Using Brazil s Racial Continuum to Examine the Short- Term Effects of Affirmative Action in Higher Education

Transcription

1 Usng Brazl s Racal Contnuum to Examne the Short- Term Effects of Affrmatve Acton n Hgher Educaton Andrew M. Francs Emory Unversty Mara Tannur-Panto Unversty of Brasla In 2004, the Unversty of Brasla establshed racal quotas reservng 20% of avalable admssons slots for blacks. Usng admssons data and a student survey, we characterze the mpact of the polcy on the racal composton of students, examne the academc performance of quota students, and estmate the effect of quotas on pre-unversty effort and racal dentty. We fnd no evdence that the polcy reduced effort n secondary school or college admssons. We also fnd that quotas ncreased the lkelhood that applcants and students, especally those n the mddle of the racal contnuum, self-dentfed as black. JEL Codes: I20, J15, J24. Keywords: Affrmatve Acton, Hgher Educaton, Racal Identty, Brazl. * Andrew M. Francs, Department of Economcs, Emory Unversty, Atlanta, GA (andrew.francs@emory.edu). Mara Tannur-Panto, Department of Economcs, Unversdade de Brasíla, Brazl (tannur@unb.br). We are extremely grateful to the Emory Unversty Research Commttee for fundng and to UnB CESPE for provdng data and assstance. 1

2 I. Introducton About 40.6% of all slaves n the Trans-Atlantc Slave Trade between 1519 and 1867 arrved n Brazl (Elts, 2001). That s approxmately ten tmes the number of slaves that arrved n Brtsh Manland North Amerca. As a result, Brazl has had a large black and mxed-race populaton. In 2007, about 49.4% of Brazl's populaton of 184 mllon was branco, 42.3% pardo, 7.5% preto, and 0.8% Indgenous or Asan (IBGE, 2009). 1 Even though the rate of ethnc ntermarrage s relatvely hgh, sgnfcant racal dspartes n educaton, ncome, health, and other dmensons contnue to exst (Telles, 2004). For ths reason, polcy makers have been consderng ways to mnmze racal nequalty. Snce 2001, a handful of unverstes have adopted an affrmatve acton program nvolvng racal quotas n admssons, and ths year the Brazlan Natonal Congress s debatng proposals to extend quotas to all publc unverstes and to extend affrmatve acton to all federal publc sector employment. In ths paper, we examne the experence of the Unversty of Brasla (UnB), whch establshed racal quotas n July 2004 makng t the frst federal unversty n the country and the only unversty n the regon to do so. At UnB, 20% of avalable admssons slots are reserved for students who self-dentfy as negro (black). Indvduals who are selected for admsson under the quota system are requred to attend an ntervew wth a unversty panel that verfes that they are "black enough" to qualfy. 2 Not only does ths provde an opportunty to address mportant polcy questons but also an opportunty to nvestgate a number of academc questons regardng affrmatve acton n hgher educaton, ncludng the effect of racal quotas on pre-unversty 1 Throughout the paper, we use varous racal terms n Portuguese. The term branco refers to whtes, typcally ndvduals wth lght skn color, pardo refers to black-whte mxed-race ndvduals, typcally those wth ntermedate skn color, and preto refers to blacks, typcally those wth dark skn color. The term negro s ndcatve of black racal dentty. 2 Intally, ndvduals had to submt to a photograph nstead of an ntervew. The unversty replaced the photo requrement after a natonal magazne exposed the case of two dentcal twns, Alan and Alex, one of whom was consdered black by the panel and the other of whom was consdered whte (Zakab and Camargo, 2007). 2

3 effort and on racal dentty. We are able to use some of the unque features of Brazl to estmate the effects. Snce most students attend college n ther home regon and the polcy was unexpected, UnB serves as a natural experment of sorts. Plus, affrmatve acton s new to Brazl, and we may analyze the perods before and after the mplementaton of the polcy. We are also able to take advantage of Brazl's racal contnuum, as some students are black enough to qualfy, whle others are not black enough. The objectves of the paper are to characterze the mpact of the polcy on the racal composton of students at UnB, examne the academc performance of quota students, and estmate the effect of quotas on pre-unversty effort and racal dentty. To ths end, we acqured academc records for all students who matrculated at UnB n addton to admssons records for about 90,000 unque ndvduals who regstered for the entrance exam two admssons-cycles before the mplementaton of quotas and three cycles afterwards. We also conducted a survey of students who matrculated before and after the mplementaton of the quota system. All n all, we obtaned about 1,000 face to face and 2,000 onlne ntervews makng ths one of the largest research projects on affrmatve acton n hgher educaton. Moreover, t s the frst to use ndvdual-level data to examne the ntroducton of an affrmatve acton program, the frst to dentfy separate effects for those of dfferent skn tones, and one of the few to study the constructon of racal dentty. To begn, we fnd that racal nequalty exsts n samples of students, applcants, and resdents of Dstrto Federal. Brancos tend to have hgher socoeconomc status than pardos, and pardos tend to have hgher status than pretos. It s essental to establsh the exstence of racal nequalty, snce one of the man reasons for enactng an affrmatve acton polcy drected toward blacks was to reduce racal dspartes, and many Brazlans have the noton that 3

4 socoeconomc status s uncorrelated wth race. Based on an analyss of self-reported dentty as well as photographs, racal quotas appear to have rased the proporton of blacks/darker-sknned students at UnB and lowered the proporton of non-blacks/lghter-sknned students. Ths was perhaps most pronounced durng the ntal semester of quotas. Addtonally, quota students tend to have lower grades than non-quota students, but the dfference s consderably less than that between male and female students. The dsparty n academc performance between quota and non-quota students s attrbutable to dfferental performance on the vestbular and, to a lesser extent, race and socoeconomc status. In prncple, affrmatve acton may rase or lower the returns to nvestments that rase the lkelhood of college admsson. Focusng on UnB students and applcants, we fnd no evdence that racal quotas had reduced effort n secondary school or college admssons. Indeed, some evdence exsts suggestng that the polcy may have rased effort. Quota students and applcants as well as pardo applcants after the mplementaton of quotas were more lkely to take a college entrance exam preparaton course. Dark-sknned students matrculatng after the mplementaton of quotas were more lkely to report hgh effort and grades n secondary school. Plus, quota and pardo applcants after quotas were more lkely to attempt the vestbular multple tmes. These fndngs make sense consderng that there exsts a herarchy of majors wth vastly dfferent mnmum scores for selecton and hence, few applcants are truly ntra-margnal. Furthermore, we fnd evdence that quotas at UnB ncreased the lkelhood that applcants and students, especally those n the mddle of the racal contnuum, self-dentfed as black. Usng the student survey, whch mnmzes the ncentve to msrepresent racal dentty, dfference-n-dfference and panel specfcatons mply that the quota system may have nspred actual change n racal dentty for students at the margn. Usng the unversty admssons 4

5 survey, whch s more susceptble to msrepresentaton, analogous specfcatons yeld larger estmated effects, whch suggest that the quota system may have spurred both actual change and msrepresentaton for applcants at the margn. These fndngs are consstent wth the ncentves engendered by the polcy. To be sure, the ncentve to apply under the quota system was sgnfcant gven the compettveness of admssons, and programs for quota students renforced and fostered nvestments n dentty. Therefore, racal dentty may respond to ncentves. Ths paper contrbutes to the economcs of affrmatve acton n hgher educaton and to the economcs of race and dentty. Economsts have long been nterested n affrmatve acton. Many studes concern employment and performance n the labor market (Coate and Loury, 1993; Donohue and Heckman, 1991; Fryer and Loury, 2005a, 2005b; Holzer and Neumark, 2000; Leonard, 1984a, 1984b, 1984c, 1990; Smth and Welch, 1984). Recently, a number of theory papers have examned effcency justfcatons for mantanng or elmnatng affrmatve acton n college admssons (Abdulkadroglu, 2005; Chan and Eyster, 2003; De Fraja, 2005; Epple, Romano, and Seg, 2008; Fryer, Loury, and Yuret, 2008). Most relevant to ths paper are studes that explore the ncentve effects of affrmatve acton on nvestments n effort and sklls pror to unversty matrculaton (Fryer and Loury, 2005a; Fryer, Loury, and Yuret, 2008; Holzer and Neumark, 2000). Essentally, they argue that the drecton of the effect s ambguous,.e. that racal preference n college admssons, n theory, may ether spur or dscourage effort. Nearly all emprcal papers about affrmatve acton n hgher educaton focus on the US experence (Bowen and Bok, 1998). Several nvestgate how the elmnaton of affrmatve acton and other state-level polcy changes mght mpact the enrollment of mnorty students n college (Card and Krueger, 2005; Conrad and Sharpe, 1996; Dckson, 2006; Long 2004a, 2004b). Generally, the evdence suggests that dsmantlng or replacng affrmatve acton may lower the 5

6 number of mnortes n college. Other studes examne the academc performance of mnortes and subsequent gans to mnortes n the labor market (Arcdacono, 2005; Loury and Garman, 1993; Rothsten and Yoon, 2008). Notably, Rothsten and Yoon (2008) employ an effectve emprcal strategy n trackng students across tme. These studes fnd that the labor market gans of mnortes lkely outwegh the potental costs of "msmatch." Smlarly, ths paper s concerned wth the effect of affrmatve acton on the enrollment of hstorcally underrepresented racal groups and also wth ther academc performance n college. Some research looks at affrmatve acton n developng countres lke Inda and Brazl. For a number of years, Inda has had quotas for underrepresented castes (Bertrand, Hanna, and Mullanathan, 2008; Desa and Kulkarn, 2008). Bertrand, Hanna, and Mullanathan (2008) evaluate the effcency of a quota system at an engneerng college n Inda. They ntervewed about 700 households from the college applcant pool about 8-10 years after the entrance exam. They fnd that the program successfully targeted poorer students who, n spte of lower entrance exam scores, enjoyed substantal gans n the labor market. However, the gans for margnal upper-caste students were larger than those for margnal lower-caste students. Other papers study the case of Brazl (Andrade, 2004; Cardoso, 2008; Ferman and Assunção, 2005). Ferman and Assunção (2005) employ a dfference-n-dfference framework to nvestgate whether black secondary school students resdng n states wth a unversty adoptng racal quotas had hgher or lower scores on a profcency exam. To our knowledge, ths s the only other paper to emprcally examne ncentve effects on effort. They fnd that scores were lower, whch they argue s evdence of decreased effort due to quotas. Nevertheless, the authors are unable to dentfy whch secondary school students actually appled to a unversty wth quotas. Even wth quotas, the average black secondary school student would have had only a 6

7 very small chance of admsson. Moreover, self-reported racal dentty may have been correlated wth test scores as well as the mplementaton of quotas makng the results dffcult to nterpret. Based on tabulatons of unversty records, Cardoso (2008) fnds that quotas at UnB ncreased the proporton of negro students; quota students had lower attrton rates than nonquota students; and quota students had comparable grades to non-quota students except n selectve majors. In ths paper, we are able to explore these and other questons emphaszng that, snce black dentty s endogenous, the answers are much more subtle than they mght appear. Focusng on UnB students and applcants, Francs and Tannur-Panto (2010a) further study the constructon of racal dentty among young adults n Brazl characterzng the basc aspects of dentty, nvestgatng the effects of famly background and academc performance, and estmatng the mpact of quotas. Francs and Tannur-Panto (2010b) evaluate whether quotas at UnB mght reduce the racal wage gap, whle Francs and Tannur-Panto (2010c) examne the redstrbutve effcacy of affrmatve acton explorng the role of race and socoeconomc status n admssons. Ths paper also contrbutes to the economcs of race and dentty. A number of papers demonstrate the mportance of skn tone beyond the nfluence of race n educaton, employment, and famly (Bodenhorn, 2006; Goldsmth, Hamlton, and Darty, 2006, 2007; Hersch, 2006; Rangel, 2007). A growng body of lterature analyzes the role of dentty n behavor and decson-makng (Akerlof and Kranton, 2000, 2002; Austen-Smth and Fryer, 2005; Darty, Detrch, and Hamlton, 2005; Darty, Mason, and Stewart, 2006; Francs, 2008; Fryer et al., 2008; Golash-Boza and Darty, 2008; Ruebeck, Averett, and Bodenhorn, 2009). These studes consder how dentty may affect behavor/markets and how behavor/markets may affect dentty. 7

8 The remander of the paper s organzed as follows. Secton II provdes background nformaton on unversty educaton n Brazl and UnB's affrmatve acton polcy. Secton III descrbes the data and emprcal strategy. Secton IV presents the results. Secton V artculates polcy recommendatons and suggests future research. II. Background and Affrmatve Acton Polcy Brazl s a country where the adult llteracy rate, 14.3% n 2004, s stll substantally hgher than the proporton of the adult populaton wth a college degree, around 8% (PNAD, 2004). Returns to college educaton are relatvely hgh n Brazl, as havng a college degree s strongly assocated wth a varety of measures of wellbeng and represents an mportant source of socal moblty. Most college students attend an nsttuton n the regon where ther famly resdes, and many contnue to lve wth ther parents. About 26% of college students attend publc unverstes (PNAD, 2004). Publc unverstes are tuton-free and generally better qualty than prvate unverstes. To be consdered for admsson, canddates select one course of study (major department) to whch to apply and take an nsttuton-specfc entrance exam called the vestbular. It s typcally a two-day exam wth questons n subjects ncludng Portuguese, Englsh or Spansh, geography, hstory, mathematcs, bology, physcs, and chemstry. The overall score on the vestbular s the prmary bass for admsson, and the mnmum score for selecton vares by department. Whle an ndvdual may select only one course of study per attempt, he or she may attempt to pass the vestbular any number of tmes. The Unversty of Brasla (UnB) s one of the best publc unverstes n Brazl. It s located n Brasla, a cty of about 3.5 mllon (metro area) and the captal of Brazl. Most undergraduates are from the state (Dstrto Federal). At UnB, a majorty of students are admtted 8

9 through the vestbular system, as descrbed above. 3 Admsson s hghly compettve. Two admsson exams are offered annually, one n January and another n July. Non-quota and quota students are selected based on ther overall score, and they must also acheve a certan mnmum score on each of the subsectons. A new cohort of undergraduate students enters every semester (twce a year), and the average sze of each cohort s approxmately 2,200. Every semester, there are approxmately 32,000 canddates for admsson. UnB establshed racal quotas n July 2004 makng t the frst federal unversty n the country and the only unversty n the regon to do so. The polcy was announced on June 6, Accordng to ts archtects, some of the major objectves of the polcy are to fght racal nequaltes, compensate for hstorcal njustces, contrbute to the dversty of experences and perspectves on campus, and rase understandng of what t means to be black n Brazl. 20% of avalable vestbular admssons slots are reserved for students who self-dentfy as negro. Indvduals who are selected for admsson under the quota system are requred to attend an ntervew wth a unversty panel that verfes that they are "black enough" to qualfy. Moreover, UnB provdes to those who matrculate as quota students an array of programs and servces that renforce and foster nvestments n black dentty. For example, these nclude lectures and events on the value of blacks n socety; an academc tutorng program for quota students; and a permanent space on campus for quota students to study, meet, and have cultural actvtes. Table 1 dsplays the number of applcants and admssons standards by department for the ntal semester of quotas,.e. the second semester of 2004 (2-2004). For ndvduals who appled under the non-quota system, the non-quota admssons score (NQ) was the mnmum score necessary for selecton. For those who appled under the quota system, the quota 3 In January, half of slots are reserved for admsson through the PAS program (Programa de Avalação Serada). PAS was nsttuted n 1999, and admsson s based on exams taken n each year of secondary school. 9

10 admssons score (Q) was the mnmum score necessary for selecton. As the table shows, varablty n admssons scores and degree of selectvty s enormous. For nstance, courses of study lke medcne, law, and engneerng are extremely selectve, whle geography, lbrary scence, and fne arts are not. For most departments, the non-quota admssons score s greater than the quota admssons score, ndcatng that departments have explctly lower standards for at least some quota students. Partcularly among relatvely selectve courses of study, the number of non-quota students who were not selected but had a vestbular score above the quota admssons score was greater than the number of selected non-quota and quota students combned. Among relatvely selectve courses, many admtted quota students would not have been selected f t were not for the lower quota admssons score. Table 2 dsplays the number of applcants and admssons standards by semester aggregatng over departments. The average selecton rate at UnB, whch vares hugely by department as the prevous table demonstrates, was less than 10%. The average rate for quota applcants was slghtly greater than that for non-quota applcants. Albet not reported n the table, about 76.0% of those ndvduals who were selected actually matrculated at UnB. Ths yeld rate s hgher than of Prnceton and Yale. What s apparent n the table s that the proporton of admtted quota students who had exam scores above the cutoff for non-quota students ncreased wth tme. By the second semester of 2005, three-fourths of them presumably would have been selected even n the absence of the polcy. Ths trend may be explaned by endogenous changes n the composton of the pool of quota applcants, whch we dscuss later n the paper. III. Data and Emprcal Strategy Populatons of Interest 10

11 There are two populatons of nterest. The frst conssts of ndvduals who regstered for the UnB vestbular exam two admssons cycles before (semesters of antcpated matrculaton and ) or three cycles after the mplementaton of the quota system (semesters of antcpated matrculaton , , and ). We refer to ths populaton as "applcants." The second conssts of ndvduals who were admtted through the vestbular system and matrculated two admssons cycles before ( and ) or three cycles after the mplementaton of the quota system (2-2004, , and ). We refer to ths populaton as "students." We draw on two prncpal data sources: unversty records and a student survey conducted by the authors. Unversty Records Unversty admssons records were provded to the authors by CESPE, the organzaton that admnsters every aspect of admssons and selecton at UnB. Records encompass all ndvduals who regstered for the vestbular exam durng the fve admssons cycles from to Records nclude ndvduals who were and were not selected for admsson and those who took the exam multple tmes. There are almost 150,000 entres altogether wth about 90,000 unque ndvduals. For all who took the exam, we have data on semester of antcpated matrculaton, course of study, system of admssons (quota/non-quota), gender, place of resdence, exam results ncludng sub-scores and overall score, and selecton outcome. Usng names and other personal nformaton, we are able to lnk multple entres correspondng to the same ndvdual. Admssons records also nclude an optonal 18-queston survey, whch applcants submtted upon regstraton for the vestbular (thus, pror to takng the exam). Ths survey, the 11

12 Soco-Cultural Questonnare (to whch we refer by ts Portuguese acronym QSC), asks about martal status, famly ncome, famly housng, parents' educaton, labor market partcpaton, publc/prvate secondary school, place of resdence, and several questons regardng preparaton for the vestbular. It was not untl 2004, one semester before the mplementaton of quotas, that questons about race were added to the QSC. The tem "what s your race/color?" has answer choces: branco, pardo, preto, Asan, Indgenous, and "no answer." Another tem asks "do you consder yourself black (negro)?" An mportant caveat s that response rates were fallng durng the study perod. We do not know f ths phenomenon was related to quotas, but we do know that response rates had been fallng pror to quotas. The overall response rate declned from about 84% to 36% between and For quota applcants, the response rate declned from about 93% to 74% between and We also had access to unversty academc records. These data were provded by DAA (Dvson of Academc Affars), the organzaton that manages course regstraton, graduaton, and student transcrpts at UnB. Academc data nclude grades and number of credts by semester of study for all students who had matrculated durng the fve semesters from to Grades range from zero to fve, where fve s the best grade possble, and zero s the worst. Wth ths nformaton, we are able to calculate overall GPA, attrton rates, and other statstcs. PSEU The second prncpal data source s a student survey conducted by the authors, the Unversty Educaton Survey (to whch we refer by ts Portuguese acronym PSEU). There were several reasons why collectng addtonal data was necessary: to obtan more nformaton about students than what the QSC and other unversty records could provde; to measure race n 12

13 multple ways; and to create panel data by askng some of the same questons as the QSC. We conducted two types of ntervews: face to face wth an ntervewer and onlne. Data collecton s descrbed n the Data Appendx. The total number of observatons s 2,846. We were also able to obtan 960 photos of respondents who partcpated n the face to face ntervews. The full verson of the PSEU questonnare entaled approxmately 200 questons and covered topcs ncludng demography/famly background, pre-unversty educaton, unversty admssons, unversty educaton, employment, future/expectatons, and race. We were especally careful regardng how and when we asked about race and affrmatve acton, snce we wanted to avod rasng awareness of these concepts before t was necessary and wanted to obscure the true purposes of the survey. For example, the ttle of the survey was ntentonally general, and we never mentoned race or affrmatve acton n any of our contacts wth potental respondents. We only asked respondents about race n the fnal secton of the face to face ntervew and asked about ther opnon of affrmatve acton on a separate, self-admnstered form at the concluson of the ntervew. We measured race n multple ways. Frst, wth the respondent's consent, the ntervewer took a photo of the respondent's student dentfcaton card, whch had a standardzed photo taken by the unversty upon matrculaton. We later cropped the photos, arranged them n a random order, and allowed a panel of Brazlans (the ntervewers and others unafflated wth the unversty) to rate the race and skn tone of each of the respondents. Second, at the begnnng of the ntervew, the ntervewer recorded hs or her ratng of the respondent's race and skn tone. Thrd, n the fnal secton of the ntervew, the ntervewer quered the respondent about hs or her race. The ntal race queston was open-ended. Respondents were smply asked to descrbe ther racal dentfcaton n one or two words. Then they were asked to place themselves nto one 13

14 of fve standard racal categores. Lke the QSC, we asked respondents whether they consdered themselves black (negro), but unlke the QSC, we offered respondents the opton to say that they dd not know. We also nqured about the race of ther parents. Emprcal Strategy In what follows, we present three sets of results. Frst, we characterze the relatonshp between race and socoeconomc status n samples of students, applcants, and resdents of Dstrto Federal. We also descrbe racal and socoeconomc change at UnB before and after the mplementaton of quotas. Tables 3-6 contan these results. Second, we evaluate the academc performance of quota students n terms of GPA and study effort. Tables 7-8 contan these results. Thrd, we estmate the effect of the quota system on pre-unversty effort and racal dentty. To do so, we explot the cross-sectonal and panel nature of the data. Tables 9-15 contan these results. In regressons, we utlze a standard set of covarates: race, gender, havng lved wth both parents at age 14 (PSEU), mother's educaton, havng domestc workers at home (PSEU), havng attended a publc secondary school, famly ncome (QSC), semester of matrculaton, overall score on the vestbular, and ndcators for area of study (socal scence, arts & humantes, hard scence, other scence, engneerng, professonal, health, teachng, and busness). We estmate the effect of the quota system n several dfferent ways. The most straghtforward s to regress the outcome varable on quota status, race, semester of matrculaton, and other covarates. The parameters of the followng model are estmated usng T ordnary least squares: Y Q t T t r 1 R r X the effect of the quota system, t 1 r 1 R 1, where s Q s the quota status ndcator, T s the semester ndcator, R s 14

15 the race ndcator, and X represents other ndvdual characterstcs. However, concern remans regardng selecton nto the quota system. For ths reason, t may helpful to thnk of the polcy as a treatment on pardos and pretos, so that a dfference-n-dfference approach can be taken (Imbens and Wooldrdge, 2009). In some specfcatons, we regress the outcome varable on an ndcator for beng pardo and matrculatng n the post-quota perod, an ndcator for beng preto and matrculatng n the post-quota perod, race, semester of matrculaton, and other covarates: Y pardo I pardo preto I preto T R T t r 1 R r X 1, where pardo t t 1 r 1 s the effect of the quota system on pardos, preto s the effect of the quota system on pretos, pardo I s an ndcator for respondent beng pardo and matrculatng n the post-quota perod, and preto I s an ndcator for beng preto and matrculatng n the post-quota perod. We also make use of the 960 photos that were taken n the face to face ntervews. We asked a group of Brazlan revewers to rate the skn tone of the subject n each photo from 1 (lght) to 7 (dark). We standardzed the scores by revewer, averaged the standardzed scores by photo, and ranked the photos accordng to average standardzed score. We desgnated the top 25% of scores as "dark." Based on ths measure, we examne the effect of the quota system on dark-sknned ndvduals. In partcular, we regress the outcome varable on an ndcator for havng dark skn tone and matrculatng n the post-quota perod, an ndcator for havng a dark skn tone, the average standardzed skn tone measure, semester of matrculaton, and other dark dark covarates: Y I D t T t r 1 R r X T t 1 r 1 R 1, where dark s the effect of the quota system on ndvduals wth a dark skn tone, dark I s an ndcator 15

16 for respondent havng a dark skn tone and matrculatng n the post-quota perod, and ndcator for havng a dark skn tone. D s an Lastly, we formulate a specfcaton that utlzes the panel nature of the data. As we have remarked, a number of ndvduals had appled to UnB multple tmes. Some of these dd so before and after the mposton of racal quotas. We are able to see f applyng as a quota applcant n the post-quota perod mght have an effect on whether an ndvdual consders hm or herself negro, condtonal on hs or her self-reported racal dentty n the pre-quota perod. The basc regresson s the followng: Y Y 0 Q Y 0 r R r X where s the effect of the quota system, 1 1, R r 1 Q s an ndcator for whether the respondent was a quota student/applcant (n the post-quota perod), Y 1 s black dentty n the post-quota perod, and Y 0 s black dentty n the pre-quota perod. In practce, we fully nteract quota status wth black dentty n the pre-quota perod. We also use the fact that some of the subjects n the PSEU also answered the QSC. Adoptng an analogous framework, we examne how quota status predcts change n racal dentty between the QSC and PSEU. IV. Results and Dscusson Racal Inequalty n Brazl One of the man reasons for enactng an affrmatve acton polcy drected toward blacks was to reduce racal dspartes. Thus, n the frst place, t s essental to establsh the exstence of racal nequalty, especally snce many Brazlans have the noton that socoeconomc status s uncorrelated wth race. Table 3 characterzes the relatonshp between race and socoeconomc status n samples of students, applcants, and resdents of Dstrto Federal. 16

17 Estmates from the 2004 PNAD (comparable to the CPS) reveal sgnfcant racal nequalty n Dstrto Federal. For 18 to 60 year olds, the percentage of brancos wth a college educaton (24.2%) s roughly three tmes hgher than the percentage of pardos and pretos wth a college educaton (8.4% and 6.4%, respectvely). Racal dfferences n havng a computer, nternet, refrgerator wth freezer, washng machne, and only one bathroom are large. For example, about 44% of brancos have access to the nternet at home, whle less than 20% of pardos and pretos do. Moreover, the percentage of pardo and preto households that are low ncome (less than three tmes the monthly mnmum wage) s almost twce the percentage of branco households that are low ncome. The percentage of branco households that are hgh ncome (more than 20 tmes the monthly mnmum wage) s two to three tmes hgher. Estmates for 15 to 24 year olds, ndvduals of secondary school and college-age, exhbt analogous patterns. The PSEU and QSC nclude many comparable measures of socoeconomc status. For students at UnB, 62.8% of brancos, 45.9% of pardos, and 38.8% of pretos have a mother wth a college educaton. 28.5% of brancos, 43.1% of pardos, and 63.4% of pretos attended a publc secondary school. The percentage of pardo households that s low ncome s almost two tmes bgger than the percentage of branco households that s low ncome, whereas the percentage of preto households s almost three tmes bgger. 38.2% of branco households, 23.4% of pardo households, and 15.0% of preto households have hgh ncome. Estmates for applcants to UnB also show that brancos tend to have hgher socoeconomc status than pardos, and pardos tend to have hgher socoeconomc status than pretos. Comparsons across racal groups wthn each subpopulaton expose a number of racal dspartes, whle comparsons across subpopulatons wthn each racal group reveal dspartes 17

18 ndependent of race. Table 3 suggests that UnB students are much dfferent than the general populaton. For example, branco students are almost three tmes more lkely than branco year olds lvng n Dstrto Federal to have a mother wth a college degree, pardo students are fve tmes more lkely than pardo year olds, and preto students are 35 tmes more lkely. Ths s consstent wth Ferrera and Veloso (2003) who contend that ntergeneratonal transmsson of human captal n Brazl s substantally hgher for chldren of college-educated parents. Also, for each racal group, the percentage of students wth low famly ncome s lower than the correspondng percentage of year olds wth low famly ncome, and the percentage of students wth hgh famly ncome s hgher than the percentage of year olds wth hgh famly ncome. Nevertheless, pardo and preto students are not necessarly more socoeconomcally advantaged than brancos n the populaton. The percentage of branco year olds wth hgh famly ncome (26.8%) s greater than both the percentage of pardo (23.4%) and preto students (15.0%) wth hgh famly ncome. To summarze, racal nequalty exsts n samples of students, applcants, and resdents of Dstrto Federal. Brancos tend to have hgher socoeconomc status than pardos, and pardos tend to have hgher status than pretos. Dspartes ndependent of race also preval. Condtonal on racal group, UnB students are consderably more advantaged than the general populaton. Racal Change at UnB An mportant queston s regardng what mpact the quota polcy had on the racal composton of students at UnB. Based on self-reported race, Table 4 contrasts the racal profle of the unversty before and after quotas. Followng the mplementaton of the polcy, the percentage of brancos decreased, and the percentage of pretos ncreased. The percentage of 18

19 pardos ncreased, but the change s not sgnfcant. However, t appears that the szable rse n the proporton of preto students was only temporary. Although the percentage of pretos rose from 6.0% n to 11.8% n , the frst semester of quotas, t subsequently fell to 6.7% n To shed lght on ths curous fndng, Table 5 examnes the racal composton of quota students. In , roughly half of quota students and applcants were preto and half were pardo. But afterwards the proporton of pardos ncreased dramatcally. By , pardos were the majorty of quota applcants and 70% of quota students. Ths may explan the drop n the percentage of pretos as well as the rse n entrance exam scores of quota students, as llustrated by Table 2, snce presumably better-qualfed pardos began to apply under the quota system. However, usng self-reported race could be problematc consderng the possble endogenety of racal dentty. Fgures 1 through 3 are hstograms of the average standardzed skn tone score based on ratngs of respondent photos by a panel of Brazlan revewers. Lght skn tone s to the left, and dark skn tone s to the rght. Fgure 1 dsplays the dstrbuton of skn tone n , one year pror to the mplementaton of quotas. As the next fgure shows, n the entre dstrbuton shfts sharply to the rght, and the rght tal thckens, whch ndcates that the polcy caused the student populaton to become darker. In the rght tal thns somewhat relatve to the dstrbuton n , but t s apparent that students matrculatng n the semesters after quotas are darker than those matrculatng n the semester before quotas. Taken together, the evdence suggests that the polcy rased the proporton of blacks/darkersknned students and lowered the proporton of non-blacks/lghter-sknned students, and that ths was perhaps most pronounced durng the ntal semester of quotas. 19

20 Another queston s what mpact affrmatve acton had on the percentage of socoeconomcally dsadvantaged students at UnB. Table 6 compares socoeconomc status before and after quotas. There s lttle dfference n many of the measures between the pre- and post-quota perods. However, after the polcy was enacted, a sgnfcantly lower percentage of students was rased wth both parents, a hgher percentage had no domestc workers, and a lower percentage had hgh famly ncome. Deconstructng the change by semester, t s apparent that the most socoeconomcally dsadvantaged cohort was Ths makes sense gven that the ntal semester of quotas had the greatest proporton of pretos, and pretos were the poorest racal group. Further analyss nvolves comparng ndvduals who were not admtted but would have been f the quota system had not exsted wth those who were admtted but would not have been f the quota system had not exsted. Francs and Tannur-Panto (2010c) fnd that dsplacng applcants were consderably more black than dsplaced applcants and were, by many measures, from famles wth sgnfcantly lower socoeconomc status. Academc Performance of Quota Students at UnB The debate n economcs about "msmatch" and the pervasve belef n Brazl that quota students drastcally underperform nspre us to examne the academc performance and effort of quota students at UnB. 4 Table 7 dsplays regressons of GPA on quota status, gender, score on the vestbular, socoeconomc varables, race, subject area, and semester of matrculaton. To contextualze the estmated coeffcents, note that the populaton standard devaton of GPA s about The regresson n the frst column nvolves all students admtted through the vestbular or PAS system. Condtonal on gender, subject area, and semester of matrculaton, the 4 Sample selecton due to attrton mght be a concern when evaluatng the academc performance of quota students. However, based on comprehensve academc records, the attrton rate of quota students at UnB was lower than that of non-quota students for every semester of matrculaton. The overall attrton rate was less than 5%. 20

21 GPA of quota students was about 0.14 ponts lower than that of non-quota students. Ths dfference s roughly 20% of the standard devaton of GPA. Moreover, the GPA of female students was about 0.32 ponts hgher than that of males. That quota students had lower scores on the vestbular explans part of the dfference n GPA. The regresson n the second column reveals that holdng constant score on the vestbular, the GPA of quota students was only about 0.08 ponts lower. The gender gap perssts. Addng controls for socoeconomc status further reduces the magntude of the coeffcent on quota status, but t remans sgnfcant. The fourth column controls for race, and the dfference between quota and non-quota students s no longer sgnfcant. Therefore, quota students tend to have lower grades than non-quota students, but the dfference s consderably less than that between male and female students. The dsparty n academc performance between quota and non-quota students s attrbutable to dfferental performance on the vestbular and, to a lesser extent, race and socoeconomc status. Table 8 dsplays regressons of study effort on quota status, gender, GPA, socoeconomc varables, race, subject area, and semester of matrculaton. Effort, based on a queston from the PSEU, s the daly number of hours spent studyng durng the most recent academc semester. The average number of daly study hours n the sample s around three. As the frst two columns demonstrate, quota students report that they study sgnfcantly more than non-quota students. Female students study sgnfcantly more than male students, and GPA s postvely assocated wth study hours. However, when socoeconomc status and race are added to the regressons, the dfference between quota and non-quota students becomes nsgnfcant. Female, GPA, and publc secondary school attendance have postve and sgnfcant coeffcents. Hence, quota students have slghtly greater study effort than non-quota students, and the dfference s mostly 21

22 attrbutable to socoeconomc status, snce students who attended publc secondary school tended to study more. Effects on Pre-Unversty Effort Examnng both students and applcants, we estmate the effect of racal quotas on effort n secondary school and unversty admssons. As artculated earler, a race-based affrmatve acton program may theoretcally have two basc knds of effects on effort (Fryer and Loury, 2005a; Fryer, Loury, and Yuret, 2008; Holzer and Neumark, 2000). On one hand, affrmatve acton may ncrease the returns to nvestments that rase the lkelhood of college admsson. Changes n admssons standards mght relocate some ndvduals who otherwse would have had lttle chance of selecton (extra-margnal) to the margn of selecton, thereby nsprng effort. On the other hand, affrmatve acton may decrease the returns to nvestments that rase the lkelhood of admsson. Changes n admssons standards mght relocate some ndvduals who otherwse would have been at the margn of selecton to an ntra-margnal poston, thus reducng effort. When applyng ths logc to Brazl, t s useful to remark that the margn of selecton s actually mult-dmensonal, snce there exsts a herarchy of majors wth vastly dfferent mnmum scores for selecton. To the extent that the objectve s to gan admsson to the most selectve course of study possble, few applcants are truly ntra-margnal. Effort s measured n multple ways. In Brazl, one of the prncpal methods for mprovng one's score on the vestbular s to enroll n a "cursnho," a 6-12 month course offered by a prvate test preparaton company. Both the PSEU and QSC ask about cursnho. Whether an ndvdual took a cursnho to prepare for the vestbular s a measure of effort. As an alternatve measure, we use the number of tmes that an ndvdual attempted the vestbular. The PSEU also 22

23 asks about secondary school achevement and study effort. In the face to face ntervews, subjects rated the ntensty wth whch they studed durng ther fnal year of secondary school. The varable "hgh effort" equals one f the respondent selected the hghest level of effort and equals zero otherwse. About 20% reported hgh effort. In both the face to face and nternet surveys, subjects characterzed ther secondary school grades. The varable "hgh grades" equals one f the respondent reported that ther grades were n the top two grade categores (mostly or nearly all 9's and 10's). About 20% had "hgh grades." Table 9 analyzes the mpact of the quota system on the lkelhood that students had taken a cursnho. The coeffcent on beng a quota student s postve and sgnfcant n each of the frst four columns. Specfcally, beng a quota student rases the lkelhood of takng a cursnho by about 8 percentage ponts. However, the coeffcent on beng pardo after the mplementaton of quotas and the coeffcent on beng preto after the mplementaton of quotas are both nsgnfcant. The coeffcent on havng dark skn tone after the mplementaton of quotas s nsgnfcant as well. The results may mply that pardos who appled under the quota system were more lkely to take a cursnho, whle pardos who dd not apply under the quota system when t was avalable were less lkely. Shortly, we report less ambguous evdence that quotas rased enrollment n cursnho among applcants to UnB. Other varables relate to the lkelhood of takng a course to prepare for the vestbular. Beng female s postvely assocated wth cursnho. Besdes, women also had hgher grades and study effort at UnB. Havng a mother wth less than secondary school educaton s negatvely assocated wth cursnho. Ths may reflect the nfluence of socoeconomc status, as cursnho mght be prohbtvely costly for some dsadvantaged students. Havng attended a publc secondary school s sgnfcantly assocated wth takng a cursnho perhaps because publc 23

24 school qualty s generally lower and ts currculum s less talored to the college entrance exam. Performance on the vestbular s postve and sgnfcantly related to cursnho. Ths lkely captures the causal effect of cursnho on exam scores as well as the postve selecton of students nto cursnho programs. Table 10 focuses on the academc effort of students n secondary school. Beng a quota student s not sgnfcantly related to ether hgh effort or hgh grades. Nevertheless, the coeffcent on havng dark skn tone after the mplementaton of quotas s postve and sgnfcant. Ths suggests that the darkest 25% of students exhbted greater effort n ther fnal year of secondary school followng the enactment of racal quotas. Thus, t appears that the darkest quota students experenced a rse n effort, whereas less dark quota students dd not. Human captal nvestments made pror to the announcement of the affrmatve acton polcy were sunk, so t s crtcal to confrm that earler nvestments are uncorrelated wth the quota system. For ths reason, we verfy (not reported n the table) that havng dark skn tone after the mplementaton of quotas s not sgnfcantly related to prmary school grades. Other varables relate to hgh effort and hgh grades n secondary school. Beng female s postvely assocated wth hgh effort and hgh grades, whch s congruent wth the fndngs that they are more lkely to have enrolled n a cursnho and more lkely to have exhbted hgh academc effort and performance n college. Socoeconomc measures are unrelated to hgh effort, but havng a mother wth less than secondary school educaton and havng no domestc workers are both postve and sgnfcantly related to hgh grades. Interestngly, more dsadvantaged students reported somewhat hgher academc achevement n secondary school. Score on the vestbular s also postvely assocated wth hgh effort and hgh grades ether 24

25 because secondary school achevement rases success on the vestbular or because ndvduals wth academc ablty perform well both n secondary school and on the vestbular. Table 11 examnes effort n unversty admssons for applcants to UnB. When the dependent varable s takng a cursnho, the coeffcent on quota status s postve and sgnfcant at the 10% level, and the coeffcent on beng pardo after the mplementaton of quotas s postve and sgnfcant as well. Ths helps to clarfy the prevously ambguous evdence on cursnho. As before, beng female, havng attended a publc secondary school, and score on the vestbular are postvely assocated wth cursnho. Addtonally, applcants from mddle-class famles (ntermedate levels of household ncome and mother wthout a college degree) are sgnfcantly more lkely to take a cursnho. In the last columns, the dependent varable s the number of tmes an applcant attempted the vestbular. About 60% attempted once, and about 90% attempted three tmes or fewer. The coeffcents on both quota status and pardo after the mplementaton of quotas are postve and sgnfcant. Beng pardo after the mplementaton of quotas ncreases the number of attempts by almost 0.2. Beng female and score on the vestbular are postvely related to the number of attempts. The number of attempts rses wth mother's educaton and household ncome. To summarze, there s no evdence that racal quotas at UnB reduced the pre-unversty effort of students or applcants. Indeed, some evdence exsts suggestng that the polcy may have rased effort. Quota students and applcants as well as pardo applcants after the mplementaton of quotas were more lkely to take a cursnho. Dark-sknned students matrculatng after the mplementaton of quotas were more lkely to report hgh effort and grades n secondary school. Plus, quota and pardo applcants after quotas were more lkely to attempt the vestbular multple 25

26 tmes. These results make sense consderng that the herarchy of majors greatly dmnshes the number of ntra-margnal ndvduals for whom ncentves to nvest n effort are low. Effects on Racal Identty Quotas at UnB are for negros. Gven the compettveness of admssons, there s substantal ncentve to self-dentfy as black to be able to apply under the quota system. Moreover, for ndvduals admtted as quota students, UnB provdes an array of servces renforcng and fosterng nvestments n black dentty. Therefore, racal quotas at UnB may have caused some ndvduals at the margn to consder themselves black. In ths context, margnal ndvduals are those n the mddle of the racal contnuum,.e. pardos and others wth ntermedate skn tone. One of the man emprcal challenges s to dfferentate between actual racal change and msrepresentaton. Although we rely on both the QSC and PSEU to measure racal dentty, we beleve that the PSEU better mnmzes msrepresentaton. PSEU respondents had lttle ncentve to msrepresent themselves because they had already matrculated at UnB, were unaware of the research objectves, and were told that ther responses were absolutely confdental. Usng the PSEU, Table 12 examnes the effect of racal quotas on the racal dentty of students. The dependent varable s whether a respondent consders hm or herself negro. The regressons nclude controls for race, semester of matrculaton, gender, socoeconomc status, and GPA. The coeffcent on quota status s postve and sgnfcant n every specfcaton. The coeffcent on beng pardo after the mplementaton of quotas s also postve and sgnfcant, whle the coeffcent on beng preto after the mplementaton of quotas s not. Based on photos, havng dark skn tone after the mplementaton of quotas s postve and sgnfcant as well. 26

27 Condtonal on race/color and socoeconomc status, quota students are about 25 percentage ponts more lkely to consder themselves negro. Beng pardo n the post-quota era rases the lkelhood of self-dentfyng as negro by almost 7 percentage ponts, an effect whch s roughly 50% of the sample average for pardos. There s no effect on pretos, snce nearly all pretos selfdentfed as black before and after quotas. The results may mply that quotas rased the lkelhood that those students n the mddle of the racal contnuum, especally pardos, consdered themselves negro. It s mportant to note that the coeffcents on semesters and are not sgnfcant, whch suggests that there was no trend n black dentty pror to the mplementaton of quotas. Other varables are related to black dentty. The estmated coeffcents on mother's educaton, domestc workers, and publc secondary school mply that socoeconomc status s nversely related to the lkelhood that respondents consder themselves negro. Also, n three of sx regressons, GPA s negatvely assocated wth black dentty. Usng the QSC, Table 13 looks at the racal dentty of applcants. The dependent varable s whether a respondent consders hm or herself negro upon regstraton for the vestbular. The coeffcent on quota status s postve and sgnfcant. The coeffcent on beng pardo after the mplementaton of quotas s postve and sgnfcant, and albet smaller n magntude, the coeffcent on beng preto after the mplementaton of quotas s postve and sgnfcant as well. Condtonal on race/color and socoeconomc status, quota applcants are almost 50 percentage ponts more lkely to consder themselves negro. Pardos who regster for the vestbular when quotas are avalable are about 30 percentage ponts more lkely to have black dentty, whle pretos are about 3 percentage ponts more lkely. Echong the prevous fndngs, the ntroducton of quotas appears to rase the lkelhood that those at the margn, pardos, self-dentfy as negro. However, the estmated effects n Table 13 are much greater n magntude than those n Table 27