Fiscal Affairs Department Effects of Good Government, by Ambrogio Lorenzetti, Siena, Italy, 1338-39 Fiscal Rules and Fiscal Responsibility Frameworks for Growth in Emerging and Low-Income Countries Martine Guerguil Assistant Director, Fiscal Affairs Department, IMF Conference on Fiscal Policy, Equity, and Long-term Growth in Developing Countries Washington DC, April 22, 2013 1
Outline Fiscal rules in the developing world Fiscal rules and growth volatility Design of fiscal rules and growth volatility 2
Number of Countries with Fiscal Rules 50 45 40 Advanced economies Developing economies 35 30 25 20 15 10 5 0 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 Sources: IMF Fiscal rules database (2012); and IMF staff estimates. 3
Fiscal Rules Around the World Sources: IMF Fiscal rules database (2012); and IMF staff estimates. 4
Fiscal Responsibility Laws 14 Advanced economies 12 Emerging economies 10 8 6 4 2 0 1990 1993 1996 1999 2002 2005 2008 2011 Sources: Corbacho and Schwartz (2007); national authorities; and IMF staff assessments. 5
Why Adopt a Fiscal Rule? 50 45 40 Other Member of currency union 35 30 27 25 20 11 15 10 5 17 20 0 Advanced Developing Sources: IMF Fiscal rules database (2012); IMF, World Economic Outlook; and IMF staff estimates. 6
Type and Number of Fiscal Rules 45 3 40 35 30 25 2 20 15 10 1 5 0 AE DE AE DE AE DE AE DE Exp. rule Revenue rule Bal. budget rule Debt rule 0 Advanced Europe Africa Asia LAC Middle East Sources: IMF Fiscal rules database (2012); IMF, World Economic Outlook; and IMF staff estimates. 7
Growth vs Growth Volatility 1.0 1995-2008 0.8 0.6 04 0.4 Proc cyclicality 0.2 0.0-0.2-0.4-0.6-0.8-1.0 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 Real GDP per capita growth, average Sources: IMF Fiscal rules database (2012); IMF, World Economic Outlook; and IMF staff estimates. 8
Fiscal Rules and Procyclicality Russia Bahrain Maldives Paraguay Tajikistan Equatorial Guinea Netherlands Cape Verde Philippines Korea Myanmar Malawi United Kingdom Central African Republic Haiti Slovak Republic Spain Vietnam Ethiopia Dominican Republic Senegal Georgia Cameroon Madagascar South Africa Uganda Fiji Tanzania Jamaica Trinidad and Tobago Oman Nigeria Estonia Lebanon Moldov va Kosovo Jorda an Burundi Peru Mauritius Portugal Belarus LM esotho Mozambique Ecuador Afghanistan AI ndia Indonesia Kazakhstan Benin St. Vincent and the Grenadines Cyprus Belize Turkmenistan Papua New Guinea Armenia Lithuania Guatemala Iceland Slovenia Honduras St. Kitts and Nevis Swaziland Burkina Faso Italy Gambia Laos Colombia Antigua and Barbuda Iran Egypt Venezuela Nicaragua Qatar Sweden Poland Malta Grenada Bolivia Czech Republic Eritrea Serbia Libya Bangladesh Dominica Mali Argentina Sudan Brazil Nepal Kiribati Ghana Gabon Latvia Azerbaijan Togo Liberia Israel Niger Mongolia Kenya KB Bulgaria China Romania Pakistan Zambia Rwanda Greece Uruguay Croatia Ukraine Uzbekistan Angola Albania Panama Hungary 1.0 0.8 0.6 0.4 0.2 0.0 2004-2012 (Countries with fiscal rules in blue, Advanced economies in light blue) Canada Denmark Algeria St. Luc cia Norw way Bo otswana United Arab Emirates Japan United States Germany Chad Switzerland Luxembourg Costa Rica El Salvador Saudi Arabia Thailand Australia Finland Belgium Austria Guyana Tunisia Chile Suriname Cambod dia Malays sia Namibia Sierra Leone Mexico Comoros Turkey France Morocco Ireland Kuwait Sri Lanka New Zealand Kyrgyz Republic Syrian Arab Republic -0.2-0.4-0.6-0.8-1.0 Countercyclical Procyclical Sources: IMF Fiscal rules database (2012); and IMF staff estimates. 9
Fiscal Rules and Procyclicality Fiscal ru ule 1.0 0.8 0.6 0.4 02 0.2 0.0-0.2-0.4-0.6-0.8-1.0-1.0-0.8-0.6-0.4-0.2 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 No fiscal rule Fiscal ru ule 1.0 0.8 0.6 0.4 02 0.2 0.0-0.2-0.4-0.6-0.8-1.0-1.0-0.8-0.6-0.4-0.2 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 No fiscal rule AFR ASIA LAC EUR Sources: IMF Fiscal rules database (2012); and IMF staff estimates. 10
Cyclically-Adjusted Budget Balance Rules 80 70 60 Percentage of countries Countercyclical Procyclical 50 40 30 20 10 0 Cyclically-adjusted No cyclically-adjusted Sources: IMF Fiscal rules database (2012); and IMF staff estimates. 11
Well Defined Escape Clauses 80 70 60 Percentage of countries Countercyclical Procyclical 50 40 30 20 10 0 Well defined escape clause No escape clause or not well defined Sources: IMF Fiscal rules database (2012); and IMF staff estimates. 12
Index of the Quality of Fiscal Rules 3.5 Advanced economies 30 3.0 Developing economies 2.5 2.0 15 1.5 1.0 0.5 00 0.0 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 Sources: IMF Fiscal rules database (2012); and IMF staff estimates. 13
Conclusions More work is needed on the relation between fiscal rules and growth The adoption of some features of second generation fiscal rules can help reduce the procyclicality of fiscal policies However, these features raise non trivial technical and communication challenges The focus must not be solely on fiscal rules a strengthening of the broader fiscal framework is equally, and perhaps more, important 14
Thank you! 15