that leads to the release of Alan Gross, thereby opening the way to a wide range of state-to-state cooperative agreements. Notes 1. White House, Office of the Press Secretary, "Memorandum for the Secretary of State, the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of Commerce, Subject: Promoting Democracy and Human Rights in Cuba," April 13, 2009; White House, Office of the Press Secretary, "Reaching Out to the Cuban People," January 14, 2011. 2. Donald P. Baker and Ronald D. White, "Va. GOP Confident At Campaign Rally," Washington Post, September 14, 1980. 3. Shawna Shepherd, "Tough Talk on Cuba from Paul Ryan," CNN Wire, September 23, 2012. 4. Laura Wides-Muñoz, The Fight for Cuban-Americans Is on in Florida," Associated Press online, January 30, 2012. 5. Luke Johnson, "Obama Tied To Hugo Chavez, Fidel Castro In Mitt Romney Spanish-Language Ad," Huffington Post, November 1, 2012.

22 6. "Clinton Courting Up-For-Grabs Florida and Its Cuban-Americans," Associated Press, September 5, 1996. 7. Barack Obama, "Our Main Goal: Freedom in Cuba," Miami Herald, August 21, 2007. 8. David Montgomery, "Two Constituencies, Two Campaigns? What You Need Is Another Tongue," Washington Post, June 3, 2007. 9. Richard McGregor, "Cuban-Americans Stun Republicans as Memories of Castro Rule Fade," Financial Times, November 9, 2012. 10. Charles Garcia, "Rubio's Deeds and Words Don't Match," CNN Wire, June 3, 2012; Lizette Alvarez, "In Florida, Romney Plays Down Immigration," New York Times, January 25, 2012. 11. Dario Moreno and Christopher Warren, "Pragmatism and Strategic Realignment in the 1996 Election: Florida's Cuban Americans," in Awash in the Mainstream : Latino Politics in the 1996 Elections, Rodolfo O. de la Garza and Louis DeSipio, eds. (Boulder: Westview Press, 1999):228. 12. Guillermo Grenier and Hugh Gladwin, "2007 FIU Cuba Poll," Cuban Research Institute, Florida International University <http://cri.fiu.edu/research/cuba-poll/>. 13. Grenier and Gladwin, "2007 FIU Cuba Poll." 14. Susan Eva Eckstein, The Immigrant Divide : How Cuban Americans Changed the U.S. and Their Homeland (New York: Routledge, 2009):128-135. 15. Lorena Barberia, "Remittances To Cuba: An Evaluation of Cuban and US Government Policy Measures," The Rosemarie Rogers Working Paper Series, Working Paper 15, September 2002, MIT Center for International Studies. 16. Jorge F. Pérez-López, The Cuban Economic Crisis of the 1990s and the External Sector 1998, Cuba in Transition (Association for the Study of the Cuban Economy), 8 (1998): 386-413. 17. Pablo Alfonso, "U.S. Leads in Authorizing Humanitarian Aid to Cuba, State Department Says," Miami Herald, April 15, 1999. On the other hand, the CDA also reinstated the ban on trade with Cuba by the subsidiaries of U.S. corporations in third countries (a ban President Gerald Ford lifted in 1975), thus halting some $768 million in annual trade, 90% of which involved Cuban imports of food and medicine. Richard Garfield and Sarah Santana, The Impact of the Economic Crisis and the US Embargo on Health in Cuba, American Journal of Public Health 87, no.1 (January 1997):15-20.

23 18. Cubans Complain Sanctions Are Hitting Them While Missing Mark of Castro, Baltimore Sun, September 2, 1994. 19. William Booth, Tighter Policy Exposes a Rip in Anti-Castro Fabric, Washington Post, August 24, 1994. 20. Jonathan P. Decker, Smuggling Cash to Cuba Rises in Defiance of Embargo, Christian Science Monitor, May 24, 1995; Juan O. Tamayo, Cuban Economy Abominable in 1998, Miami Herald, July 9, 1999; Barberia, "Remittances To Cuba." 21. Vanessa Arrington, Fewer Americans Travel to Cuba While Number of Fines Rise for Those Who Do, Cuba Says, Associated Press, September 28, 2005; Gary Marx, Tougher U.S. policy curtails aid to Cubans, Chicago Tribune, October 13, 2005; Dalia Acosta, Cuba-U.S.: New Transaction Fees Squeeze Family Remittances, Inter-Press Service, June 9, 2006. 22. Grenier and Gladwin, "2007 FIU Cuba Poll." 23. Madeline Baro Diaz and Doreen Hemlock, Ease Rules on Travel to Cuba, Group Asks: They Claim Bush's Policy Not Helping, South Florida Sun-Sentinel, December 5, 2006. 24. U.S. Department of the Treasury, "Fact Sheet: Treasury Amends Cuban Assets Control Regulations To Implement the President s Initiative on Family Visits, Remittances, and Telecommunications," September 3, 2009, TG-273, Press Room. 25. Michelle Higgins, "New Ways to Visit Cuba Legally," New York Times, June 30, 2011. 26. Guillermo Grenier and Hugh Gladwin, "2011 Cuba Poll," Cuban Research Institute, Florida International University <http://cri.fiu.edu/research/cuba-poll/>. 27. The Flake amendment is at Congressional Record, July 25, 2001, H4598, H4607. Keith Perine, Conferees Purge Controversial Items From Treasury-Postal Service Bill, Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, October 27, 2001, 2548. 28. Keith Perine, Presidents, Lawmakers Alike Caught Up In Cuba Embargo s Power to Polarize, Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, May 18, 2002, 1270. 29. Mark P. Sullivan, Cuba: U.S. Restrictions on Travel and Remittances, Congressional Research Service Report for Congress RL31139, May 3, 2007, 18-24. 30. Mary Beth Sheridan, Sides Gear up for Fight over U.S. Ban on Travel to Cuba, Washington Post, November 19, 2009; Johannes Werner, Window Opens to Lift Cuba Travel Ban, St. Petersburg Times, July 11, 2010.

31. "2008 Cuba/US Transition Poll," Institute for Public Opinion Research, Florida International University, The Brookings Institution, Cuba Study Group <http://www2.fiu.edu/~ipor/cuba t/>; Bendixen and Amandi, "National Poll of Cuban & Cuban Americans on Changes to Cuba Policy," Bendixen and Associates, 2009, <http://www.bendixenandassociates.com/cuba_flash_poll_executive_summary.html>; Arian Campos-Flores, "Havana Dreaming," Newsweek, August 2, 2010. 32. Stephen Weber, et al., Cuba Policy and US Public Opinion (WorldPublicOpinion.org, April 15, 2009). 33. Howard LaFranchi, "Cuba Travel Ahead for Americans? House Committee Advances Measure," Christian Science Monitor, June 30, 2010. 34. U.S. House of Representatives, Is it Time to Lift the Ban on Travel To Cuba? Hearing Before the Committee on Foreign Affairs, One Hundred Eleventh Congress, First Session, November 19, 2009, Serial No. 111 63: 3. 35. Sheridan, Sides Gear Up for Fight Over U.S. Ban on Travel to Cuba. 36. Public Campaign, Cold Hard Cash, Cold War Politics: How Cuban American Hard-Liners Influence Congress With Campaign Contributions, November 16, 2009: 2, 11. 37. Ian Swanson, "Hard-Line Cuba PAC Makes Inroads with House Freshmen," The Hill, September 18, 2007. 38. Cold Hard Cash, Cold War Politics, 6,11. 39. Niels Lesniewski, Kerry Young and Sam Goldfarb, "Senate Clears Year-End Spending Agreement," Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, December 22, 2011, p. 2660. 40. Pete Kasperowicz, "Rubio to Resume Holds on Two Western Hemisphere Nominees over Cuba," The Hill, December 19, 2011. 41. Ed Royce, "'Reset Button' Turns off Cuba Democracy Ticker," July 28, 2009, <http://royce.house.gov/> 42. Stephen F. Propst, Presidential Authority To Modify Economic Sanctions Against Cuba, (Washington, DC: Hogan Lovells LLP, 2011). 43. William Gibson, Wasserman Schultz Defends Cuba Travel Ban, Orlando Sentinel, September 27, 2010. 44. Damien Cave, "Licensing Rules Slow Tours to Cuba," New York Times, September 11, 2012. 24

45. Brian Wagner, "Latin American Leaders Congratulate President-elect Obama," Voice of America, November 6, 2008. 46. Remarks by the President at the Summit of the Americas Opening Ceremony, Office of the Press Secretary, White House, April 17, 2009. 47. AG/RES. 2438 (XXXIX-O/09): Resolution On Cuba (Adopted at the third plenary session, held on June 3, 2009), in Organization Of American States General Assembly, Thirty-ninth Regular Session, San Pedro Sula, Honduras, June 2-4, 2009, Proceedings, Volume I, p. 12. 48. Vivian Sequera, "US, Canada Alone at Summit in Cuba Stance," The Guardian, April 14 2012. 49. Scott Wilson, "Americas Summit Ends Without an Agreement," Washington Post, April 16, 2012. 50. Press Briefing by Ben Rhodes and Dan Restrepo to Preview the President's Trip to the Summit of the Americas, White House, Office of the Press Secretary, April 11, 2012. 51. Reuters, "Despite Obama Charm, Americas Summit Boosts U.S. Isolation," Times & Transcript (New Brunswick), April 17, 2012. 52. Juan O. Tamayo, "Diplomat with Cuba Experience to Handle WH Latam Policy," Miami Herald, May 25, 2012. 53. State's Jacobson on Upcoming Western Hemisphere Meetings, U.S. Department of State, October 18, 2012, <http://www.state.gov/p/wha/>. 54. Randal C. Archibold, "Cuban Minister Leaves a Door Open to American's Release," New York Times, September 24, 2011; Press Conference by Josefina Vidal Ferreiro, Head of the United States division at Cuban Chancery. International Press Center, Havana, December 5, 2012, Ministry of Foreign Relations, <www.cubaminrex.cu>. 55. Damien Cave, "Americans And Cubans Still Mired In Distrust," New York Times, September 16, 2011; Author's interview with Bill Richardson, October 6, 2011,Washington, DC. 25