Testing IPv6 Firewalls with ft6
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1 Testing IPv6 Firewalls with ft6 Oliver Eggert IPv6 Security TROOPERS14 March 17th, 2014
2 Outline 1 The beginnings 2 Design of ft6 3 Tests done by ft6 4 Live Demo 5 Testing ip6tables 6 Pitfalls 7 (optionally: writing your own tests) Oliver Eggert Testing IPv6 Firewalls with ft6 2/ 93
3 The beginnings IPv6 Intrusion Detection System Project ( ) at University of Potsdam funded by Bundesministerium für Bildung und Forschung Oliver Eggert Testing IPv6 Firewalls with ft6 3/ 93
4 The beginnings motivation & goal IPv6 adoption continues to rise. However, lack of IPv6-enabled tools for: analyzing threat level checking firewall/ids configuration checking firewall/ids capabilities checking IPv6 readiness Oliver Eggert Testing IPv6 Firewalls with ft6 4/ 93
5 The beginnings: contributions IPv6 Darknet not advertised check who s scanning /48 network less than 1200 packets in 9 months Oliver Eggert Testing IPv6 Firewalls with ft6 5/ 93
6 The beginnings: contributions IPv6 Honeypot check what attackers are doing honeydv6 emulates a whole virtual network and services Oliver Eggert Testing IPv6 Firewalls with ft6 6/ 93
7 The beginnings: contributions IPv6 IDS Snort-Plugin: check Martin Schütte s talk tomorrow! Oliver Eggert Testing IPv6 Firewalls with ft6 7/ 93
8 The beginnings: contributions Performance Benchmarks how well does IPv6-enabled hardware perform? what impact do additional features of IPv6 have? Oliver Eggert Testing IPv6 Firewalls with ft6 8/ 93
9 The beginnings: information project is over now check results and publications at: Oliver Eggert Testing IPv6 Firewalls with ft6 9/ 93
10 Outline 1 The beginnings 2 Design of ft6 3 Tests done by ft6 4 Live Demo 5 Testing ip6tables 6 Pitfalls 7 (optionally: writing your own tests) Oliver Eggert Testing IPv6 Firewalls with ft6 10/ 93
11 Design of ft6 motivation Why should I? you are responsible for the network you have to / want to migrate to IPv6 can you switch now? not really a good methodology for telling if your device supports IPv6 comparing firewalls finding problems in your configuration Oliver Eggert Testing IPv6 Firewalls with ft6 11/ 93
12 Design of ft6 motivation checking for Supports IPv6 -stickers is not an option! Oliver Eggert Testing IPv6 Firewalls with ft6 12/ 93
13 Design of ft6 motivation you must check for yourself why is this hard? lot of SHOULDs, MUSTs and REQUIREDs for IPv6 across lot of different RFCs vague best practices still evolving, hard to keep track Oliver Eggert Testing IPv6 Firewalls with ft6 13/ 93
14 Design of ft6 motivation ft6 should help goal: easy to configure and visualize results easily reproducable, comparable usually tedious, error prone work provide starting point for firewall evaluation also consider testing for performance, attacks on local network can act as a framework for new tests Oliver Eggert Testing IPv6 Firewalls with ft6 14/ 93
15 Design of ft6 Architecture ft6 is a client-server application Oliver Eggert Testing IPv6 Firewalls with ft6 15/ 93
16 Design of ft6 Architecture ft6 is a client-server application requires machines on both sides of your firewall Oliver Eggert Testing IPv6 Firewalls with ft6 15/ 93
17 Design of ft6 Architecture ft6 is a client-server application requires machines on both sides of your firewall place machines not more than one hop away from firewall Oliver Eggert Testing IPv6 Firewalls with ft6 15/ 93
18 Design of ft6 Architecture ft6 is a client-server application requires machines on both sides of your firewall place machines not more than one hop away from firewall one open port Oliver Eggert Testing IPv6 Firewalls with ft6 15/ 93
19 Design of ft6 Running ft6 Client and Server perform a handshake Server begins to sniffs Oliver Eggert Testing IPv6 Firewalls with ft6 16/ 93
20 Design of ft6 Running ft6 Client and Server perform a handshake Server begins to sniffs Client starts sending packets Oliver Eggert Testing IPv6 Firewalls with ft6 16/ 93
21 Design of ft6 Running ft6 Client and Server perform a handshake Server begins to sniffs Client starts sending packets Some packts pass the firewall Oliver Eggert Testing IPv6 Firewalls with ft6 16/ 93
22 Design of ft6 Running ft6 Client and Server perform a handshake Server begins to sniffs Client starts sending packets Some packts pass the firewall Others are dropped Oliver Eggert Testing IPv6 Firewalls with ft6 16/ 93
23 Design of ft6 Running ft6 Server sends back list of packets it recieved Oliver Eggert Testing IPv6 Firewalls with ft6 17/ 93
24 Design of ft6 Running ft6 Server sends back list of packets it recieved Client figures out what went missing and displays result Oliver Eggert Testing IPv6 Firewalls with ft6 17/ 93
25 Design of ft6 Design of ft6 open-source (Creative Commons BY-NC-SA 3.0) uses scapy 2.2.0, python 2.7, PyQt 4 developed on (2.6.32), tested with more recent (3.7.1) should work on Windows 7, Mac OS X Oliver Eggert Testing IPv6 Firewalls with ft6 18/ 93
26 Outline 1 The beginnings 2 Design of ft6 3 Tests done by ft6 4 Live Demo 5 Testing ip6tables 6 Pitfalls 7 (optionally: writing your own tests) Oliver Eggert Testing IPv6 Firewalls with ft6 19/ 93
27 Tests done by ft6 written by EANTC EANTC-IPv6-IDS-FW-Abstract-Test-Suite_v1.0-public.pdf ft6 does 9 of those Oliver Eggert Testing IPv6 Firewalls with ft6 20/ 93
28 Tests done by ft6 Test 1: ICMPv6 filtering Check if the firewall correctly forwards and discards ICMPv6 Packets. informational, diagnostic messages Identified by type and code field Type Code Checksum Message Body + RFC 4890 Recommendations for Filtering ICMPv6 Messages in Firewalls Oliver Eggert Testing IPv6 Firewalls with ft6 21/ 93
29 Tests done by ft6 Test 1: ICMPv6 filtering belong to one of 3 groups: mandatory, optional and nonfiltered 1 mandatory: Always reject them. local Messages (Neighbor Solicitation, Neighbor Advertisement). 100, 101, 127, , 148, 149, , 200, 201, optional: Reject unless needed. unassigned types and codes 3 (Code 1), 4 (Code 0), 4-99, , , 150, , nonfiltered: Always forward them. neccessary for correct operation (echo request, echo reply, packet too big). 1, 2, 3 (Code 0), 4 (Code 1), 4 (Code 2), 128, 129. Oliver Eggert Testing IPv6 Firewalls with ft6 22/ 93
30 Tests done by ft6 Test 2: Routing Header Check if the firewall correctly forwards and discards packets containing a Routing Header. Used to specify a list of nodes a packet has to visit RFC 5095 Deprecation of Type 0 Routing Headers in IPv6 loops denial of service applies to Routing Header type 0 only Oliver Eggert Testing IPv6 Firewalls with ft6 23/ 93
31 Tests done by ft6 Test 2: Routing Header Depends upon type and segments-left field Next Header Hdr Ext Len Routing Type Segments Left type-specific data Oliver Eggert Testing IPv6 Firewalls with ft6 24/ 93
32 Tests done by ft6 Test 2: Routing Header RH-type segs. left action 0 0 drop 2 1 drop others 0 drop Oliver Eggert Testing IPv6 Firewalls with ft6 25/ 93
33 Tests done by ft6 Test 3: Chained Extension Headers Check if the firewall correctly forwards and discards packets containing a number of different Extension Headers. DSTOPT header at most twice (before a RH, before Layer 4) HBH Options only after base IPv6 header others: at most once (should) avoid ambiguity, prevent denial of service RFC 2460 Internet Protocol, Version 6 (IPv6) Specification Oliver Eggert Testing IPv6 Firewalls with ft6 26/ 93
34 Tests done by ft6 Test 3: Chained Extension Headers 1 A single DSTOPT. Should be forwarded. 2 Two DSTOPTs in a row. Should be dropped. 3 DSTOPT, Routing Header, DSTOPT. Forward. 4 A single HBH. Forward. 5 Two HBHs in a row. Drop. 6 A DSTOPT, followed by one HBH. Drop. 7 HBH, DSTOPT, Routing Header, HBH. Drop. Oliver Eggert Testing IPv6 Firewalls with ft6 27/ 93
35 Tests done by ft6 Test 4: Overlapping Fragments Check if the firewall correctly detects overlapping fragments Forward only if no overlap RFC 5722 Handling of Overlapping IPv6 Fragments IPv6 fragments at source & reassembles at destination fragments controlled by fragment-offset Oliver Eggert Testing IPv6 Firewalls with ft6 28/ 93
36 Tests done by ft6 fragmentation source want s to send a packet that is too big Oliver Eggert Testing IPv6 Firewalls with ft6 29/ 93
37 Tests done by ft6 fragmentation payload is split into chunks each sent as separate fragment Oliver Eggert Testing IPv6 Firewalls with ft6 29/ 93
38 Tests done by ft6 reassembly destination receives fragment one, allocates buffer Oliver Eggert Testing IPv6 Firewalls with ft6 30/ 93
39 Tests done by ft6 reassembly virtually splits buffer into slots Oliver Eggert Testing IPv6 Firewalls with ft6 30/ 93
40 Tests done by ft6 reassembly target-slot is determined by fragment-offset Oliver Eggert Testing IPv6 Firewalls with ft6 30/ 93
41 Tests done by ft6 reassembly data is copied accordingly Oliver Eggert Testing IPv6 Firewalls with ft6 30/ 93
42 Tests done by ft6 reassembly same procedure for second fragment Oliver Eggert Testing IPv6 Firewalls with ft6 30/ 93
43 Tests done by ft6 reassembly same procedure for second fragment Oliver Eggert Testing IPv6 Firewalls with ft6 30/ 93
44 Tests done by ft6 reassembly same procedure for third fragment Oliver Eggert Testing IPv6 Firewalls with ft6 30/ 93
45 Tests done by ft6 reassembly same procedure for third fragment Oliver Eggert Testing IPv6 Firewalls with ft6 30/ 93
46 Tests done by ft6 reassembly all fragments have arrived Oliver Eggert Testing IPv6 Firewalls with ft6 30/ 93
47 Tests done by ft6 reassembly reassembly complete Oliver Eggert Testing IPv6 Firewalls with ft6 30/ 93
48 Tests done by ft6 attack first fragment arrives. It carries a TCP-Header Oliver Eggert Testing IPv6 Firewalls with ft6 31/ 93
49 Tests done by ft6 attack data is copied into buffer Oliver Eggert Testing IPv6 Firewalls with ft6 31/ 93
50 Tests done by ft6 attack second fragment has wrong offset Oliver Eggert Testing IPv6 Firewalls with ft6 31/ 93
51 Tests done by ft6 attack still, data get s copied Oliver Eggert Testing IPv6 Firewalls with ft6 31/ 93
52 Tests done by ft6 attack last fragment arrives Oliver Eggert Testing IPv6 Firewalls with ft6 31/ 93
53 Tests done by ft6 attack data get s copied Oliver Eggert Testing IPv6 Firewalls with ft6 31/ 93
54 Tests done by ft6 attack reassembly complete, firewall bypassed Oliver Eggert Testing IPv6 Firewalls with ft6 31/ 93
55 Tests done by ft6 Test 4: Overlapping Fragments 1 Fragments w/o overlap. Should be forwarded. 2 Overlapping fragments that overwrite the TCP-port. Drop 3 Overlapping fragments that overwrite the payload. Drop Oliver Eggert Testing IPv6 Firewalls with ft6 32/ 93
56 Tests done by ft6 Tests 5 & 6: Tiny IPv6 Fragments Check if the firewall inspects the second fragment if no Layer 4 is present in the first fragment Firewall should wait for next fragment before deciding draft-gont-6man-oversized-header-chain-02.txt Check if the firewall respects the timeout as specified in the rfc prevent resource starvation allow for some lag drop after 60 seconds RFC 2460 Internet Protocol, Version 6 (IPv6) Specification Oliver Eggert Testing IPv6 Firewalls with ft6 33/ 93
57 Tests done by ft6 Tests 5 & 6: Tiny IPv6 Fragments 1 Tiny-Fragment with allowed port in second fragment. Forward. 2 Tiny-Fragment with denied port in second fragment. Drop. 3 Send first fragment, wait 59 seconds, send last fragment. Forward. 4 Send first fragment, wait 61 seconds, send last fragment. Drop. Oliver Eggert Testing IPv6 Firewalls with ft6 34/ 93
58 Tests done by ft6 Test 7: Excessive HBH/DSTOPT Options Check if the firewall blocks packets with multiple options IPv6 supports different option types per header Option Type Opt Data Len Option Data can be daisy-chained Most option types should occur at most once Only Pad1 and PadN are allowed multiple times prevent ambiguity, prevent denial of service RFC 4942 IPv6 Transition/Coexistence Security Considerations Oliver Eggert Testing IPv6 Firewalls with ft6 35/ 93
59 Tests done by ft6 Test 7: Excessive HBH/DSTOPT Options Each variant has duplicate options. Each should be dropped. 1 Jumbo Payload, PadN, Jumbo Payload. 2 Router Alert, Pad1, Router Alert 3 Quick Start, Tunnel Encapsulation Limit, PadN, Quick Start 4 RPL Option, PadN, RPL Option Oliver Eggert Testing IPv6 Firewalls with ft6 36/ 93
60 Tests done by ft6 Test 8: PadN Covert Channel Check if the firewall can block packets with non-zero padding Used to align options (usually) don t carry a payload RFC 4942 IPv6 Transition/Coexistence Security Considerations Oliver Eggert Testing IPv6 Firewalls with ft6 37/ 93
61 Tests done by ft6 Test 8: PadN Covert Channel 1 Padding with payload all zeroes in a HBH. Forward. 2 Padding with other payload in a HBH. Drop. 3 Padding with payload all zeroes in a DSTOPT. Forward. 4 Padding with other payload in a DSTOPT. Drop. Oliver Eggert Testing IPv6 Firewalls with ft6 38/ 93
62 Tests done by ft6 Test 9: Address Scopes Verify that the firewall does not route traffic from an inappropriate scope. 1 ff00::/16 (multicast) 2 fe80::/10 (link local) RFC 4942 IPv6 Transition/Coexistence Security Considerations 256 packets with source addresses from group 1. Drop. 16 packets with source addresses from group 2. Drop. Oliver Eggert Testing IPv6 Firewalls with ft6 39/ 93
63 Outline 1 The beginnings 2 Design of ft6 3 Tests done by ft6 4 Live Demo 5 Testing ip6tables 6 Pitfalls 7 (optionally: writing your own tests) Oliver Eggert Testing IPv6 Firewalls with ft6 40/ 93
64 Live Demo Live Demo Oliver Eggert Testing IPv6 Firewalls with ft6 41/ 93
65 Outline 1 The beginnings 2 Design of ft6 3 Tests done by ft6 4 Live Demo 5 Testing ip6tables 6 Pitfalls 7 (optionally: writing your own tests) Oliver Eggert Testing IPv6 Firewalls with ft6 42/ 93
66 Testing ip6tables setup Linux grml grml-amd64 Debian grml.1 x86_64 ip6tables ft Python Scapy Oliver Eggert Testing IPv6 Firewalls with ft6 43/ 93
67 Testing ip6tables procedure use a default configuration perform test if test fails: try to improve config perform test again Oliver Eggert Testing IPv6 Firewalls with ft6 44/ 93
68 Testing ip6tables default configuration ip6tables -A FORWARD -p tcp --dport 80 -j ACCEPT ip6tables -A FORWARD -p udp --dport 80 -j ACCEPT ip6tables -A FORWARD -m state --state ESTABLISHED,RELATED -j ACCEPT ip6tables -P FORWARD DROP Oliver Eggert Testing IPv6 Firewalls with ft6 45/ 93
69 Testing ip6tables Results test basic config improved rules ICMPv6 Filtering Routing Header Header Chain Overlapping Fragments Tiny IPv6 Fragments Excessive HBH Options PadN Covert Channel Address Scope Oliver Eggert Testing IPv6 Firewalls with ft6 46/ 93
70 Testing ip6tables Test 1: ICMPv6 Filtering Check how the firewall handles ICMPv6-messages according to the three groups mandatory, optional, nonfiltered. default config mandatory: all dropped optional: all dropped nonfiltered: all dropped Oliver Eggert Testing IPv6 Firewalls with ft6 47/ 93
71 Testing ip6tables Test 1: ICMPv6 Filtering Cause: policy is DROP improved configuration: ip6tables -A FORWARD -p icmpv6 --icmpv6-type destination-unreachable \ -j ACCEPT ip6tables -A FORWARD -p icmpv6 --icmpv6-type packet-too-big \ -j ACCEPT ip6tables -A FORWARD -p icmpv6 --icmpv6-type ttl-zero-during-transit \ -j ACCEPT Oliver Eggert Testing IPv6 Firewalls with ft6 48/ 93
72 Testing ip6tables Test 1: ICMPv6 Filtering improved configuration (cont.): ip6tables -A FORWARD -p icmpv6 --icmpv6-type unknown-header-type \ -j ACCEPT ip6tables -A FORWARD -p icmpv6 --icmpv6-type unknown-option \ -j ACCEPT ip6tables -A FORWARD -p icmpv6 --icmpv6-type echo-request \ -m limit --limit 900/min -j ACCEPT ip6tables -A FORWARD -p icmpv6 --icmpv6-type echo-reply \ -m limit --limit 900/min -j ACCEPT Oliver Eggert Testing IPv6 Firewalls with ft6 49/ 93
73 Testing ip6tables Test 1: ICMPv6 Filtering improved config mandatory: all dropped optional: all dropped nonfiltered: all forwarded Oliver Eggert Testing IPv6 Firewalls with ft6 50/ 93
74 Testing ip6tables Test 1: ICMPv6 Filtering other firewalls most allow filtering by type and code some drop packets even if they are allowed (see pitfalls). Oliver Eggert Testing IPv6 Firewalls with ft6 51/ 93
75 Testing ip6tables Test 2: Routing Header Check how the firewall handles Routing Headers. Depends on RH type and segments left. default config type = 0, segments-left = 0: forwarded type = 0, segments-left 0: forwarded type = 2, segments-left 1: forwarded type = 2, segments-left = 1: forwarded type = 200, segments-left = 0: forwarded type = 200, segments-left 0: forwarded Oliver Eggert Testing IPv6 Firewalls with ft6 52/ 93
76 Testing ip6tables Test 2: Routing Header Cause: Packets are directed at allowed port 80 ip6tables does not check the Routing Header Solution: Use the ip6tables-module rt. But not like this: ip6tables -A FORWARD -m rt --rt-type 0 -j ACCEPT This will accept all packets containng a routing header w/o checking for the port. Better: handle RH in separate chain. Oliver Eggert Testing IPv6 Firewalls with ft6 53/ 93
77 Testing ip6tables Test 2: Routing Header improved configuration: ip6tables -N routinghdr ip6tables -A routinghdr -m rt --rt-type 0! --rt-segsleft 0 -j DROP ip6tables -A routinghdr -m rt --rt-type 2! --rt-segsleft 1 -j DROP ip6tables -A routinghdr -m rt --rt-type 0 --rt-segsleft 0 -j RETURN ip6tables -A routinghdr -m rt --rt-type 2 --rt-segsleft 1 -j RETURN ip6tables -A routinghdr -m rt! --rt-segsleft 0 --j DROP ip6tables -A FORWARD -m ipv6header --header ipv6-route --soft \ -j routinghdr Oliver Eggert Testing IPv6 Firewalls with ft6 54/ 93
78 Testing ip6tables Test 2: Routing Header improved configuration type = 0, segments-left = 0: forwarded type = 0, segments-left 0: dropped type = 2, segments-left 1: dropped type = 2, segments-left = 1: forwarded type = 200, segments-left = 0: forwarded type = 200, segments-left 0: dropped Oliver Eggert Testing IPv6 Firewalls with ft6 55/ 93
79 Testing ip6tables Test 2: Routing Header other firewalls some can only drop all or no RH some can only inspect type, not segments-left Oliver Eggert Testing IPv6 Firewalls with ft6 56/ 93
80 Testing ip6tables Test 3: Extension Header Chain Check how the firewall handles packets containing header chains. default config DSTOPT: forwarded HBH: dropped DSTOPT-HBH: forwarded DSTOPT-DSTOPT: forwarded HBH-HBH: dropped DSTOPT-RH-DSTOPT: forwarded HBH-DSTOPT-RH-HBH: dropped Oliver Eggert Testing IPv6 Firewalls with ft6 57/ 93
81 Testing ip6tables Test 3: Extension Header Chain Cause: Packets are directed at allowed port 80 ip6tables does not check the DSTOPT or HBH Solution: Use ip6tables-module ipv6header or ipv6headerorder. Check headers in separate chain. Problems: Not stateful enough need to enumerate all possible combinations Rule for forwarding single HBH didn t work. Dropping duplicate DSTOPT-DSTOPT also drops single DSTOPT. Oliver Eggert Testing IPv6 Firewalls with ft6 58/ 93
82 Testing ip6tables Test 3: Extension Header Chain other firewalls similar problems only a Cisco ASA w/ additional IPS-module could detect duplicates. performance benchmark showed importance: throughput down to approx. 65 when sending extension headers Oliver Eggert Testing IPv6 Firewalls with ft6 59/ 93
83 Testing ip6tables Test 4: Overlapping Fragments Check how the firewall handles packets containing fragments. default config no overlap: forwarded overlap overwriting the port: dropped overlap overwriting the payload: dropped Oliver Eggert Testing IPv6 Firewalls with ft6 60/ 93
84 Testing ip6tables Test 4: Overlapping Fragments other firewalls some do not allow fragments at all some do not recognize overlap Oliver Eggert Testing IPv6 Firewalls with ft6 61/ 93
85 Testing ip6tables Tests 5 & 6: Tiny Fragments Check how the firewall handles Tiny Fragments (upper layer header not present in first fragment). Check if timeout of 60s is handled correclty default config port 80 in second fragment (allowed): dropped port 22 in second fragment (forbidden): dropped last fragment arriving after 59 seconds: dropped last fragment arriving after 61 seconds: dropped Oliver Eggert Testing IPv6 Firewalls with ft6 62/ 93
86 Testing ip6tables Tests 5 & 6: Tiny Fragments Problem: ip6tables appears to drop all tiny fragments checking for timeout is not useful. no solution was found, no improved config. other firewalls similar results Oliver Eggert Testing IPv6 Firewalls with ft6 63/ 93
87 Testing ip6tables Test 7: Excessive HBH/DSTOPT Options Check how the firewall handles extension headers containing duplicate options. default config HBH with Jumbo-PadN-Jumbo: dropped DSTOPT with Jumbo-PadN-Jumbo: forwarded HBH with RouterAlert-Pad1-RouterAlert: forwarded DSTOPT with RouterAlert-Pad1-RouterAlert: forwarded HBH with QuickStart-TunnelEncapLimit-PadN-QuickStart: forwarded DSTOPT with QuickStart-TunnelEncapLimit-PadN-QuickStart: forwarded HBH with RPL-PadN-RPL: dropped DSTOPT with RPL-PadN-RPL: forwarded Oliver Eggert Testing IPv6 Firewalls with ft6 64/ 93
88 Testing ip6tables Test 7: Excessive HBH/DSTOPT Options Cause: not really sure... Solution: Use ip6tables-modules hbh and dst to check for payload of these headers. enumerate all possible combinations example config for dropping second combination: ip6tables -A FORWARD -m dst --dst-opts 194,1,194 -j DROP Oliver Eggert Testing IPv6 Firewalls with ft6 65/ 93
89 Testing ip6tables Test 7: Excessive HBH/DSTOPT Options improved config HBH with Jumbo-PadN-Jumbo: dropped DSTOPT with Jumbo-PadN-Jumbo: dropped HBH with RouterAlert-Pad1-RouterAlert: dropped DSTOPT with RouterAlert-Pad1-RouterAlert: dropped HBH with QuickStart-TunnelEncapLimit-PadN-QuickStart: dropped DSTOPT with QuickStart-TunnelEncapLimit-PadN-QuickStart: dropped HBH with RPL-PadN-RPL: dropped DSTOPT with RPL-PadN-RPL: dropped Oliver Eggert Testing IPv6 Firewalls with ft6 66/ 93
90 Testing ip6tables Test 7: Excessive HBH/DSTOPT Options other firewalls most were unable to inspect contents of options some were only able to inspect the first option Oliver Eggert Testing IPv6 Firewalls with ft6 67/ 93
91 Testing ip6tables Test 8: PadN Covert Channel Check how the firewall handles packets containing a PadN-option. It s payload should be all zeroes. default config HBH with PadN-payload = 0: dropped HBH with PadN-payload 0: dropped DSTOPT with PadN-payload = 0: forwarded DSTOPT with PadN-payload 0: forwarded Oliver Eggert Testing IPv6 Firewalls with ft6 68/ 93
92 Testing ip6tables Test 8: PadN Covert Channel Cause: ip6tables doesn t seem to check payload at all no solution found, no improved config. other firewalls same result Oliver Eggert Testing IPv6 Firewalls with ft6 69/ 93
93 Testing ip6tables Test 9: Address Scopes Check how the firewall handles packets originating from an inappropriate scope. default config multicast: all dropped link-local: all dropped other firewalls same result Oliver Eggert Testing IPv6 Firewalls with ft6 70/ 93
94 Testing ip6tables conclusion test improved rules ICMPv6 Filtering Routing Header Header Chain Overlapping Fragments Tiny IPv6 Fragments Excessive HBH Options 1 PadN Covert Channel Address Scope 1 not very elegant Oliver Eggert Testing IPv6 Firewalls with ft6 71/ 93
95 Outline 1 The beginnings 2 Design of ft6 3 Tests done by ft6 4 Live Demo 5 Testing ip6tables 6 Pitfalls 7 (optionally: writing your own tests) Oliver Eggert Testing IPv6 Firewalls with ft6 72/ 93
96 Pitfalls ideal world scenario: tests performed automatically mismatch between rfc s intent, your setup, firewall capabilities ft6 s results may be misleading in some cases Oliver Eggert Testing IPv6 Firewalls with ft6 73/ 93
97 Pitfalls Example: ICMPv6 non-filtered messages include Packet Too Big, Time Exceeded and Parameter Problem in our tests: were dropped by some firewalls, marked red in ft6 responses to some previous malformed packet ft6 doesn t send the previous packet firewall more capable than assumed Oliver Eggert Testing IPv6 Firewalls with ft6 74/ 93
98 Pitfalls how would you fix that? you can t (reliably) too many edge-cases, to many differences across vendors problem remains: what s the result of that ICMP test? Oliver Eggert Testing IPv6 Firewalls with ft6 75/ 93
99 Pitfalls another example: Routing Header decision to drop or forward depends upon value of segments-left field. some firewalls were unable to inspect the field. all or nothing firewall less capable than assumed yet: dropping valid RH is arguably better than forwarding invalid RH how do we reflect that in ft6? Oliver Eggert Testing IPv6 Firewalls with ft6 76/ 93
100 Pitfalls don t focus too hard on rfc-conformity if a result is not in accordance with rfc but "more secure": no longer red can t make it green: for example: dropping all RH, kills Mobile-IPv6 feature Oliver Eggert Testing IPv6 Firewalls with ft6 77/ 93
101 Pitfalls results: more yellow, longer explanations more interpretation required shows problems of IPv6. Too many what-ifs Oliver Eggert Testing IPv6 Firewalls with ft6 78/ 93
102 Outline 1 The beginnings 2 Design of ft6 3 Tests done by ft6 4 Live Demo 5 Testing ip6tables 6 Pitfalls 7 (optionally: writing your own tests) Oliver Eggert Testing IPv6 Firewalls with ft6 79/ 93
103 Writing your own test Example: build own test, to see if packets containing the string "randomword"can traverse the firewall. Requires three steps: 1 create a class for your test 2 craft packets in the prepare method 3 register your test with the application (More detailed in ft6 s documentation) Oliver Eggert Testing IPv6 Firewalls with ft6 80/ 93
104 Writing your own tests packet handling with scapy handling network packets is usually messy binary protocols accessing individual flags invovles bitshifting or bitmasking sending and receiving is error-prone, too scapy does all that for you and is human readable. great TAB-completion Oliver Eggert Testing IPv6 Firewalls with ft6 81/ 93
105 Writing your own tests packet handling with scapy Oliver Eggert Testing IPv6 Firewalls with ft6 82/ 93
106 Writing your own tests packet handling with scapy Oliver Eggert Testing IPv6 Firewalls with ft6 83/ 93
107 Writing your own tests packet handling with scapy Oliver Eggert Testing IPv6 Firewalls with ft6 84/ 93
108 Writing your own tests packet handling with scapy Oliver Eggert Testing IPv6 Firewalls with ft6 85/ 93
109 Writing your own tests packet handling with scapy Oliver Eggert Testing IPv6 Firewalls with ft6 86/ 93
110 Writing your own tests Step 1: Create a class for your test class TestRandomWord(Test): def init (self, id, name, description, test_settings, app): super(testrandomword, self). init (id, name, description, test_settings, app) (copy-paste, change the name) Oliver Eggert Testing IPv6 Firewalls with ft6 87/ 93
111 Writing your own tests Step 2: Craft packets in the prepare-method def prepare(self): e = Ether(dst=self.test_settings.router_mac) ip = IPv6(dst=self.test_settings.dst, src=self.test_settings.src) udp= UDP(dport=self.test_settings.open_port, sport=12345) p = Ft6Packet(e/ip/udp/Raw("randomword")) p.setvalid() p.setdescription("a valid packet containing a random word") p.ifdropped("this violates rfc #23") self.addpacket(p) Oliver Eggert Testing IPv6 Firewalls with ft6 88/ 93
112 Writing your own tests Step 2: Craft packets in the prepare-method p = Ft6Packet(e/ip/udp/Raw("otherword")) p.setinvalid() p.setdescription("an invalid packet containing some other word") p.ifforwarded("this violates rfc #42") self.addpacket(p) Oliver Eggert Testing IPv6 Firewalls with ft6 89/ 93
113 Writing your own tests That s it! ft6 will send each packet that has been added like this and add results according to the packet s state Oliver Eggert Testing IPv6 Firewalls with ft6 90/ 93
114 Writing your own tests Step 3: register your test # create test classes, store them in the dictionary # so they can later be called by their id ticmp = TestICMP(1, "ICMPv6 Filtering", "The ICMP Test", self.test_settings, app) self.registertest(ticmp)... trandomword = TestRandomWord(42, "My Random Word Test", "Tests for Random Words", self.test_settings, app) self.registertest(trandomword) Oliver Eggert Testing IPv6 Firewalls with ft6 91/ 93
115 Wrap up a lot of things to take care of don t trust the vendors also do performance, link-local tests ft6 is a work in progress lots of improvement could be done better results more tests Oliver Eggert Testing IPv6 Firewalls with ft6 92/ 93
116 Thank You! Questions? get ft6 from: more info on the project: Oliver Eggert Testing IPv6 Firewalls with ft6 93/ 93
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