Recap. Duopoly models. ! Last class (January 13, 2004) ! Today (January 15, 2004) ! Two competing firms, selling a homogeneous good
|
|
|
- Eunice Wilcox
- 7 years ago
- Views:
Transcription
1 Reap! Last lass (January 13, 24)! Domnant and domnated atons! Best response! ash eulbrum! Mxed strateges! Pareto domnane! Today (January 15, 24)! Examples of games wth ontnuous aton sets! Duopoly models: Cournot and Bertrand Duopoly models! Two ompetng frms, sellng a homogeneous good! The margnal ost of produng eah unt of the good: 1 and 2! The market pre, P s determned by (nverse) market demand:! Pa-bQ f a>bq, P otherwse.! Both frms seek to maxmze profts! Cournot: Frms set uanttes smultaneously! Bertrand: Frm set pres smultaneously! Stakelberg: Frms set uanttes, frm 1 followed by frm 2 1
2 Cournot Competton! The market pre, P s determned by (nverse) market demand:! Pa-bQ f a>bq, P otherwse.! Eah frm dedes on the uantty to sell (market share): 1 and 2! Q 1 2 total market demand! Both frms seek to maxmze profts Cournot Competton: Best response of Frm 1! Suppose frm 2 produes 2! Frm 1 s profts, f t produes 1 are: π 1 (P- 1 ) 1 [a-b( 1 2 )] (Resdual) revenue Cost! How to hoose 1 to maxmze π 1?! Frst note that π 1 s onave: d 2 π 1 /d 1 2-2b <! Frst order ondtons (FOC): d π 1 /d 1 a - 2b 1 -b 2 1 Resdual margnal revenue Margnal ost 1 (a- 1 )b 2 R 1 ( 2 ) 2
3 Cournot Competton: Best response of Frm 2! Suppose frm 1 produes 1! Frm 2 s profts, f t produes 2 are: π 2 (P- 2 ) 2 [a-b( 1 2 )] (Resdual) revenue Cost! Frst order ondtons: d π 2 /d 2 a - 2b 2 b 1 2 RMR MC 2 (a- 2 )b 1 R 2 ( 1 ) Example: Cournot Competton! P 13-( 1 2 ), so a13, b1! 1 2 1! Suppose Frm 2 thnks that Frm 1 wll set 1 4! Resdual demand of Frm 2: P 9-2! Resdual revenue of Frm 2: RR[9-2 ] 2! Resdual margnal revenue: RMR9-2 2! Settng RMRMC
4 Cournot Competton: Graphal soluton 13 P 9 Resdual demand: P9-5 RMR 9-2 P13-Q MC Cournot Eulbrum! 1 (a- 1 )b 2! 2 (a- 2 )b 1! Solvng together for 1 and 2 : C 1 (a )/3b C 2 (a )/3b! Market demand and pre: Q C C 1 C 2 (2a- 1-2 )/3b P a - bq C (a 1 2 )/3 4
5 Example: Cournot Competton! P 13-( 1 2 ), so a13, b1! 1 2 1! The frms best response funtons: 1 (a-b 2 -)b ( )6-2 2 (a-b 1 -)b ( )6-1! Solvng for 1 and 2 : Q8 P 5! Frms profts: π 1 π 2 (5-1)4 16 Cournot Competton: Graphal soluton! 1 R 1 ( 2 ) R 2 ( 1 ) R 2 ( 1 ) 6-1 Cournot eulbrum R 1 ( 2 )
6 6 Cournot Eulbrum wth frms j j b b a ] [ ), ( max π Frst order ondtons: b b a j j,..., 1 2 Substtute Q : bq b a,..., 1 Sum over : bq bq a Cournot Eulbrum wth frms 1 1 1) ( 1) ( a P b b a Q C C If eah frm has the same ost : 1 1) ( a P b a Q C C C
7 Bertrand Eulbrum Model! Frms set pres rather than uanttes! Pa-bQ! Customers buy from the frm wth the heapest pre! The market s splt evenly f frms offer the same pre Best response! Frm 1 s proft funton: π(p 1 )(P 1-1 ) 1! To ensure 1 > (reall: Pa-bQ and Q(a-P)/b) P 1 a! To ensure nonnegatve profts P 1 1! Frm 1 should hoose 1 P 1 a! Smlarly, frm 2 should hoose 2 P 2 a 7
8 Best response (ont.)! Frm s demand depends on the relatonshp between P 1 and P 2, f P > Pj a P, f P < Pj 1,2 b a P, f P Pj P 2b! Frm 1 should hoose 1 P 1 P 2 (f possble)! Frm 2 should hoose 2 P 2 P 1 (f possble) Bertrand eulbrum! For both frms to sell postve uanttes proftably 1 P 1 P 2 and 2 P 2 P 1! Suppose 1 2 P 1 2 (a-)b! Suppose 1 < 2 P 1 2 -ε P (a- 2 ε)/b 2 8
9 Example! P 13-( 1 2 ) (a13, b1)! 1 2 1! P1! 1 2 (a-p)b 6 Q12! Frms profts: π 1 π 2 Quantty-settng monopolst! Sngle frm (monopolst), sellng a sngle good! The margnal ost of produng eah unt of the good:! The frm dedes on the uantty to sell: Q (market demand! The market pre, P s determned by (nverse) market demand:! Pa-bQ f a>bq, P otherwse.! The frm seeks to maxmze profts 9
10 Quantty-settng monopolst! The frm s profts, f t produes Q are: π (P-)Q [a-bq]q Q Revenue Cost! How to hoose Q to maxmze π?! Frst note that π s onave: d 2 π/dq 2-2b <! Frst order ondtons (FOC): d π/dq a - 2bQ Margnal revenue Margnal ost Q (a-)b P (a) Example! P 13-Q (a13, b1)! 1! Q (a-)b 6 P (a) 7! Monopolst s profts: π (7-1)6 36 1
11 Monopoly vs. Cournot vs. Bertrand Compettve Bertrand Cournot Monopoly Pre Quantty Total Frm Profts 32 36! Frm profts and pres: Compettve Bertrand Cournot Monopoly Monopoly vs. Cournot vs. Bertrand Compettve Bertrand Cournot Monopoly Pre (a2)/3 (a) Quantty (a-)/b (a-)/b 2(a-)/3b (a-)b Total Frm Profts 2(a-) 2 /9b (a-) 2 /4b! Frm profts and pres: Compettve Bertrand Cournot Monopoly 11
12 Cournot ompetton 13 P 9 5 Consumer surplus32 P13-Q Frm profts Deadweght loss8 MC1 13 Bertrand ompetton 13 P Consumer surplus72 P13-Q MC1 12
13 Monopoly 13 P Consumer surplus18 7 P13-Q Frm profts36 6 Deadweght loss18 MC1 13 Monopoly vs. Cournot vs. Bertrand Compettve Bertrand Cournot Monopoly Consumer surplus Deadweght loss 8 18 Total Frm Profts
Chapter 7: Answers to Questions and Problems
19. Based on the nformaton contaned n Table 7-3 of the text, the food and apparel ndustres are most compettve and therefore probably represent the best match for the expertse of these managers. Chapter
Problem Set 3. a) We are asked how people will react, if the interest rate i on bonds is negative.
Queston roblem Set 3 a) We are asked how people wll react, f the nterest rate on bonds s negatve. When
Figure 1. Inventory Level vs. Time - EOQ Problem
IEOR 54 Sprng, 009 rof Leahman otes on Eonom Lot Shedulng and Eonom Rotaton Cyles he Eonom Order Quantty (EOQ) Consder an nventory tem n solaton wth demand rate, holdng ost h per unt per unt tme, and replenshment
Price competition with homogenous products: The Bertrand duopoly model [Simultaneous move price setting duopoly]
![Price competition with homogenous products: The Bertrand duopoly model [Simultaneous move price setting duopoly]](/thumbs/24/4353364.jpg "Price competition with homogenous products: The Bertrand duopoly model [Simultaneous move price setting duopoly]")
ECON9 (Spring 0) & 350 (Tutorial ) Chapter Monopolistic Competition and Oligopoly (Part ) Price competition with homogenous products: The Bertrand duopoly model [Simultaneous move price setting duopoly]
Production. 2. Y is closed A set is closed if it contains its boundary. We need this for the solution existence in the profit maximization problem.
Producer Theory Producton ASSUMPTION 2.1 Propertes of the Producton Set The producton set Y satsfes the followng propertes 1. Y s non-empty If Y s empty, we have nothng to talk about 2. Y s closed A set
Addendum to: Importing Skill-Biased Technology
Addendum to: Importng Skll-Based Technology Arel Bursten UCLA and NBER Javer Cravno UCLA August 202 Jonathan Vogel Columba and NBER Abstract Ths Addendum derves the results dscussed n secton 3.3 of our
Oligopoly: How do firms behave when there are only a few competitors? These firms produce all or most of their industry s output.
Topic 8 Chapter 13 Oligopoly and Monopolistic Competition Econ 203 Topic 8 page 1 Oligopoly: How do firms behave when there are only a few competitors? These firms produce all or most of their industry
reduce competition increase market power cost savings economies of scale and scope cost savings Oliver Williamson: the efficiency defense
Mergers Why merge? reduce competton ncrease market power cost savngs economes of scale and scope Why allow mergers? cost savngs Olver Wllamson: the effcency defense Merger wthout cost savngs Before merger:
24. Impact of Piracy on Innovation at Software Firms and Implications for Piracy Policy
4. mpat of Pray on nnovaton at Software Frms and mplatons for Pray Poly Jeevan Jasngh Department of nformaton & Systems Management, HKUST Clear Water Bay, Kowloon Hong Kong jeevan@ust.h Abstrat A Busness
Table of Contents MICRO ECONOMICS
economicsentrance.weebly.com Basic Exercises Micro Economics AKG 09 Table of Contents MICRO ECONOMICS Budget Constraint... 4 Practice problems... 4 Answers... 4 Supply and Demand... 7 Practice Problems...
Series Solutions of ODEs 2 the Frobenius method. The basic idea of the Frobenius method is to look for solutions of the form 3
Royal Holloway Unversty of London Department of Physs Seres Solutons of ODEs the Frobenus method Introduton to the Methodology The smple seres expanson method works for dfferental equatons whose solutons
Monopoly: static and dynamic efficiency M.Motta, Competition Policy: Theory and Practice, Cambridge University Press, 2004; ch. 2
Monopoly: static and dynamic efficiency M.Motta, Competition Policy: Theory and Practice, Cambridge University Press, 2004; ch. 2 Economics of Competition and Regulation 2015 Maria Rosa Battaggion Perfect
Solution: Let i = 10% and d = 5%. By definition, the respective forces of interest on funds A and B are. i 1 + it. S A (t) = d (1 dt) 2 1. = d 1 dt.
Chapter 9 Revew problems 9.1 Interest rate measurement Example 9.1. Fund A accumulates at a smple nterest rate of 10%. Fund B accumulates at a smple dscount rate of 5%. Fnd the pont n tme at whch the forces
Revenue Management Games
Revenue Management Games Sergue Netessne and Robert A. Shumsky 2 Unversty of Rohester W. E. Smon Graduate Shool of Busness Admnstraton Rohester, NY 4627 Otober, 2000 netessnse@smon.rohester.edu 2 shumsky@smon.rohester.edu
A Two Stage Stochastic Equilibrium Model for Electricity Markets with Two Way Contracts
A Two Stage Stochastc Equlbrum Model for Electrcty Markets wth Two Way Contracts Dal Zhang and Hufu Xu School of Mathematcs Unversty of Southampton Southampton SO17 1BJ, UK Yue Wu School of Management
NON-CONSTANT SUM RED-AND-BLACK GAMES WITH BET-DEPENDENT WIN PROBABILITY FUNCTION LAURA PONTIGGIA, University of the Sciences in Philadelphia
To appear n Journal o Appled Probablty June 2007 O-COSTAT SUM RED-AD-BLACK GAMES WITH BET-DEPEDET WI PROBABILITY FUCTIO LAURA POTIGGIA, Unversty o the Scences n Phladelpha Abstract In ths paper we nvestgate
Oligopoly and Strategic Pricing
R.E.Marks 1998 Oligopoly 1 R.E.Marks 1998 Oligopoly Oligopoly and Strategic Pricing In this section we consider how firms compete when there are few sellers an oligopolistic market (from the Greek). Small
ARTICLE IN PRESS. Telecommunications Policy
Telecommuncatons Polcy 34 (2010) 262 269 Contents lsts avalable at ScenceDrect Telecommuncatons Polcy URL: www.elseverbusnessmanagement.com/locate/telpol On the compettve effects of moble vrtual network
Oligopoly Theory Made Simple
Olgopoly Theory Made Smple Huw Dxon Chapter 6, Surfng Economcs, pp 5-60. Olgopoly made smple Chapter 6. Olgopoly Theory Made Smple 6. Introducton. Olgopoly theory les at the heart of ndustral organsaton
The Economics of Two-sided Markets 2. Platform competition!
U. Porto Doctoral Programme n Economcs The Economcs of Two-sded Markets 2. Platform competton! Paul Belleflamme, CORE & LSM! Unversté catholque de Louvan! Aprl 10-13, 2012 Learnng objectves At the end
Competition and Regulation. Lecture 2: Background on imperfect competition
Competition and Regulation Lecture 2: Background on imperfect competition Monopoly A monopolist maximizes its profits, choosing simultaneously quantity and prices, taking the Demand as a contraint; The
Supply network formation as a biform game
Supply network formaton as a bform game Jean-Claude Hennet*. Sona Mahjoub*,** * LSIS, CNRS-UMR 6168, Unversté Paul Cézanne, Faculté Sant Jérôme, Avenue Escadrlle Normande Némen, 13397 Marselle Cedex 20,
2.4 Multiproduct Monopoly. 2.4 Multiproduct Monopoly
.4 Multiproduct Monopoly Matilde Machado Slides available from: http://www.eco.uc3m.es/oi-i-mei/.4 Multiproduct Monopoly The firm is a monopoly in all markets where it operates i=,.n goods sold by the
Chapter 5: Tariffs and Quotas. An import tariff is a tax on the imported goods, levied as goods pass into the
Chapter 5: Tarffs and Quotas n mport tarff s a tax on the mported goods, leved as goods pass nto the domestc country. n mport quota s a physcal lmt on the amount of the mported goods for a specfed perod
Economics 201 Fall 2010 Introduction to Economic Analysis Problem Set #6 Due: Wednesday, November 3
Economics 201 Fall 2010 Introduction to Economic Analysis Jeffrey Parker Problem Set #6 Due: Wednesday, November 3 1. Cournot Duopoly. Bartels and Jaymes are two individuals who one day discover a stream
Game theory in Oligopoly
Game theory n Olgopoly Prof. Marx Boopath, Nkolaj Sujen. Abstract The game theory technques are used to fnd the equlbrum of a market. Game theory refers to the ways n whch strategc nteractons among economc
Managerial Economics & Business Strategy Chapter 9. Basic Oligopoly Models
Managerial Economics & Business Strategy Chapter 9 Basic Oligopoly Models Overview I. Conditions for Oligopoly? II. Role of Strategic Interdependence III. Profit Maximization in Four Oligopoly Settings
Strategic segmentation of a market
Internatonal Journal of Industral Organzaton 18 (000) 179 190 www.elsever.com/ locate/ econbase Strategc segmentaton of a maret Santanu Roy* Department of Economcs, Florda Internatonal Unversty, Unversty
A Detailed Price Discrimination Example
A Detailed Price Discrimination Example Suppose that there are two different types of customers for a monopolist s product. Customers of type 1 have demand curves as follows. These demand curves include
Week 7 - Game Theory and Industrial Organisation
Week 7 - Game Theory and Industrial Organisation The Cournot and Bertrand models are the two basic templates for models of oligopoly; industry structures with a small number of firms. There are a number
Multi-settlement Systems for Electricity Markets: Zonal Aggregation under Network Uncertainty and Market Power 1
Proeedngs of the 35th Hawa Internatonal Conferene on System Senes - 2002 Mult-settlement Systems for Eletrty Markets: Zonal Aggregaton under Network Unertanty and Market Power 1 Ransh Kamat and Shmuel
Chapter 9 Basic Oligopoly Models
Managerial Economics & Business Strategy Chapter 9 Basic Oligopoly Models McGraw-Hill/Irwin Copyright 2010 by the McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc. All rights reserved. Overview I. Conditions for Oligopoly?
Discriminatory versus Uniform-Price Electricity Auctions with Supply Function Equilibrium
Dscrmnatory versus Unform-Prce Electrcty Auctons wth Supply Functon Equlbrum Talat S. Genc a December, 007 Abstract. A goal of ths paper s to compare results for dscrmnatory auctons to results for unform-prce
Chapter 6. Demand Relationships Among Goods
Chapter 6 Demand Relatonshps Among Goods Up to ths pont, we have held the pre of other goods onstant. Now we onsder how hanges n p affet n a two-good world. I p I p I p I p p p ( ) ( ) then I p then (
or, put slightly differently, the profit maximizing condition is for marginal revenue to equal marginal cost:
Chapter 9 Lecture Notes 1 Economics 35: Intermediate Microeconomics Notes and Sample Questions Chapter 9: Profit Maximization Profit Maximization The basic assumption here is that firms are profit maximizing.
THE METHOD OF LEAST SQUARES THE METHOD OF LEAST SQUARES
The goal: to measure (determne) an unknown quantty x (the value of a RV X) Realsaton: n results: y 1, y 2,..., y j,..., y n, (the measured values of Y 1, Y 2,..., Y j,..., Y n ) every result s encumbered
Technical Memorandum Number 815. Bigger Slice or Larger Pie? Optimal Marketing Strategies for New Firms. John Angelis Moren Lévesque
Techncal Memorandum Number 815 Bgger Slce or Larger Pe? Optmal Marketng Strateges for New Frms by John Angels Moren Lévesque June 26 Department of Operatons Weatherhead School of Management Case Western
Optimal Bidding Strategies for Generation Companies in a Day-Ahead Electricity Market with Risk Management Taken into Account
Amercan J. of Engneerng and Appled Scences (): 8-6, 009 ISSN 94-700 009 Scence Publcatons Optmal Bddng Strateges for Generaton Companes n a Day-Ahead Electrcty Market wth Rsk Management Taken nto Account
Power-of-Two Policies for Single- Warehouse Multi-Retailer Inventory Systems with Order Frequency Discounts
Power-of-wo Polces for Sngle- Warehouse Mult-Retaler Inventory Systems wth Order Frequency Dscounts José A. Ventura Pennsylvana State Unversty (USA) Yale. Herer echnon Israel Insttute of echnology (Israel)
HORIZONTAL MERGERS Advanced Industrial Organization 1
HORIZONTAL MERGERS Advanced Industrial Organization 1 THIBAUD VERGÉ CREST-LEI ENSAE 3A / Master APE (2009-2010) THIBAUD VERGÉ ( CREST-LEI ) Horizontal Mergers Advanced IO 1 1 / 42 Outline Introduction
1 Example 1: Axis-aligned rectangles
COS 511: Theoretcal Machne Learnng Lecturer: Rob Schapre Lecture # 6 Scrbe: Aaron Schld February 21, 2013 Last class, we dscussed an analogue for Occam s Razor for nfnte hypothess spaces that, n conjuncton
Section 5.4 Annuities, Present Value, and Amortization
Secton 5.4 Annutes, Present Value, and Amortzaton Present Value In Secton 5.2, we saw that the present value of A dollars at nterest rate per perod for n perods s the amount that must be deposted today
Texas Instruments 30X IIS Calculator
Texas Instruments 30X IIS Calculator Keystrokes for the TI-30X IIS are shown for a few topcs n whch keystrokes are unque. Start by readng the Quk Start secton. Then, before begnnng a specfc unt of the
PRICING AND REPLENISHMENT STRATEGIES IN A DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM WITH COMPETING RETAILERS
PRICING AND REPLENISHMENT STRATEGIES IN A DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM WITH COMPETING RETAILERS FERNANDO BERNSTEIN The Fuqua School of Busness, Duke Unversty, Durham, North Carolna 27708, fernando@duke.edu AWI
8.5 UNITARY AND HERMITIAN MATRICES. The conjugate transpose of a complex matrix A, denoted by A*, is given by
6 CHAPTER 8 COMPLEX VECTOR SPACES 5. Fnd the kernel of the lnear transformaton gven n Exercse 5. In Exercses 55 and 56, fnd the mage of v, for the ndcated composton, where and are gven by the followng
The vertical differentiation model in the insurance market: costs structure and equilibria analysis
The vertical differentiation model in the insurance market: costs structure and equilibria analysis Denis V. Kuzyutin 1, Maria V. Nikitina, Nadezhda V. Smirnova and Ludmila N. Razgulyaeva 1 St.Petersburg
Economic Models for Cloud Service Markets
Economc Models for Cloud Servce Markets Ranjan Pal and Pan Hu 2 Unversty of Southern Calforna, USA, rpal@usc.edu 2 Deutsch Telekom Laboratores, Berln, Germany, pan.hu@telekom.de Abstract. Cloud computng
Substitution Effects in Supply Chains with Asymmetric Information Distribution and Upstream Competition
Substtuton Effects n Supply Chans wth Asymmetrc Informaton Dstrbuton and Upstream Competton Jochen Schlapp, Mortz Fleschmann Department of Busness, Unversty of Mannhem, 68163 Mannhem, Germany, jschlapp@bwl.un-mannhem.de,
Equlbra Exst and Trade S effcent proportionally
On Compettve Nonlnear Prcng Andrea Attar Thomas Marott Franços Salané February 27, 2013 Abstract A buyer of a dvsble good faces several dentcal sellers. The buyer s preferences are her prvate nformaton,
Oligopoly and Trade. Notes for Oxford M.Phil. International Trade. J. Peter Neary. University of Oxford. November 26, 2009
Oligopoly and Trade Notes for Oxford M.Phil. International Trade J. Peter Neary University of Oxford November 26, 2009 J.P. Neary (University of Oxford) Oligopoly and Trade November 26, 2009 1 / 11 Oligopoly
Microeconomics. Lecture Outline. Claudia Vogel. Winter Term 2009/2010. Part III Market Structure and Competitive Strategy
Microeconomics Claudia Vogel EUV Winter Term 2009/2010 Claudia Vogel (EUV) Microeconomics Winter Term 2009/2010 1 / 25 Lecture Outline Part III Market Structure and Competitive Strategy 12 Monopolistic
Causal, Explanatory Forecasting. Analysis. Regression Analysis. Simple Linear Regression. Which is Independent? Forecasting
Causal, Explanatory Forecastng Assumes cause-and-effect relatonshp between system nputs and ts output Forecastng wth Regresson Analyss Rchard S. Barr Inputs System Cause + Effect Relatonshp The job of
n + d + q = 24 and.05n +.1d +.25q = 2 { n + d + q = 24 (3) n + 2d + 5q = 40 (2)
MATH 16T Exam 1 : Part I (In-Class) Solutons 1. (0 pts) A pggy bank contans 4 cons, all of whch are nckels (5 ), dmes (10 ) or quarters (5 ). The pggy bank also contans a con of each denomnaton. The total
METODA OTRZYMYWANIA ELEMENTOW BIMACIERZY W HIERARCHICZNEJ GRZE O SUMIE NIEZEROWEJ ZA POMOCĄ MODELU DUOPOLU STACKELBERGA
ESYTY NUOWE POLITECHNII ŚLĄSIEJ 2013 Sera: ORGNICJ I RĄDNIE z. 64 Nr kol. 1894 Jan ŁUSI Poltechnka Śląska MODELLING OF DECISION SUPPORT USING THE STCELERG DUOPOLY MODEL TO IMTRIX HIERRCHICL NON-ERO-SUM
Use of Multi-attribute Utility Functions in Evaluating Security Systems
LLNL-TR-405048 Use of Mult-attrbute Utlty Funtons n Evaluatng Seurty Systems C. Meyers, A. Lamont, A. Sherman June 30, 2008 Ths doument was prepared as an aount of work sponsored by an ageny of the Unted
How to Sell Innovative Ideas: Property right, Information. Revelation and Contract Design
Presenter Ye Zhang uke Economcs A yz137@duke.edu How to Sell Innovatve Ideas: Property rght, Informaton evelaton and Contract esgn ay 31 2011 Based on James Anton & ennes Yao s two papers 1. Expropraton
Economics 203: Intermediate Microeconomics I Lab Exercise #11. Buy Building Lease F1 = 500 F1 = 750 Firm 2 F2 = 500 F2 = 400
Page 1 March 19, 2012 Section 1: Test Your Understanding Economics 203: Intermediate Microeconomics I Lab Exercise #11 The following payoff matrix represents the long-run payoffs for two duopolists faced
DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS UNIVERSITY OF CRETE
DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS UNIVERSITY OF CRETE BE.NE.TeC. Workng Paper Seres Workng Paper: 2007-07 Corporate Socal Responsblty n Olgopoly Constantne Manasaks, Evangelos Mtrokostas, Emmanuel Petraks Busness
(6)(2) (-6)(-4) (-4)(6) + (-2)(-3) + (4)(3) + (2)(-3) = -12-24 + 24 + 6 + 12 6 = 0
Chapter 3 Homework Soluton P3.-, 4, 6, 0, 3, 7, P3.3-, 4, 6, P3.4-, 3, 6, 9, P3.5- P3.6-, 4, 9, 4,, 3, 40 ---------------------------------------------------- P 3.- Determne the alues of, 4,, 3, and 6
Competition between Apple and Samsung in the smartphone market introduction into some key concepts in managerial economics
Competition between Apple and Samsung in the smartphone market introduction into some key concepts in managerial economics Dr. Markus Thomas Münter Collège des Ingénieurs Stuttgart, June, 03 SNORKELING
Market Structure: Duopoly and Oligopoly
WSG10 7/7/03 4:24 PM Page 145 10 Market Structure: Duopoly and Oligopoly OVERVIEW An oligopoly is an industry comprising a few firms. A duopoly, which is a special case of oligopoly, is an industry consisting
Overview: Transfer Pricing
Overview: Transfer Pricing Framework and Economic Principles Cases Considered No outside market for upstream good Competitive outside market for upstream good Market power in outside market for upstream
INDUSTRIAL ECONOMICS COMPONENT: THE INTERACTIVE TEXTBOOK
UNIT EC407, LEVEL 2 INDUSTRIAL ECONOMICS COMPONENT: THE INTERACTIVE TEXTBOOK Semester 1 1998/99 Lecturer: K. Hinde Room: 427 Northumberland Building Tel: 0191 2273936 email: kevin.hinde@unn.ac.uk Web Page:
benefit is 2, paid if the policyholder dies within the year, and probability of death within the year is ).
REVIEW OF RISK MANAGEMENT CONCEPTS LOSS DISTRIBUTIONS AND INSURANCE Loss and nsurance: When someone s subject to the rsk of ncurrng a fnancal loss, the loss s generally modeled usng a random varable or
Feature selection for intrusion detection. Slobodan Petrović NISlab, Gjøvik University College
Feature selecton for ntruson detecton Slobodan Petrovć NISlab, Gjøvk Unversty College Contents The feature selecton problem Intruson detecton Traffc features relevant for IDS The CFS measure The mrmr measure
Institute of Informatics, Faculty of Business and Management, Brno University of Technology,Czech Republic
Lagrange Multplers as Quanttatve Indcators n Economcs Ivan Mezník Insttute of Informatcs, Faculty of Busness and Management, Brno Unversty of TechnologCzech Republc Abstract The quanttatve role of Lagrange
Exercises for Industrial Organization Master de Economía Industrial 2012-2013. Matilde Pinto Machado
Exercises for Industrial Organization Master de Economía Industrial 2012-2013 Matilde Pinto Machado September 11, 2012 1 Concentration Measures 1. Imagine two industries A and B with concentration curves
How Sets of Coherent Probabilities May Serve as Models for Degrees of Incoherence
1 st Internatonal Symposum on Imprecse Probabltes and Ther Applcatons, Ghent, Belgum, 29 June 2 July 1999 How Sets of Coherent Probabltes May Serve as Models for Degrees of Incoherence Mar J. Schervsh
Managing Cycle Inventories. Matching Supply and Demand
Managng Cycle Inventores Matchng Supply and Demand 1 Outlne Why to hold cycle nventores? Economes of scale to reduce fxed costs per unt. Jont fxed costs for multple products Long term quantty dscounts
This paper looks into the effects of information transparency on market participants in an online trading
Vol. 29, No. 6, November December 2010, pp. 1125 1137 ssn 0732-2399 essn 1526-548X 10 2906 1125 nforms do 10.1287/mksc.1100.0585 2010 INFORMS The Effects of Informaton Transparency on Supplers, Manufacturers,
COMMERCE MENTORSHIP PROGRAM COMM295: MANAGERIAL ECONOMICS FINAL EXAM REVIEW SOLUTION KEY
COMMERCE MENTORSHIP PROGRAM COMM295: MANAGERIAL ECONOMICS FINAL EXAM REVIEW SOLUTION KEY WR1 Sam-I-Am is a local restaurant chain located in Vancouver. It is considering different pricing strategies for
PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE
Ths artcle was downloaded by:[jurdsche Bblotheek] [Jurdsche Bblotheek] On: 24 May 2007 Access Detals: [subscrpton number 731714882] Publsher: Routledge Informa Ltd Regstered n England and Wales Regstered
Elements of Advanced International Trade 1
Elements of Advanced Internatonal Trade 1 Treb Allen 2 and Costas Arkolaks 3 January 2015 [New verson: prelmnary] 1 Ths set of notes and the homeworks accomodatng them s a collecton of materal desgned
Project Networks With Mixed-Time Constraints
Project Networs Wth Mxed-Tme Constrants L Caccetta and B Wattananon Western Australan Centre of Excellence n Industral Optmsaton (WACEIO) Curtn Unversty of Technology GPO Box U1987 Perth Western Australa
Compiling for Parallelism & Locality. Dependence Testing in General. Algorithms for Solving the Dependence Problem. Dependence Testing
Complng for Parallelsm & Localty Dependence Testng n General Assgnments Deadlne for proect 4 extended to Dec 1 Last tme Data dependences and loops Today Fnsh data dependence analyss for loops General code
Leonardo Raffo López **
77 The sugar market n Colomba an ts nteratons wth the usa market Leonaro Raffo López Resumen En este artíulo se propone un moelo e equlbro paral para entener el omportamento el merao el azúar en Colomba
UTILIZING MATPOWER IN OPTIMAL POWER FLOW
UTILIZING MATPOWER IN OPTIMAL POWER FLOW Tarje Krstansen Department of Electrcal Power Engneerng Norwegan Unversty of Scence and Technology Trondhem, Norway Tarje.Krstansen@elkraft.ntnu.no Abstract Ths
On the Role of Consumer Expectations in Markets with Network Effects
No 13 On the Role of Consumer Expectatons n Markets wth Network Effects Irna Suleymanova, Chrstan Wey November 2010 (frst verson: July 2010) IMPRINT DICE DISCUSSION PAPER Publshed by Henrch Hene Unverstät
Peak Inverse Voltage
9/13/2005 Peak Inerse Voltage.doc 1/6 Peak Inerse Voltage Q: I m so confused! The brdge rectfer and the fullwae rectfer both prode full-wae rectfcaton. Yet, the brdge rectfer use 4 juncton dodes, whereas
ECON 312: Oligopolisitic Competition 1. Industrial Organization Oligopolistic Competition
ECON 312: Oligopolisitic Competition 1 Industrial Organization Oligopolistic Competition Both the monopoly and the perfectly competitive market structure has in common is that neither has to concern itself
Economic Models for Cloud Service Markets Pricing and Capacity Planning
Economc Models for Cloud Servce Markets Prcng and Capacty Plannng Ranjan Pal 1 and Pan Hu 2 1 Unversty of Southern Calforna, USA, rpal@usc.edu 2 Deutsch Telekom Laboratores, Berln, Germany, pan.hu@telekom.de
Heuristic Static Load-Balancing Algorithm Applied to CESM
Heurstc Statc Load-Balancng Algorthm Appled to CESM 1 Yur Alexeev, 1 Sher Mckelson, 1 Sven Leyffer, 1 Robert Jacob, 2 Anthony Crag 1 Argonne Natonal Laboratory, 9700 S. Cass Avenue, Argonne, IL 60439,
6.254 : Game Theory with Engineering Applications Lecture 2: Strategic Form Games
6.254 : Game Theory with Engineering Applications Lecture 2: Strategic Form Games Asu Ozdaglar MIT February 4, 2009 1 Introduction Outline Decisions, utility maximization Strategic form games Best responses
No 144. Bundling and Joint Marketing by Rival Firms. Thomas D. Jeitschko, Yeonjei Jung, Jaesoo Kim
No 144 Bundlng and Jont Marketng by Rval Frms Thomas D. Jetschko, Yeonje Jung, Jaesoo Km May 014 IMPRINT DICE DISCUSSION PAPER Publshed by düsseldorf unversty press (dup) on behalf of Henrch Hene Unverstät
Price Competition in an Oligopoly Market with Multiple IaaS Cloud Providers
Prce Competton n an Olgopoly Market wth Multple IaaS Cloud Provders Yuan Feng, Baochun L, Bo L Department of Computng, Hong Kong Polytechnc Unversty Department of Electrcal and Computer Engneerng, Unversty
Market Structure: Perfect Competition and Monopoly
WSG8 7/7/03 4:34 PM Page 113 8 Market Structure: Perfect Competition and Monopoly OVERVIEW One of the most important decisions made by a manager is how to price the firm s product. If the firm is a profit
Cournot equilibria in two-settlement electricity markets with system contingencies. Jian Yao, Shmuel S. Oren* and Ilan Adler
142 Int. J. Crtal Infrastrutures, Vol. 3, Nos. 1/2, 2007 Cournot equlbra n two-settlement eletrty markets wth system ontngenes Jan Yao, Shmuel S. Oren* and Ilan Adler Department of Industral Engneerng
The New Trade Theory. Monopoly and oligopoly in trade. Luca De Benedictis 1. Topic 3. 1 University of Macerata
The New Trade Theory Monopoly and oligopoly in trade Luca De Benedictis 1 1 University of Macerata Topic 3 A new generation of models Main characteristics and insights: Countries do not trade, rms do.
Support Vector Machines
Support Vector Machnes Max Wellng Department of Computer Scence Unversty of Toronto 10 Kng s College Road Toronto, M5S 3G5 Canada wellng@cs.toronto.edu Abstract Ths s a note to explan support vector machnes.
The OC Curve of Attribute Acceptance Plans
The OC Curve of Attrbute Acceptance Plans The Operatng Characterstc (OC) curve descrbes the probablty of acceptng a lot as a functon of the lot s qualty. Fgure 1 shows a typcal OC Curve. 10 8 6 4 1 3 4
Using Series to Analyze Financial Situations: Present Value
2.8 Usng Seres to Analyze Fnancal Stuatons: Present Value In the prevous secton, you learned how to calculate the amount, or future value, of an ordnary smple annuty. The amount s the sum of the accumulated
IS-LM Model 1 C' dy = di
- odel Solow Assumptons - demand rrelevant n long run; assumes economy s operatng at potental GDP; concerned wth growth - Assumptons - supply s rrelevant n short run; assumes economy s operatng below potental
This article appeared in a journal published by Elsevier. The attached copy is furnished to the author for internal non-commercial research and
Ths artcle appeared n a ournal publshed by Elsever. The attached copy s furnshed to the author for nternal non-commercal research educaton use, ncludng for nstructon at the authors nsttuton sharng wth
The Choice of Direct Dealing or Electronic Brokerage in Foreign Exchange Trading
The Choce of Drect Dealng or Electronc Brokerage n Foregn Exchange Tradng Mchael Melvn & Ln Wen Arzona State Unversty Introducton Electronc Brokerage n Foregn Exchange Start from a base of zero n 1992
Stock Profit Patterns
Stock Proft Patterns Suppose a share of Farsta Shppng stock n January 004 s prce n the market to 56. Assume that a September call opton at exercse prce 50 costs 8. A September put opton at exercse prce
BEE2017 Intermediate Microeconomics 2
BEE2017 Intermediate Microeconomics 2 Dieter Balkenborg Sotiris Karkalakos Yiannis Vailakis Organisation Lectures Mon 14:00-15:00, STC/C Wed 12:00-13:00, STC/D Tutorials Mon 15:00-16:00, STC/106 (will
Behavior Coordination in E-commerce Supply Chains
Assoaton for Informaton ystems AI Eletron Lbrary AIeL) WHICEB 25 Proeedngs Wuhan Internatonal Conferene on e-busness ummer 6-9-25 Behavor Coordnaton n E-ommere upply Chans Yanhong Zhang Insttute of system
QE1: Economics Notes 1
QE1: Economics Notes 1 Box 1: The Household and Consumer Welfare The final basket of goods that is chosen are determined by three factors: a. Income b. Price c. Preferences Substitution Effect: change
Hedging Interest-Rate Risk with Duration
FIXED-INCOME SECURITIES Chapter 5 Hedgng Interest-Rate Rsk wth Duraton Outlne Prcng and Hedgng Prcng certan cash-flows Interest rate rsk Hedgng prncples Duraton-Based Hedgng Technques Defnton of duraton