1 TERRORISM IN AFRICA By Anneli Botha and Hussein Solomon Terrorism, in particular Islamic extremism, presents a real threat to regional and international security. On a global scale, the biggest threat presented by Islamic militancy does not necessarily lie in a temporary hold on political and economic power in a particular country, but rather in the formation of a transnational terror network that has disastrous consequences as witnessed in the Kenya and Tanzania US Embassy bombings followed by the 11 September incidents. Both examples affected Africa. African countries were used as a target for an operation directed against a foreign government, while in the second example Africans were directly and indirectly involved. These and other acts of terrorism lead to a classification between victims and agents of terrorism despite this simplified classification, African countries, as the focus of this article manifest a growing transnational threat to international security. The reason for this argument can be found in the assessment of the following two factors: Africa, as with other Third World countries, provides the breeding ground for transnational terrorist activities. Lack of interest and definite commitment from the developed world as well as specific African governments to pro-actively counter this threat. Despite the renewed focus on the influence of religion in violence and terrorism after the September 11, 2001 attacks, discussions and projects to date have a distinguished Middle Eastern and Asian focus in explaining the impact of religion, and in particular Islam, in violence and terrorism. In many African countries Islam represented itself as the religion of the underdog against corrupt elites. The simple truths of Islam may hold a particular appeal for the dispossessed masses of Third World countries that are struggling to find meaning in their lives at a time of great cultural and economic change. This Islamic resurgence is, in essence, a response to the confusion and anxiety of modernity and can be described as a socio-political resistance movement based on religious concepts. Despite the moderate spread of the religious principles of Islam focussed on peace, tolerance and good moral values, Muslim influence has been insidious in it's spread and often accomplished by the "behind-the scenes" supply of finance and arms to various tribes and factions that are already in conflict. Islamic "advisors" from Iran and Lebanon have Anneli Botha and Hussein Solomon are members of the Centre for International Political Studies, University of Pretoria. Hussein Solomon is also a Research Associate of the Africa Institute of South Africa.
2 been providing weapons and explosives to various African groups since at least 1990, and have ingratiated themselves in the inner circles of a number of African regimes. As a result the Islamic world, including African governments, are struggling to contain Islamic pressures and to respond to a widespread desire among their citizens for a more "Islamic" government and society, usually achieved through the use of violence. Even in countries where there is little prospect that Islamic forces will rule in the near future, Islamic extremists present a threat across cultural and ethnic borders. Islamic militancy is distinguished from any other form of religious militancy or violence by its universal occurrence across national and ethnic borders. The involvement of Islamic militants in acts of violence has led to numerous governments as well as international defence and security organisations indicating that they count Islamic militancy as being among the greatest threats to their security. In other words, Islam is currently on the defensive against its own militant elements that misuse Islamic principles to further their own interests. Islamic groups that choose violence and militancy represent a small, although growing, minority within Africa that presents a clear and present threat to national, regional and international stability. With the latest developments in transnational terrorism, Muslims reject any link between Islam and extremist groups, pointing out that the (Saudi) Wahabite doctrine has helped the terrorist phenomenon emerge with the Islamic Salafi organizations, and created a link between the Islamic organizations which share a common ideological denominator based on a comprehensive hegemony ideology. Islam as a threat to the internal and external security of countries in Africa is binomial: i) The Islamic revival has led to the establishment of more radical Muslim groups, which according to authorities, are aimed at subverting their rule. ii) The second phenomenon to emerge in Africa over the last year has been clashes between rival Islamic groups that, with the formation of transnational terror networks, become a secondary threat to national security. The following article will be divided into the following sections: 1. The manifestation of terrorism in Africa as compared to the rest of the world, followed by an assessment of the situation in the different regions (figures provided in Patterns of Global Terrorism published by the United States Department of State). Through this discussion the primary role-players will also be introduced. 2. Reasons for extremism. 3. Modus operandi and target selection of terror groups in Africa.
3 4. Discussion on the difference between targets and agents of terrorism. 5. Government reaction MANIFESTATION Africa is the continent with the largest Muslim population and as such, presents fertile ground for the growth and spread of violence and terrorism associated with Islam. To date this trend has manifested itself primarily in the Northern African region, where the majority of the population is either predominantly or totally Muslim, in contrast to the predominantly non- Muslim sub-saharan Africa, where Islamic militancy is a growing phenomenon. During the late 1990 s Islamic extremism was manifested into two different areas on the African continent: The containment of Islamic subversion in the Horn of Africa and in West Africa Ethiopia, Eritrea, Nigeria and Senegal; Intense activities of radical organizations that manifested in violence in the Eastern and Southern regions Uganda, Tanzania and South Africa. Since 1995 Africa witnessed an increase in the number of terrorist attacks against foreigners or foreign interests. Most attacks stemmed from internal civil unrest and spilled over from regional wars, as African rebel movements and opposition groups resorted to terrorism in an attempt to further their political, social, or economic objectives. Only 8% of international acts of terrorism were committed on African soil from 1995 till 2001, making it the fifth most targeted continent after Latin America, Western Europe, Asia and the Middle East. It is expected that this trend will change as a result of the war against terrorism, as terror groups and network look for more suitable targets. African countries, as with the rest of the third world, lack the resources to prevent acts of terrorism, making it a suitable playing field, although the primary target might be the United States, Israel and the Western world. Despite this representation, it is important to focus the reader s attention on the fact that the figures used only reflect on the number of international attacks where the target involved persons of another nationality. In addition to these incidents African countries are plagued by periods of domestic terrorism, with devastating effects on human life, stability and development. International Acts of Terrorism by Region: 1995-2001 Latin America 9% 25% 38% Asia Africa North America Eurasia Middle East Western Europe 6% 1% 8% 13%
4 Evaluating the cost of terrorism in terms of loss to human life; international acts of terrorism, Africa recorded 5932 casualties out of 194 acts of terrorism between 1995 and 2001, making Africa the second continent, after Asia, with the most casualties. Direct costs, in terms of devastation to infrastructure and indirect costs, through the withdrawal of investors and tourism, one of Africa s biggest industries, cannot be calculated. Number of Attacks versus Casualties per Region: 1995-2001 305 5932 10364 199 923 2712 3322 1252 Casualties Number of Attacks 194 335 154 233 19 625 Africa Asia Euroasia Latin America Middle East North America Western Europe Breaking this figure up, 1998 recorded the most casualties as a result of the Kenyan and Tanzanian bombings. It is also important to recognise the increase in the number of attacks and intensity (reflected in the number of casualties) since 1998. Number of Attacks versus Casualties in Africa: 1995-2001 8 80 28 5379 185 102 150 Casualties Number of Attacks 10 11 55 53 11 33 21 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 Common to all the extremist organizations is the goal to establish a religious Islamic state. The organizations, however, differ in the way they perceive society, government and their modus operandi. Consequently two main streams can be discerned within these organizations: i) The conservative / moderate stream: The Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt the FIS in Sudan and Al-Nahdha in Tunisia are currently identified with this stream, as was the Algerian FIS until its violent confrontation with the government. The leaders of this stream:
5 Believe that most of society, including the politicians, are good Muslims but must be more observant with the religious laws and must enhance Islamic awareness. Support co-existence with the regimes. Strive to achieve their goals by legitimate or semi-legitimate means while refraining from violence. However, in the past there have been incidents where moderate extremist movements or some of their members have had violent confrontations with a particular regime. This was the case with the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt during Nasser s regime, and the most recent and prominent example of this is the Algerians FIS transformation from a movement co-existing with the regime to one that is violently opposed it. ii) The Radical/Extremist Stream: The supporters of this stream reject the existing political and social order, operating outside the boundaries of acceptable political dissent. According to this stream the establishment of an Islamic state is only possible through the destruction of the current order, through violence. Jihad organizations refer to the concept jihad as a religiously sanctioned military confrontation in a revolutionary sense. In his book, Mu Alim Fi Al-Tariq, Sayyed Qutb gave to the concept jihad a new revolutionary meaning: (Jihad) religious war against Muslim leaders who fail to fulfil the tenets of Islam and are therefore to be considered infidels. The idea of jihad in this sense was first espoused by the Islamic liberation party but was developed into a general concept and modus operandi by Muhammad Abd Al-Salam Farj, the Jihad organization s ideologist, who assassinated Sadat in November, 1981. In his book, Al-Faridha Al-Ghayba Farj explains the revolutionary meaning of jihad. He accuses the religious sages of neglecting Jihad and sees it at the only way of reinstating Islam to its former glory, through: Using force against governments perceived as heretic, particularly because those in power neglected the duty of Islam in renewing the image of Islam. Establishing an Islamic state based on their interpretation of Islam. Giving higher priority to war against infidel Muslim leaders rather than war against foreign imperialism based on the assumption that imperialism stems from the infidel rulers themselves. Organizing underground conditions into a military framework. Making a special effort to penetrate security power bases the army and security forces in order to acquire weapons and useful means to fight the particular regimes. The aforementioned characteristics of the activities of Islamic extremism could be presented as:
6 Attempts to implement the Shari a or Islamic Law and to turn countries into Islamic Republics. These demands have been voiced in Nigeria, Senegal, Tanzania, Ethiopia and Somalia. Already adopted by Sudan and, in part, by Nigeria. An attempt to destabilize the traditional orthodox establishment on all levels. This has been the case in Nigeria, Senegal, Tanzania and Kenya. Demands for equality, representation in the government and the recognition of unique religious needs, especially in countries where the Muslim community are in the minority. This is also used as a trap for government officials: although legitimate, if the authorities do not comply, they are presented as anti-islam and serve as a focus for mobilization and recruitment. The manipulation of racial and social ferments based on a sense of discrimination and deprivation of Muslims. In Tanzania, Senegal, Kenya, Nigeria and Uganda social ferment led to violence and riots. In addition to jihad organizations an Al-Takfir stream also exists within the radical stream. Although these groups are extreme in their interpretation of Islamic principles they call for isolation from society. Although violent clashes might occur, the threat presented by this stream is limited. NORTH AFRICA Most of the countries in North Africa are characterised by desperate socio-economic conditions and military dominated governments that use repressive measures to consolidate their hold on power, thus providing the ideal conditions for natural discontent and the growth of militant sentiments. Since the Sudanese government s declared aim and actions to promote its brand of Islamism, it added to the tensions and instability in the region. Each of the North African states is characterised by a different manifestation of Islamic militancy and politics and their governments react in different ways to the political realities in their respective countries. Most of the governments, however, apply stringent security measures to deal with Islamic groups (both moderates and militants) while some follow a two-pronged approach by also attempting to involve more moderate Islamic opposition in political processes. This trend contributed to indiscriminate and spiralling acts of violence, as occurred particularly in Algeria and Egypt (al-jamā ah al Islāmiyyah and Harakat al-jihād al-islāmī (al-jihad)). The perception of the nature and extent of the militant Islamic threat (real or imagined) by states, also increasingly determines the nature and content of their internal and foreign policies. In general, the various militant Islamic groups themselves are characterised by internal divisions and distrust, which affect their attempts to establish a coordinated opposition or control over the actions of their followers.
7 The efforts by the governments of Morocco, Tunisia and Libya to eradicate the power base of Islamic militants appear to be more successful, but their failure to address underlying causes (largely related to autocratic rule, human rights abuses and socio-economic decline), means that Islamic militancy still represents a growing and potentially disruptive trend in these countries. TERRORISM IN EGYPT The most prominent Islamic organization in Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) and the two main militant Islamic groups, the al-jamā ah al Islāmiyyah and Harakat al-jihād al-islāmī (al- Jihad) accuse the Mubarak government of being an authoritarian, secular government and follow diverse campaigns to achieve their objectives. While the predominantly moderate MB attempts to establish an Islamic political identity at grassroots level by non-violent means, inter alia by gaining control over the educational systems, professional organizations and trade unions, increasing the value and visibility of Islamic religious symbols among communities and by distributing pro-islamic material, the militant groups attempt to overthrow the government through a jihad. The Al-Jihad (which was responsible for Sadat s assassination in 1981 and consists mainly of Islamic militia who fought in Afghanistan) is particularly militant in its approach. Islamic militancy presents a growing threat in Egypt, as is evident from a significant increase in violent incidents and armed clashes between the Egyptian security forces and the Islamic militants since the end of 1994. Although the incidents are primarily limited to Egypt s southern regions, the conflict could escalate to the northern regions and result in a recurrence of sporadic terrorist incidents in urban centres such as Cairo and Alexandria as well as tourist destinations. The Egyptian security forces introduced harsh security measures against these groups and believe in the total elimination of all militants. As a result of increased security measures terrorism within Egypt dramatically decreased. Most of its high-ranking extremists fled to other countries to establish and expand terror networks, therefore facilitating transnational terror networks. Probably the best example would be the alignment of al- Jamā ah al Islāmiyyah and Harakat al-jihād al-islāmī (al-jihad) with Usama bin Laden s al- Qa ida network. TERRORISM IN ALGERIA Simplistic analyses date the onset of Islamic-motivated terrorism to the interruption of elections in January 1992 with the banning of the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS). Since then the country (civilians, government officials and foreigners) were targeted by attacks and indiscriminate bomb explosions. Tactics also include the creation of false roadblocks. More than 15,200 rebels had been killed in the war, of the total official death toll of approximately 100,000 people. Despite the amnesty deal in January 2000 violence has continued, returning
8 to urban areas in 2002, and killings in the hinterland of the capital, Algiers, has increased in frequency and brutality. The reported killing of the leader of the Groupe islamique armée (GIA: the main militant Islamist group) by the army in July provoked a ferocious backlash of revenge killing, much as it did when the army killed his predecessor on February i. According to official reports more than 1,000 people have been killed in attacks blamed on Algeria s Islamist militants since the beginning of the year. The most troubled provinces are those in the west of the country. The mountainous countryside of Chlef, Ain Defla and Relizane has continued to see large-scale attacks against civilians attributed to the Group islamique armée (GIA) and its breakaway factions. During a conference on terrorism in October 2002, General Maiza ii (the chief of staff of one of the six military regions) announced that between 600 and 650 Islamic extremists remained active in the country, down from the figure of 27,000 previously cited by the military sources. The most active Islamist group in Algeria was the group led by Hassan Hattab, known as the Salifist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC), whose strength was estimated at between 350 and 380 men. It was founded in 1998 by a dissident of the GIA and is active in the Berber-dominated region of Kabylia in the north-east, as well as areas further east in Batna and Tebessa. The GSPC split from the GIA over the killing of civilians, with the GSPC deciding to target only the security forces. The GIA had split up into at least four dissident groups excluding the GSPC. 1. The more ruthless GIA is based south of Algiers and has only about 60 fighters. The group includes hardcore veterans of the Afghan war against Soviet occupation in the 1980s. In addition autonomous groups exist outside the hierarchy of the GIA but share its doctrine, which holds that the Algerian people are infidels and therefore could be massacred without religious sanction. 2. Humaat Adaaw a al-salafiya (Defenders of the Salafi Call). Strength estimated at 60 or 70 men and operates in the provinces of Ain Defla and Relizane. 3. The Salafi Group for Jihad, composed of about 60 men, active in the provinces of Ain Defla and Tissemsilt. 4. The Fighting Salafi Group, numbering about 80 men, describing it as closer to the GSPS and active in a triangle between the provinces of Chlef, Tiaret and Tissemsilt in the Ouarsenis Mountains. In addition to the terror campaign within Algeria, terrorism also spread to France, Algeria s former colonial power that has a large Algerian population. The terror campaign of the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) and the Armed Islamic Group (GIA) in France included the bombings at
9 the Regional Express Underground Railway in July 1995 and again in 3 December 1996. The group has also been linked to the arrest of weapon smugglers into the United States from Canada in December 1999 iii. WESTERN AFRICA Although the Muslim populations of West African countries vary, between 95% in the case of Guinea and Senegal and 30% in the case of Sierra Leone, Islamic militancy has not really manifested as the main threat to the stability of this region. However, the large Muslim presence in the West African region, together with political instability and socio-economic decline, provide ideal breeding grounds for religious tensions and Islamic militancy. In this regard the presence of militant Islamic preachers and support (financial and in other fields such as education) by Algerian, Libyan, Iranian and Pakistani Islamic groups, as well as the involvement of the latter governments in Western African countries, contributes to the spread of militant ideas. The Senegalese government forces arrested several hundred Islamic leaders and Islamic militants early in 1994, following incidents of public violence and armed clashes. The contact between certain Islamic organizations in Senegal with Islamic groups in, inter alia, Algeria and Iran, attracted the necessary concern from the Senegalese authorities. In December 1994 the government expelled two aid officials from Chad and Sudan after accusing them of furthering Islamic militancy. In an attempt to curb the spread of Islamic militancy, foreign ministers of the Saharan Sahel countries, including Senegal, Mali and Mauritania also signed an official joint security agreement during 1995 iv. Despite this initiative, Mali president Alpha Oumar Konaré has repeatedly warned of rising Islamist agitation from organisations that include the Malian Hizbullah, and from individual preachers in Bamako and major regional cities. During the 1990 s Mali also experienced an upswing in unrest among former Tuareg fighters of the Mouvement des Fronts Unis de l'azaouad, some of who have alleged experience in Afghanistan. During March 1996, four years after sighing the Bamako peace agreement, the group dissolved v. During 2000 authorities in Senegal arrested Mohanbedou Ould Slahi, originally from neighbouring Mauritania (a brother-in-law of Khaled al-shanquitione, one of Usama bin Laden s key lieutenants vi ), who, according to United States authorities, was linked to the arrest of Ahmed Ressam in a car loaded with explosives and detonators in the United States (on 14 December 1999) vii. Sierra Leone has reportedly been identified by Iran as a springboard for the spread of their Islamic ideas in the Western African region and an Iranian-backed radio station has already been set up in that country. Security problems in Sierra Leone spiked during the first half of
10 1999 when Revolutionary United Front (RUF) rebels mounted an offensive on Freetown in January. Despite the failure of this offensive and individual clashes the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) again attracted the attention of investigatiors after the September 2001 attacks. According to reports, the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) rebels sold diamonds to Usama Bin Ladin s al-qa ida terrorist network prior to the attacks in the United States as a pro-active measure in the event that the United States would freeze al-qa ida bank accounts viii. Niger has over 50 registered Muslim organisations in the aftermath of the September 2001 attacks and two of these organizations which are described as 'radical', were banned: namely the Nigériene Islamic Organisation, led by El Hadj Aboubacar Issa, and the Association for Islamic Culture and Development, which is led by Cheikh Souleiman Youssouf. TERRORISM IN NIGERIA Terrorism in Nigeria could be broadly divided into two categories: Religious motivated terrorism on ethnic borders between Muslims and Christians and between Yoruba and Hausa. Kaduna in northern Nigeria forms the basis of conflict between Christians and Muslims. Even at local level, fighting takes on an ethnic or religious character, since Christianity and the Yoruba and Ibo people are associated with the south, and Islam and the Hausa people with the north. Usually, the conflict has been sparked by local rivalries, but fuelled by wider regional resentments, whether on commercial or political differentiations. The first state to implement Shari a was the overwhelmingly Muslim Zamfara, and their transition passed off largely peacefully. But in Kaduna - which has a substantial Christian minority - the mere mention of Shari a has sparked bloodshed and destruction. Although Nigerian Muslim leaders gave their assurance that Shari a law will not affect the lives of the Christian minority in Shari a states Christians in Kaduna turned to peaceful demonstrations that grew to open violence. Out of 36 states, all 12 northern states have embraced Shari a law. According to Professor Paden, between 5,000 and 7,000 people have been killed in the north in clashes, stimulated by religious conflict since 1999 ix. The Iranianbacked Islamic Movement is active in the north and has close tribal and religious ties with Senegal s Islamic militants, through Sufi and Marabout Islamic fraternities. Economic motivated terrorism for control of oil reserves, particularly in southern Nigeria, directed against multi-national corporations. Nigerians, particularly in the oilproducing southern regions, demanded a larger share of the nation's oil wealth. Radical ethnic Ijaw youth resorted to violence against oil firms as a means of expressing their grievances. The most common modus operandi include the abduction of foreign oil workers, followed by the demand for ransom from the victims' employers as well as compensation from the government on behalf of their village, ethnic group, or larger community. In most cases the youths held the hostages for only a few days before releasing them unharmed. During 2000 approximately 300
11 people, including 54 foreigners, were abducted between April and July. The most serious kidnapping incident occurred on 31 July when armed youths attacked two oildrilling rigs and took 165 hostages, including seven US citizens and five Britons. All hostages were released unharmed on 4 August x. During riots in the northern Nigerian city of Kaduna on 25 November 2002 between Muslims and Christians more than 200 people were killed. The violence began when Muslim youths began protesting in opposition to the staging of the Miss World beauty contest in Nigeria. More than 1,000 people were arrested in connection with the riots. The possibility that violence might spread to other cities, and even to the capital, Abuja, and the south eastern city of Aba could not be excluded. One could, however, respect the position of Muslim clerics that were opposed the idea of hosting the beauty contest on the grounds that it would be a parade of nudity offensive to Islamic principles, thereby reflecting a lack of understanding to the religion and its values. EASTERN AFRICA Until the bombings in 1998 in Kenya and Tanzania the general perception was held that, notwithstanding the significant percentage of Muslims in sub-saharan Africa, the phenomenon of Islamic militancy had not developed into a significant threat to the stability of Eastern African countries. Despite this perception Islamic militant groups were formed and motivated by the following objectives: Opposition to particular government systems, fuelled by dissatisfaction with the inability of the governments to address socio-economic problems; Political aspirations; Ethnicity and tribalism; and External influences. Even before the bombings in 1998 Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania have, in recent years, had to cope with violent actions by armed Islamic activists. In all three countries government policy in general was to marginalize the support base of militants by recognising and accommodating official, moderate Islamic organizations, while maintaining harsh security action against militant elements. The Kenyan, Tanzanian and Ugandan governments also share the concern of other governments in the region about Sudan s Islamization ambitions and its role beyond its borders. The deterioration of relations between Uganda and Sudan led to the decision by Uganda to end diplomatic relations with Sudan on 23 April 1995 - after Uganda accused Sudan of providing finance and training to the Lord s Resistance Army (LRA), a Northern Ugandan rebel group while Sudan accused Uganda of supporting the SPLA in Southern Sudan xi. With Iranian mediation diplomatic relations between these two countries resumed in September 1996 xii. Despite diplomatic relations, distrust between the two countries continue,
12 with the accusations from the Ugandan government that Sudan provides arms and sanctuary to the following northern-based Ugandan rebel groups: the Ugandan West Nile Bank Front (WNBF); The Lord s Resistance Army; the Uganda National Rescue Front II and the Ugandan Democratic Freedom Movement xiii. The latter believe that they will be protected from enemy gunfire by torn pieces of the Qur an xiv. The Sudanese government was further accused of providing aid in the creation of the Ugandan Islamic Battalion (consisting of northern Ugandan Muslims) in 1992 and providing military training to its members. On the other hand Sudan accused Uganda of arming and supporting the Sudan People s Liberation Army (SPLA) xv. In Tanzania, a militant Islamic group, the Mujahideen Rovers (MR), has declared a holy war against the government. Although the MR does not have the strategic or logistical ability to overthrow the Tanzanian government, its call for jihad constitutes a threat. In addition Sudan is also providing support to the Balukta (Council for Reciting the Qur an), particularly active in Dar es-salaam and Zanzibar. The organization primarily attracted attention when the Tanzanian government banned the organization after supporters vandalized butcheries that sold pork. The possibility that militant Muslims may use Zanzibar as a springboard for their activities and ideas is a matter of great concern. During 1993 allegations were also made that Balukta had links with Iran xvi. TERRORISM IN KENYA The involvement of the Islamic Relief Organizations (NGO s) within the Islamic community in Kenya increased in the wake of the August 1998 attack against the U.S. Embassy in Nairobi. Mercy International Relief Agency was implicated in the bombing after FBI agents found a receipt in its files that referred to plans to obtain weapons from Somalia xvii. The stated purpose of the relief organizations was to extend aid (distribute food and providing education) to the needy, under the banner of Islam. NGOs had been closed down by Kenyan authorities immediately after the attack against the U.S. Embassy, but following ferment and protest among the Muslims and an appeal to the supreme court, the Kenyan authorities retracted the ban. Islamic extremists in Kenya s political and public systems took advantage of the ferment to increase their political activities. The group that claimed responsibility for the Kenya and Tanzania Embassy bombings, Islamic Army for the Liberation of the Holy Places did not attract any direct attention after the attacks. Despite an attempt by the Kenyan Government to counter the threat of Islamic extremism through dealing with the particular issues that led to the rise of the extremism on 28 November 2002, The Army of Palestine accepted responsibility for a co-ordinated attack that included a suicide bombing at an Israeli-controlled hotel in Mombassa that killed 13 people (including three suicide bombers) and injuring 80 people. The firing of two missiles in Mombassa on an Israeli airliner (no injuries) followed this
13 incident. Evidence that both groups are cover organizations for al-qa ida with additional links with Al-Itihad al-islami xviii is expected to be found. HORN OF AFRICA Tensions and the potential for conflict in this region can increasingly be ascribed to the phenomenon of Islamic militancy. This trend relates to Sudan s southern and eastern neighbours view that a non-muslim southern Sudan should serve as a buffer between them and Sudanese Islamization attempts. The governments and intelligence services of Ethiopia and Eritrea currently regard the phenomenon of Islamic militancy (and Sudan s role in this regard) as one of the most important threats to their existing order. Despite the active role of Sudan the region, in terms of its geographical location, insufficient government control and a young Muslim population faced with inadequate socio-economic conditions, presents a breeding ground for extremism as well as a transit point for external elements into Africa. SOMALIA Somalia s Muslim population is predominantly moderate, but since the breakdown of state authority with the fall of Mohammed Siad Barre s regime in January 1991 and the political void that it created, an opportunity has been presented to Islamic extremists to step up their activities. Radical Islamic organizations, which had previously operated in a limited and clandestine manner, began to function in the open. These organizations favour the spread of Islam, the conversion of Somalia into an Islamic Republic and support a stricter observance of Islamic law (Shari a) as a means of instilling some form of law and order. The dominant Islamic organization in Somalia is Al-Itihad Al-Islami. It is a militant organization that advocates the transformation of Somalia into an Islamic republic. In the late 1990 s its activities extended over wide areas in and outside Somalia. Other Islamic organizations working alongside Al-Itihad include: The Somali Islamic Front; The Islamic Movement in Somali; The Jihad Al-Islam; and The Muslim Brotherhood. According to previous allegations Sudanese advisors are present in Mogadishu and southern Somalia (Luuq). The role of Sudan as a centre for the training of extremist elements throughout the world also includes the provision of training to Somali activists in Sudan. After intensive activities Islamic organizations managed to implement Shari a law in extensive parts of the country, especially in the capital Mogadishu, which entrenched their influence within the Somali population. Their influence has grown as a result of promises for personal safety, the distribution of food to the needy and the provision of legal assistance for the solution of local conflicts by means of ad-hoc conciliation committees. Since its formation Al- Ittihad developed as a decentralized structure with different objectives and modus operandi from area to area throughout the Horn of Africa. According to the Ethiopian Foreign Ministry,
14 al-ittihad had direct contact with Bin Laden. The political reality in Somalia, and the organization s need of foreign aid make this country a convenient refuge and base for foreign radicals and extremists. In retrospect allegations were made during the late 1990 s that Islamic extremists known as the Arab Afghans connected with Usama bin Laden arrived in Somalia from Sudan and Yemen, and that funds were received to facilitate a number of Al- Itihad training camps. According to United States officials two or three top Al-Itihad leaders disappeared since the 11 September 2001, believed to be in hiding xix. Despite these allegations, other sources reported that the organization disbanded and is no longer active xx. In addition, the Ethiopian government implicated al-ittihad in the assassination attempt of its minister of transport and communication in 1996 and a series of hotel bombings in Addis Ababa, Harar, and Dire Dawa in the past 5 years xxi. Ethiopia has responded by periodically attacking al-ittihad bases within Somalia xxii. The threat of terrorism reaches beyond this organization as Somalia itself, with its long coastline and lack of government,t could be used as a transit point for transnational extremist groups. ETHIOPIA Islamic extremism in Ethiopia is mainly found in the Ogaden area in Eastern Ethiopia, among groups of the Somali and Oromo. Tribes resorted to terrorism and harassment against government targets and against civilians in the Ogaden Area, preventing the orderly implementation of government in the area. Most radical Islamic activities in Ethiopia are being carried out by the following three organizations: Al-Itihad Al-Islami (whose origin and major infrastructure are in Somalia, as presented in above discussion); The Islamic Liberation Front of Oromo (ILFO) (its primary objective is self-determination for the Oromo and for transformation of Oromia to an Islamic State); and the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) (which is considered to be a relatively moderate Islamic movement). The latter, however, formed a militant faction that is mainly active in Gode, Ogaden. In October 2000 the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) formally announced the reunification of the Islamic Liberation Front of Oromo (ILFO), the Oromo Liberation Council (OLC), the Oromo Liberation Ffront (OLF), the Oromo People s Liberation Organization (OPLO) and the United Oromo People s Liberation Front (UOPLF), and the formation of the joint United Liberation Front of Oromiya (ULFO) xxiii. The military faction has ties with Sudanese extremists while extremist elements in Somalia provide them with weapons. Although Ethiopian authorities requested the governments of Iran, Sudan and Saudi Arabia to cease assisting the Islamic organizations operating in Ethiopia, Islamic extremist elements from Somalia might take advantage of the tension between Ethiopia and Eritrea over the border dispute to reconstruct their infrastructure and resume activities against Ethiopian targets.
15 The decision of the United States to set up an anti-terrorist headquarters in the Horn of Africa in November 2002 in its war against terrorism will not only support the region in combating terrorism, it might also influence an increase in anti-us sentiments. The United States is increasing its forces stationed around the Horn of Africa to about 1,200 troops. Approximately 400 troops were sent to Djibouti to set up their headquarters xxiv. SOUTHERN AFRICA For more than two decades, Angola has been plagued by the protracted civil war between the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) and the Angolan Government. In addition to the immediate threat to its citizens and foreign investors, the conflict also has a regional impact in that it often spread to Namibia, with the abduction and killing of Namibian civilians in cross-border conflicts. Although Islamic extremism in comparison with Northern African countries does not present the same threat in terms of numbers, a threat still exists. Zambia even broke diplomatic relations with Iran and Iraq during 1993 after accusing the two countries of sponsoring religious and political disturbances in an attempt to make Zambia ungovernable xxv. Taking the above into consideration, the threat of Islamic extremism and transnational terrorism cannot be evaluated in terms of numbers, but rather on the basis of the ideology and commitment of individuals and organizations. In addition to the threat of extremism, the interrelation between the transnational flow of narcotics, firearms and precious metals, domestic instability and terrorism presents a clear threat to security. Domestic instability would probably be a central issue in that it divides the attention of security forces away from the real issues thereby presenting a breeding ground and safe heaven for transnational organized crime and terrorism. Considering the focus of this article, attention should also be given to the question of whether the actions of the Zimbabwean government could be classified as state-sponsored terrorism? In addition to the treatment of white farmers and opposition supporters, that government s "anti-terrorism" bill threatens the death penalty for anyone convicted of acts of "insurgency, banditry, sabotage and terrorism" xxvi. The bill is widely perceived to be a tool to crack down on the opposition party, and in so doing, creating a threat to the honouring of basic human rights. TERRORISM IN SOUTH AFRICA Although not on the same level as the crime and violence already discussed, South Africa s internal security (as part of a transnational phenomenon) is threatened by both Islamic and right wing motivated extremism. In contrast to earlier manifestations of terrorism, South Africa, as well as the rest of the world, is confronted by a new trend of terrorism. Although ideology as a motivation for terrorism could be clearly identified in larger movements, small independent cells, if not individuals, are conducting the planning and execution of acts of
16 terrorism. Police and intelligence structures need to accept that although these manifestations of terror may not be considered as rational, they really exist. Right-wing extremism Although not a new threat to stability, the recent exposure of a right-wing conspiracy to overthrow the government by force attracted attention. In addition to the prior threat, the possible transnational threat of this phenomenon was re-affirmed. One of the accused, after resigning from the South African Defence Force, went to the United States where he made contact with the Ku Klux Klan. Despite the assessment that right-wing elements who had "declared war" on the government pose little real danger to South African stability, its possible transnational character presents a threat to the stability of other countries. Islamic extremism Within the development of PAGAD s target selection, the process of how an organization develops, from a pressure group that functions within the boundaries of legitimate dissent, into a terrorist organization, was clearly illustrated. The increasing selectivity of targets by perpetrators of these acts of urban terrorism reflected a noteworthy qualitative shift in strategic objectives. Following the period of urban terror between 1996 and 2000, the arrest of prominent PAGAD leaders led to a dramatic decline in terror activities. Despite this immediate success, an analysis of the history of terror groups throughout the world presented a scenario in which the arrest (or death) of senior members is followed by a period of regrouping, which is then followed by a next wave of violence. Considering that the philosophy and reason for its existence is still there, to be used by internal and external roleplayers, the security community continues to monitor the situation. In addition to extremism, one is confronted by an international phenomenon that automatically broadens its capabilities and threat. In other words, the events of the Western Cape could re-occur as a manifestation of a much greater problem that could come to pass in other parts of the country under the right circumstances. REASONS FOR TERRORISM IN AFRICA The increasing spread of extremism in Africa is the result of the socio-political ferment born out of poor socio-economic conditions, which has characterized African countries ever since independence. African countries are confronted by corruption, worsening these conditions and their government s inability to deal with extremism. These conditions made African regimes unable to offer solutions to every-day socio-economic conditions, again contributing to instability. This state of affairs opened the door and enabled Islamic Relief Organizations (NGO s) to gain importance in providing necessary humanitarian services in the name of Islam in all aspects of life: Education, health, welfare and culture. Muslim countries or individuals wishing to spread Islam and to increase their influence on Muslim communities in African countries fund these organizations. Although some of these NGO s have legitimate
17 objectives, those in control of it use it as a vanguard for destabilizing activities. These objectives include the destabilization of regimes or the determination to change the composition of regimes. Another reason for the increasing importance of extremism in Africa is the political changes in some of the countries in the region. These changes proved to provide fertile ground for the growth of radical Islamic movements. The development of democracy and political pluralism enabled even the more radical Islamic groups to operate overtly, in an organized framework with greater effect and intensity. It also helped their integration into political systems after they concealed their illegal activities under the guise of legitimate objectives, with the assistance of outside role-players. Despite the decision in individual African countries to open the democratic process, history proved that most African countries banned Islamic organizations as soon as it gained prominence. In addition to the most common examples in Algeria and Egypt, Morocco also banned the most ardent Islamist groups. The intention was to align Islamic party candidates with the government making it unlikely that they would attack it outright for any links to the West. Experts that studied the causes and effects of terrorism agree that political changes and poor socio-economic conditions proved to be the primary reasons for the development of extremism and terrorism: for example, in the Horn of Africa radical Islamic activities intensified as a result of political changes in the early 1990 s. These activities included: i) Political pluralism in Ethiopia; ii) The institution of a secular regime in Eritrea; and iii) A political void in Somalia. These changes proved to be a fertile ground for the growth of radical Islamic movements. Although the levels of violence declined in Ethiopia and Eritrea as a result of government action signs of recuperation in the activities of these groups were identified. For example, the Al-Itihad Al-Islami in Somalia showed signs of recovery in 1999. In Eastern Africa the development of radical Islamic groups were stimulated by social ferment on the part of the Muslim minority that experienced a feeling of discrimination and deprivation. The development of Islamic extremism in this area was manifested in the establishment of Muslim political parties. The August 1998 US Embassy bombings in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam placed the activities of NGO s and local activities of extremist groups in a new light. In Kenya, a former cornerstone of economic development, slid into the current socio-economic and political decline as a result of insufficient government and administrative practices. Agriculture, formerly the revenue mainstay of the economy, tourism, commerce and industry has virtually come to a standstill. The economic collapse led to a desperate situation open to extremism.
18 In Central Africa most local Muslim communities are still marginal and not pose a direct threat to the government. However, since small Muslim communities are outside forces in the form of states, organizations and individuals will target these communities in the spread of their radical viewpoints. During the 1990 s Iran and Sudan proved to be the best-known external role-players. Based on past experiences it is safe to assume that external forces would use any possible cause as a recruitment incentive in mobilizing support for their ideals, although it may not always be openly stated. In presenting a pro-active threat analysis it will therefore be impossible to dismiss the developments in this region. In West African countries Muslim communities present a decisive majority, which presents a more significant threat. During the 1990 s, countries in this region were plagued by public turmoil as a result of the involvement of Islamic fundamentalist and extremist organizations. In Nigeria, the Ivory Coast and Senegal Muslim and Christian groups came into conflict over the nature of the government. Governments were however informed of the possible threat, which led to an immediate government reaction in Nigeria and Senegal in an attempt to deal with Islamic extremism. This pro-active stance proved to be successful, at least in the immediate aftermath. Despite extremism in northern Africa, the above-mentioned discussion also proved that a large Muslim population is not a pre-request for Islamic extremism and terrorism. Although a support base is needed for its activities to grow, transnational terrorism represents a changing trend in contrast to revolutionary terrorism, a former problem in Africa. Within the latter it was essential to have a large support base to equip the activist with necessary means to conduct its activities. This also acted as a balance to its activities, with target selections made so as not to alienate its larger support base (mostly residents of the country targeted), therefore the target selection was mostly discriminate. Transnational terrorism is in this regard alienated, receiving its means through other sources. MODUS OPERANDI AND TARGET SELECTION USED BY TERRORIST IN AFRICA In contrast to the most preferred modus operandi in Europe and the Middle East, the use of explosives reflect only 28% of the incidences of terrorism in Africa. Shooting incidents were the most frequently used modus operandi, represented by 47% of acts of terrorism. One of the most important contributing factors to instability (including terrorism, crime and violence) in Africa is the flow of illegal firearms as a result of inter- and intra-state warfare and instability. With the end of the Cold War and the conclusion of civil wars in most African countries, the continent is faced with extensive stockpiles of used and unused weapons. Since 1970, more that 30 wars have been fought in Africa. In 1996 alone 14 of the 53 countries were affected by armed conflicts xxvii. Stockpiles of weapons that were used and then
19 circulated by secondary and tertiary actors to other conflict areas are one of the primary concerns faced by governments. Most African countries do not have the resources to implement sufficient control over illegal weapons and border control measures. Terrorism in Africa: Modus Operandi 1990-2001 47% 16% 28% 8% 1% Explosives Knives Hijacking Hostage Shooting Contributing to the threat is a culture of violence. In some African countries it is easier and cheaper to buy an AK-47 than to provide a decent meal. The situation is made worse by an insufficient record system, due to the fact that no agency keeps comprehensive statistics on such sales, and arms dealers have little interest in revealing the details of these transactions. The availability of illegal weapons led to the emergence of warlords in Somalia (responsible for 7% of acts of terrorism in Africa) and Ethiopia (presenting 12% of acts of terrorism) and cult movements (the Lord s Resistance Army in Uganda). Terrorism in Africa: Target Selection 1990-2001 6% 3% 1% 10% 5% 1% 3% Civilian Commercial Diplomatic Government Humanitarian Missionary 71% NGO United Nations Africa also introduced a unique target selection, different from the situation in Europe and the Middle East. Although civilian targets are the most preferred targets (71%), commercial targets represent 10% of the targets followed by 9% directed against representatives of humanitarian assistance (including United Nations representatives). The latter introduce a
20 new trend, only similar to the target selection in Asia. An example of this is the abduction of members of the International Rescue Committee in August 1999 by the Joint Forces for Liberation of Liberia, who demanded fuel and other assistance in return for their release xxviii. In July 2001 gunmen in Mogadishu attacked a World Food Program convoy, killing six persons and wounding several others. In March the same year, also in Somalia, extremists attacked a Medecins Sans Frontieres medical charity facility, killing 11 persons, wounding 40, and taking nine hostages. The hostages were later released xxix. Despite the immediate effects of this trend, medium and long-term consequences cannot be estimated. Africa is in urgent need of humanitarian assistance, and yet humanitarians are considered to be soft targets. The attack on these initiatives, can be construed as an attack against reconstruction and development initiatives (the breeding ground for extremism). In countering this threat the International Criminal Court passed a Statute making it a war crime to intentionally direct attacks against personnel, installations, material, units and vehicles involved in humanitarian assistance and peacekeeping missions xxx. DIFFERENCE BETWEEN TARGET AND AGENT OF TERRORISM As presented in the introduction, the effect terrorism has on Africa could be divided into incidents were African countries were the targets of acts of terrorism and incidents were African nationals committed acts of terrorism in other countries. Although terrorism in Sudan only presents 8% of terrorism in Africa, Sudan is considered to be the primary actor or agent of terrorism in Africa. Algeria on the other hand is both an agent and target of terrorism. The 26% of terrorism only referred to acts of terrorism that had an impact on the international community. This reference does not reflect the country s domestic terrorism problem between the Algerian government and the Islamic Salvation Army (AIS), the military wing of the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) and the Armed Islamic Group (GIA). 1. TARGETS OF TERRORISM Both categories could be subdivided: for example, the former could be affected by international acts of terrorism (US Embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania) or the consequence of national-dominated political terrorism, that through indiscriminate acts of terrorism could have international consequences. This category will be discussed throughout the article.
21 AFRICAN COUNTRIES FREQUENTLY TARGETED BY TERRORISM 26% 8% 9% 16% 12% 7% 22% Ethiopia Egypt Sumalia Nigeria Sudan Algeria Sierra Leone In Egypt (22%) al-gama at al-islamiyya terrorists were responsible for 22% of the acts of terrorism directed against foreign tourists. Attacks on tourists took effect on 15 July 1992, when armed terrorists attacked a tour bus near Luxor xxxi. This trend escalated followed by shooting incidents and bombings directed at tour busses, cruise ships and trains transporting tourists in Cairo and Luxor, culminating in the shooting incident on 17 November 1997 at the Hatshepsut Temple in the Valley of Kings near Luxor that left 58 tourists dead and wounded 26 others (United States Department of State 1998:51). After this incident the Egyptian government introduced strict counter terrorism measures that led to an immediate end to attacks of terrorism. 2. AGENTS OF TERRORISM With respect to incidents were African nationals were responsible for acts of terrorism in other countries; the threat could be divided between state and individual/organizational actors. Within Africa, the governments of Sudan and Libya developed a reputation as the two most prominent agents of terrorism. They aided the development of international transnational terror networks (for example, al-qa ida) and incidents where an individual group was primarily responsible for terror acts in another country. Countries where insurgent groups have indiscriminately employed terrorist tactics and attacked civilians include the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Liberia and Sierra Leone. International terrorist organizations with Islamic ties, including al-qa ida and Lebanese Hizballah, have a presence in Africa and continue to exploit Africa s favourable operating environment, which includes: porous borders, conflict, lax financial systems and the wide availability of weapons to expand and strengthen their networks. Further, these groups are able to flourish in "failed states" or those with weak governments that are unable to monitor the activities of terrorists and their supporters within their borders. Press reports also indicate that terrorists may be using the illicit trade in conflict diamonds both to launder money and to finance their operations. SUDAN
22 Since August 1993, Sudan is on the list of state sponsors of terrorism. After Iran, Sudan is projected as the second most prominent supporter of terrorism. As a matter of fact the active role of Sudan as an agent of terrorism could be presented as an extension of Iran s involvement in terrorism in Africa. Iran regarded Sudan as a springboard into the Middle East and Africa, especially into Egypt. The latter is regarded as the main obstacle to Iran's hegemony in the Persian Gulf xxxii. The Sudanese Government, controlled and manipulated by the National Islamic Front (NIF), attempts to project itself as an example (besides Iran) of an Islamic state as a workable political system. Sudan spreads its interpretation of Islam on the African continent through military and religious training offered to foreigners, especially from African countries. During the 1990 s militants were trained at Iranian-backed military camps and academic/theological institutions in Sudan, the latter plays a central role in spreading its own interpretation of Islam, and particularly militant tendencies, throughout the African continent. This relationship was established in December 1991 with the visit of Iranian President Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, accompanied by Major General Mohsen Razai (commander of the Revolutionary Guards) and Brigadier General Ahmad Vahidi (the commander of the Quds Forces, a secret unit that exports the Islamic revolution). Besides the Iranian-backed military camps provided by the Revolutionary Guards in Sudan, reports indicate that the Palestinian Islamic Jihad as well as Hizballah has established training facilities in Sudan. Training was also provided to al- Jamā ah al Islāmiyyah, an-nahda (an outlawed Tunisian Islamic Group) and the Islamic Salvation Front xxxiii. The Sudanese government s hard-line approach to Islamization was again evident when General Al-Bashir stated, at a public gathering in southern Sudan during March 1995, that there would be no compromise with the rebel (largely Christian) Sudanese People s Liberation Army (SPLA) on the issue of the Islamic Shari a law. He remarked that negotiations on the issue of Shari a would only be conducted through the barrel of the gun. Sudan in 1999 continued to serve as a central hub for several international terrorist groups, including Usama Bin Laden s al-qa ida organization. The Sudanese Government also condoned Iran's assistance to terrorist and radical Islamist groups operating in and transiting through Sudan. Khartoum served as a meeting place, safe haven, and training hub for members of the Lebanese Hizballah, Egyptian Gama'at al-islamiyya, al-jihad, the Palistinian Islamic Jihad, HAMAS, and the Abu Nidal organization. Sudan's support to these groups included the provision of travel documentation, safe passage, and refuge. Most of the groups maintained offices and other forms of representation in the capital, using Sudan primarily as a secure base for organizing terrorist operations and assisting compatriots elsewhere. Sudan also continued to assist several Islamist and non-islamist rebel groups based in East Africa. Nonetheless, Sudan's relations with its neighbours appeared to improve in 1999. Ethiopia renewed previously terminated air links, while Eritrea considered re-establishing
23 diplomatic ties. Moreover, in early December, Sudan signed a peace accord with Uganda under which both nations agreed to halt all support for any rebel groups operating on each other's soil. Despite the fact that Sudan condemned the acts of terrorism in the United States that even included the investigation and apprehension of extremists suspected of being involved in terrorist activities, the country still remain a designated state sponsor of terrorism. A number of international terrorist groups including al-qa ida, the Egyptian Islamic Jihad, Egyptian al- Gama a al-islamiyya, the Palestine Islamic Jihad, and HAMAS continued to use Sudan as a safe haven, primarily for conducting logistic and other support activities. In addition to being an agent of terrorism Sudan has also been ravaged by a civil war since 1983 xxxiv, which killed an estimated two million people, complicated by issues including oil, tribal affiliation and religion. In working towards a peaceful settlement the Machakos protocol was signed between government representatives and the SPLM delegation on 20 July 2002; followed by the Nairobi agreement between the Government of Sudan and the Southern Sudan Liberation Movement (SSLM) of Riak Machiar signed on 21 July 2002. The main points of the agreement signed by Government of Sudan and the SPLA are the following: The Muslim Law (Shari a) will be applied only in the North of the country. There will be a separation between Church and State, at least in the South. The present Basic Law (Constitution) will be reviewed, and, where necessary, replaced, to accommodate these changes. There will be a sharing of political power between North and South, and its legitimate representatives. National revenues and wealth will be shared. Slavery will be banned. The parties will engage in talks to obtain a quick, national ceasefire. Present regional or local ceasefire agreements shall continue. The South will be given the right of self-determination. After a period of six years, a vote will take place on the possibility of Southern independence. LIBYA As with Sudan, Libya has been one of the most important state-agents of terrorism in the world. During the 1980's Iran, Iraq, Syria and Libya were responsible for 152 terrorist incidents, or 42% of all Middle Eastern terrorist activities in Western Europe. Inside Libya, Muammar Qadhafi operated 20 terrorist training camps, with separate facilities to train Palestinian, African and European terrorists.
24 During the 1990 s, the Libyan government, while projected in the Western media as an Islamic terrorist state, itself became a target of Islamic militants who called for the implementation of Shari a law and not the interpretation of Qadhafi. Therefore Libya is both an agent and a target of terrorism. As an agent of terrorism Libya is directly as well as indirectly involved in terrorism: for example, the Pan Am and UTA airliner bombings. Libya s indirect involvement in terrorism include the financial assistance to terrorist groups, logistical support as well as the provision of a safe-haven for terrorist groups and individuals associated with terrorism. For example, Libya provided support to a variety of Palestinian terrorist groups, including the Abu Nidal organization (ANO), the Palestine Islamic Jihad (PIJ), and Ahmed Jabril's Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine General Command (PFLP-GC). The ANO maintains its headquarters in Libya, where the group's leader, Sabri al-banna (a.k.a. Abu Nidal) resides xxxv. Following the September 11 terrorist attacks, Libyan leader Muammar Qadhafi issued a statement condemning the attacks as horrific and gruesome. With the extradition of Libyan intelligence agent Abdel Basset Ali al-megrahi and Libyan Arab Airlines employee Al-Amin Khalifa Fhima, Libya indicated their intention of redeeming themselves as a state-sponsor of terrorism xxxvi. INDIVIDUALS AND ORGANIZATIONS AS AGENTS OF TERRORISM Since the development of transnational terrorism, influenced by post-afghan war veterans and a consequence of globalisation, our attention should focus on transnational groups and individuals as agents of terrorism, presenting a clear and present danger to regional and international stability. Prior to the Kenya and Tanzania bombings followed by the September 2001 acts of terrorism, the world of terrorism was viewed as comprising of hundreds of radical Islamic organizations operating around the world, all individual and distinct from each other. Usama bin Laden proved that it is possible, out of this decentralized system, to co-ordinate devastating acts of terrorism. This global network tied all Islamic groups together in a loose coalition comprising of organizations and sympathetic individuals from all over the Muslim world, including financiers and aid donors, government officials and diplomats, former and possibly current military officers, intelligence agents, former and current guerrilla and militant groups, information technology specialists and operational commanders and their lieutenants. Focussing on the reach of Usama bin Laden s influence in Africa, Kenya and Tanzania already serve as examples of his capabilities. Other countries in this region include Madagascar, Gambia, Togo, Liberia, Namibia and Senegal; these only serve as part of a network that includes more than 60 countries xxxvii. The objective of Bin Laden s international
25 network is to unite all Muslims and establish a government which follows the rule of the caliphs, by overthrowing Muslim governments, driving Western influences from those countries and eventually by abolishing state boundaries xxxviii. Probably the most active part of this network would be Egyptian organizations and individuals. During a TV interview with Osama bin Laden broadcast on 23 September 2000, Egyptian Islamic Jihad leader Ayman Zawahri, Rifai Ahmad Taha, and a leader of Jamaa Islamiya, issued a renewed call for jihad against the United States. In addition to being part of the al-qa ida network, Ayman al- Zawahiri, was also part of the planning and executing stages of the bombings of the U.S. embassies in East Africa. Even before September 2001 Ahmed Salama Mabruk, the head of Jihad's military operations, told Al-Hayat in London that the Jihad had drawn up a plan for carrying out 100 attacks against U.S. and Israeli targets and public figures in different parts of the world. The U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in Azerbaijan confiscated the plan, on a computer disk, during his arrest. In another example Mohammed Zeki Mahjoub was arrested in July 2000 by the Canadian Intelligence Service after he arrived in Canada on a false Saudi passport in 1995. According to the CSIS, Mahjoub is a high-ranking member of an Egyptian Islamic terrorist organization, the Vanguards of Conquest, a radical wing of the Egyptian Islamic Jihad or Al Jihad" movement. During a conference on terrorism held in Algeria in October 2002 a senior military officer Lt- Col Jamal Eddine Bouzagaya (director of research) xxxix said that the fight against the terrorist organizations in the world has not started yet. According to him, until 2001, about 70 000 activists of armed Islamic groups from 50 countries had visited training camps in Afghanistan or at the Pakistani borders. A distinction is also made between first and second generation extremist elements: First generation extremists were trained between 1980 and 1992. This includes between 30 000 to 40 000 at camps in Afghanistan or at the Pakistani borders, and approximately 2 000 to 3 000 Algerian Afghans. A matter of concern is that the security apparatus acknowledged that they did not know the whereabouts or the fate of these individuals who were active in five countries: Afghanistan, Pakistan, Yemen, Sudan and Lebanon. The second generation of activists include French citizens of French origin as well as of Maghreban origin, and represents a real threat to Western capitals. Arrests made in Europe since the 11 September events involved only second-rate elements of the Algerian armed organizations and not the leadership or real masterminds. Lt-Col Bouzagaya is also of the opinion that Quebec, Canada, will become another capital from where armed groups will prosper. This danger was noticed by the Canadian authorities after the discovery of the Ahmed Rassam network, when the latter tried to smuggle explosives (into the USA) in 1999. Lt-Col Bouzagaya pointed out that the danger of the Algerian armed groups remains trans-national and provided the following examples of networks led by Algerians in Europe. The Algerian armed Islamist networks active in Europe constitute in fact a single
26 organization while the Algerian Afghan networks abroad are divided into three basic groups, using a cobweb structure. Although its activists were arrested the groups are still active even after 11 September 2001 xl : RASSAM - The first group is that of Rassam. It includes many Algerians, but some of its members are Moroccans, Tunisians and other nationalities who managed to get Canadian nationality, such as Fatah Kamel who succeeded even in having his name placed in the Algerian consulate records. Others managed to obtain the right to political asylum. Among the prominent members of the organization are Fatah Kamal who was arrested in 1998 in Jordan and was expelled to France, Dahman Abdelmadjid who fled from Canada to Europe and was arrested when he tried to join the Salafi Group for Call and Combat led by Hassan Hattab in Algeria, Mokhtar Houari arrested on 12 January 2001 and expelled to the USA to be investigated in the case of (Ahmed) Rassam (who tried to smuggle explosives from Canada into the USA in 1999). MELIANI - The second group is that of Meliani. The emir (religious leader) of the group was Mohamed Bensakhria, alias Maliani, who, together with Mohamed Benaissa had planned for armed aggressions in Hamburg, Germany, with targets including the European Parliament and a cathedral. The group was active in Frankfurt, Germany and in Milan, Italy, and was linked to the leaders of the armed groups in London. Ben Sakhria, who was arrested in June 2001, was in Alicante, Spain, and in contact with the second generation Afghans, particularly French citizens of Algerian and Moroccan origin such as Yassine Akkouche who, in turn, was closely linked to Zakaria Moussaoui, a Moroccan currently on trial in the USA for involvement in the 11 September events. The network also includes the French citizen Merouane Berrahal and the Moroccan Samir Kourachi who were both involved in the assassination of former Afghan Defence Minister Shah Masud. They also both had contacts with Algerian Rachid Boukhalfa, alias Abou Dhouha. The group has a branch in Milan, Italy, involving activists from the Tunisian Islamic Front, who were in contact with a Tunisian Tarek Maaroufi who was in Brussels, and considered as one of the coordinators of the Salafi Group for Call and Combat in Europe. BAGHAL - Finally there is the Baghalo group led by Algerian Djamel Baghal who was arrested in Dubai, the UAE, on his return from his second tour to Afghanistan. He was planning armed aggressions against American targets in France, Belgium and Holland. Four members of this group were arrested in Rotterdam, they are: An Algerian, a French citizen of Algerian origin, an Eritrean and a French citizen. They were in contact with leaders of terrorist organizations active in London through Abou Dhouha and Abu-Qatada, a Palestinian who is the ideologist of the Algerian groups. In addition to the above-mentioned network, allegations were also made during the 2000- Dakar Rally that GIA established clandestine bases in northern Niger between Agadez and the Libyan border. This led to the re-routing of the Dakar Rally in 2000 to Libya. These
27 allegations were based on the arrest of 20 GIA members by Niger security forces during 1999 xli. GOVERNMENT REACTIONS AND INITIATIVES TO COUNTER TERRORISM With the renewed global commitment to combat terrorism since the September 11 terrorist attacks on the United States, African countries, including former agents of terrorism committed themselves to this initiative. This particularly after the statement of President George W Bush: "Every nation in every region now has a decision to make. Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists." In addition to providing American agencies with intelligence, regional efforts include the sharing of intelligence, technical expertise, and financial information, and cooperating on legal issues. An additional tactic includes the shutting down of terrorist financial networks. Since the acts of terrorism in the United States on 11 September 2001 and the subsequent declaration of war against terrorism individual African states as well as multilateral organizations, such as the Organization for African Unity and the Southern African Development Community, have committed themselves to the global fight against terrorism. Despite the commitment from political leaders, within the communities in African countries, particularly Muslim communities, one can detect a growing resentment. Despite the renewed commitment in the war against terrorism, African countries need to realize that instability facilitates transnational organized crime and terrorism. In order to counter one or the other both need to be addressed. Transnational organized crime syndicates, particularly in narcotics, illegal firearms and precious metals and stones, could not only provide the financial means for keeping these groups functioning (considering the use of diamonds by al-qa ida,) it could also facilitate networking. African countries, in particular countries with predominantly Muslim populations are currently confronted with a delicate situation, that could in the medium and long-term be a test to ensuring internal stability. Although these countries are obligated to assist the United States in its war against terrorism (particularly as a result of their dependence on US military and humanitarian assistance) their own populations might regard this step as fraternisation with the enemy. Coming down to the same ultimatum: You are either for us or against us. Either way a loose-loose situation exists. How to deal with extremism and terrorism remains to be seen. Adopting a hard approach as presented in Egypt and Algeria proved to contribute to extremism. On the other hand actions taken by the Kenyan Government that included: attending to the state of poverty that was
28 afflicting the Muslim community; ensuring that laws that are deemed oppressive are removed; provision of essential services, including health and education facilities, water and electricity; plans to remove the high rate of unemployment in the Muslim community; increasing the security presence in areas plagued by insecurity; and the renewing the laws, also proved to be insufficient to prevent the November 2002 attacks. It might therefore be necessary to remind ourselves that extremism and terrorism is a reality, even in the most democratic and developed societies. i Associated Press. Assailants massacre 21 people, wound five in Algeria 25 October 2002. ii BBC Monitoring Middle East. Army general says there are 650 terrorists "all groups included" 27 October 2002. iii AP Online. Terror Threat Cancels Niger Race 11 January 2000. iv BBC Monitoring Service. Final Agreement issued at end of Saharan Sahel Foreign Ministers Meeting. 26 August 1995. v Africa Review World of Information. Mali Review 1997 1 February 1997. vi Vise, D.A. & Adams, L. FBI set to question African about bomb plot man in Senegal tied to Bin Laden group The Record, Northern New Jersey. 28 January 2000. vii New York Times News Service. U.S. says Senegal holding man linked to Bin Laden, Algerians 27 January 2000. viii United States Department of State. 2001. Patterns of Global Terrorism: 2000. ix Krutz, J. Africa, Islam and Terrorism Meeting Summary. Democracy and Rule of Law Project at the Carnegie Endowment x United States Department of State. 2001. Patterns of Global Terrorism: 2000. xi Kizito, E. 1995. Uganda-Sudan break is culmination of years of suspicion Reuters News. 25 April 1995. xii Reuters News. Uganda-Sudan peace talks hit deadlock 15 March 1997. xiii The Guardian. Uganda benefits from Sudanese Rebel advance 11 April 1997. xiv Kizito, E. 1995. Uganda Leader warms rebels will be crushed Reuters News. 20 March 1995. xv Reuters News. Uganda, Sudan agree to release prisoners in peace move 11 May 1997. xvi Reuters News. Moslem Extremists freed after attacks on Pork Shops 3 June 1993. xvii Johnson, D. Link seen in bomb plot terrorism: A man held in Senegal is suspected of ties to Algerian group and Osama bin Laden The New York Times. 27 January 2000. xviii The Daily Star (Beirut, Lebanon) Washington sees al-qaeda s hand in Mombasa operations Somali group also suspected 30 November 2002. xix The Daily Star (Beirut, Lebanon) Washington sees al-qaeda s hand in Mombasa operations Somali group also suspected 30 November 2002. xx Andualem, A. Explosion in Ethiopia Hotel Kills 1 The Associated Press. 12 September 2002. xxi The Daily Star (Beirut, Lebanon) Washington sees al-qaeda s hand in Mombasa operations Somali group also suspected 30 November 2002. xxii Krutz, J. Africa, Islam and Terrorism Meeting Summary. Democracy and Rule of Law Project at the Carnegie Endowment xxiii BBC Monitoring Africa. Ogaden rebel Group Welcomes Formation of New Oromo Rebel Alliance 17 October 2000. xxiv UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. HORN OF AFRICA: Rumsfeld completes tour 17 December 2002. Hwww.irinnews.orgH xxv Lusekelo, A. Tanzania outlaws Muslim fundamentalist group Reuters News. 29 April 1993. xxvi Shea, G. African ministers back Mugabe after talks on Zimbabwe crisis Agence France-Presse. 12 December 2001. xxvii UN Secretary General s report to the Security Council, April 2000. xxviii Toweh, A. 1999. Liberia rebels release at last two hostages Reuters News. 14 August 1999. xxix United States Department of State. 2001. Patterns of Global Terrorism: 2000. xxx M2 Presswire. Refugees victims of terrorism, not its perpetrators, High Commissioner tells Third Committee, as refugee debate opens Part 2 20 November 2001. xxxi United States Department of State 1993. Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1994 p.27 xxxii Greenberger, R.S. 1993. Global Outlaws: Accusations Against Sudan Signal Spread of Terrorism The Asian Wall Street Journal. 19 August 1993. xxxiii Greenberger, R.S. 1993. Global Outlaws: Accusations Against Sudan Signal Spread of Terrorism The Asian Wall Street Journal. 19 August 1993. xxxiv Reuters News. Sudan Rebels say they committed to peace 20 December 2002. xxxv United States Department of State 1997 Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1998. p. 8-9 xxxvi Ghanmi, L. 2002. Son of Libya s Gaddafi pursues charm drive Reuters News. 24 March 2002.
29 xxxvii Arquilla, J. Ronfeldt, D. & Zanini, M. 2000. Information-Age Terrorism Current History Vol. 99 No. 636 pp. 179-185. xxxviii Coordinator for Counterterrorism. 1999. Fact Sheet: Usama bin Laden Coordinator for Counterterrorism: Department of State. 21 August 1998 Hhttp://www.state.govH xxxix BBC. Official assesses "terrorist" networks abroad 30 October 2002. xl BBC. Military official says war on terror has not started yet 28 October 2002. xli AP Online. Terror Threat Cancels Niger Race 11 January 2000.