Securing Your Data In Transit For The Long Term
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1 Securing Your Data In Transit For The Long Term Or what happens when RSA encryption is finally broken by mathematicians or quantum computers? October 2014
2 ID Quantique Photon Counters Services Quantum Random Number Generators Technology Quantum Security Network Encryption Swiss company, founded 2001, based in Geneva Spin-off of University of Geneva, Group of Applied Physics Offers encryption technology which is safe into the quantum era Protection of long-term data in high-speed transit 2014 ID Quantique SA, Switzerland page 2 ID Quantique PROPRIETARY
3 Thank you! 2014 ID Quantique SA, Switzerland page 3 ID Quantique PROPRIETARY
4 HACKING IS EASY (AND EVERYONE IS DOING IT) 2014 ID Quantique SA, Switzerland page 4 ID Quantique PROPRIETARY
5 2014 ID Quantique SA, Switzerland page 5 ID Quantique PROPRIETARY
6 Optical Tapping for under 500 Optical fiber bending & coupling Buy an optical tap legally online Emitter Eavesdropper Receiver 2014 ID Quantique SA, Switzerland page 6 ID Quantique PROPRIETARY
7 Social Engineering A telecom company outsources the laying of new optical fibers for a bank to a maintenance team who do not understand the security issues. The naked optical fiber is accessible..and the detailed layout of the fiber network & the name of the bank is clearly visible for future hacking attempts 2014 ID Quantique SA, Switzerland page 7 ID Quantique PROPRIETARY 7
8 THE THREAT: PUBLIC-KEY CRYPTOGRAPHY 2014 ID Quantique SA, Switzerland page 8 ID Quantique PROPRIETARY
9 Public Key Cryptography: Threats Alice Bob What are the 2 prime factors of : Hint : ID Quantique SA, Switzerland page 9 ID Quantique PROPRIETARY 9
10 Public Key Cryptography: Threats Alice Bob = * ID Quantique SA, Switzerland page 10 ID Quantique PROPRIETARY 10
11 Public Key Cryptography: Threats Alice Bob Use mathematical «one-way» functions Theoretical Progress Vulnerable to x =? A x B = Increase in Computing Power Quantum Computers 2014 ID Quantique SA, Switzerland page 11 ID Quantique PROPRIETARY 11
12 Classical and Quantum Physics Classical physics Describes the macroscopic world Quantum physics Description of the microscopic world Deterministic Intuitive Probabilistic Central role of the observer Not very intuitive Quantum physics Novel information processing possibilities Quantum Information Theory (QIT) 2014 ID Quantique SA, Switzerland page 12 ID Quantique PROPRIETARY
13 The Threat: Quantum Computing Quantum Computing Basics Uses quantum properties, not binary code (qubits vs. bits) Acts as a massively parallel computer Will render today s public key encryption unsafe 2014 ID Quantique SA, Switzerland page 13 ID Quantique PROPRIETARY
14 Quantum Computing and Cryptography Shor s Algorithm Grover s Algorithm Peter Shor, 1994 Lov Grover, 1996 Quantum algorithm for integer factorization Quantum algorithm to perform search in an unsorted database O((log N) 3 ) vs O(e 1.9 (log N)1/3 (log log N)2/3 ) O(n ½ ) vs O(n) Key halfed for symmetric cryptography AES bits security AES bits security Can break RSA, Elliptic Curve & Diffie Hellman 2014 ID Quantique SA, Switzerland page 14 ID Quantique PROPRIETARY
15 Quantum Computing in Research America is building a quantum computer for cryptanalysis quantum-computer-that-could-crack-most-types-of-encryption/2014/01/02/8fff297e e3-8def-a df2_story.html According to Snowden this is a major NSA initiative called Penetrating Hard Targets China Prepares for Quantum Age Source: The importance of building a quantum computer is such that the Chinese government funded 90 quantum related projects last year through the National Natural Science Foundation of China. Lazaridis (RIM cofounder) has invested $250 million+ into quantum computing at Waterloo Quantum Valley Dwave raised funds from Jeff Bezos (Amazon), InQTel (NSA investment arm) and sells to Lockheed Martin, NASA 2014 ID Quantique SA, Switzerland page 15 ID Quantique PROPRIETARY
16 When do we need to start worrying? «Wait and see» approach is too risky Time Vulnerability Information Exchange Information lifetime (based on legal, business or strategic constraints) Time for migration (from a few months to several years) Next generation of cryptographic infrastructure: Must have quantum-safe alternatives Should have algorithmic agility built in 2014 ID Quantique SA, Switzerland page 16 ID Quantique PROPRIETARY 16
17 Leading Signs That It s Time To Adopt QKD Quantum computers have more than 1000 qubits OR Quantum computers have demonstrated that Shor s algorithm to factor numbers works D-Wave sold a 128-bit computer in 2011; announced a 512-bit computer Lazaridis (RIM cofounder) has invested $250MM+ into quantum computing at Waterloo Quantum Valley RSA-1024 has been broken OR RSA-768 was cracked in December, 2009 using 5TB of data and 1500 CPU-years of a 2.2GHz Opteron NIST recommendation stop using RSA-1024 before 12/31/2013 U of Mich reported breaking RSA-1024 using a side channel attack Large organized networks of computers can be formed to solve complex, timeconsuming problems OR Network bots, SETI-at-home Bitcoin Millions-to-billions of smart phones around the world with quad-core ARM processors all linked over a common network (telecom systems) You transmit data over the network that needs to be protected for more than five years 2014 ID Quantique SA, Switzerland page 17 ID Quantique PROPRIETARY
18 The Solution: Quantum-Safe Cryptographic Infrastructure «Post-quantum» cryptography Classical codes deployable without quantum technologies Believed/hoped to be secure against quantum computer attacks of the future + Quantum Key Distribution Quantum codes requiring some quantum technologies currently available Typically no computational assumptions and thus known to be secure against quantum attacks Both sets of cryptographic tools can work together to form a quantum-safe cryptographic infrastructure 2014 ID Quantique SA, Switzerland page 18 ID Quantique PROPRIETARY
19 ONE SOLUTION: QUANTUM MECHANICS FOR SECURE ENCRYPTION KEYS 2014 ID Quantique SA, Switzerland page 19 ID Quantique PROPRIETARY
20 Change in Paradigm Network Encryption Key Management High speed cryptosystem implementation (typically AES) Crypto Key Lifecycle 2014 ID Quantique SA, Switzerland page 20 ID Quantique PROPRIETARY 20
21 THE SOLUTION (1): QUANTUM RANDOM NUMBER GENERATION (QRNG) 2014 ID Quantique SA, Switzerland page 21 ID Quantique PROPRIETARY
22 Quantum Randomness Physical Random Number Generator exploiting a phenomenon described by quantum physics Detectors Truly random Photons Semi-transparent Mirror Advantages Speed Source of photons Simple process that can be modeled influence of environment can be ruled out Live monitoring of elementary components possible 2014 ID Quantique SA, Switzerland page 22 ID Quantique PROPRIETARY
23 Quantum Random Number Generator 2014 ID Quantique SA, Switzerland page 23 ID Quantique PROPRIETARY 23
24 THE SOLUTION (2): QUANTUM KEY DISTRIBUTION (QKD) 2014 ID Quantique SA, Switzerland page 24 ID Quantique PROPRIETARY
25 Quantum Cryptography "0" "1" "1" "0" Fragile! Alice Message Scrambled Message Message Symmetric Cryptography Secret Key Secret Key Bob Identical keys Key Exchange?!? 2014 ID Quantique SA, Switzerland page 25 ID Quantique PROPRIETARY
26 Quantum-Enabled Network Encryption Transparent Layer 2 Encryption AES-256 in CFC and CTR modes Up to 100Gbps Multiprotocol (Ethernet, Fibre Channel) Provably secure key distribution: QKD Distilled key distribution rate: 1000 bps over 25km/6dB Range: 100km + xwdm Local Area Network Quantum Channel Dark Fiber Local Area Network 2014 ID Quantique SA, Switzerland page 26 ID Quantique PROPRIETARY
27 Today s Depoyments of QKD Hybrid solutions: Conventional encryption on wide area network QKD on DRC and backbone links (WAN) Classical Encryption Device Quantum Encryption Solution MAN/SAN 2014 ID Quantique SA, Switzerland page 27 ID Quantique PROPRIETARY
28 Sporting & Public Events Critical police & Joint Operations link secured during 2010 FIFA World Cup in South Africa Secured communication for data, telephone, internet, video, and ID Quantique SA, Switzerland page 28 ID Quantique PROPRIETARY
29 European Banks: Data Center Interconnect European banks secure critical links between bank headquarters and data recovery centers 2014 ID Quantique SA, Switzerland page 29 ID Quantique PROPRIETARY
30 Data Centers for Financial Companies QKD-secured data center link large financial institution in Netherlands Installed in 2010 High-speed encryption 4 x Ethernet 1G links 2 x FC-4 links 2014 ID Quantique SA, Switzerland page 30 ID Quantique PROPRIETARY
31 Government & Public Administration Downtown Geneva Geneva (Switzerland) uses QKD to guarantee confidentiality & integrity of data during federal & cantonal elections Geneva Government Data Center 4 km Central Vote Counting Station Ballots Working since October 2007 Mail Votes Cerberis Solution 2014 ID Quantique SA, Switzerland page 31 ID Quantique PROPRIETARY
32 Quantum Keys-as-a-Service by Telecom Operators Data Recovery Center World-first QKD-as-a-Service offered by Colt Data link between Swiss financial district and critical DRC 70 kms away Eg. 10Gigabit FCoIP link Bank Ethernet or FC connection for data Server Room Bank Colt provides quantumsecured link as a monthly service for banks & enterprises Client B QKD fiber Server Room Client B Easy to set up & maintain under existing SLAs First step towards a QuantumCloud Client C Server Room Client C Client D Server Room Client D 2014 ID Quantique SA, Switzerland page 32 ID Quantique PROPRIETARY
33 Enterprise: Corporate Data & IP Battelle USA World s largest nonprofit R&D organization Over 22,000 employees at more than 130 locations globally Requirement to protect mission critical corporate, financial information & intellectual property (designs, drawings, etc) IDQ s quantum cryptography used to secure critical links between headquarters in Columbus Ohio and satellite office in Dublin Ohio By 2015 will connect Battelle building in Washington DC with QKD-secured link Working with IDQ to develop trusted nodes for increased distance of QKD 2014 ID Quantique SA, Switzerland page 33 ID Quantique PROPRIETARY
34 QKD IN THE FUTURE 2014 ID Quantique SA, Switzerland page 34 ID Quantique PROPRIETARY
35 Battelle in 2015 Battelle QKD Backbone Columbus Ohio to Washington DC area > 770 km Deployment in 2015 Battelle Aberdeen Office Battelle Main Campus 2014 ID Quantique SA, Switzerland page 35 ID Quantique PROPRIETARY
36 2015: IDQ-Battelle quantum backbone for longterm inter-datacenter security Columbus, OH QKD pilot network (showing four Battelle-IDQ prototype Trusted Nodes operating today) illustrates multi-access metro topology ID Quantique SA, Switzerland page 36 ID Quantique PROPRIETARY
37 QKD Networks 2014 ID Quantique SA, Switzerland page 37 ID Quantique PROPRIETARY 37
38 Thank you for your attention 7th Winter School on Practical Quantum Communications Dates: January or February 2015 Location: Les Diablerets, Switzerland More: or Pictures from previous editions 2014 key note speakers included: Gilles Brassard Nicolas Gisin Vadim Makarov Sandu Popescu Renato Renner 2015 will include Whitfield Diffie Nicolas Gisin Catherine Mc Geoch Colin Williams and more! ID Quantique SA, Switzerland page ID Quantique PROPRIETARY
39 Our team today : Gilles Gravier Director Product Management [email protected] ID Quantique SA Pierre-Alain Hinnen Key Account Manager [email protected] 2014 ID Quantique SA, Switzerland page 39 ID Quantique PROPRIETARY
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