Protection Profile Digital Tachograph Vehicle Unit (VU PP) Version 1.0 BSI-CC-PP
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1 Protection Profile Digital Tachograph Vehicle Unit (VU PP) Version 1.0 BSI-CC-PP Dipl.-Phys. Certification Federal Office for Information Security (BSI), Germany
2 Topics of VU-PP CC 3.1 R3 Overview Security Concept of the Digital Tachograph Security Objectives for the TOE (VU PP, CC 3.1 R3) Security Objectives for the Operational Environment (VU PP, CC 3.1 R3) Primary Assets to be protected (VU PP, CC 3.1 R3) Secondary Assets to be protected (VU PP, CC 3.1 R3) Security Functional Requirements (VU PP, CC 3.1 R3) Security Assurance Requirements (VU PP, CC 3.1 R3) Outlook Folie 2
3 Overview The Digital Tachograph Systems consists of Vehicle Unit, Motion Sensor and Tachograph Cards. The System with different components will be installed in road transport vehicles (e.g. truck over 3.5T, bus 9 Persons) The Security of the technical components of the Digital Tachograph System (e.g. vehicle unit) expressed in the European Commission Regulation 1360/2002, Annex I B, Appendix 10 (Generic Security Target written according to ITSEC) Generic Security Target is issued by the European Commission (basis for the VU PP) Joint Interpretation Library (JIL),Version 1.12, Security Evaluation and Certification of Digital Tachographs, interpretation of the Security Certification according to Commission Regulation (Annex IB) Folie 3
4 Overview This new Protection Profile should reflect the content of the Generic Security Target (GST) in Appendix 10 of Annex IB (issued by the EC) and Joint Interpretation Library (JIL, Digital Tachographs), V1.12 The intention is the coverage of the requirements in Appendix 10 by the security functional requirements of the current PP and the JIL document GST (ITSEC:E3, high) ===> CC EAL4+ Draft developments of the PP for VU have been commented by the European Schemes and manufacturers Folie 4
5 Security Concept of the Digital Tachograph Mechanical Interface Sensor Tachograph Cards:driver, control, workshop and company cards Secure Controller Secure Components Secure Components Motion Sensor 2 Card Reader Display Printer Memory Calibration Secure Components Vehicle Unit Interaction between Components of Digital Tachograph Folie 5
6 Security Objectives for the TOE (VU PP, CC 3.1 R3) O.Access The TOE must control user access to functions and data. O.Accountability The TOE must collect accurate accountability data. O.Audit The TOE must audit attempts to undermine system security and should trace them to associated users. O.Authentication The TOE should authenticate users and connected entities (when a trusted path needs to be established between entities). O.Integrity The TOE must maintain stored data integrity. Folie 6
7 Security Objectives for the TOE (VU PP, CC 3.1 R3) O.Output The TOE must ensure that data output reflects accurately data measured or stored. O.Processing The TOE must ensure that processing of inputs to derive user data is accurate. O.Reliability The TOE must provide a reliable service. O.Secured_Data_ Exchange The TOE must secure data exchanges with the motion sensor and with tachograph cards. O.Software_Analysis There shall be no way to analyse or debug software in the field after the TOE activation. Folie 7
8 Security Objectives for the Operational Environment (VU PP, CC 3.1 R3) Design environment Manufacturing environment Workshops environment End-user environment Folie 8
9 Security Objectives for the Operational Environment (VU PP, CC 3.1 R3) OE.Activation Vehicle manufacturers and fitters or workshops shall activate the TOE after its installation before the vehicle leaves the premises where installation took place. OE.Approved_Workshops Installation, calibration and repair of recording equipment shall be carried by trusted and approved fitters or workshops. OE.Faithful_Calibration Approved fitters and workshops shall enter proper vehicle parameters in recording equipment during calibration. Folie 9
10 Primary Assets to be protected (VU PP, CC 3.1 R3) Object No. 1 2 Asset user data (recorded or stored in the TOE) user data transferred between the TOE and an external device connected Definition Any data, other than security data and authentication data, recorded or stored by the VU, required by Commission Regulation All user data being transferred from or to the TOE. A TOE communication partner can be: - a motion sensor, - a tachograph card, or - an external medium for data download. Generic security Integrity Authenticity Confidentiality Integrity Authenticity Folie 10
11 Secondary Assets to be protected (VU PP, CC 3.1 R3) Object Asset No. 1 Accessibility to the TOE functions and data only for authorised subjects 2 3 Definition Generic Security Availability Property of the TOE to restrict access to TSF and TSF-data stored in the TOE to subjects only. Genuineness of the Property of the TOE to Availability TOE be authentic in order to provide the claimed security functionality in a proper way. TOE immanent secret Secret security Confidentiality security data elements: All Keys used Integrity (e.g. symmetric master key, session keys) Folie 11
12 Security Functional Requirements (VU PP, CC 3.1 R3) Identification and authentication of motion sensor and tachograph cards, Access control to functions and stored data, Accountability of users, Audit of events and faults, Prevention of object reuse for secret data, Accuracy of recorded and stored data, Reliability of services, Secure data exchange (e.g. MS or Tach. Cards). Folie 12
13 Security Assurance Requirements (VU PP, CC 3.1 R3) Common Criteria Part 3 conformant EAL 4 augmented by ATE_DPT.2 and AVA_VAN.5 ID: BSI-CC-PP Why ATE_DPT.2? Folie 13
14 Outlook The advantages of this CC VU PP: Easy creation of the Security Target for manufacturer Applying the new evaluation technique according to CC improvement Applying the latest CEM after harmonization with different schemes Using the latest CC interpretation during certification Comparability of the certification results between schemes CC has more acceptance than ITSEC in the world Next steps: PPs for Tachograph Cards and Motion Sensors Folie 14
15 Contact Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (BSI) Referat Zertifizierung Godesberger Allee Bonn Tel: +49 (0) [email protected] Folie 15
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On Security Evaluation Testing Kerstin Lemke-Rust Hochschule Bonn-Rhein-Sieg Workshop: Provable Security against Physical Attacks Lorentz Center, 19 Feb 2010 Kerstin Lemke-Rust (H BRS) On Security Evaluation
Securing VoIP Networks using graded Protection Levels
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