Efficiency, utility and wealth maximization

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1 University Press Scholarship Online You are looking at 1-10 of 41 items for: keywords : economic efficiency Efficiency, utility and wealth maximization Jules L. Coleman in Markets, Morals, and the Law Published in print: 2002 Published Online: ISBN: eisbn: acprof:oso/ This chapter argues that two states of affairs, S' and S, can be Kaldor- Hicks efficient to each other (the Scitovsky paradox), whereas S' and S cannot each contain more utility than the other. So from the fact that S' is Kaldor-Hicks efficient to S, it cannot be inferred that S' increases utility over S. This leads to the contradictory conclusion that S and S' increase utility with respect to each other. Based on the fact that a social state, S, is Pareto optimal, no inference about whether the move to it from a previous social state increases utility can be warranted at least not without a standard of interpersonal comparability. The chapter goes on to show that only Pareto superiority bears the desired relationship to utilitarianism; that is, if S' is Pareto superior to S, then S' increases utility with respect to S. The rest of the chapter discusses at length various lines of defense for normative economic analysis. Modern Financial Markets and Finance Theory EMILIOS AVGOULEAS in The Mechanics and Regulation of Market Abuse: A Legal and Economic Analysis Published in print: 2005 Published Online: ISBN: eisbn: acprof:oso/ This chapter analyses modern financial markets as well as modern and post-modern finance theory. The discussion sheds light on the economic theories and assumptions used in this book for the exploration of the function of market manipulation and insider dealing as forms of economic behaviour, and especially of their mechanics: techniques, Page 1 of 6

2 devices, and tools used to perpetrate them. A sound understanding of modern financial markets and of economic theory concepts used to explain them is indispensable in the study of market abuse. It also underpins the analysis of the economic efficiency rationales that support its regulation. The chapter draws extensively on the relevant works of eminent economists such as Modigliani, Akerlof, Scholes, and Stiglitz, and from leading finance textbooks. Risks and Wrongs Jules L. Coleman Published in print: 2002 Published Online: ISBN: eisbn: acprof:oso/ This book is concerned with the conflict between the goals of justice and economic efficiency in the allocation of risk, especially risk pertaining to safety. The book approaches the subject from the premise that the market is central to liberal political, moral, and legal theory. The first part of the book rejects traditional rational choice liberalism in favor of the view that the market operates as a rational way of fostering stable relationships and institutions within communities of individuals with broadly divergent conceptions of the good. However, markets are needed most where they are most difficult to create and sustain, and one way to understand contract law in liberal legal theory, according to this book, is as an institution designed to reduce uncertainty and thereby make markets possible. Truth or Economics: On the Definition, Prediction, and Relevance of Economic Efficiency Richard S. Markovits Published in print: 2008 Published Online: October 2013 ISBN: eisbn: Publisher: Yale University Press DOI: /yale/ Is economic efficiency a sound basis upon which to make public policy or legal decisions? This book considers the way in which scholars and public decision-makers define, predict, and assess the moral and legal relevance of economic efficiency. The book begins by identifying imperfections in the traditional definition of economic efficiency. Further, the book develops and illustrates an appropriate response to Second- Best Theory and investigates the moral and legal relevance of economicefficiency analyses. Not only do virtually all economic, legal, and public policy thinkers misdefine economic efficiency, but also the book Page 2 of 6

3 concludes, that they ignore or respond inadequately to Second-Best Theory when analyzing the economic efficiency of public choices and mis-assess the relevance of economic-efficiency conclusions both for moral evaluations and for the answer to legal-rights questions that is correct as a matter of law. Efficiency, auction and exchange Jules L. Coleman in Markets, Morals, and the Law Published in print: 2002 Published Online: ISBN: eisbn: acprof:oso/ This chapter distinguishes between Pareto optimality, Pareto superiority, and Kaldor-Hicks efficiency, and provides an extended discussion of the Coase theorem. One of the central claims in this chapter is that the economic analysis of law relies largely on the Kaldor-Hicks criterion of efficiency, less on Pareto optimality, and almost not at all on Pareto superiority. This is important, especially from a normative point of view. What justifies the use of public power, that is, courts, legislatures and administrative agencies, in pursuing efficiency? In his essay Theory of Negligence, Richard Posner shows that a large number of negligence cases were decided along lines of economic efficiency. Climate Change and Common Sense: Essays in Honour of Tom Schelling Robert W. Hahn and Alistair Ulph (eds) Published in print: 2012 Published Online: May 2012 ISBN: eisbn: acprof:oso/ There is widespread agreement that climate change is a serious problem. If we fail to regulate greenhouse gases that contribute to global warming, or use alternative strategies for addressing the problem, the damages could be significant, and perhaps catastrophic. After several international meetings in which nation states have tried unsuccessfully to address the climate change problem, there is a widespread sense of frustration and urgency: frustration at the slow pace at which countries are moving toward an international agreement to reduce greenhouse gas emissions; urgency because of the growing evidence that climate change is a serious problem that should be addressed globally and quickly. The aim of this book is to take a close look at the fundamental political Page 3 of 6

4 and economic processes driving climate change policy. It identifies institutional arrangements and policies that are needed to design more effective climate change policy. The book also examines ethical and distributional arguments that are critical in understanding and framing the climate debate. The book is built around a conference honouring Tom Schelling that took place at the Sustainable Consumption Institute at The University of Manchester in October Each chapter represents a significant contribution to the literature on the political economy of climate change. The Foundations of European Union Competition Law: The Objective and Principles of Article 102 Renato Nazzini Published in print: 2011 Published Online: January 2012 ISBN: eisbn: acprof:oso/ Article 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union prohibits the abuse of a dominant position as incompatible with the internal market. Its application in practice has been controversial with goals as diverse as the preservation of an undistorted competitive process, the protection of economic freedom, the maximisation of consumer welfare, social welfare, or economic efficiency all cited as possible or desirable objectives. These conflicting aims have raised complex questions as to how abuses can be assessed and how a dominant position should be defined. This book addresses the conceptual problems underlying the tests to be applied under Article 102 in light of the objectives of EU competition law. Adopting an interdisciplinary approach, the book covers all the main issues relating to Article 102, including its objectives, its relationship with other principles and provisions of EU law, the criteria for the assessment of individual abusive practices, and the definition of dominance. It provides an in-depth doctrinal and normative commentary of the case law with the aim of establishing an intellectually robust and practically workable analytical framework for abuse of dominance. The Measurement of Productive Efficiency and Productivity Change Harold O. Fried, C. A. Knox Lovell, and Shelton S. Schmidt (eds) Published in print: 2008 Published Online: January 2008 ISBN: eisbn: acprof:oso/ Page 4 of 6

5 This book is an update of the 1993 publication of The Measurement of Productive Efficiency: Techniques and Applications. The same editors have here compiled over ten years of the most recent research in this changing field, and expanded on those seminal chapters and written this new edition. The book guides from the basic models to the latest, cutting-edge extensions, and is reinforced by references to classic and current theoretical and applied research. The book focuses on measuring and explaining producer performance. It views performance as a function of the state of technology and economic efficiency. It shows that insights can be gained by allowing for the possibility of a divergence between the economic objective and actual performance, and by associating this inefficiency with causal variables subject to managerial or policy influence. The Distortion-Analysis Approach to Economic-Efficiency Assessment Richard S. Markovits in Truth or Economics: On the Definition, Prediction, and Relevance of Economic Efficiency Published in print: 2008 Published Online: October 2013 ISBN: eisbn: Publisher: Yale University Press DOI: /yale/ This chapter describes the distortion-analysis approach to economicefficiency assessment. The three major stages of the resource-allocation process, the major category of economic inefficiency that can be generated at each, and the various subtypes of each major category of economic inefficiency are examined. The expression allocation of resources refers to the pattern in which an economy's basic resources are distributed among their various possible users and uses and the way in which an economy's output is distributed among its possible consumers. The consumer choices that affect the allocation at the third, consumption-optimum stage and the producer choices that affect the allocation at the second, top-level-optimum stage obviously affect the identity of the producers to whom particular resources are allocated at the first, production-optimum stage. Page 5 of 6

6 The Government as Body Politic Peter Trepte in Regulating Procurement: Understanding the Ends and Means of Public Procurement Regulation Published in print: 2004 Published Online: March 2012 ISBN: eisbn: acprof:oso/ Market and institutional failures leading to conditions of imperfect competition which negatively affect economic efficiency (Pareto efficiency) explain many of the provisions which are common to most procurement systems. This chapter addresses a further concern of welfare economics which considers the normative value judgements made by governments and their effect on issues of allocative efficiency. Whilst it is expected that the value choices made by the government would remain Pareto efficient (that is, would fall within one of the many Pareto-efficient options), it is also the responsibility of governments to decide (based on their election promises) which Pareto-efficient option to choose. That is not always achievable and, where it is not, there will be a trade-off between the attainment of a non-economic policy objective and economic efficiency. The success of procurement regulation will be measured by its ability to satisfy the requirements of the context in which it operates. This chapter also discusses the instrumental use of procurement, protective policies and proactive policies, strategic policies, non-discrimination, statutory compliance, and contract compliance. Page 6 of 6