SPU SHOOTING MCI Avenue W. Incident # June 5, Incident #

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1 SPU SHOOTING MCI Avenue W. Incident # June 5, 2014 Incident #

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3 From the Desk of the Assistant Chief of Operations The SPU Shooting MCI was an incident of national significance that challenged our firefighters with an active shooter situation in a school. Although this event only lasted a few moments, it required a substantial amount of vigilance and reconnaissance from Seattle Police to understand the extent of the threat. This report is an important study of how opposing statements about the security of a scene causes confusion and makes it challenging to formulate an accurate risk benefit analysis. It illustrates that a definitive statement by Command must be declared to ensure a single action plan. This incident also demonstrates the critical nature of quickly developing a Unified Command Post. For this incident, I would like to note a number of effective actions: Early recognition of an MCI by first-in units. The transportation corridor was designated and maintained. The use of the Command Board and the making of assignments for an MCI was a proven effective use of the Command Tactical Sheets. In this incident, we also faced challenges from which we can learn: Units must go through Incident Command when making scene declarations such as Scene not secure and not go directly to the FAC. Although communications were challenging, using the NFA handshake prevents repeated transmissions and using the Command channel gives us a secondary channel from which to operate. PIA s are developed for use as training tools so that we can continually improve our service delivery. As always, keep up the good work and stay safe. Jay Hagen, Assistant Chief Operations Division Incident #

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5 INCIDENT NARRATIVE 1525 hours On Thursday, June 5, 2014, at 1525 hours, the Fire Alarm Center (FAC) received a call reporting a shooting at Seattle Pacific University (SPU) at 3 Avenue West and West Nickerson Street. An Assault with Weapons Med-7 (AWW7) response was dispatched. Engines 20 and 9, Medic 16 and 44, and Battalion 4 responded. While units were responding, the dispatcher transmitted the following information: Scene is not secure. It s a male with a gunshot wound again, scene is not secure. All units, stand by until SPD has cleared the scene. Engine 20 arrived approximately 3 minutes later and staged 2 blocks away at the SPU Campus Security Office. (Engine 20 knew from previous alarms the Security Office would be the best place to be in contact with both Campus Security and Seattle Police Department Officers.) 1 Engine 9 and Battalion 4 arrived about a minute later and parked on Nickerson, near 3 Avenue West hours Shortly after arriving, Battalion 4 transmitted: Dispatch from Battalion 4, the scene is secure. All units can come in. Gunshot of an adult male. Concurrently, the Fire Alarm Center was receiving information from SPD dispatchers that there were two victims. The response was upgraded to an Assault with Weapons Med-14 response, which added 3 more units (Engine 8, Medic 1, and Safety 2). Picture 1 Otto Miller Hall 1 The first arriving company went to the Campus Security Office to rendezvous with security and SPD. (See Effective Actions #1) 2 Incident Command was not established by the first arriving company. (See Obs/Rec #1) Incident #

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7 added, That's affirmative Engine 20, neither does this office. All units stand by until we report that scene is secure, all units stand by. During this same time, the Incident Commander was receiving a scene secure status, in person, from SPD units that were operating in their proximity. The IC allowed members to work in the warm zone to extract victims. 6 Picture 3 Transportation Corridor Medic 16 began transport of the first patient to Harborview Medical Center (HMC) hours Medic 44 contacted Command with the following message 3 minutes after arrival: Command from Medical Group, treatment will be on Nickerson, west of 3 Avenue West, corridor east to west on 3 Avenue West. This transmission effectively established the Medical Group Supervisor, in addition to defining the transportation corridor. 7 Command identified base as Nickerson Street, 1 block west of 3 Avenue West. 8 Command also reported that SPD was giving a preliminary scene secure hours The FAC again notified Command that they had not yet received Scene Secure from SPD dispatchers. Engine 20 corroborated this information stating that, Our SPD personnel say there are a possible 2 shooters on-scene. The Fire Alarm Center again stated, All units stand by until directed otherwise. 9 At this point, units from the MCI response were beginning to arrive. Medic 44 was spending a considerable amount of time keeping the transportation corridor clear of arriving units. Engine 9 transmitted that their patient (from inside the building) had a gun-shot wound to the chest. Medic 1 was directed to treat and transport this patient. 6 Multiple entries were made with SPD escort into the warm zone in an attempt to evacuate red victims to a secure treatment area. (See Effective Actions #3) 7 Triage, Treatment and Transportation Supervisors were all assigned for this incident along with an effective transportation corridor. (See Effective Actions #4 and #5) 8 Base was established early to provide for the overflow of apparatus. (See Effective Actions #6) 9 Unified Command between SFD and SPD developed late into the incident. (See Obs/Rec #4) Incident #

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10 1542 hours Engine 20 continued to receive information from SPD that the scene was not secure, with the possibility of an assailant still armed with a handgun and a shotgun. The FAC acknowledged and repeated this report, advising units to continue standing by. Units on-scene were now beginning to deploy equipment (stretchers, aid kits, Mega Movers, etc.) to the treatment area. The treatment area was designated as the sidewalk just east of the intersection of 3 Avenue West and West Nickerson Street hours At 1546 hours, Deputy 1 arrived at the scene. Coinciding with the arrival, Command directed Safety 2 to, Be sure that all SFD personnel are out of the hot zone. This directive, as well as many others, was not acknowledged on the tactical channel. 10 It is important to note that units on-scene were experiencing significant difficulty transmitting on the radio. (Attributable to poor radio reception in the area.) Remember that apparatus mobile radios have more signal strength to transmit. Deputy 1 was advised by the FAC that the scene was still not secure. Deputy 1 acknowledged this transmission and indicated the intention to confirm scene security and establish a hot zone. A few moments later, Command transmitted the following: Dispatch from 3 Ave Command, I m with SPD Command at this time, the scene is not secure, the hot zone is Nickerson and 3 Ave, including the building Avenue West. This report was acknowledged by the FAC hrs Later arriving units continued to deploy personnel and equipment to the treatment area in anticipation of additional patients. Picture 4: Patient (1) being loaded Meanwhile, the Medical Group Supervisor had coordinated the staging of several AMR ambulances with AMR dispatch and an onscene AMR supervisor. 10 The National Fire Academy (NFA) handshake model was not followed by all units. (See Obs/Rec #5) Incident #

11 Deputy 1 assumed Command and directed all radio traffic on the tactical channel be directed to Operations (Battalion 4). Channel 11 was also activated and future updates were transmitted to the FAC on Channel Engine 20 again announced to dispatch (not Command) that SPD was reporting scene secure. Approximately 30 seconds later, the FAC notified 3 Ave Command the scene was secure. This was 25 minutes from initial dispatch. NOTE: In all, once SFD arrived on-scene, there were 16 changes in scene safety declarations in 23 minutes. Ultimately, the IC has the authority to make the definitive call on the security and zones for an incident hours Mutual Aid medic units were requested to provide city-wide coverage for Advanced Life Support (ALS) responses. On-scene units were standing-by inside Otto Miller Hall for notification from SPD of additional patients hours The companies inside Otto Miller Hall were ordered back out of the building as Seattle Police Department Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) officers proceeded to do a thorough search of the premise hours The incident was beginning to de-escalate and several units were placed back inservice. Some SFD units remained near the entrance to Otto Miller Hall as SPD SWAT officers continued to clear the rest of the building. No additional patients or suspects were located. SYNOPSIS On June 5, 2014, at approximately 1525 hours a lone gunman randomly attacked students on the Seattle Pacific University campus. Casualty count: 1 dead, 1 critically wounded, 2 superficially wounded. Shooter was subdued and pepper sprayed by SPU student. Response: 8 Engines, 2 Ladders, 3 Aid cars, 5 AMR ambulances, 6 Medic units, 3 Battalion Chiefs, Deputy 1, Safety 2, 89, MCI-1, Staff 10, Air 9, PIO, M44, M45, Chaplain 6. Unknown number of SPD resources. Number of members involved: 63 SFD Personnel 11 Incident Command used tactical and command radio channels effectively. (See Effective Actions #7) Incident #

12 Initial dispatch was for a single victim of a GSW at 1525 hours. The first unit to arrive on-scene was Engine 20 who staged at the SPU security building to await scene secure. This also provided them the opportunity to interface with SPU security and SPD to utilize the real time video surveillance equipment at that location. Response upgraded to MCI at 1534 hours. Transportation Corridor established at 1542 hours. First patient transported at 1552 hours. Last patient transported at 1614 hours. EFFECTIVE ACTIONS 1) The initial arriving company reported to the security office to rendezvous with school security and police. 2) There was an early recognition of the need for more on-scene staffing. 3) Multiple entries were made with SPD escort into the warm zone in an attempt to evacuate red victims to a secure treatment area. 4) An effective transportation corridor was established, maintained and prioritized early and throughout the remainder of the incident. 5) Triage, Treatment, and Transportation Supervisors were all assigned for this incident. 6) Base was established early to provide for the overflow of apparatus. 7) Tactical and Command radio channels were used as designed and practiced. OBSERVATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 1. Observation: The initial arriving fire company did not establish Incident Command. References: POG 5011 Incident Management Analysis: Initially dispatched at 1526 hours as an AWW Med7, Incident Command was indicated because 5 units were responding. Engine 20 was the first unit to arrive at 1528 hours and staged 2 blocks away, but did not establish Command. Battalion 4 was the next unit to arrive at 1530 hours and established 3 Ave Command at 1533 hours. Protocol was correctly followed for the eventual implementation of the Incident Command System in relation to the number of units responding on a medical response. However, there was a 5 minute delay between the first unit s arrival and the establishment of Incident Command. Also, Unified Command with SPD was not effectively established. Recommendations: Training Incident #

13 2. Observation: There was confusion in regard to the declaration of Scene Secure between units at the scene and the FAC. References: POG Analysis: This incident was dynamic and understandably difficult to define. Recommendations: Incident Command should conduct 10 minute progress reports to establish/reinforce incident strategy. 3. Observation: Firefighter working at emergency scene without a portable radio. References: POG Communications Equipment. Portable radios will be carried by all Operations Division personnel when at the scene of emergency responses. Analysis: The firefighter was requested by SPD to assist with patient care but did not have a portable radio in order to request assistance with the patient care. Recommendations: Reinforce that portable radios will be carried by all Operations Division personnel when at the scene of emergency responses. 4. Observation: Unified Command between Fire and Police was slow to develop but eventually established for this incident. References: POG : Assault with Weapons Analysis: SFD and SPD set up separate Commands at the incident. Additionally, SFD command was stationary while SPD command was mobile, which in turn made effective communication between the two very difficult. The lack of communication between the separate SPD and SFD Commands at this incident greatly contributed to the confusion regarding multiple Scene Secure/Scene Not Secure declarations. Recommendations: Training 5. Observation: There were numerous transmissions with which the NFA handshake model was either not used or transmissions were not heard. References: NICE Inform transcript Analysis: It is the policy of the SFD to utilize the NFA handshake model for radio transmissions. On occasion during this incident that handshake model was ignored or omitted. When the handshake model is not utilized, transmissions may occur without the intended recipient hearing or properly understanding the intended message. Misunderstanding or lack of information can breed confusion, lack of intended execution, and/or duplication of effort. The result of all of which reduces our ability to respond efficiently and effectively at incidents. Recommendations: Training Incident #