2012 USW Health, Safety & Environment Conference

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2012 USW Health, Safety & Environment Conference OSHA s Refinery & Chemical National Emphasis Programs The Westin Convention Center Pittsburgh March 6, 2012 Mike Marshall, PE PSM Coordinator USDOL-OSHA, Directorate of Enforcement Programs

National Emphasis Programs Provide for planned inspections in high hazard industries Focus efforts on specific hazards Refinery NEP focuses on implementation of PSM in Refineries Chemical NEP focuses on implementation of PSM in all other PSM covered facilities

NEP Purpose To control or eliminate workplace hazards associated with the release of highly hazardous chemicals (HHCs)

Comparison of Refinery and Chem NEPs to Prior PSM Inspections NEPs are the most significant PSM enforcement actions since the standard was promulgated in 1992 Significant differences between current effort and pre-2007 inspections: 73% of early inspections were initiated due to accidents, complaints or referrals. Almost all Refinery NEPs were program planned

Comparison of Refinery and Chem NEPs to Prior PSM Inspections NEP inspections have more violations and higher penalties than prior PSM OR PQV inspections: Type of PSM Inspection Program Citations per Inspection Penalty ($) per Inspection Refinery NEP 11.2 76,800 Chem NEP 8.4 31,600 PQV and other non-nep inspections (Before 2007) 2.3 2,950

Refinery NEP Originally launched June 7, 2007 Last inspections completed in 2011 Combined static and dynamic question lists with guidance for compliance officers (CSHOs)

Refinery NEP Comprehensive Resource intensive for employers and OSHA About 1,000 OSHA hours/inspection Compliance found to be highly uneven Average penalties/inspection = $76,821 Average penalty/violation = $6,859 Average violations/inspection = 11.2

Refinery NEP Frequently Cited PSM Elements Element Description Number Percent j Mechanical Integrity 198 19.5% d Process Safety Information 177 17.4% f Operating Procedures 174 17.1% e Process Hazard Analysis 168 16.5% l Management of Change 92 9.0% m Incident Investigation 68 6.7% h Contractors 44 4.3% o Compliance Audits 41 4.0% g Training 29 2.9% n Emergency Planning & Response 14 1.4% c Employee Participation 12 1.2%

Refinery NEP Frequently Cited PSM Sub-elements Sub-element Description Number 119(d)(3)(ii) Compliance w/ RAGAGEP 71 119(j)(5) Correction of deficiencies 63 119(e)(5) PHA findings not addressed 52 119(l)(1) MOC not established/implemented 39 119(d)(3)(i)(B) P&IDs missing / incorrect 37 119(j)(2) No written MI procedures 38 119(e)(3)(v) PHA facility siting 29 119(f)(4) Safe work practices not established 29 119(j)(4)(iii) I&T frequency 25 119(j)(4)(i) Inspections and tests not performed 24 119(d)(3)(i)(D) Relief system design & design basis 24 119(f)(1)(i)(D) Emergency shutdown in OPs 24

Lessons Learned Main Challenge Refinery NEP hours 40 times greater than average OSHA inspection 1000 hours for REF NEP inspection 25 hours for average OSHA inspection Learnings List based approach does find hazards Compared to PQV approach The listed questions also result in many off-script citations CSHO training works OSHA focus on RAGAGEP resulted in large number of deficiencies 20+ years after SHELL-Norco & Phillips-Pasadena, refining industry still has many problems with facility siting

Other Learnings from the Refinery NEP Citations in the NEP reflect the focus on PSI, Incident Investigation, and the various elements involving RAGAGEP in Inspection Priority Items (IPI), and improved CSHO training Refineries are not resolving PHA and audit findings and recommendations at a rate expected of large, sophisticated employers

PSM-Covered Chemical Facilities A National Emphasis Program The Chem NEP

Less resource-intensive Chem NEP Pilot Chem NEP effective July 27, 2009 Region I CT, MA, ME, NH, RI Region VII Nebraska, Kansas, Missouri Region X Idaho Extended nationwide Nov. 29, 2011 Outlines a different approach for inspecting PSM-covered chemical facilities Not comprehensive

Chem NEP State plan participation is now required Can adopt Federal program or develop one that is equally protective CSHO s must check abatement of PSM citations requiring abatement going back six years

Chem NEP Approach Differs from Refinery NEP Intent is to perform a larger number of shorter, less resource intensive, inspections A small number of dynamic list questions are applied to a selected unit or units No static list questions

Chem NEP Approach Questions are specific and contain compliance guidance (similar to Refinery NEP) Questions differ by type of facility Ammonia refrigeration General PSM (e.g., storage only) Chemical Processing Dynamic questions are not published outside OSHA Questions change periodically

Details Details of OSHA inspection procedures (Field Operations Manual), as well as company and employee rights and obligations, can be found on OSHA s website The text of the Chem NEP (but not the dynamic list questions) is also accessible at www.osha.gov

Chem NEP Inspections November 2011 (Completion of Pilot) 173 inspections have issued citations Average 8.4 citations per inspection with citations Average $31,587 in proposed penalties per inspection with citations 19

Chem NEP Inspections November 2011 >60 standards cited: 5 major standards categories 1910 General Industry 1904 Record Keeping 5a1 General Duty 1926 Construction 1903 Inspections (abatement verification) 1,487 total proposed violations $5,464,553 total proposed penalties Overwhelming majority of violations under 1910 - General Industry (>90%) 20

Top Twelve 1910 Standards Violated Description # Cum % 1910.119 Process Safety Management 891 59.9 1910.147 Lockout / Tagout 55 63.6 1910.120 Haz Waste & Emergency Response 47 66.8 1910.134 Respiratory Protection 36 69.2 1904.029 Forms (Record Keeping) 31 71.3 1910.023 Guarding Openings 31 73.4 1910.305 Electrical 22 74.8 1910.1200 HazCom 19 76.3 1910.146 Permit Req d Confined Space 19 77.5 1910.151 Medical Services & First Aid 19 78.8 1910.212 Machine Guarding 19 80.1 5a1 General Duty 18 81.3 21

Chem NEP Inspections Facility Type Unprogrammed Inspections - 38% <2% 8% 37% 53% Chlorine Contractor NH3 Refrigeration Other 22

Chem NEP Inspections Facility Type Total Inspections 3% 9% 41% 47% Chlorine Contractor NH3 Refrigeration Other 23

Chem NEP Citations by PSM Element Element Description % of PSM Citations Cumulative % j Mechanical Integrity 23.2% 23.2% d Process Safety Information 20.9% 44.1% e Process Hazard Analysis 15.8% 59.9% f Operating Procedures 14.0% 74.0% l Management of Change 5.5% 79.5% o Compliance Audits 4.5% 84.0% g Training 3.8% 87.8% h Contractors 3.4% 91.1% c Employee participation 2.8% 93.9% m Incident Investigation 2.6% 96.5% n Emergency Planning & Response 1.8% 98.3% i Pre-startup Review 1.1% 99.4% k Hot Work 0.6% 100.0% 24

Chem NEP Citations by PSM Element Pareto Chart 25% 120% 20% 15% 10% 5% 100% 80% 60% 40% 20% 0% j d e f l o g h c m n i k 0% 25

Chem NEP Citations by PSM Sub-element Sub-element Description % All Citations Cumulative % 119(d)(3)(ii) PSI RAGAGEP 7.0% 7.0% 119(j)(2) MI written procedures 6.7% 13.7% 119(j)(5) MI equipment deficiencies 3.7% 17.4% 119(l)(1) Management of Change dev & imp 3.7% 21.1% 119(j)(4)(i) MI I&T performance 3.6% 24.7% 119(e)(5) PHA findings & recommendations 3.5% 28.2% 119(d)(3)(i)(B) PSI P&IDs 3.4% 31.5% 119(o)(1) Compliance Audits performed / certified 3.0% 34.6% 119(j)(4)(iii) MI I&T frequency 2.7% 37.3% 119(e)(3)(i) PHA Hazards of the Process 2.5% 39.7% 119(e)(1) PHAs performance 2.2% 42.0% 119(f)(1) OP Developed & Implementation 2.2% 44.2% 119(f)(3) OP annually certified 2.2% 46.5% 26 119(j)(4)(ii) MI I&T follow RAGAGEP 2.0% 48.5%

Chem NEP Citations by PSM Sub-element (Pareto) 8% 7% 6% 5% 4% 3% 2% 1% 60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 0% 0% 119(d)(3)(ii) 119(j)(2) 119(j)(5) 119(l)(1) 119(j)(4)(i) 119(e)(5) 119(d)(3)(i)(B) 119(o)(1) 119(j)(4)(iii) 119(e)(3)(i) 119(e)(1) 119(f)(1) 119(f)(3) 119(j)(4)(ii) 27

VPP Sites and the NEPs VPP sites are not subject to programmed inspections However, the NEP applies OSHA-wide for unprogrammed PSM related inspections: Accidents Complaints Referrals Catastrophes

PSM.What s Being Cited EXAMPLES 1910.119..

d(3) PSI Citations P&ID's not accurate Relief system design & design basis not documented Failure to document that equipment follows RAGAGEP Relief device set at 540 psig for 480 psig MAWP (ASME B&PV Code) Relief isolation valve positions not controlled (ASME B&PV Code) Relief valves undersized (API 521) KO drum w/ inadequate retention time (API 752) Trailers located subject to blast loading (API 753) Positive pressure air supply to control building not alarmed (NFPA 496-2003 Section 7.4.7)

j(4) MI Inspect & Test Citations All aspects of j(4) cited Many types of equipment & controls. Many problems involved thickness measurements Examples: Process piping not inspected per facility s I&T program I&T schedule on relief valves not adjusted when valves found to be heavily fouled Cathodic protection system & process analyzers not tested per employers program requirements Anomalous thickness measurements not resolved per RAGAGEP (e.g., API 570) No inspection data for critical process piping circuit Thickness readings not documented

f(1) Op Procedures Citations Many regarding procedures for emergency shutdown, safe operating limits, operations w/o procedures Examples: Failure to address when emergency shutdown required & assignment to qualified operators Operating limits procedures not consistent w/ instructions on DCS / control board No procedures for operation of complex unit blowdown systems Lack of emergency OPs for flare system No procedure for switching lube pumps on large compressor

e(3) PHA Citations Not addressing siting or human factors; others for not addressing consequences of failure of controls, not identifying previous incidents Examples: Siting - failure to address potential atmospheric blowdown impacts on shelters, furnaces, control rooms Human Factors failure to consider HF, failure to evaluate operator / DCS alarm interface, failure to consider risk posed by unmarked equipment Hazards freeze protection of process piping Hazards lack of support steel fireproofing near likely release points (pump seals) Incidents failure to consider previous incident with explosive gas under UPS battery room

j(5) MI Deficiency Citations Wide variety of equipment operated outside acceptable limits Examples: Pipe or equipment thickness measurements below retirement thickness Intervening valves to/from relief valves not car sealed open Pressurized electrical cabinets w/o functional alarms Broken flange bolts Inoperable control panel board indicator lights Inoperable valves (broken, non-functional, or fouled) Gage glasses unusable Toxic / LEL gas detectors in control room air supply not working

j(2) MI Procedure Citations Procedures often lacking for special situations, and for evaluating and resolving anomalous data Examples of missing or deficient procedures: For under-insulation corrosion; for injection locations; for pressure vessels For inspecting non-metallic linings in pressure vessels Procedures did not address adequate number and locations of TMLs Relief valves past inspection intervals (many) No procedures for performing repairs on pressure vessels (welder quals & certs, QC, etc.) No procedure for resolving thickness measurement increases (anomalous data)

e(5) PHA Recommendations Citations Mostly failure to resolve recommendations at all, or in a timely manner. Many recommendations requiring little investment go unresolved and unimplemented low hanging fruit. Examples of unresolved findings/recommendations: Relief isolation valves not car sealed open 23 findings from 1996 PHA still unresolved PHA recommendations rolled over from previous study, including instruments and alarms for detecting critical equipment conditions Recommendations on blast exposure of control rooms from multiple siting studies not resolved (periodically do new studies without resolving issues) No written plans for implementing agreed actions

m(1) Incident Invest Citations Failure to investigate potentially catastrophic incidents (near-miss); frequently multiple instances Examples of failing to investigate Pump seal failures Packing blown out of pump HC liquid and vapor releases Exchanger acid/hc leaks (alky units) Corrosion FCC fire Overpressure leading to release to flare system Pipe rack and line releases Instrument leaks and failures

m(4) Incident Invest Citations Citations for all sub-elements. Failure to include all required information is common. Contributing factors are often left out, or are tangential to the actual contributing factors Examples: Date investigation began not listed No determination of how cross-contamination occurred or was corrected Causal factors not documented in 2 crude heater tube leak fires; in weld corrosion failure; in failure of faulty weld, in fan shaft breakage, in over-temperature on a reactor, on smoke in a substation Recommendations not established in crude heater fire

l(1) MOC Citations Most frequently cited MOC was for failure to establish or implement equipment design changes followed by operating procedure changes. Examples Removing secondary process piping wo/conducting MOC Increasing charge to units wo/moc Changing procedures for addition of methanol to chloride injection tank No MOC for temporary weld patch for hole in pressure vessel 3,600 barrel throughput change in unit wo/moc Added seven exchangers and associated piping to crude unit wo/moc No MOC for control room upgrade 47 operating procedure changes and 58 alarm set point changes wo/moc No MOC for placement of temporary structures

o(4) Audit Citations Primarily failures to address deficiencies identified in compliance audits and document their correction Examples: Problems with PSSR and MOC tracking and approval noted in last two compliance audits not resolved Finding that OPs not being updated or unaddressed Correction of deficiencies in maintenance program not documented Audit findings from previous CA not addressed Ventilation system designs for control rooms Safety system information not available Testing & inspection frequencies not complying with RAGAGEP

QUESTIONS

OSHA s DEP PSM Team Jim Lay Lay.jim@dol.gov 202-693-1827 Jeff Wanko JWanko@dol.gov 202-693-2137 Mike Marshall Marshall.mike@dol.gov 202-693-2179