African Swine Fever: Modelling the silent release from Small Scale Farms and Consequences for Disease Persistence in Affected Areas

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African Swine Fever: Modelling the silent release from Small Scale Farms and Consequences for Disease Persistence in Affected Areas Costard, S., Zagmutt, F., Porphyre, T., Roger, F., Pfeiffer, D.U.

Background ASF in Sub-Saharan Africa, Sardinia, Russian Fed. Most outbreaks in backyard and small-scale farms ASF persistence in domestic pig populations: Domestic pigs European boar Ornithodoros spp. Ornithodoros spp. African wild suids Ornithodoros spp.

Background ASF in Sub-Saharan Africa, Sardinia, Russian Fed. Most outbreaks in backyard and small-scale farms ASF persistence in domestic pig populations: Domestic pigs Movement of infected pigs (or products) between farms European boar Ornithodoros spp. Ornithodoros spp. African wild suids Ornithodoros spp.

In Afr. (and R.F.), suspected outbreaks usually not reported: Dead pig discarded of (nearby farms, rivers...); Pigs with clinical signs sold for slaughter; Pigs without detected signs sold to traders at farm gate. Problem: Incubation and latency period Farmers & traders imperfect clinical diagnosis => risk of release of infected pigs via emergency sale of pigs without symptoms

Objectives Estimate the risk of ASF silent release from small scale farms - i.e. emergency sale of ASFV infected pigs without (detected) signs Assess if increasing farmers awareness of ASF (i.e. improve clinical diagnosis) can reduce this risk

time

time ASF

time ASF Within herd transmission

time ASF Within herd transmission

time ASF Within herd transmission

time ASF Within herd transmission

time ASF Within herd transmission 1 st clinical case

time ASF Within herd transmission 1 st clinical case

time ASF Within herd transmission 1 st clinical case

time ASF Within herd transmission 1 st clinical case

time ASF Within herd transmission 1 st clinical case Detection and sale traders abattoir

Materials and Methods Within-farm spread: Stochastic, individual-based, discrete time (1d), state transition model Susceptible (S) Infected not infectious (E) Infectious No clinical signs (L) Infectious & Clinical signs (I) Dead or Recovered (DR) Effective contacts Incubation period & latent period Time from infectiousness to onset of clinical signs Disease duration Binomial process Density dependant R0 based on literature Transition times: simulation for each pig Distributions for incubation & latent periods and disease duration, based on literature Weibull distributions: re-parameterised using percentiles and minimum

Action by farmer when disease suspected: At decision (detection and sale) time t, removal of animals that farmers consider diseased sale of others to traders Susceptible (S) Infected not infectious (E) Infectious No clinical signs (L) Infectious & Clinical signs (I) Dead or Recovered (DR) Decision time & (1-specificity) Removed (slaughtered) Decision time & sensitivity

Action by farmer when disease suspected: At decision (detection and sale) time t, removal of animals that farmers consider diseased sale of others to traders Pig Infected Infectious not No Susceptible infectious clinical signs (S) (E) (L) Infectious & Clinical signs (I)

Clinical signs not noticed and pig sold to traders Action by farmer when disease suspected: At decision (detection and sale) time t, removal of animals that farmers consider diseased sale of others to traders Pig Infected Infectious not No Susceptible infectious clinical signs (S) (E) (L) Infectious & Clinical signs (I) Clinical signs noticed and pig removed

Action by farmer when disease suspected: At decision (detection and sale) time t, removal of animals that farmers consider diseased sale of others to traders Pig Infected Infectious not No Susceptible infectious clinical signs (S) (E) (L) Infectious & Clinical signs (I) Se 1 -Se Clinical signs noticed and pig removed Clinical signs not noticed and pig sold to traders

Action by farmer when disease suspected: At decision (detection and sale) time t, removal of animals that farmers consider diseased sale of others to traders Pig Infected Infectious not No Susceptible infectious clinical signs (S) (E) (L) Clinical signs perceived and pig removed No clinical sign perceived and pig sold to traders Infectious & Clinical signs (I) Se 1 -Se Clinical signs noticed and pig removed Clinical signs not noticed and pig sold to traders

Action by farmer when disease suspected: At decision (detection and sale) time t, removal of animals that farmers consider diseased sale of others to traders Pig Infected Infectious not No Susceptible infectious clinical signs (S) (E) (L) 1 -Sp Sp Clinical signs perceived and pig removed No clinical sign perceived and pig sold to traders Infectious & Clinical signs (I) Se 1 -Se Clinical signs noticed and pig removed Clinical signs not noticed and pig sold to traders

Scenarios: Herd size: 5, 10, 30 pigs R 0 : 3 (ML), 1.5 (min) and 15 (max) Decision time: 5 35 days Sensitivity and Specificity of clinical diagnosis: 0.5, 0.75, 0.9 Simulation of Probability of silent release of infected pigs Number of infected pigs released

Probability of releasing at least 1 infected pig Results: Probability of silent release from farm 1.0 0.9 0.8 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.0 1.0 N: 30 N: 10 N: 30 R 0 : 3 1.5 15 Sp: 0.75 0.90 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 1.0 0.9 0.8 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.0 1.0 N: 10 Se:0.75 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 Se:0.90 1.0 0.9 0.8 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.0 1.0 N: 5 N: 5 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 Decision time (days) 5 10 15 20 25 30 35

Overall, high risk of ASF silent release from small scale farms: linked to within-herd disease spread for very small (5 or less), decrease for decision times >15 days for others, remains above 0.5. Higher risk observed for larger herds and longer decision times Little impact of Se/Sp

Proportion of herd infected and released to traders (R 0 =3) 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.1 Clinical signs not noticed No clinical signs 0 5 10 30 Herd size Decision time= 10days

Proportion of herd infected and released to traders (R 0 =3) 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.1 Clinical signs not noticed No clinical signs 0 5 10 30 Herd size Decision time= 15days

Proportion of herd infected and released to traders (R 0 =3) 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.1 Clinical signs not noticed No clinical signs 0 5 10 30 Herd size Decision time= 25days

Putting it into context - Madagascar Background: ASF endemic since intro in late 1990s Pig production important for cultural and economic reasons Serious impact on smallholder farmers Diagnosis / control not implemented by vet authorities (resources scarce) Farmers follow behaviour described in present study Contribution of different herds to local ASF spread via emergency sale to traders: 80% 60% 40% 20% 0% Percentage of herds Proportion of all infected pigs sold to traders <5 5 to 10 10 to 30 30 to 100 Scenario considered: R 0 =3 and decision time=10 and 20 days Assumptions: No control measure implemented nor reporting Same risk of infection for all herds in Madagascar, Same percentage of herd infected within each herd size interval.

Putting it into context - Madagascar Background: ASF endemic since intro in late 1990s Pig production important for cultural and economic reasons Serious impact on smallholder farmers Diagnosis / control not implemented by vet authorities (resources scarce) Farmers follow behaviour described in present study Contribution of different herds to local ASF spread via emergency sale to traders: 80% 60% 40% 20% 0% Percentage of herds Proportion of all infected pigs sold to traders <5 5 to 10 10 to 30 30 to 100 Scenario considered: R 0 =3 and decision time=10 and 20 days Assumptions: No control measure implemented nor reporting Same risk of infection for all herds in Madagascar, Same percentage of herd infected within each herd size interval.

Conclusions Emergency sale: Common because limits immediate financial losses for affected farmers Risk of selling infected animals high, suggesting it contributes to ASFV persistence in domestic pig populations. Mitigation strategies for ASF: Training to improve farmers ASF diagnostic not effective Alternative control measures required (involvement of other actors; integrative / certification approaches, etc.)

Acknowledgements Partners: CIRAD, RVC, Epix Analytics DSAPS, MPE, FOFIFA (Madagascar) Study funded by the Wellcome Trust