Practical Security Assessment of IPv6 Networks and Devices. Fernando Gont
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1 Practical Security Assessment of IPv6 Networks and Devices Fernando Gont
2 About I have done a fair share of IPv6 standardization work I have published and maintain the SI6 Networks IPv6 Toolkit I run the IPv6 Hackers mailing-list References at: Everyday work: Security Assessment Producing fixes Tools & Testing
3 Agenda I ve never met anybody who really did spend blood on something who wasn t eager to describe what they ve done and how they did it and why -- Ken Thompson (in Coders at Work: Reflections on the Craft of Programming ) This talk is about SI6 Network's IPv6 Toolkit, and how to use it for fun & profit
4 Disclaimer Lots of stuff + 30' talk = Fasten your Seatbelts!
5 Introduction 5
6 IPv6 security tools It is hard to assess networks and devices without tools What would happen if I sent this or that packet to this device? For ages, THC-IPv6 was the only IPv6 security tools publicly available Mostly focused on specific vulnerabilities We felt the need for a general IPv6 toolkit
7 SI6 Networks' IPv6 Toolkit: Intro Brief history: Produced as part of a project funded by UK CPNI on IPv6 security Maintenance and extension taken over by SI6 Networks Goals: Security analysis and trouble-shooting of IPv6 networks and implementations Clean, portable, and secure code Good documentation
8 SI6 Networks' IPv6 Toolkit: Intro (II) Supported OSes: Linux, FreeBSD, NetBSD, OpenBSD, and Mac OS License: GPL (free software) Home: Collaborative development:
9 SI6 Networks' IPv6 Toolkit: Philosophy IDEAS TOOLS ipv6 NETWORK an interface between your brain and your IPv6 network Some find this is NOT a useful approach, though!
10 SI6 Networks' IPv6 toolkit: Tools addr6: An IPv6 address analysis tool scan6: An IPv6 address scanner path6: A versatile IPv6-based traceroute frag6: Play with IPv6 fragments tcp6: Play with IPv6-based TCP segments ns6: Play with Neighbor Solicitation messages na6: Play with Neighbor Advertisement messages
11 SI6 Networks' IPv6 toolkit: Tools (II) rs6: Play with Router Solicitation messages ra6: Play with Router Advertisement messages rd6: Play with Redirect messages icmp6: Play with ICMPv6 error messages ni6: Play with Node Information messages flow6: Play with the IPv6 Flow Label jumbo6: Play with IPv6 Jumbograms
12 Some general notes on the tools 12
13 Modes of operation Active mode: Fire packets regardless of what is being received Listening mode: Listen to packets and respond with crafted packets If both modes are selected, Active mode goes first Then the tool enters listening mode
14 More about active mode --loop specifies that the active attack must be repeated indefinitely --sleep specifies the amount of time (in secs) to sleep between iterations Some tools support a --rate-limit option
15 More about listening mode Most tools support filters for the captured packets: Link-layer Address(es) IPv6 Address(es) Tool-specific filters (e.g., ND Target Address) Filters can be: accept filters : MUST match block filters : MUST NOT match Example: --accept-src fc00::1/64 --block-link-src 00:11:22:33.44:55
16 Support for Extension Headers All tools support use of: Destination Options Header Hop-by-Hop Options Header Fragment Header Extension headers can be combined (somewhat) arbitrarily e.g. to make the IPv6 header chain span multiple fragments
17 Neighbor Discovery tools 17
18 Overview Tools: ns6 na6 rs6 ra6 rd6 Can perform: Neighbor Cache poisoning attacks a plethora of DoS attacks
19 Example #1: DAD-based DoS attack Example (DAD-based DoS attack):: # na6 -i wlan0 -b ::/128 -c -o -L -vv interface accept filter flags listening mode be very verbose
20 Example #2: RA-Guard evasion Example (DAD-based DoS attack) interface PIO Dest Opt Hdr Dest Opt Hdr # ra6 -i wlan0 -P fc00:1::/64#la -u u 100 -y 160 Frag Hdr
21 Playing with IPv6 fragments 21
22 Overview (frag6 tool) Can assess IPv6 fragmentation-related issues: Support for IPv6 atomic fragments Assess the Fragment ID generation policy Assess the fragment reassembly policy Stress nodes with fragments
23 Example #1: Frag. Reassembly policy When fragments overlap, a node may: Use the first copy of the data, Use the second copy of the data, or, Discard duplicate fragments Example: # frag6 -i eth0 -v --frag-reass-policy -d fc00:1::1
24 Example #2: Frag ID generation policy Nodes typically generate the Frag ID as: a global counter initialized to 0, a per-destination counter initialized to 0, a per-destination counter initialized to a random value, or, a random value Predictable Frag IDs have well-known security implications Example: # frag6 --frag-id-policy -d fc00:1::1 -v
25 Example #3: Flooding with fragments Some nodes may have poor management of the fragment reassembly queue Example: # frag6 -s ::/0 F 100 -l -z 5 -d fc00:1::1 -v Rand. Src Addr from 0::/ Frags at a time loop Sleep 5 secs.
26 Playing with ICMPv6 errors 26
27 Overview (icmp6 tool) Can generate arbitrary ICMPv6 errors: Smart generation based on received packet, or, Generation based on specified parameters Example (generate ICMPv6 PTB): # icmp6 -i wlan0 -L -p TCP -E -v interface listening mode capture TCP packets ICMPv6 PTB be verbose
28 Playing with TCP segments 28
29 Overview For a long time there was not even a IPv6-based SYN flooder Even IPv4-based TCP tools were rather scarce and primitive tcp6 can: Perform SYN floods Flood with connections in virtually any state Perform TCP probing Perform some smart scans (buffer exhaustion, closed windows, etc.)
30 Example #1: Buffer/connection DoS The effect of this attack is two-fold: Lots of TCP connections with no controlling process Lots of queued data for such connections Example: Target Listen # tcp6 -d fc00:1::1 -a 80 -L -s fc00:1::/112 --flood-ports 10 -l -r 100pps --data "GET / HTTP/1.0\r\n\r\n" --close-mode last-ack Source Flood HTTP Req. Conn. state
31 Scanning IPv6 networks 31
32 Overview IPv6 host scanning deemed unfeasible for a long time -> But it is not! scan6 can leverage IPv6 address patterns: Traditional SLAAC address (embedded MAC address) Port-based addresses Virtual machines Low-byte-addresses etc. You should read draft-ietf-opsec-ipv6-host-scanning
33 Example Scan a network for port-based addresses # scan6 -d PREFIX/64 --tgt-port
34 Analyzing IPv6 addresses 34
35 Overview There are different address types and scopes There are different IID generation schemes At times they are not that easy to spot Our addr6 tool is your friend here
36 Example #1: Analyzing IPv6 Addresses The addr6 tool can analyze IPv6 addresses Example: $ addr6 -a ADDRESS Format: type=subtype=scope=iid_type=iid_subtype Example: $ addr6 -a fc00::1 unicast=unique-local=global=lowbyte=unspecified
37 Example #2: IPv6 address stats $ cat addresses.txt addr6 -i -s
38 (Rather uninteresting) tools 38
39 (Rather uninteresting) tools jumbo6 flow6 ni6 Checks for support of IPv6 jumbogams Assesses the Flow Label generation policy Same as ping6 -N in Linux, but with more options
40 IPv6 Toolkit v1.6 in Troopers! 40
41 A versatile traceroute tool (new in SI6 ipv6 Toolkit v1.6!) 41
42 Overview (path6 tool) No existing traceroute tool supports IPv6 extension headers We needed to measure packet drops resulting from IPv6 EHs Hence we produced our path6 tool Supports IPv6 Extension Headers Can employ TCP, UDP, or ICMPv6 probes It's faster ;-) Example: # path6 -u 100 -d fc00:1::1 Dst Opt Hdr
43 Questions? 43
44 Thank you's Troopers 14 crew, for taking care of all details!
45 Thanks! Fernando SI6 Networks
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