Evaluation Criteria for True (Physical) Random Number Generators Used in Cryptographic Applications

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Transcription:

Evaluation Criteria for True (Physical) Random Number Generators Used in Cryptographic Applications Werner Schindler 1, Wolfgang Killmann 2 1 Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (BSI) Bonn, Germany 2 T-Systems ISS GmbH Bonn, Germany

Random numbers in cryptographic applications Examples: - random session keys - RSA prime factors - random numbers for DSS - zero-knowledge-proofs - challenge-response-protocols - IV vectors -...

Random number generators - true (physical) random number generators (TRNGs) - deterministic random number generators (DRNGs) (output completely determined by the seed) - hybrid generators (refreshing their seed regularly; e.g. by exploiting user s interaction, mouse movement, key strokes or register values)

Requirements on random numbers The requirements on the used random numbers depend essentially on the intended application! R1: The random numbers should have good statistical properties R2: The knowledge of subsequences of random numbers shall not enable to compute predecessors or successors or to guess them with non-negligible probability.

TRNGs vs. DRNGs For sensitive applications requirement R2 is indispensable! DRNGs rely on computational complexity ( practical security ) TRNGs: If the entropy per random number is sufficiently large this ensures theoretical security.

Objectives of a TRNG evaluation (I): Verification of the general suitability of the TRNG-design at hand of theoretical considerations and carefully investigated prototypes

TRNGs in operation: General problems and risks - total breakdown of the noise source - aging effects - tolerances of components

tot-test / startup test / online test test tot-test startup test online test aim shall detect a total breakdown of the noise source very soon shall ensure the functionality of the TRNG at the start shall detect non-tolerable weaknesses or deterioration of the quality of random numbers

Objectives of a TRNG evaluation (II): Verification of the suitability of the tot-, startup- and online test at hand of theoretical considerations

TRNG (schematic design) analog digital external interface noise source algorithmic postprocessing buffer (optional) (optional) digitised analog signal (das-random numbers) internal r.n. external r.n.

Which random numbers should be tested? (I) Example: linear feedback shift register das-r.n....... internal r.n. worst case scenario: total breakdown of the noise sorce das-r.n.s : constant, i.e. entropy /bit = 0... but... internal r.n.s: good statistical properties!!!

Which random numbers should be tested? (II) Example (continued): Statistical blackbox tests applied on the internal random numbers will not detect a total breakdown of the noise source (unless the linear complexity profile is tested). The relevant property is the increase of entropy per random bit.

Entropy (I) General demand (-> R2): - Entropy / random bit should be sufficiently large Fundamental problems: - Entropy is a property of random variables but not of observed random numbers! - general entropy estimators do not exist Consequences: - Entropy cannot be measured as voltage etc. - at least the distribution class of the underlying random variables has to be known

Entropy (II) das-random numbers: - may not be equidistributed - may be dependent on predecessors - but there should not be complicated algebraic long-term dependencies (-> math. model of the noise source) Conclusion: The das-random numbers should be tested.

ITSEC and CC ITSEC (Information Technology Security Evaluation Criteria) and CC (Common Criteria) - provide evaluation criteria which shall permit the comparability between independent security evaluations. - A product or system which has been successfully evaluated is awarded with an internationally recognized IT security certificate.

CC: Evaluation of Random Number Generators ITSEC, CC and the corresponding evaluation manuals do not specify any uniform evaluation criteria for random number generators! In the German evaluation and certification scheme the evaluation guidance document AIS 31: Functionality Classes and Evaluation Methodology for Physical Random Number Generators has been effective since September 2001

AIS 31 (I) - provides clear evaluation criteria for TRNGs - distinguishes between two functionality classes P1 (for less sensitive applications as challenge-response mechanisms) P2 (for sensitive applications as key generation) - no statistical blackbox tests for class P2 - discusses positive and negative examples

AIS 31 (II) - does not favour or exclude any reasonable TRNG design; if necessary, the applicant has give and to justify alternative criteria - mathematical-technical reference: W. Schindler, W. Killmann: A Proposal for: Functionality Classes and Evaluation Methodology for True (Physical) Random Number Generators www.bsi.bund.de/zertifiz/zert/interpr/trngk31.pdf

AIS 31: Alternative Criteria (I) P2-specific requirement P2.d)(vii): Digitised noise signal sequences meet particular criteria or pass statistical tests intended to rule out features such as multi-step dependencies...... Tests and evaluation rules are specified in sub-section P2.i) Aim of this requirement: to guarantee a minimum entropy limit for the das-random numbers and, consequently, for the internal random numbers.

AIS 31: Alternative Criteria (II) Case A): The das-random numbers do not meet these criteria. Using an appropriate (data-compressing) mathematical postprocessing the entropy of the internal r.n.s may yet be sufficiently large. The applicant has to give clear proof that the entropy of the internal random numbers is sufficiently large, taking into account the mathematical postprocessing on basis of the empirical properties of the digitized noise signal sequence.

AIS 31: Alternative Criteria (III) Case B): Due to construction of the TRNG there is no access to the das-random numbers possible. The applicant additionally has to give a comprehensible and plausible description of a mathematical model of the noise source and of the das random numbers (specifying a distribution class!).

AIS 31: Reference Implementation The AIS 31 has been well-tried in a number of product evaluations A reference implementation of the applied statistical tests will be put on the BSI website in September www.bsi.bund.de/zertifiz/zert/interpr/ais_cc.htm

Proposals and ideas for improvement of the AIS 31 are always welcome!