F.6 History DBQ exercise Invasion: the Japanese invasion (7 Apr 13 Apr)

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1 F.6 History DBQ exercise Invasion: the Japanese invasion (7 Apr 13 Apr) Source A It was not until 22 January (1915) that I learned the astonishing nature of the Japanese proposals (Twenty-one Demands). I found one of the Chinese ministers worried when I called on him. He finally confided to me, almost with tears, that Japan had made demands which, if agreed to, would destroy the independence of his country and reduce it to slavery. He then told me in general terms their contents. He said: 'Control of natural resources, finances, and the army! What will be left of China? Our people are being punished for their peacefulness and sense of justice'. The blow evidently had come with stunning force. The councillors of the President had not been able to develop any idea how the crisis might be met. -From the memoirs of Paul Reinsch (date unknown) Source B On 4 May 1919, students in Beijing demonstrated in protest against the Chinese government's humiliating policy towards Japan. This resulted in a series of strikes and other events leading to a social unrest and agitation... This rising tide was soon called by the students the May Fourth Movement. -From The May Forth Movement by Chow Tse-tsung, 1960 Source C The population density of Japan is large and the birthrate is high. Japan cannot solve the population problem without the expansion of industry. Industry cannot expand without the expansion of the raw material supply and the market for finished products. Only in the continuous, successful search for new raw materials and new markets can Japan guarantee everlasting prosperity... It is most pleasing to Japan that Chinese officials, being so afraid of Japan, will not dare do anything against Japanese wishes. Approximately seventy percent of the people in North China cannot and will not be united in finding a way to cope with Japan... Self-centred attitudes and total selfishness among the Chinese is the best help we Japanese have. We can easily win a victory without having to fight a battle. The Chinese will grant us all kinds of concessions if we simply say the word... Our strategy in China is therefore clear. We shall crush those Chinese who have shown strong leadership, and support those who are extremely selfish... To keep China divided, we shall continue to sow the seeds of suspicion and disagreement among different persons or groups, and set them against one another... -From a report by Matsumuro Koryo, Chief of Japanese Intelligence, Beiping, (Beiping was the GMD name for Beijing.) Source D Chinese resistance was feeble and patchy. There seemed to be no general overall plan for the Chinese campaigns. Some generals quietly sold out to the Japanese, while others fought stubbornly, although cut off from supplies and lacking even money to pay their troops... Week after week the Japanese kept up the act that they were in Dongbei simply to restore peace and order. Whenever there was a growing concentration of scattered Chinese troops, the Japanese would charge the Chinese with 'insincerity' and with a

2 refusal to co-operate in restoring order. The Japanese would then launch smashing offensives. - From My Years in China by Hallett Abend, 1944 Source E You can never imagine the difficulties under which our army and other Chinese armies operate. The Japanese have trucks, airplanes and other efficient means of transport. We have donkeys, horses, a few mules, and men. Almost all of our army walks. No motorized units here! - From a Communist interviewed by Agnes Smedley in the 1930s. Agnes Smedley spent many years in China and lived with the Communists. Source F Zhou Enlai told me that the Reds wanted to end the civil war and unite with the nationalists to resist Japan. That would not mean giving up the revolution, he said, but advancing it. The first day of the anti-japanese war he predicted, will mean the beginning of the end of Jiang Jieshi. -From an account by Edgar Snow, who was in China at the time 1. How do Sources A & B help explain Japan s later invasion of Manchuria? 2. Explain what Sources C-F suggest about the consequences of the Japanese success in Manchuria in 1931.

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