Private security companies in anti-piracy operations

Transcription

1 Marievej Vedbaek Denmark Private security companies in anti-piracy operations Tel: Fax: Nis Leerskov Mathiesen, Chief analyst, Risk Intelligence Piracy off Somalia has increased significantly since 2008, both in terms of frequency and severity. The ensuing surge of private security company (PSC) operations off the country has spurred a natural interest in International Relations (IR) circles. The privatisation of security in this specific realm is once again a good pretext for examining issues such as deterioration of the state monopoly on violence, construction of risk and legal challenges of armed private citizens on the high seas. Parallel to examination in academic journals and conferences, a similar discussion is taking place in the shipping business as well as the smaller circle of private security companies. This discussion, however, most often deals with the practical implications of the structural and legal complications. This paper will subdivide PSCs into three categories based on the tasks they do, relay some of the current discussion on armed security providers in maritime circles and suggest that understanding the difference in tasks will nuance the understanding of how PSCs compliment and possibly compete with the State in providing security for the maritime business. Along the way, a presentation of Risk Intelligence offers some insight into the scope of security-related tasks that private actors deal with. Tasks and organisations What many current academic articles on the subject seem to overlook, is that Private Security Companies do not all do the same job; there is a distinct division in what types of tasks they solve. This is a difference that has been noted in studies of more traditional PSCs (such as with Singer in Corporate Warriors, 2003), but I would identify three distinct tasks related to maritime security: Security intelligence analysis and risk advisory services (security intelligence companies) Security services, including armed guards (security providers) Hijack and hostage negotiations (response consultants) Some companies like Control Risks Group and ArmorGroup - deal in all three areas, while others only take up one type of work. Nis Leerskov Mathiesen holds a Cand.Mag in Rhetoric from the University of Copenhagen and a MA in Intelligence and International Security from King s College London. As Chief analyst, he primarily deal with coordination and analysis in Risk Intelligence s maritime threat monitor MaRisk. 1

2 Private intelligence companies count our company Risk Intelligence and companies such as Grey Page International, Bergen Risk Solutions, Exclusive Analysis and Dryad Maritime. The private intelligence companies are typically focusing on providing services prior to a transit or operation in a high-risk area. This includes intelligence gathering, white and grey open source monitoring, vulnerability- and risk assessment. These services aim at both the strategic level as well as the operational levels of a company, ranging from advice on business ventures in high risk areas and advice to insurers in order to fix premiums to tactical incident alerts for masters served directly on electronic sea charts (ECDISS). About Risk Intelligence Risk Intelligence is a Danish-based maritime security intelligence company. It deals with all threats to maritime operations and the current flagship service is MaRisk, an online threat monitor. Furthermore, Risk Intelligence has a consultancy branch that provides specific advice to customers on threat, vulnerability and contingency planning. Risk Intelligence has customers mainly among shipping and offshore, oil and gas, companies but also insurance companies, trade organisations, navies, other military organisations and governments. Apart from a continuous reporting on day-to-day maritime incidents such as piracy, robbery, cargo theft, stowaways and fraud, Risk Intelligence also provides country threat assessments and in-depth analyses in MaRisk. In this way, customers are able to access both analysis on highattention issues such as Somali piracy as well as topics that might be over-the-horizon for commercial operations, such as the rampant maritime robbery and kidnapping in the Sundarbans region of Bangladesh, Indian port security reforms and the creeping proliferation of maritime incidents off Cameroon. One of the tenets in Risk Intelligence is to combine practitioners and academics, acknowledging that the best result is often found in the synergy of the two. Thus, the globally based staff of Risk Intelligence is typically made up of Ph.ds in area- or military studies as well as former naval or intelligence officers. Risk Intelligence is solely focusing on preventive intelligence and consultancy. This also means that the company does not provide security services. Risk Intelligence, however, does provide its customers with guidance on selecting unarmed and armed guard services when a risk assessment has left that as the most viable option (see box below). 2

3 Security providers, companies that provide guards, include the likes of Drum Cussac, HART, MAST, Muse, PVI, Salama Fikira and Gulf of Aden Group Transits (GoAGT). These services are often called upon during transit or operation in a high risk area. Private security providers are the recent poster-children of private maritime security, as this type of PSC has had the most visible growth during the upsurge of maritime security awareness. Several new companies have been formed in this area since 2008 and many existing PSCs have refocused on maritime security. These companies offer guard services and accompanying hardening on actual transits through or operations in high risk areas. Following, they have attracted criticism from within and outside the maritime (security) industry, companies being blamed for having reckless cowboy mentalities and lacking the necessary skills. It is interesting to note, that in trying to avoid this negative labelling and accommodate the industry body warnings about armed guards at the time, a host of the newly formed PSCs were focusing on unarmed guards. They were implying that these teams had the defensive qualities of an armed team, by substituting weapons with sonic devises such as the LRAD. The general inherent inadequacy of this approach, when dealing with Somali piracy, was highlighted during the BISCAGLIA incident in November Unarmed guards from the private company APMSS (later reformed as GoAGT and the Merchant Maritime Warfare Centre) had to jump overboard from a vessel that had been hijacked with relative ease by pirates, as their concept of defence and single LRAD - had proven inadequate. Since then, the promotion of unarmed guards have faded significantly from the security providers offerings while the armed option has reluctantly but increasingly been adopted by industry and individual shipping lines. This is not necessarily to say that unarmed teams are useless, rather they pose a much greater conceptual challenge, which makes it a less attractive endeavour for some of the newly formed, lower quality security providers. Unarmed solutions these days can consist of bridge advisors, who advise the master before and during the transit, train the crew in basic anti-piracy procedures and assist in planning and deploying the vessel s passive defence measures. Excerpts of Risk Intelligence s guidelines for vetting of security providers Comment: In this list, the questions are designed to focus on competency and training issues with the security company in question, not so much on legal issues. An example of a legal focus can be found in a recent (September 2010) Dryad questionnaire. General considerations Is the security provider certified or otherwise accredited in its home country? If so, for which services? Is the company accredited, or does it possess valid permits, for transferring and/or carrying arms on vessels of the flag state (if applicable), in the country of embarkation/disembarkation or in the coastal states that may be passed or in whose EEZ operations may take place? 3

4 If restrictions for armed private security exist for the operation, is there a verifiable relationship with local law-enforcement or military? Have legal implications including liability, detention risks and flag/crew state legal positions? Contractor s bid/offer Is the proposed interaction of different elements of defensive concept (including passive defences) explained? Has the adverse impact of customer s operational requirements on proposed security measures been identified, described and contingencies provided? Are rules of engagement (ROEs) explicitly explained and not just referenced to (e.g. voluntary principles) Armed team considerations Are on-board roles and responsibilities of team members clearly described? Shipboard etiquette understood by armed team, including acceptance of master s authority? Are safety considerations clearly understood and is an effort made to reconcile safety/security conflicts? The last and least publicised type of task in the maritime security realm is hostage negotiators or response consultants. Companies like AON, BGN Risk, Clayton, Control Risk Group, ASI and Armor Group are called upon after a ship has been hijacked or individual crewmembers been kidnapped, the distinct results of Somali and Nigerian maritime security incidents. Most of these companies have experiences in other hostage hot spots of the world, such as Mexico or Colombia. They have made the transition into Somali hijacking negotiations partly per customer demand, as an increasing number of companies sought their help during Typically the response consultants deal with a hijacking situation from the very start, until after the ransom money has been delivered and the vessel or crew has been brought to safety. They often draw on security providers and intelligence companies along the way in support of e.g. a ransom drop or negotiation strategies. In comparison to the two other types of maritime security tasks, these companies rarely do much to advertise their services. Increasingly they are tied close or even owned by the large insurers, who also provide maritime policies. Following, certain insurers will suggest certain response consultants, although you are most often free to choose. 4

5 Why the distinction? It is important to distinguish between these three tasks and the companies that carry them out, as their operations have different implications for the discussion of technical, legal and ethical issues. The most obvious challenge, in an IR perspective, is that of legality and sovereignty when dealing with armed security providers. This discussion is being mirrored in the maritime industry, where both providers and consumers of security are scrambling to find a practical solution to fit around the many lacunas in international and domestic laws on carrying armed guards aboard ships. In some articles, PSCs have been portrayed as subversive entities, disregarding or bending all legislation to scoop up business in troubled waters. But as most of these companies are working for legitimate and transnational shipping-lines (that in turn often have government contracts and are subject to the law of each flag state of their vessels), disregarding domestic and international laws is a very short sighted business decision. One that will alienate customers and can incriminate the security staff who are reliant on clearances and criminal records to do their jobs. That said, the cowboyish reputation of some newcomers to the maritime security business is not fully undeserved. As an example, the US telecommunication company Tyco sued two security providers in 2009 for failing to adequately secure their vulnerable cable-laying vessel during operations off East Africa. The two companies one US and one Serbian had not secured import/export licenses for weapons for their guards, nor had they been able to provide a suitable escort vessel, at one point trying to subcontract an Iranian vessel (which would have been a breach of the US embargo on Iran). Examples like this have led to an ongoing discussion of vetting and certification of security providers, even for a call for international certification of maritime security companies. To be fair, some shipping companies have doubtable standards themselves for these types of operations and will employ sub-standard armed teams only to satisfy some owner, charterer or insurance requirements. Although many of the private security providers work diligently not to bring their clients in distress by bungling domestic and international laws, the practical search for workable solutions is arguably contributing to the perceived changes of the traditional security vestiges of the State. An example could be when Yemen, Tanzania, Nigeria and other African states hire their navies out to private companies, to act as escort and protection for individual vessels. Whether this is seen as an undermining or a welcome influx of cash and experience to a country s maritime security establishment is probably very dependent on the individual country and what school of thought one subscribes to. The motor of the private side of this dilemma is the difference between individual risk and collective risk. Companies with vulnerable operations (i.e. offshore, tugs, chemical tankers) have a desire to seek the best protection available on a case-by-case basis, based on the potential outcome of a successful attack. Other companies with less vulnerable operations (container shipping, car carriers) will see no need to utilise this protection. Companies that in this way draw on a national navy know very well that it will not mitigate the collective risk in any immediate way - just like an armed team aboard a vessel in the Gulf of Aden does not protect other ships in the 1,000 NM long corridor or tackle poverty in Puntland. But since it does not make sense to apply a general risk assessment across all companies operations, a simple cost-benefit analysis can make this option very attractive for those with vulnerable, high-value operations that needs a solution right away. 5

6 The two other tasks of maritime PSCs risk intelligence and response consultancy are less eyecatching in regards to an IR discussion. Their operations hold a number of interesting challenges for the IR community, albeit they are sometimes more discrete than the visible gun-wielding of the security providers. Moreover, there is a tendency that governments and industry bodies rely on these providers to supplement state capabilities, in a way that is often overlooked in the academic discussion. Lastly, specifically the intelligence providers often have an interaction with the academic world in the area- and security studies cross pollinating academic studies while gaining industry-relevant information. This interaction is not so pronounced within the IR circle, and that is perhaps why it is somewhat overlooked here. The more subtle interactions of intelligence and response consultancy with state actors could warrant studies of their own. The hope of this article is to have introduced the distinction between various types of PSCs to qualify the discussion on private companies roles in the maritime security work, as it will be a constant, alongside the threat of Somali piracy, in the coming years. 6