Threat Model for Software Reconfigurable Communications Systems
|
|
|
- Mark Bond
- 8 years ago
- Views:
Transcription
1 Threat Model for Software Reconfigurable Communications Systems Presented to the Management Group 6 March 007 Bernard Eydt Booz Allen Hamilton Chair, SDR Security Working Group
2 Overview Overview of the SDR Forum SDR Forum High Level Security Requirements Vision for Attribute Authentication Threat Model (work in progress) Assets Threats Countermeasures Mechanisms 2
3 Overview of the SDR Forum
4 Mission Overview of the SDR Forum Accelerate the development and proliferation of SDR and cognitive radio technologies to support the needs of all user domains and stakeholders Vision Ubiquitous wireless communications Membership The SDR Forum is a non-profit organization comprised of decision makers, planners, policy makers and program/product managers from a broad range of organizations 4
5 SDR Forum Organization Board of Directors Executive Director CTO (vacant) Technical Committee Regulatory Committee Markets Committee Cognitive Radio Processes &Tools R&D Smart Antenna Systems Interface Commercial SDR Security Education Space SCA Standards Management API Interface Test and Evaluation Public Safety Avionics Cognitive Applications 5
6 SDR Forum High Level Security Requirements 6
7 High-level Security Requirements Overview Documented in the SDR Forum publication High Level SDR Security Requirements (SDRF- 06-A-0002-V0.00, January 2006) High-level Detailed functional requirements are in development Universal Intended for all radio market segments, not public safety in particular SDR reconfigurability demands a universal approach SDR Security Address SDR risks, not general communications risks Requirements List 1. Policy-driven behavior 2. Stakeholder-driven Policy 3. Device attestation 4. Protected download 5. Policy-compliant installation and instantiation 6. Run-time control 7. Resource integrity 8. Access control 9. Audit 10.Process separation 11.Implementation assurance 12.Supportive operations 7
8 Requirements ive: Mitigate Risk Bad software can: Adversely impact radio performance, reliability, and availability Cause radio interference Potentially generate unintended harmful electromagnetic radiation Unauthorized Modification of Hardware versus Software Radio Hardware Radio Modify one device at a time Requires some radio expertise Requires physical access to the device Software Radio Modify large numbers of devices nearly simultaneously No special expertise required (for software download or update) Can occur over significant distances using any frequency that the SDR is capable of receiving 8
9 Requirement #1: Policy Driven Behavior An SDR device SHALL enforce a device-specific SDR security policy that governs the behavior of the device at all times. Potential Areas of Standardization: Policy language Trusted boot process Spectrum System Integrity at Rest Integrity in Transit Protection of Non-SDR Resources #Primary control #Secondary control #Minimal protection provided / NA 9
10 Potential Types of Policy and Their ives 1. Spectrum Access Policy: Limit functionality to user requirements Software Radio Functionality Hardware Radio Functionality Policy Defined Functionality To prevent an accidental or malicious use of additional software functionality, radio is limited by policy 2. Attribute Policy: Authenticate list of required attributes (e.g., s/w origin, security certification, platform compatibility) 10
11 Requirement #2: Stakeholder Driven Policy The SDR device SHALL ensure that its device-specific SDR security policy incorporates the SDR security policies of its stakeholders within the scope of their authority. Potential Areas of Standardization: Policy language Spectrum System Integrity Integrity Protection of Non-SDR Resources #Primary control #Secondary control #Minimal protection provided / NA 11
12 Potential Stakeholders Manufacturer Assembler Component manufacturer Software Developer Network Operator Regulator Owner Others 12
13 Requirement #3: Attestation An SDR device SHALL provide trusted configuration information to the device s radio communications service providers and other authorized entities on demand. Potential Areas of Standardization: Attestation protocol Spectrum System Oject Integrity Integrity Protection of Non-SDR Resources #Primary control #Secondary control #Minimal protection provided / NA 13
14 Requirement #4: Protected Download An SDR device SHALL provide confidentiality services for download of SDR-related software and configuration data as determined by the device s SDR security policy. Potential Areas of Standardization: Download protocol Spectrum System Integrity Integrity Protection of Non-SDR Resources #Primary control #Secondary control #Minimal protection provided / NA 14
15 Requirement #5: Policy-compliant installation and instantiation An SDR device SHALL only install and instantiate SDR-related software and policy that have been appropriately certified to be compliant with the device s SDR security policy. Potential Areas of Standardization: Most likely left to vendor implementation Spectrum System Integrity Integrity Protection of Non-SDR Resources #Primary control #Secondary control #Minimal protection provided / NA 15
16 Requirement #6: Run-time control An SDR device SHALL at run-time prevent transmissions that violate its SDR security policy. Potential Areas of Standardization: Policy language Radio transmission interface Spectrum System Integrity Integrity Protection of Non-SDR Resources #Primary control #Secondary control #Minimal protection provided / NA 16
17 Requirement #7: Resource integrity An SDR device SHALL detect the unauthorized modification of its SDRrelated resources and take actions determined by the SDR security policy. Potential Areas of Standardization: Most likely left to vendor implementation Spectrum System Integrity Integrity Protection of Non-SDR Resources #Primary control #Secondary control #Minimal protection provided / NA 17
18 Requirement #8: Access control SDR devices SHALL control access to each SDR-related resource on the device. Potential Areas of Standardization: Most likely left to vendor implementation Spectrum System Integrity Integrity Protection of Non-SDR Resources #Primary control #Secondary control #Minimal protection provided / NA 18
19 Requirement #9: Audit An SDR device SHALL detect security relevant events and notify specified processes as determined by the SDR security policy. Potential Areas of Standardization: Audit record content and format SDR SNMP MIB and traps Spectrum System Integrity Integrity Protection of Non-SDR Resources #Primary control #Secondary control #Minimal protection provided / NA 19
20 Requirement #10: Process separation An SDR device SHALL have mechanisms to prevent SDR-related applications from compromising the security of non-sdr-related applications and data. Potential Areas of Standardization: Separation methods Spectrum System Integrity Integrity Protection of Non-SDR Resources #Primary control #Secondary control #Minimal protection provided / NA 20
21 Requirement #11: Implementation assurance Information assurance mechanisms that support enforcement of the SDR security policy SHALL be validated against industryrecognized evaluation standards. Potential Areas of Standardization: Evaluation of cryptographic methods Certification of SDR policy enforcement mechanisms Spectrum System Integrity Integrity Protection of Non-SDR Resources #Primary control #Secondary control #Minimal protection provided / NA 21
22 Requirement #12: Supportive operations Operational practices supporting information assurance mechanisms SHALL be consistent with and supportive of the SDR security policy. Potential Areas of Standardization: Processes (e.g., key insertion for root of trust) Software development assurance (e.g., DO 178B) Spectrum System Integrity Integrity Protection of Non-SDR Resources #Primary control #Secondary control #Minimal protection provided / NA 22
23 Requirement Mapping Requirements to ives Spectrum System Integrity Integrity Protection of Non-SDR Resources Policy Driven Behavior Stakeholder Driven Policy Attestation Protected Download Policy Compliant I&I Run-time Control Resource Integrity Access Control Audit Process Separation Implementation Assurance Supportive Operations 23
24 Attribute Authentication 24
25 Attribute Authentication Principles Stakeholders state required attributes of objects Attributes are open-ended; defined by stakeholders A platform s object attribute policy (OAP) is the conjunction of stakeholder contributions Developers/distributors of objects or their agents make attribute claims Claimants generate digital signatures on objects for each claim to provide: Binding of claim to object (assurance of integrity) Non-repudiation of the claimant s identity Radio platforms verify digital signatures (claims) Assurance of truth of claim is provided through out-ofband process 25
26 Examples of Attribute Policy (OAP) Simple OAP example Stakeholder Claimant Attribute Claim Authentication Method Acme Radio (manufacturer) Acme Radio This radio software functions properly on radio model 123 RSA 1024 Extended OAP policy example Stakeholder Claimant Attribute Claim Authentication Method FCC (regulator) Acme Radio This radio software operates in compliance with FCC Part 15 rules ECC 163 Acme Radio (manufacturer) Easy-link Software Easy-link wrote this software and is liable for performance failures RSA 2048 DHS (owner) NIST Crypto modules are validated against FIPS RSA 1024 DHS (owner) Conformance Testing Laboratory This software running on Acme Radio model 123 has passed interoperability tests specified in TIA TSB-102.CABA ECC
27 OAP = Conjunction of Policy Contributions Regulator Contribution Manufacturer statement of Part 15 Compliance OAP Manufacturer statement of Part 15 Compliance Manufacturer Contribution Easy-link liability assignment Easy-link liability assignment Owner Contribution NIST validated crypto TIA interoperability certification NIST validated crypto TIA interoperability certification Note: Each Contribution and OAP can be implemented as an array of public key certificates 27
28 Attribute Authentication Transaction OAP Manufacturer statement of Part 15 Compliance Easy-link liability assignment NIST validated crypto TIA interoperability certification Should this object be instantiated? No. Easy-link made claim for wrong attribute Missing claim for NIST validated crypto Header Acme: Part 15 Compliant Easy-link: Developed code TIA: Interoperability certification Data signatures (claims) 28
29 High-Level Security Architecture for Reconfigurable Radio Communications v0.09 Radio Domain(s) Software Policy Domain Crypto Domain Untrusted Domain (s) (e.g., consumer OS/applications ) Communications Software and Applications Radio Transmission Filter Policy Service Download and Reconfiguration Service Cryptographic Services Untrusted Application (s) Untrusted Communications Protocols Isolation Layer Radio Hardware Front End(s) Hardware Resources Legend Security Domain Boundary Optional Domain Boundary Universally-defined interface = Reconfigurable Radio Resource = Other Resources Within Scope of Reconfigurable Communications Policy = Out of Scope of Reconfigurable Communications Policy = Hardware 29
30 Digital Signature-based Verification Today 3GPP Mobile Execution Environment (MExE) Symbian Signed program Microsoft Windows Mobile OS and.net framework Java JSR118 Mobile Information Device Profile (MIDP)
31 What s New About SDR Forum Approach Multiple signatures To date, most authenticated code systems rely on one signature Stakeholder contributions To date, most systems involve single stakeholder Claimant/Claim framework Today, signatures primarily only used for object origin and in some cases certification 31
32 SDR Threat Model (work in progress) 32
33 Threat Model Overview Model Layer Primary Assets Supporting Assets Threats Countermeasures Mechanisms Example Electromagnetic Spectrum Radio Software Unauthorized Modification Integrity Services Hash value in digital signature 33
34 Primary Assets Electromagnetic Spectrum Health and Safety Communications Service Intellectual Property User Applications and Data Reputation 34
35 Supporting Assets Radio Software Operating Environment Operating System Software Device Drivers Memory 35
36 Threats Unauthorized Modification Unauthorized Reading } In transit In storage While Executing Masquarade/Impersonation Of user/organizational entity Of device/infrastructure Software Misuse Rogue Software 36
37 Countermeasures Integrity Services Services Authentication Services Entity Device Attribute Access Control Physical (to the device) Computing Environment Spectrum } In transit In storage While executing 37
38 Countermeasures Integrity Services Services Authentication Computing Resource Access Control Spectrum Access Control 38
39 - Human health - Ordinance -Fuel - Medical materials - Spectrum owner: revenue - User: communications content - Service provider: revenue - Enforceable intellectual property rights - Unenforceable trade secrets - Operating system/environment - Protocols/drivers - Cryptographic secrets - Situational awareness Primary Assets Health and Safety Electromagnetic Spectrum Communications Service Intellectual Property Reputation User Data Supporting Assets Consequences Threats Software Misuse Unauthorised Reading of Software in Transit Radio Software Unauthorised Modification of Software Replay of Software Unauthorised Reading of Software in Storage Unauthorised Modification of Software in Storage Unauthorised Reading of Software while Executing User Applications and Data Unauthorised Modification of Software while Executing Sample consequences Revelation of trade secrets Illegal copying Activation of a non-desired service Breaking of service commitment Denial/Degradation of Service Inoperable device Violation of spectrum access rules Increased power output Execution of older buggy software version Violation of user privacy Enabling Threats Masquarade/ Impersonation of Device Masquarade/ Impersonation/ Cloning of Software Provider Countermeasures Spectrum Access Control of Software in Transit Integrity of Software in Transit Replay Protection Device Authentication Software Origin Authentication Entity Authentication Secure Storage Integrity of, of and Controlled Access to Stored Software and Data Process Separation Potential Mechanisms Spectrum Policy Control Asymmetric Encryption MACing Timestamps Platform Attestation Unilateral Authentication Protocol Sealing Software-based Isolation Software-based Isolation with Hardware Support Hardware isolation Symmetric Encryption Digital Signatures Nonces Secure Boot Process Supporting Mechanisms Authenticated Boot Process Recommended Universal Mechanisms Spectrum Policy Control Cryptographic Functionality Security Policy Management Trusted Computing Technologies 39
40 Summary The SDR Forum has published high-level SDR security requirements A major component of the security framework is code signing using public key cryptography Current work: Understanding threat profile under which controls are desirable Developing compete set of mechanisms 40
A SECURITY ARCHITECTURE FOR AGENT-BASED MOBILE SYSTEMS. N. Borselius 1, N. Hur 1, M. Kaprynski 2 and C.J. Mitchell 1
A SECURITY ARCHITECTURE FOR AGENT-BASED MOBILE SYSTEMS N. Borselius 1, N. Hur 1, M. Kaprynski 2 and C.J. Mitchell 1 1 Royal Holloway, University of London 2 University of Strathclyde ABSTRACT Future mobile
Aalborg Universitet. Policy-based Approach for Secure Radio Software Download Stango, Antonietta; Prasad, Neeli R.
Aalborg Universitet Policy-based Approach for Secure Radio Software Download Stango, Antonietta; Prasad, Neeli R. Published in: Proceedings of SDR'09 Technical Conference and Product Exposition Publication
Smart Card- An Alternative to Password Authentication By Ahmad Ismadi Yazid B. Sukaimi
Smart Card- An Alternative to Password Authentication By Ahmad Ismadi Yazid B. Sukaimi Purpose This paper is intended to describe the benefits of smart card implementation and it combination with Public
Secure Network Communications FIPS 140 2 Non Proprietary Security Policy
Secure Network Communications FIPS 140 2 Non Proprietary Security Policy 21 June 2010 Table of Contents Introduction Module Specification Ports and Interfaces Approved Algorithms Test Environment Roles
CycurHSM An Automotive-qualified Software Stack for Hardware Security Modules
CycurHSM An Automotive-qualified Software Stack for Hardware Security Modules Dr. Frederic Stumpf, ESCRYPT GmbH Embedded Security, Stuttgart, Germany 1 Introduction Electronic Control Units (ECU) are embedded
GENERIC SECURITY FRAMEWORK FOR CLOUD COMPUTING USING CRYPTONET
http:// GENERIC SECURITY FRAMEWORK FOR CLOUD COMPUTING USING CRYPTONET Manisha Dawra 1, Ramdev Singh 2 1 Al-Falah School of Engg. & Tech., Vill-Dhauj, Ballabgarh-Sohna Road, Faridabad, Haryana (INDIA)-121004
Embedded Java & Secure Element for high security in IoT systems
Embedded Java & Secure Element for high security in IoT systems JavaOne - September 2014 Anne-Laure SIXOU - ST Thierry BOUSQUET - ST Frédéric VAUTE - Oracle Speakers 2 Anne-Laure SIXOU Smartgrid Product
Safeguarding Data Using Encryption. Matthew Scholl & Andrew Regenscheid Computer Security Division, ITL, NIST
Safeguarding Data Using Encryption Matthew Scholl & Andrew Regenscheid Computer Security Division, ITL, NIST What is Cryptography? Cryptography: The discipline that embodies principles, means, and methods
M-Shield mobile security technology
Technology for Innovators TM M-Shield mobile security technology making wireless secure Overview As 3G networks are successfully deployed worldwide, opportunities are arising to deliver to end-users a
FIPS 140-2 Non- Proprietary Security Policy. McAfee SIEM Cryptographic Module, Version 1.0
FIPS 40-2 Non- Proprietary Security Policy McAfee SIEM Cryptographic Module, Version.0 Document Version.4 December 2, 203 Document Version.4 McAfee Page of 6 Prepared For: Prepared By: McAfee, Inc. 282
Hardware Security Modules for Protecting Embedded Systems
Hardware Security Modules for Protecting Embedded Systems Marko Wolf, ESCRYPT GmbH Embedded Security, Munich, Germany André Weimerskirch, ESCRYPT Inc. Embedded Security, Ann Arbor, USA 1 Introduction &
Innovations in Digital Signature. Rethinking Digital Signatures
Innovations in Digital Signature Rethinking Digital Signatures Agenda 2 Rethinking the Digital Signature Benefits Implementation & cost issues A New Implementation Models Network-attached signature appliance
Chapter 1: Introduction
Chapter 1 Introduction 1 Chapter 1: Introduction 1.1 Inspiration Cloud Computing Inspired by the cloud computing characteristics like pay per use, rapid elasticity, scalable, on demand self service, secure
SDR Architecture. Introduction. Figure 1.1 SDR Forum High Level Functional Model. Contributed by Lee Pucker, Spectrum Signal Processing
SDR Architecture Contributed by Lee Pucker, Spectrum Signal Processing Introduction Software defined radio (SDR) is an enabling technology, applicable across a wide range of areas within the wireless industry,
IoT Security Platform
IoT Security Platform 2 Introduction Wars begin when the costs of attack are low, the benefits for a victor are high, and there is an inability to enforce law. The same is true in cyberwars. Today there
SP 800-130 A Framework for Designing Cryptographic Key Management Systems. 5/25/2012 Lunch and Learn Scott Shorter
SP 800-130 A Framework for Designing Cryptographic Key Management Systems 5/25/2012 Lunch and Learn Scott Shorter Topics Follows the Sections of SP 800-130 draft 2: Introduction Framework Basics Goals
Embedding Trust into Cars Secure Software Delivery and Installation
Embedding Trust into Cars Secure Software Delivery and Installation André Adelsbach, Ulrich Huber, Ahmad-Reza Sadeghi, Christian Stüble Horst Görtz Institute for IT Security, Bochum, Germany Third Workshop
MovieLabs Specification for Enhanced Content Protection Version 1.0
MovieLabs Specification for Enhanced Content Protection Version 1.0 Introduction Digital content distribution technologies are evolving and advancing at a rapid pace. Content creators are using these technologies
FIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy. IBM Internet Security Systems SiteProtector Cryptographic Module (Version 1.0)
FIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy IBM Internet Security Systems SiteProtector Document Version 2.3 August 5, 2010 Document Version 2.3 IBM Internet Security Systems Page 1 of 24 Prepared For:
SECURITY INFRASTRUCTURE Standards and implementation practices for protecting the privacy and security of shared genomic and clinical data
Global Alliance for Genomics and Health SECURITY INFRASTRUCTURE Standards and implementation practices for protecting the privacy and security of shared genomic and clinical data VERSION 1.1 March 12,
Recipe for Mobile Data Security: TPM, Bitlocker, Windows Vista and Active Directory
Recipe for Mobile Data Security: TPM, Bitlocker, Windows Vista and Active Directory Tom Olzak October 2007 If your business is like mine, laptops regularly disappear. Until recently, centrally managed
INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY SECURITY STANDARDS
INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY SECURITY STANDARDS Version 2.0 December 2013 Table of Contents 1 OVERVIEW 3 2 SCOPE 4 3 STRUCTURE 5 4 ASSET MANAGEMENT 6 5 HUMAN RESOURCES SECURITY 7 6 PHYSICAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL
Email Management and Security Good Practice Guide. August 2009
Email Management and Security Good Practice Guide August 2009 contents 1 Introduction to Good Practice Guides 3 2 Email Management and Security Overview 3 2.1 Understanding Good and Better Practice 4 3
Certicom Security for Government Suppliers developing client-side products to meet the US Government FIPS 140-2 security requirement
certicom application notes Certicom Security for Government Suppliers developing client-side products to meet the US Government FIPS 140-2 security requirement THE PROBLEM How can vendors take advantage
Lecture VII : Public Key Infrastructure (PKI)
Lecture VII : Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) Internet Security: Principles & Practices John K. Zao, PhD (Harvard) SMIEEE Computer Science Department, National Chiao Tung University 2 Problems with Public
Data Protection: From PKI to Virtualization & Cloud
Data Protection: From PKI to Virtualization & Cloud Raymond Yeung CISSP, CISA Senior Regional Director, HK/TW, ASEAN & A/NZ SafeNet Inc. Agenda What is PKI? And Value? Traditional PKI Usage Cloud Security
12/3/08. Security in Wireless LANs and Mobile Networks. Wireless Magnifies Exposure Vulnerability. Mobility Makes it Difficult to Establish Trust
Security in Wireless LANs and Mobile Networks Wireless Magnifies Exposure Vulnerability Information going across the wireless link is exposed to anyone within radio range RF may extend beyond a room or
OFFICE OF THE CONTROLLER OF CERTIFICATION AUTHORITIES TECHNICAL REQUIREMENTS FOR AUDIT OF CERTIFICATION AUTHORITIES
OFFICE OF THE CONTROLLER OF CERTIFICATION AUTHORITIES TECHNICAL REQUIREMENTS FOR AUDIT OF CERTIFICATION AUTHORITIES Table of contents 1.0 SOFTWARE 1 2.0 HARDWARE 2 3.0 TECHNICAL COMPONENTS 2 3.1 KEY MANAGEMENT
Secure web transactions system
Secure web transactions system TRUSTED WEB SECURITY MODEL Recently, as the generally accepted model in Internet application development, three-tier or multi-tier applications are used. Moreover, new trends
IoT Security Concerns and Renesas Synergy Solutions
IoT Security Concerns and Renesas Synergy Solutions Simon Moore CTO - Secure Thingz Ltd Agenda Introduction to Secure.Thingz. The Relentless Attack on the Internet of Things Building protection with Renesas
Best Practices for the Use of RF-Enabled Technology in Identity Management. January 2007. Developed by: Smart Card Alliance Identity Council
Best Practices for the Use of RF-Enabled Technology in Identity Management January 2007 Developed by: Smart Card Alliance Identity Council Best Practices for the Use of RF-Enabled Technology in Identity
PrivyLink Cryptographic Key Server *
WHITE PAPER PrivyLink Cryptographic Key * Tamper Resistant Protection of Key Information Assets for Preserving and Delivering End-to-End Trust and Values in e-businesses September 2003 E-commerce technology
Accellion Secure File Transfer Cryptographic Module Security Policy Document Version 1.0. Accellion, Inc.
Accellion Secure File Transfer Cryptographic Module Security Policy Document Version 1.0 Accellion, Inc. December 24, 2009 Copyright Accellion, Inc. 2009. May be reproduced only in its original entirety
ITL BULLETIN FOR AUGUST 2012
ITL BULLETIN FOR AUGUST 2012 SECURITY OF BLUETOOTH SYSTEMS AND DEVICES: UPDATED GUIDE ISSUED BY THE NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF STANDARDS AND TECHNOLOGY (NIST) Shirley Radack, Editor Computer Security Division
USB Portable Storage Device: Security Problem Definition Summary
USB Portable Storage Device: Security Problem Definition Summary Introduction The USB Portable Storage Device (hereafter referred to as the device or the TOE ) is a portable storage device that provides
IBM Crypto Server Management General Information Manual
CSM-1000-0 IBM Crypto Server Management General Information Manual Notices The functions described in this document are IBM property, and can only be used, if they are a part of an agreement with IBM.
Pulse Secure, LLC. January 9, 2015
Pulse Secure Network Connect Cryptographic Module Version 2.0 Non-Proprietary Security Policy Document Version 1.1 Pulse Secure, LLC. January 9, 2015 2015 by Pulse Secure, LLC. All rights reserved. May
Information Technology Security Training Requirements APPENDIX A. Appendix A Learning Continuum A-1
APPENDIX A Appendix A Learning Continuum A-1 Appendix A Learning Continuum A-2 APPENDIX A LEARNING CONTINUUM E D U C A T I O N Information Technology Security Specialists and Professionals Education and
Arnab Roy Fujitsu Laboratories of America and CSA Big Data WG
Arnab Roy Fujitsu Laboratories of America and CSA Big Data WG 1 The Big Data Working Group (BDWG) will be identifying scalable techniques for data-centric security and privacy problems. BDWG s investigation
Cryptographic Modules, Security Level Enhanced. Endorsed by the Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
Common Criteria Protection Profile Cryptographic Modules, Security Level Enhanced BSI-CC-PP-0045 Endorsed by the Foreword This Protection Profile - Cryptographic Modules, Security Level Enhanced - is issued
RELEASE NOTES. Table of Contents. Scope of the Document. [Latest Official] ADYTON Release 2.12.9 - corrections. ADYTON Release 2.12.
![RELEASE NOTES. Table of Contents. Scope of the Document. [Latest Official] ADYTON Release 2.12.9 - corrections. ADYTON Release 2.12.](/thumbs/25/6654548.jpg "RELEASE NOTES. Table of Contents. Scope of the Document. [Latest Official] ADYTON Release 2.12.9 - corrections. ADYTON Release 2.12.")
Table of Contents Scope of the Document... 1 [Latest Official] ADYTON Release 2.12.9... 1 ADYTON Release 2.12.4... 1 ADYTON Release 2.9.3... 3 ADYTON Release 2.7.7... 3 ADYTON Release 2.6.2... 4 ADYTON
Chap. 1: Introduction
Chap. 1: Introduction Introduction Services, Mechanisms, and Attacks The OSI Security Architecture Cryptography 1 1 Introduction Computer Security the generic name for the collection of tools designed
The DoD Public Key Infrastructure And Public Key-Enabling Frequently Asked Questions
The DoD Public Key Infrastructure And Public Key-Enabling Frequently Asked Questions May 3, 2004 TABLE OF CONTENTS GENERAL PKI QUESTIONS... 1 1. What is PKI?...1 2. What functionality is provided by a
Ohio Supercomputer Center
Ohio Supercomputer Center Security Education and Awareness No: Effective: OSC-6 06/02/2009 Issued By: Kevin Wohlever Director of Supercomputer Operations Published By: Ohio Supercomputer Center Original
CoSign for 21CFR Part 11 Compliance
CoSign for 21CFR Part 11 Compliance 2 Electronic Signatures at Company XYZ Company XYZ operates in a regulated environment and is subject to compliance with numerous US government regulations governed
Information Security
Information Security Dr. Vedat Coşkun Malardalen September 15th, 2009 08:00 10:00 vedatcoskun@isikun.edu.tr www.isikun.edu.tr/~vedatcoskun What needs to be secured? With the rapid advances in networked
Safety and security related features in AUTOSAR
Safety and security related features in Dr. Stefan Bunzel Spokesperson (Continental) Co-Authors: S. Fürst, Dr. J. Wagenhuber (BMW), Dr. F. Stappert (Continental) Automotive - Safety & Security 2010 22
Securing Data on Microsoft SQL Server 2012
Securing Data on Microsoft SQL Server 2012 Course 55096 The goal of this two-day instructor-led course is to provide students with the database and SQL server security knowledge and skills necessary to
Security Technical. Overview. BlackBerry Enterprise Service 10. BlackBerry Device Service Solution Version: 10.2
BlackBerry Enterprise Service 10 BlackBerry Device Service Solution Version: 10.2 Security Technical Overview Published: 2014-09-10 SWD-20140908123239883 Contents 1 About BlackBerry Device Service solution
Cornerstones of Security
Internet Security Cornerstones of Security Authenticity the sender (either client or server) of a message is who he, she or it claims to be Privacy the contents of a message are secret and only known to
CPSC 467: Cryptography and Computer Security
CPSC 467: Cryptography and Computer Security Michael J. Fischer Lecture 1 September 2, 2015 CPSC 467, Lecture 1 1/13 Protecting Information Information security Security principles Crypto as a security
Part I. Universität Klagenfurt - IWAS Multimedia Kommunikation (VK) M. Euchner; Mai 2001. Siemens AG 2001, ICN M NT
Part I Contents Part I Introduction to Information Security Definition of Crypto Cryptographic Objectives Security Threats and Attacks The process Security Security Services Cryptography Cryptography (code
CRYPTOGRAPHY AS A SERVICE
CRYPTOGRAPHY AS A SERVICE Peter Robinson RSA, The Security Division of EMC Session ID: ADS R01 Session Classification: Advanced Introduction Deploying cryptographic keys to end points such as smart phones,
Introduction to Security
2 Introduction to Security : IT Security Sirindhorn International Institute of Technology Thammasat University Prepared by Steven Gordon on 25 October 2013 its335y13s2l01, Steve/Courses/2013/s2/its335/lectures/intro.tex,
Certification Practice Statement
Certification Practice Statement Revision R1 2013-01-09 1 Copyright Printed: January 9, 2013 This work is the intellectual property of Salzburger Banken Software. Reproduction and distribution require
White Paper How Noah Mobile uses Microsoft Azure Core Services
NoahMobile Documentation White Paper How Noah Mobile uses Microsoft Azure Core Services The Noah Mobile Cloud service is built for the Microsoft Azure platform. The solutions that are part of the Noah
Start building a trusted environment now... (before it s too late) IT Decision Makers
YOU CAN T got HAP Start building a trusted environment now... IT Decision Makers (before it s too late) HAP reference implementations and commercial solutions are available now in the HAP Developer Kit.
Christchurch Polytechnic Institute of Technology Information Systems Acquisition, Development and Maintenance Security Standard
Christchurch Polytechnic Institute of Technology Information Systems Acquisition, Development and Maintenance Security Standard Corporate Policies & Procedures Section 1: General Administration Document
User Authentication Guidance for IT Systems
Information Technology Security Guideline User Authentication Guidance for IT Systems ITSG-31 March 2009 March 2009 This page intentionally left blank March 2009 Foreword The User Authentication Guidance
Cloud Computing and Security Risk Analysis Qing Liu Technology Architect STREAM Technology Lab Qing.Liu@chi.frb.org
Cloud Computing and Security Risk Analysis Qing Liu Technology Architect STREAM Technology Lab Qing.Liu@chi.frb.org 1 Disclaimers This presentation provides education on Cloud Computing and its security
Lecture Objectives. Lecture 8 Mobile Networks: Security in Wireless LANs and Mobile Networks. Agenda. References
Lecture Objectives Wireless Networks and Mobile Systems Lecture 8 Mobile Networks: Security in Wireless LANs and Mobile Networks Introduce security vulnerabilities and defenses Describe security functions
---Information Technology (IT) Specialist (GS-2210) IT Security Competency Model---
---Information Technology (IT) Specialist (GS-2210) IT Security Model--- TECHNICAL COMPETENCIES Computer Forensics Knowledge of tools and techniques pertaining to legal evidence used in the analysis of
Patterns for Secure Boot and Secure Storage in Computer Systems
Patterns for Secure Boot and Secure Storage in Computer Systems Hans Löhr, Ahmad-Reza Sadeghi, Marcel Winandy Horst Görtz Institute for IT Security, Ruhr-University Bochum, Germany {hans.loehr,ahmad.sadeghi,marcel.winandy}@trust.rub.de
FIPS 140 2 Non Proprietary Security Policy: Kingston Technology DataTraveler DT4000 Series USB Flash Drive
FIPS 140 2 Non Proprietary Security Policy Kingston Technology Company, Inc. DataTraveler DT4000 G2 Series USB Flash Drive Document Version 1.8 December 3, 2014 Document Version 1.8 Kingston Technology
Application Note Gemalto.NET 2.0 Smart Card Certificate Enrollment using Microsoft Certificate Services on Windows 2008
7 Application Note Gemalto.NET 2.0 Smart Card Certificate Enrollment using Microsoft Certificate Services on Windows 2008 All information herein is either public information or is the property of and owned
TEMPLE UNIVERSITY POLICIES AND PROCEDURES MANUAL
TEMPLE UNIVERSITY POLICIES AND PROCEDURES MANUAL Title: Computer and Network Security Policy Policy Number: 04.72.12 Effective Date: November 4, 2003 Issuing Authority: Office of the Vice President for
SECURE IMPLEMENTATIONS OF CONTENT PROTECTION (DRM) SCHEMES ON CONSUMER ELECTRONIC DEVICES
SECURE IMPLEMENTATIONS OF CONTENT PROTECTION (DRM) SCHEMES ON CONSUMER ELECTRONIC DEVICES Contents Introduction... 3 DRM Threat Model... 3 DRM Flow... 4 DRM Assets... 5 Threat Model... 5 Protection of
User. Role. Privilege. Environment. Checkpoint. System
8. Security Features Motivation Viruses, spam, trojan horses have become increasingly common in PC environment In mobile environment, new kinds of opportunities offered for malicious software Potentially
Wireless and Mobile Technologies for Healthcare: Ensuring Privacy, Security, and Availability
Wireless and Mobile Technologies for Healthcare: Ensuring Privacy, Security, and Availability T. Jepsen, N. Buckley, D. Witters, K. Stine INTRODUCTION The IEEE-USA Medical Technology Policy Committee sponsored
CS 356 Lecture 29 Wireless Security. Spring 2013
CS 356 Lecture 29 Wireless Security Spring 2013 Review Chapter 1: Basic Concepts and Terminology Chapter 2: Basic Cryptographic Tools Chapter 3 User Authentication Chapter 4 Access Control Lists Chapter
A PRACTICAL APPROACH TO INCLUDE SECURITY IN SOFTWARE DEVELOPMENT
A PRACTICAL APPROACH TO INCLUDE SECURITY IN SOFTWARE DEVELOPMENT Chandramohan Muniraman, University of Houston-Victoria, chandram@houston.rr.com Meledath Damodaran, University of Houston-Victoria, damodaranm@uhv.edu
MS-55096: Securing Data on Microsoft SQL Server 2012
MS-55096: Securing Data on Microsoft SQL Server 2012 Description The goal of this two-day instructor-led course is to provide students with the database and SQL server security knowledge and skills necessary
How To Protect Your Network From Attack
Department of Computer Science Institute for System Architecture, Chair for Computer Networks Internet Services & Protocols Internet (In)Security Dr.-Ing. Stephan Groß Room: INF 3099 E-Mail: stephan.gross@tu-dresden.de
What Does it Mean to be PIVish in PACS ICAM PIV in E-PACS Guidance v2.0.2 the short form. December 3, 2012
Federal CIO Council Information Security and Identity Management Committee IDManagement.gov What Does it Mean to be PIVish in PACS ICAM PIV in E-PACS Guidance v2.0.2 the short form December 3, 2012 HSPD-12
WIND RIVER SECURE ANDROID CAPABILITY
WIND RIVER SECURE ANDROID CAPABILITY Cyber warfare has swiftly migrated from hacking into enterprise networks and the Internet to targeting, and being triggered from, mobile devices. With the recent explosion
Cloud security architecture
ericsson White paper Uen 284 23-3244 January 2015 Cloud security architecture from process to deployment The Trust Engine concept and logical cloud security architecture presented in this paper provide
BlackBerry Enterprise Service 10. Secure Work Space for ios and Android Version: 10.1.1. Security Note
BlackBerry Enterprise Service 10 Secure Work Space for ios and Android Version: 10.1.1 Security Note Published: 2013-06-21 SWD-20130621110651069 Contents 1 About this guide...4 2 What is BlackBerry Enterprise
EAC Decision on Request for Interpretation 2008-03 (Operating System Configuration)
EAC Decision on Request for Interpretation 2008-03 (Operating System Configuration) 2002 VSS Volume1: 2.2.5.3, 4.1.1, 6.2.1.1, Volume2: 3.5 2005 VVSG Volume1: 2.1.5.2, 5.1.1, 7.2.1, Volume2: 3.5 Date:
Cryptography and Network Security
Cryptography and Network Security Third Edition by William Stallings Lecture slides by Shinu Mathew John http://shinu.info/ Chapter 1 Introduction http://shinu.info/ 2 Background Information Security requirements
Information Security Program Management Standard
State of California California Information Security Office Information Security Program Management Standard SIMM 5305-A September 2013 REVISION HISTORY REVISION DATE OF RELEASE OWNER SUMMARY OF CHANGES
A Framework for Secure and Verifiable Logging in Public Communication Networks
A Framework for Secure and Verifiable Logging in Public Communication Networks Vassilios Stathopoulos, Panayiotis Kotzanikolaou and Emmanouil Magkos {v.stathopoulos, p.kotzanikolaou}@adae.gr emagos@ionio.gr
Using BroadSAFE TM Technology 07/18/05
Using BroadSAFE TM Technology 07/18/05 Layers of a Security System Security System Data Encryption Key Negotiation Authentication Identity Root Key Once root is compromised, all subsequent layers of security
Content Teaching Academy at James Madison University
Content Teaching Academy at James Madison University 1 2 The Battle Field: Computers, LANs & Internetworks 3 Definitions Computer Security - generic name for the collection of tools designed to protect
Why self-signed certificates are much costlier and riskier than working with a trusted security vendor
The Hidden Costs of Self-Signed SSL Certificates Why self-signed certificates are much costlier and riskier than working with a trusted security vendor Introduction Even when business is booming, smart
CipherShare Features and Benefits
CipherShare s and CipherShare s and Security End-to-end Encryption Need-to-Know: Challenge / Response Authentication Transitive Trust Consistent Security Password and Key Recovery Temporary Application
Plain English Guide To Common Criteria Requirements In The. Field Device Protection Profile Version 0.75
Plain English Guide To Common Criteria Requirements In The Field Device Protection Profile Version 0.75 Prepared For: Process Control Security Requirements Forum (PCSRF) Prepared By: Digital Bond, Inc.
Computer Networks. Network Security and Ethics. Week 14. College of Information Science and Engineering Ritsumeikan University
Computer Networks Network Security and Ethics Week 14 College of Information Science and Engineering Ritsumeikan University Security Intro for Admins l Network administrators can break security into two
Best Practices for Outdoor Wireless Security
Best Practices for Outdoor Wireless Security This paper describes security best practices for deploying an outdoor wireless LAN. This is standard body copy, style used is Body. Customers are encouraged
Information Supplement: Requirement 6.6 Code Reviews and Application Firewalls Clarified
Standard: Data Security Standard (DSS) Requirement: 6.6 Date: February 2008 Information Supplement: Requirement 6.6 Code Reviews and Application Firewalls Clarified Release date: 2008-04-15 General PCI
Securing Your Software for the Mobile Application Market
WHITE PAPER: SECURING YOUR SOFTWARE FOR THE MOBILE APPLICATION MARKET White Paper Securing Your Software for the Mobile Application Market The Latest Code Signing Technology Securing Your Software for
The Security Framework 4.1 Programming and Design
Tel: (301) 587-3000 Fax: (301) 587-7877 E-mail: info@setecs.com Web: www.setecs.com Security Architecture for Development and Run Time Support of Secure Network Applications Sead Muftic, President/CEO
Key Management Best Practices
White Paper Key Management Best Practices Data encryption is a fundamental component of strategies to address security threats and satisfy regulatory mandates. While encryption is not in itself difficult
05.0 Application Development
Number 5.0 Policy Owner Information Security and Technology Policy Application Development Effective 01/01/2014 Last Revision 12/30/2013 Department of Innovation and Technology 5. Application Development
BUSINESS GUIDE SECURING YOUR SOFTWARE FOR THE MOBILE APPLICATION MARKET THE LATEST CODE SIGNING TECHNOLOGY
SECURING YOUR SOFTWARE FOR THE MOBILE APPLICATION MARKET THE LATEST CODE SIGNING TECHNOLOGY Now from CONTENTS 1 THE CHALLENGE 1 A BRIEF REVIEW OF CODE SIGNING 2 THE SOLUTION 2 HOW THE CODE SIGNING PORTAL
Trusted Platforms for Homeland Security
Trusted Platforms for Homeland Security By Kevin Schutz, Product Manager Secure Products Summary Ongoing threats from hackers, viruses, and worms continue to make security a top priority for IT and business
FIPS 140-2 Security Policy LogRhythm 6.0.4 Log Manager
FIPS 140-2 Security Policy LogRhythm 6.0.4 Log Manager LogRhythm 3195 Sterling Circle, Suite 100 Boulder CO, 80301 USA September 17, 2012 Document Version 1.0 Module Version 6.0.4 Page 1 of 23 Copyright
A Draft Framework for Designing Cryptographic Key Management Systems
A Draft Framework for Designing Cryptographic Key Management Systems Elaine Barker Dennis Branstad Santosh Chokhani Miles Smid IEEE Key Management Summit May 4, 2010 Purpose of Presentation To define what
Securing Distribution Automation
Securing Distribution Automation Jacques Benoit, Cooper Power Systems Serge Gagnon, Hydro-Québec Luc Tétreault, Hydro-Québec Western Power Delivery Automation Conference Spokane, Washington April 2010