National Network of Quantum Technologies Hubs: Quantum Communications Hub. Director: Professor Tim Spiller Affiliation
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1 National Network of Quantum Technologies Hubs: Quantum Communications Hub Director: Professor Tim Spiller Affiliation
2 Quantum Communications Hub: Partners Academic partners: York (lead), Bristol, Cambridge, Heriot-Watt, Leeds, Royal Holloway, Sheffield, Strathclyde Industrial partners: R&D: Toshiba Research Europe Ltd. (TREL), BT and the National Physical Laboratory (NPL) Network: ADVA, NDFIS Supplier/Consultancy (optical): Oclaro, ID Quantique Collaboration/Consultancy (microwave): Airbus, L3-TRL Start-ups (exploitation): Qumet (Bristol), Cryptographiq (Leeds/IP Group) Standards/Consultancy: ETSI, GCHQ User engagement: Bristol City Council, Knowle West Media Centre, Cambridge Science Park, Cambridge Network Ltd
3 Quantum Communications Hub Vision: To develop new quantum communications (QComm) technologies that will reach new markets, enabling widespread use and adoption in many scenarios from government and commercial transactions through to consumers and the home. Delivery: First generation: Take proven concepts in Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) and advance these to commercial-ready stages. (Work packages 1-3) Next generation: Explore new approaches, applications, protocols and services beyond QKD. (Work package 4)
4 Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) Secure sharing of a key between two parties (Alice and Bob!) The quantum part is the distribution of the key, with a promise from quantum physics that only Alice and Bob have copies. Once distributed, the (non-quantum) uses of the key(s) cover a wide range of secure information tasks: communication or data encryption, financial transactions, entry, passwords, ID/passports The keys are consumables (use once only for security), so need regular replenishment, which is quantum.
5 Quantum Communications Hub: Work packages WP1 Short Range Consumer QKD (WP Lead: John Rarity (Bristol)) Near infra red, line-of sight Microwave WP2 Chip Scale QKD Components (WP Lead: Mark Thompson (Bristol)) Chip scale optics Network switches WP3 Quantum Networks (WP Lead: Andrew Shields (TREL)) Quantum Core Networks Quantum Metro Networks Quantum Access Networks WP4 Next Generation QComm (WP Lead: Gerald Buller (Heriot-Watt)) Quantum digital signatures Quantum Relays, Repeaters and Amplifiers Device Independent and Measurement-device independent QKD
6 Quantum Communications Hub: Work packages [IMG] Image legend
7 WP1: Quantum secured key exchange for consumers < 3000 < 10 Could use one-time-pad to protect the PIN Generate one-time-pad using quantum secured key exchange Key exchange at ATM allows user to top-up a personal one-time-pad.
8 WP1: Why? Weekly top-up a personal one-timepad into a personal phone/card. Protects against skimming Type your PIN into YOUR device Absolute security for PIN online Low cost: free to all customers The competition: present readers provide simplistic security based on toy codes. In shops: data between card and reader NOT encrypted during a transaction, PIN is sent in the clear! See See also google/vodafone: phone=wallet The image cannot be display ed. Your computer may not hav e enough memory to open the image, or the image may hav e been corrupted. Restart y our computer, and then open the file again. If the red x still appears, y ou may hav e to delete the image and then insert it again. Hacking demo
9 Bob meets Alice 9
10 WP1: The credit card Alice New System: Target 3x20x40mm Alice >100MHz operation
11 WP1: Flexible receiver and software concept: Standard 19 rack system with replaceable receiver and software sub-units
12 WP2 Vision: Chip-based Qcomms devices Integrated quantum photonic Qcomms chip 1mm Current approach
13 WP2: Compact chip-based QKD Chip-based devices for: Low cost Compact Energy efficient Mass-manufacture Compatibility with current microelectronic devices Hub will target: Fully integrated and packaged QKD devices with control electronics Deployment in real networking situations
14 WP2: Targeted Applications Mobile devices Computer networks City wide communications network
15 WP2: Chip-based QKD/WDM switches 4x4 building block 16x16 integrated switch Compact switching device for reconfigurable quantum networks InGaAsP devices based on Clos switching architecture
16 WP3: Quantum Networks Today: Point-to-point fibre QKD links
17 WP3: Quantum Networks Long-Haul Access Metro Explore integration of QKD in different network segments (long-haul, metro, access) Key management and security analysis of extended trusted node network Application development, eg layer 3 encryption, quantum digital signatures Multiplex quantum signals on conventional DWDM grid data Provisioning of quantum and data channels quantum DWDM DWDM
18 WP3: UK Quantum Network Establish large-scale Quantum Network test-bed in UK Implemented in stages TREL Metro networks in Cambridge and Bristol Long-haul network connecting Cambridge-London-Bristol (NDFIS) with possibility to extend Cambridge Bristol Reading UCL Martlesham (BT) Telehouse NPL Access networks providing multi-user connectivity Southampton A focus for application development, industrial standardisation and user engagement Potential test-bed for the other QT Hubs and associated projects
19 WP 4: Emerging Quantum Communications Technologies Quantum Digital Signatures Quantum Repeaters Information Theoretic Secure Digital Signatures Amplifiers for Quantum Communications Systems ΨAlice> Bob Noiseless amplifier Verify Quantum limited amplifier Alice ΨAlice> Charlie Coherent states Classical amplifier Measurement Device Independent Quantum Key Distribution Cryptographic Key Exchange in an Untrustworthy World Alice Bob Untrusted Measurement Unit
20 Quantum Comms Hub: Theory and Security Analysis Contributes to all four Technology Workpackages: Identify and remove security vulnerabilities at an early stage Contribute to ETSI standards for QKD and other Qcomm systems Physical level security analysis Match physical models for analysis to practical implementations Widely applicable channel analysis with side channel information leakage studies Analysis of attacks and countermeasure design Protocol level security analysis Analysis of protocol stacks, incorporating low-level quantum and higher level conventional protocols Analysis of practical security advantages of new protocols such as QDS and MDIQKD Quantum-immune conventional (classical) protocols Hybrid system analysis High speed (Gb/s upwards) systems combine QKD and conventional secure communications protocols, trading unconditional and forward security for speed Detailed security analysis of such hybrid systems (and mitigation against security loss ) is needed
21 Quantum Communications Hub: Work package targets Commercial-ready QKD technologies... WP1 Short Range Consumer QKD Handheld system, leading to minimal mobile phone modification for Alice Microwave quantum secure communications analysed and demonstrated WP2 Chip Scale QKD Components Chip scale Alice with semi-bulk Bob, leading to fully packaged chip scale QKD optical modules Network switches demonstrated on the UKQN WP3 Quantum Networks High bit rate link encryption Quantum Metro Networks demonstrated in Bristol and Cambridge Establishment and operation of the UKQN WP4 Next Generation Quantum Communications Quantum digital signatures deployed at Metro Network level Quantum Relays/Repeaters for weak pulse QKD demonstrated on UKQN Device Independent and Measurement-device independent QKD deployed at QAN level
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