Deepwater Horizon Blowout follow-up in the Netherlands IGM and NOGEPA Excom Meeting 6 October 2010
Presentation overview 1. Timeline (milestones from start Macondo blowout) 2. Self-assessment categories 3. SSM review process 4. Overall observations SSM 5. Recommended follow-up for Nogepa 6. Follow-up actions by SSM 7. Follow-up actions by SSM - international 2
Timeline (milestones from start Macondo blowout) 20 April Macondo blowout 27 May Report of the Secretary of the Interior of the US 2 June Presentation of IGM to Nogepa 18 June Format for the self-assessments sent out 2 September Self-assessment reports received 1 st half of September Presentations held by all operators 2 nd half of September Self-assessment review by SSM 8 September BP Accident Investigation Report published 30 September Letter to four ministers 6 October Letter to ministers published on www.sodm.nl 3
Self-assessment categories» Self-assessment conducted along the following chapters: A. well design B. well construction C. well control D. emergency response (incl. worst-case scenario) E. general aspects F. conclusions» For each chapter specific topics and issues have been identified by SSM, to be addressed in the self-assessments. 4
SSM review process 1. Evaluation to what extend the topics and issues have been addressed in the self-assessments and presentations; 2. Identification of best practices for a specific topic or issue; 3. Identification of items to be verified; 4. Identification of follow-up items by category of operators (oil & gas, salt and geothermal energy). 5
Overall observations SSM (1) 1. Thorough and serious assessments performed, with extensive management involvement; 2. The presentations were structured along the provided format; 3. During presentations, professional reactions on SSM remarks; 4. All operators reported no serious shortcomings; 5. Follow-up actions have been identified and action plans made; 6. During presentations and after discussions, it was concluded that emergency response for a blowout scenario can be improved. 6
Overall observations SSM (2) 7. Companies differ in size and can be divided in two categories: 1) - operators with their own professional staff; - support/expertise available from parent company; - high level of drilling activities. 2) - operators with limited staff (own professional staff or contracted-in); - non or limited support from parent company; - changing level of drilling activities. 7
Overall observations SSM (3) 8. Operators have different views and procedures regarding essential aspects, e.g. barriers, verification of cementation, management of change; 9. Design of the BOP has not changed during the last decades; 10.Only a few operators specify advanced well control training; 11.Financial strengths & insurance coverage varies amongst operators; not all operators were aware of OPOL. 8
Findings Well design 1. Well design process: - category 1 and some category 2 operators use a stage-gate process; - there is a wide variety in how peer reviews are conducted. 2. Category 2 operators have a less formal design & construction process and not always with sufficient checks & balances, regarding realisation and approval of the well design; 3. Pore pressure - and formation strength test data are gathered and used in different manners. 9
Recommended follow-up for Nogepa Well design 1. Discuss differences & consider guidelines/ standards for: temporary suspensions; well barriers; and influx tolerances. 2. Consider common database for pore pressures and formation strengths. 10
Findings Well construction 1. A wide variation in the application of management of change (MOC); 2. Differences in the definition of barriers, procedures for pressure testing and inflow testing; 3. Cementing design primarily done by specialist contractors and adequately verified by operator. 11
Recommended follow-up for Nogepa Well construction Discuss differences & consider guidelines/ standards for: changes that require a MOC (Management of Change request); actions in case of failing float equipment; and pressure testing casing/liner, for hard cement and soft cement. 12
Findings Well control 1. Drilling hazards and possible well control issues are shared with drilling contractor at drilling well on paper exercises or pre-spuds; 2. Current testing practices for accumulator sizing do not take maximum expected wellhead pressure into account legislation to be amended; 3. Inspection & testing regime for well control equipment in well services differ from regime for drilling well control equipment; 4. Design of BOP has not changed in the last decades and has inherent vulnerability; 5. Only a few operators specify advanced well control training for drilling staff that goes beyond IWCF. 13
Recommended follow-up for Nogepa Well control 1. Review current BOP configuration and well control procedures and consider improvements (suggest to liaise with IADC); 2. Review design of the BOP and the BOP control system and consider improvements (suggest to liaise with IADC); 3. Discuss differences in well control training for drilling & well activities supervisors consider to implement advanced well control training. 14
Findings Emergency Response 1. Insufficient engineering effort put in the planning of emergency response, especially with respect to well capping/ containment, preparation of relief well and oil spill response capacity; 2.The format of the emergency response plan for a blowout scenario of one operator is considered best in class. 15
Recommended follow-up for Nogepa Emergency Response 1. Discuss differences & consider guideline/ standard for emergency response, for a blowout scenario; 2. Plan and regularly hold full fledged drills and exercises; 3. Review calamity control training for supervisory staff on drilling (and production) installations. 16
Findings General aspects 1. Competency of well engineering staff is generally good, but category 2 operators have not formalised their competency acceptance criteria for hiring drilling and well services staff; 2. Category 2 operators are currently extending and improving their Safety Management System. However, the adequacy of the management system w.r.t. the drilling process could not be demonstrated by a recent independent audit. 17
Recommended follow-up for Nogepa General aspects Consider development of a competency and training matrix for various seniority levels of drilling engineering and - construction staff. Nb. The competency management system of two operators are considered as best practice. 18
Follow-up actions by SSM (1) 1. Sent letter to category 2 operators (with infrequent drilling activities) in which they are asked before starting new drilling activities: - to review drilling program by an independent well examiner; - to audit the safety management system w.r.t. drilling process by independent auditor; - have the drilling installation inspected by an external inspection body. 19
Follow-up actions by SSM (2) 2. As a result of the self-assessment reviews, items for verification have been identified by SSM. These will be checked during inspections on (drilling) installations and/or office visits. 3. Inspection project Maintenance & testing of BOP s has started. 4. Scope of the inspection project Maintenance of installations will be expanded to include drilling installations, to start this year. 5. Review roles of RWS and SSM during emergency response. Will be verified during emergency response exercises. 20
Follow-up actions by SSM - international SSM will co-operate with NSOAF and IRF members in order to: exchange information on Deepwater Horizon & Montara disasters; harmonise possible measures; develop harmonised response on expectations/ questions of other international bodies like EC, OSPAR and G20. 21