MIP6 Route Optimization Enhancements



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MIP6 Route Optimization Enhancements draft-arkko-mip6-ro-enhancements-00 Jari Arkko, jari.arkko@ericsson.com Christian Vogt, chvogt@tm.uka.de IETF 61, Washington D.C. Mobopts Meeting, November 10, 2004 Jari Arkko, Christian Vogt, IETF 61, Washington D.C., Mobopts Meeting, November 10, 2004 1

Outline Where we are Goals Toolbox Categorization Analysis Conclusion and future work Jari Arkko, Christian Vogt, IETF 61, Washington D.C., Mobopts Meeting, November 10, 2004 2

Where We Are MIP6 as part of the entire stack Jari Arkko, Christian Vogt, IETF 61, Washington D.C., Mobopts Meeting, November 10, 2004 3

Where We Are: The Big Picture MN Beacon AP/AR HA CN 802.11 Attachment L2 802.11 Authentication 802.1X & EAP 802.11i L3 IP6 Router Discovery IP6 DAD MIP6 Home Registration DNA ODAD Mobopts L3.5 MIP6 Correspondent Reg. L4 Transport-proto. proto. adjustment varies Jari Arkko, Christian Vogt, IETF 61, Washington D.C., Mobopts Meeting, November 10, 2004 4

Where We Are: MIP6 Route Optimization Registration issues Prove MN s ownership of HoA (authentication) Verify MN s presence at new CoA (flooding-attack prevention) Register new CoA No problem with home registration Security association authentication HoA ownership Trust relationship supersedes CoA test But how about correspondent registration? No security association How to authenticate unknown principals? (Certificates bind ID to public key, but ID typically HoA) No trust relationship How to ensure e presence at CoA? Solution adopted in MIP6: Return Routability Jari Arkko, Christian Vogt, IETF 61, Washington D.C., Mobopts Meeting, November 10, 2004 5

Where We Are: Return Routability RR is a compromise Efficiency Security under the pre-condition of universal applicability (low requirements, zero-configurability) RR may not be optimal in all scenarios Real-time applications reduce latency Confidential communications increase security Resource constraints relax signaling, processing overhead Jari Arkko, Christian Vogt, IETF 61, Washington D.C., Mobopts Meeting, November 10, 2004 6

Goals Improving and enhancing MIP6 RO Jari Arkko, Christian Vogt, IETF 61, Washington D.C., Mobopts Meeting, November 10, 2004 7

Goals Latency optimizations Security enhancements Signaling optimizations Applicability enhancements Jari Arkko, Christian Vogt, IETF 61, Washington D.C., Mobopts Meeting, November 10, 2004 8

Goals: Latency Optimizations 4 msg. exchanges IETF 61, Washington D.C. Register w/ HA Prove HoA ownership Verify presence at new CoA Register w/ CN 2 end-to to-end paths (longest governs delay) Chris Jari Chris HA Karlsruhe,, Germany Jari s HA Kauniainen, Finland Jari Arkko, Christian Vogt, IETF 61, Washington D.C., Mobopts Meeting, November 10, 2004 9

Goals: Security Enhancements RR narrows the windows of vulnerability to on-path, on-time attackers Off-path attacker cannot impersonate MN Off-path attackers cannot flood 3rd parties (through faked data-stream subscriptions) On-path attacker must be present constantly RR raises security level of mobile Internet to that of today s s Internet But we may still want to have a stronger, cryptographic mechanism Jari Arkko, Christian Vogt, IETF 61, Washington D.C., Mobopts Meeting, November 10, 2004 10

Goals: Signaling Optimizations 3 out of 4 msg. exchanges pertain to correspondent registration In HO case and periodically (Prevent time/space-shift shift attacks; limit attack to on-path, on-time) Overhead is not a problem for a communicating, moving MN but may be an issue for an idle,, temporarily non-moving MN Overhead issue in core network providing HA functionality? Jari Arkko, Christian Vogt, IETF 61, Washington D.C., Mobopts Meeting, November 10, 2004 11

Goals: Applicability Enhancements Since HoA and CoA are carried in each packet, pseudonymity, anonymity,, and location privacy are not provided. Reducing processing overhead at MNs by using cheaper authentication algorithms (Be careful of bidding-down down attacks!) or delegation. Jari Arkko, Christian Vogt, IETF 61, Washington D.C., Mobopts Meeting, November 10, 2004 12

Toolbox Strategies used in existing proposals Jari Arkko, Christian Vogt, IETF 61, Washington D.C., Mobopts Meeting, November 10, 2004 13

Toolbox: Latency Optimization Optimistic home registration (= Parallel home registration, correspondent reg. = Don t t wait for HA s Ack) Optimistic correspondent reg. (= Parallel correspondent reg., data exchange = Don t t wait for CN s Ack) Parallel HoA, CoA tests (send HoTI, CoTI simultaneously) Proactive HoA test (periodically, in anticipation) Proactive CoA test (requires 2 I/F) Diverting packets through HA (intermediate binding cancellation) Anticipated registration (new CoA through external mechanism) Concurrent CoA test (Heuristics, Credit-Based Authorization) RFC-3775 3775-conformant Modifications Jari Arkko, Christian Vogt, IETF 61, Washington D.C., Mobopts Meeting, November 10, 2004 14

Toolbox: Security Enhancements Encrypted tunnel secures signaling close to the MN Links close to the MN are likely to involve wireless links Stateless HoA, CoA tests Make the CN resilient to resource-exhaustion exhaustion attacks Cryptographically bound identifiers Bind MN s s identity to public key (routable MIP6 HoA,, CGA, or non-routable HIP HI) Pre-configuring shared keys MN and CN must know each other Adopted in RFC 3775 Modifications Jari Arkko, Christian Vogt, IETF 61, Washington D.C., Mobopts Meeting, November 10, 2004 15

Toolbox: Signaling Optimization Local mobility management Spare global signaling (plus the associated latency) Gradual binding-lifetime extension Relax binding-refreshment interval for non-moving MNs Jari Arkko, Christian Vogt, IETF 61, Washington D.C., Mobopts Meeting, November 10, 2004 16

Toolbox: Applicability Enhancements Reducing processing through alternative cryptographic algorithms E.g., use MD5 instead of SHA-1, ECC instead of RSA or through delegating authentication and vouching HA is less constrained than MN and may do expensive processing or signaling Jari Arkko, Christian Vogt, IETF 61, Washington D.C., Mobopts Meeting, November 10, 2004 17

Categorization and Analysis Looking at existing proposals Jari Arkko, Christian Vogt, IETF 61, Washington D.C., Mobopts Meeting, November 10, 2004 18

Categorization Local vs. End-to to-end Pre-conf conf. keys HMIP6 FMIP6 PKI DNSSEC RR CGA-OMIP6 EBU/CBA Pre-Configuration vs. Zero-Configuration Local support eliminates global signaling but implies investments in the access network and does not support cross-domain handovers Pre-configuration eliminates signaling and latency,, too but limits applicability End-to to-end approaches are cost-effective effective and work w/ any access network but require longer RTTs Jari Arkko, Christian Vogt, IETF 61, Washington D.C., Mobopts Meeting, November 10, 2004 19

Analysis Reasonable relationship btw. efficiency, security gain and deployment cost Proposals usually use more than one strategy from the toolbox Community analysis is paramount for any new proposal E.g. early RR, CGA, EBU had no sufficient protection against 3rd-party flooding Early BUB, OMIP6 were subject to Kilroy-was was-here-first attack Many of the existing proposals are mature Jari Arkko, Christian Vogt, IETF 61, Washington D.C., Mobopts Meeting, November 10, 2004 20

Conclusion and Future Work Lots more remains to be done Jari Arkko, Christian Vogt, IETF 61, Washington D.C., Mobopts Meeting, November 10, 2004 21

Conclusion and Future Work RR is the default; enhancements mainly for special usage scenarios (Fast movements, real-time applications, MNs in stand-by mode) No single enhancement, but a variety Future work Local enhancements w/o network support CoA verifications using lower-layer layer assistance or SEND Further enhancements that increase the cost for a particular attack to an unacceptable level (like CBA) Combining mobility and multi-homing Applying enhancements to other mobility protocols Experimental data (How usable are proposals as part of the complete stack?) Publication as RFC (Wider deployment can yield more insight as well) Jari Arkko, Christian Vogt, IETF 61, Washington D.C., Mobopts Meeting, November 10, 2004 22