U.S. MANNED SPACE POLICY IN THE POST APOLLO ERA,

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1 U.S. MANNED SPACE POLICY IN THE POST APOLLO ERA, By Michael P. O Hara SPST300I001 Introduction to Space Studies Professor Katie Berryhill August 30, 2009

2 U.S. MANNED SPACE POLICY IN THE POST APOLLO ERA Since the early days of the space age there have been conflicting messages around what should be the use and purpose of space (Brzezinski 2007, 81). With the first successful launch of a German V-2 rocket on October 3, 1942, the space age was officially born, but not as a means to satisfy scientific pursuits, but born of war time needs. It is impossible to look at a segment of space policy without viewing in context the activities, politics, and personalities that converged at a point in history that would ultimately give rise to great successes in space exploration and great tragedies. It would be that very timing of events since that launch of the V-2 that would initially force development of a set of policies and strategies driven by political desires. It can be argued that United States Space Policy has been hampered by political and social influences more than technical constraints over the fifty-year history of the program. It was post World War I policies limiting German offensive weapons that led to the development of rockets as a strategic capability, but the architects of these weapons dreamed of greater uses of space. The end of World War II and the spread of German rocket technology, along with the talent, marked the beginning of the global quest for space driven by two large rivals. It would be the actions of one of those rivals, the Soviet Union, that would force America s hand in space and lead to a dramatic policy change. The current state of America s space program is the culmination of actions leading up to the Apollo moon landing and the strategies laid in place for a post-apollo program. These events would result in a program that would founder for decades from the last moon landing up until the Space Shuttle Columbia accident in That accident would force a strategic change in direction for the space program, but would find lukewarm political and public support. U.S. Space Policy in the Post Apollo Era O Hara

3 Post World War II Space Policy The war in Europe ended with the surrender of Germany on May 8, It was at that point a new race had begun: The race to divide the intellectual capital of the Third Reich, including its top rocket scientists and their advanced technology. It was widely believed that the Germans had acquired a twenty-year lead over both the United States and the Soviet Union (Cadbury 2007, 17). Both the Soviets and the U.S. sought the services of top German rocket expert Wernher Von Braun to gain a lead over their rival, but the U.S. was at a particular disadvantage since it did not possess at the time a top rocketry expert. The Soviet s had Sergei Korolev, while the U.S. program had failed to develop a depth of talent that could manage and understand the technology captured at the end of the war. America would win the war and the battle for top German rocket talent when Von Braun and his team surrendered to the U.S. troops. Of the 4300 personnel that work at Peenemunde, only about 150 would remain at war s end and join the American forces (Piszkiewicz 1995, 210). The end of the war revealed the true atrocities that occurred under Adolph Hitler. As such, the V-2 and the German rocket team were products of Nazism that would initially impact U.S. Space Policy. The U.S. had won the war by overwhelming brute force against forces that were superior in technology, but where their use of that technology was still in its infancy. The U.S. saw the importance of rocket technology, but did not see the urgency in developing these weapons. Von Braun and the German rocket team would languish in virtual obscurity for their first five years confined to Fort Bliss, Texas, with minimal privileges (Brzezinski 2007, 84-85). The U.S. lack of urgency in developing rockets was due largely to their strength in other elements of war. Long ranger bombers, it was believed, were more reliable and fail-safe than U.S. Space Policy in the Post Apollo Era O Hara

4 missiles and rockets. Internal conflict between branches of the Armed Services diluted progress as various units competed for resources. The Soviets faced a different dilemma when it came to space technology: The lack of a long range bomber, and the fear that America could use the same force against them that defeated Germany (Lambakis 2001, 10-12). It was to be those key factors that would create in the Soviets the urgency that America lacked towards the use of space. The Soviets needed the ability to deliver a force of attack to an enemy thousands of miles away and they saw rocket technology as the way to nullify America s superior numbers. Eisenhower and NASA By the end of Dwight Eisenhower s presidency, he would become the first American President of the modern space age, responsible for the creation of NASA, the U.S. space agency charged with civilian space initiatives, but his beginning involvement in space was tentative. In the post World War II and Korean War era, Eisenhower was content to rely on America s bomber advantage and the fact that overseas bases were well within range of Soviet targets (Brzezinski 2007, 52-53). His programs were focused domestically on building the interstate highway system, which was modeled after the German Autobahn, schools, and power plants. In 1954, the Von Braun team had already developed the Redstone rocket sufficiently to put a satellite into orbit. They requested $100,000 in funding to achieve the task, but were denied (Brzezinski 2007, 92). The denial of this request illustrated the unwillingness to commit to ventures in space. It wasn t until intelligence reports indicated that the U.S. was in grave danger of falling permanently behind the Soviets in missile and rocket technology did the budget for development increase. The increase was still well below what was deemed necessary to close the gap, but with an election year looming in 1956, Eisenhower did not want to be portrayed as soft U.S. Space Policy in the Post Apollo Era O Hara

5 on national defense (Brzezinski 2007, 53). The October Surprise of 1957, with the launch of Sputnik, shocked the public into believing that America had lost the battle for space. Eisenhower dismissed Sputnik as one small ball in the air. The Commander-in-Chief that once led the forces to victory in Europe was unable to win the battle of public opinion. American s reaction to Sputnik struck a fear that he was unable to control or minimize (Brzezinski 2007, 53). Those fears would mark the beginning of a race to overtake the Soviets in space technology that would last another decade. The Eisenhower presidency would leave two legacies that laid the foundation for America s space policies: His agreement to participate in the International Geophysical Year and acceptance that during that event, the member nations should focus on putting a satellite in orbit. This would help validate his belief in a Freedom of Space policy where nations controlled their airspace, but were free to roam in outer space without violating another nation s territorial rights (Lambakis 2001, 215). Originally, Eisenhower sought much tougher restrictions on the use of space, including international control over launch systems and that would have included prelaunch inspections of launch vehicles and payloads (Lambakis 2001, 214). Spuntik s preemptive launch and overflight of the U.S. solved that dilemma for Eisenhower and cleared the way for the 1958 Preliminary Policy on Outer Space and eventually, the January 1960 U.S. Policy on Outer Space. Both of these which allowed for free transit of space vehicles, provided that they did not interfere with legitimate actives or cause harm, injury, or damage (Lambakis 2001, 215). Eisenhower struggled with how to consolidate the sprawling efforts of the fledgling U.S. space program (Logsdon, web). Initially, he sought to combine all efforts under the umbrella of the Department of Defense. It was at the urging of his science advisor and then Vice President U.S. Space Policy in the Post Apollo Era O Hara

6 Richard Nixon, that he was persuaded to create a separate non-defense agency (Logsdon, web). The creation of NASA, through the National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958, handed U.S. space policy and the direction of America s space initiatives into civilian hands. While the move was designed to largely emphasize the civilian and peaceful uses of space and de-emphasize the military use of space at least in the public s eye, Eisenhower was beginning to understand the use of space for reconnaissance. This was a change from Eisenhower s Space for Peace proposal where he openly lobbied for a ban on the military use of space (Lambakis 2001, 214). Only due to the Soviet Union s unwillingness to adopt a similar view on the use of space and the increasing frequency of launches, did the U.S. finally adopt strategies that in principle where focused on scientific and peaceful uses of space, but did not ban military use of space. During the late stages of his administration, Eisenhower shifted his focus to classified reconnaissance satellites (Logsdon, web), The soldier who became President still clung to a belief that war was strategies, tactics, a battle for the last man standing, and better intelligence that gave the infantrymen a better chance at winning (Brzezinski 2007, 81). In the waning months of his presidency, he learned of NASA s long range plans to send humans to the moon. Eisenhower s initial fear with creating NASA was that it would be another government bureaucracy that would grow out of control and compete for scarce government resources. When he learned of what NASA had planned, he opposed the idea on the grounds that it could not be justified. Amid the conflict and turmoil of the late 50 s around the use of space that led to the creation of NASA, by Inauguration Day, 1961, it was an agency without a clear strategy for what it wanted to achieve (Logsdon, web). U.S. Space Policy in the Post Apollo Era O Hara

7 Cold War Space Policy It would be a young, new President and a string of Soviet successes in space that would ignite a rivalry between nations for leadership in space. Slowly, the weapons of wars were being used not just as delivery vehicles for warheads, but to launch living creatures, starting with dogs followed by chimps, then eventually, humans into space. The natural evolution of progressing from unmanned launch vehicles to manned launch vehicles was progressing rapidly. Less than three months into the Kennedy presidency on April 12, 1961, the Soviet s launched Yuri Gargarin into earth orbit. The U.S. had the capability to launch the first man in space on a suborbital flight prior to Gargarin s launch, but the Von Braun team opted for additional testing. Von Braun actions and timing would once again be pivotal in how U.S. space policy would change. Initially, Von Braun could have launched the first satellite three years ahead of the Soviets and created his own October Surprise, but he was denied. This time it was his attention to detail and insistence on safety that caused Alan Shepard s flight to be delayed, opening the door for the Soviets to claim another victory in space (Cadbury 2007, ). The Soviet launch of a man in space once again played into the hands of a public who saw communism as a threat to the American way of life and their highly visible achievements in space as validation of that threat. Kennedy would order an immediate review of U.S. space activities to identify a space program which promises dramatic results in which we could win (Logsdon, web). The report concluded with Von Braun telling Vice President Lyndon Johnson that with a crash program, a moon landing could be achieved in the timeframe. Just twenty days after Alan Shepard became the first American in space on May 5, 1961, and with only 15 minutes of American manned activity in space, President John F. Kennedy in an address to a joint session of Congress announced that before this decade is out, this nation U.S. Space Policy in the Post Apollo Era O Hara

8 should commit itself to achieving the goal of landing a man on the moon and returning him safely to the earth (Logdson, web). Kennedy would make several gestures towards the Soviets in an attempt to use space to defuse international tensions between the two nations. In a June, 1961 meeting with Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev, he asked Why don t we do this together? (Logdson, web). The Soviet Premier refused on the ground that disarmament should be a higher priority. Two months before his assassination on September 20, 1963, Kennedy addressed the United Nations, once again pitching international cooperation in space and in particular a joint international venture to the moon. At that point, it had become too late to reverse his statement to Congress in May of His clear and definitive targets that he set for the U.S. had the space race well underway. With the ouster of Nikita Khrushchev and the ascension of Leonid Brezhnev, the Cold War between the U.S. and the Soviets entered a new phase where cooperation would not be an option. Aggressive Goals and Unlimited Resources American space policy in the sixties was dominated by Kennedy s goal to land a man on the moon. What Eisenhower feared NASA would become had materialized. NASA became a large sprawling agency dedicated towards advancing human spaceflight. Almost immediately after Kennedy s speech committing America to the moon, NASA received an 89% increase in their budget, followed by an additional 101% the following year (Logsdon, web). For the remainder of the decade, NASA would have a clear vision for its objectives in space with virtually an unlimited budget and political support to accomplish those goals. Despite the overtures by Kennedy early in his presidency and late in his presidency to seek international cooperation for a moon venture, Kennedy s driver for space was all about beating the Russians (Logsdon, web). U.S. Space Policy in the Post Apollo Era O Hara

9 Until 2001, most thought Kennedy to be a progressive visionary when it came to moving America forward in space. It was his ambitious goal that propelled humans beyond earth orbit and to the surface of the moon. NASA Administrator James Webb had argued that such a goal put America at risk, given such a concrete and aggressive objective, it almost certainly could not be accomplished without failure or a loss of life. Webb would argue for a broader set of objective in manned space activities, but Kennedy would have no part of it. He told Webb in no uncertain terms that This is, whether we like it or not, a race. He would go on to say that everything we do in space ought to be tied to getting to the moon ahead of the Russians and that winning the moon race is the top priority of the agency and except for defense, the top priority of the United States Government. Otherwise, we shouldn t be spending this kind of money, because I m not that interested in space (Logdson, web). That conversation occurred between Webb and Kennedy in a recorded White House meeting in November of The recording released by the Kennedy Library in 2001 dispelled the myth of Kennedy being a visionary that architected a sustainable plan for America s role in space. History now records that Kennedy s goal was based purely on his competitive nature and the political climate between rivals brought on by early Russian successes in space, a concerned public, and an increase in Cold War tensions caused by a change in Soviet leadership and the escalating conflict in Vietnam. The Perfect Storm As early as 1963, public fatigue had already begun to set in with the space program (Cadbury 2007, 275). In his final days as President, Kennedy had visited Cape Canaveral in the hope that his visibility would rekindle public interest in space. Days later while in Dallas, Kennedy was assassinated and with his death on November 22, 1963, the goal of reaching the U.S. Space Policy in the Post Apollo Era O Hara

10 moon did not end, but provided the resurgence in public interest he had sought. Just six days after his death while the nation still mourned its fallen leader, President Lyndon Johnson addressed the nation and announced that the Florida space complex would forever bear Kennedy s name (Logdson, web). A perfect storm had begun to brew in America s space policy even before the moon landing had taken place. As a tribute to the fallen Kennedy, Johnson would continue support for the space program, but Johnson became increasingly mired in political events at home and abroad. Civil unrest, the spread of communism, the Iron Curtain in Europe, and his own personal agenda to use his presidency to create a vast set of social programs he called the Great Society all deflected his focus from what would happen after the goal of reaching the moon had been achieved. From his experience in the Senate, Johnson knew that the budgets set out for the space program were not realistic beyond achieving the goal of landing on the moon. There were too many other needs and once the goal was achieved, continued funding for NASA at the present level would not find political support (Cadbury 2007, 275). Searching for a Post-Apollo Strategy While Johnson had remained firmly committed to a moon landing before the end of the decade and never wavered in his support, the handwriting for what a post-apollo NASA would look like began to emerge. As the final hardware had been bought and paid for, NASA s funding began to drop ahead of the moon landing. In what would be a foretelling statement of the future of NASA, Johnson told astronaut Wally Schirra on a visit to the New Orleans assembly plant for the Saturn V that It s too bad. We have this great capability, but instead of taking advantage of it, we ll probably just piss it away (Logsdon, web). Johnson would leave office in January, 1969, prior to the fulfillment of Kennedy s goal, but with the finish line clearly in sight. Johnson U.S. Space Policy in the Post Apollo Era O Hara

11 would hand over to incoming President Richard Nixon the honor of being in office while NASA, the agency Nixon advocated for eleven years earlier, would reach its zenith with the landing on the moon in July, Nixon would also inherit an agency that failed to recognize the changing political climate in America. Johnson had left NASA adrift for the first time since Kennedy s speech to Congress in May of NASA would undergo a change in administration, but would do so without a political backing for its future from the outgoing President and the public. NASA had laid out it vision for its next goals after Apollo in the Report of the Space Task Group, The report labeled Apollo 11 as a beginning to the long term exploration and use of space by man (NASA 1969, web). The report cautiously painted a vision for landing men on Mars by It suggested that the Apollo program was a set of foundational elements upon which to build larger exploration goals. However, the report contained elements that appeared to be contradictory to achieving these goals. There are elements in the report of both hubris and humbleness by NASA. On one hand, they acknowledged the public and political concerns about the budget, but then stated goals that would continue Apollo-like funding to achieve a Mars landing. The report also acknowledged, but readily admitted that the benefits of space exploration could not be precisely determined (NASA 1969, web). During the sixties, NASA had accustomed itself to a mindset of achieving impossible goals with strong political backing and virtually unlimited funding. With the new President would come a readjustment from goal oriented policy to an expense oriented strategy (Logsdon, web). Nixon s Lasting Effect on Space Policy With sufficient hardware bought and paid for by the taxpayers that would have sustained the Apollo program three additional flights beyond Apollo 17, Richard Nixon brought an end to NASA s golden era of space exploration by cancelling the moon landing program in He U.S. Space Policy in the Post Apollo Era O Hara

12 agreed to finish scheduled flights through 1972, but declared in a March, 1970 speech that the U.S. would continue space exploration, but do it with an unmanned program (Lambakis 2001, 224). Nixon had rejected the proposals laid out by the Space Task Group Report of 1969 chaired by his Vice President Spiro Agnew (Jenkins 2008, 99). The report had laid out three objectives: 1. An $8b-$10b per year program to reach Mars, but also included both an Earth-orbit and lunar orbiting outpost. The Earth orbiting outpost capable of supporting a crew of 50 that would have been served by a reusable space shuttle. 2. An $8b per year program that dropped the Mars landing, but included a shuttle and the Earth and lunar orbit space stations. 3. A $5b per year program that included the shuttle and a earth orbit space station. As Vice President under Eisenhower, Nixon had fought for a strong space organization, but as President, he ignored his own Vice President s advice to continue with a manned program to Mars (Lambakis 2001, 224). During this time, NASA had continued to rework a proposal that would be palpable to both the President and the Congress. NASA had been studying the concept of a fully reusable shuttle craft for over a decade and a new NASA Administrator James C. Fletcher was determined to find the right formula to gain approval for the program (Jenkins 2008, 99). The new approach would involve including the Department of Defense as both a customer and operator of the space shuttle. Continuation of the manned space program now came down to being able to show that the shuttle was the most economical option to reach space. In May of 1971, the White House Budget Office informed NASA that it had an absolute budget ceiling of $3.2b to conduct all operations (Jenkins 2008, 139). This once again forced a redesign of the proposed space shuttle. The resulting design would continue to downsize the capabilities of the vehicle and make the full stack only semi-reusable. With reduced capability, increased U.S. Space Policy in the Post Apollo Era O Hara

13 safety risks, a demanding flight schedule and turnaround time, lesser operating costs and lower startup costs, the shuttle program was able to finally meet the approval of Richard Nixon (Jenkins 2008, 171). On January 5, 1972, President Richard Nixon announced the new era of space exploration The Space Transportation System. In his announcement, Nixon touted the benefits of the new system categorizing it as taking the astronomical costs out of aeronautics (Nixon 1972, web). Nixon went on to add that the space shuttle would make space flight routine, provide access to space for non-astronauts, and provide America with a real working presence in space. Focusing on the economics of the space shuttle, Nixon commented that because this new system will be recovered and used again and again, up to 100 times, the resulting economies may bring operating costs down as low as one-tenth of those present launch vehicles (Nixon 1972, web). Aftermath Few could have seen that the decision made on that day in 1972 would have such a lasting impact on the U.S. manned space program. The shuttle program finally flew on April 12, 1981 on what was NASA s first crewed flight of a vehicle on its maiden voyage. At the time of its initial flight, the space shuttle was the most complex machine humans had ever built (Jenkins 259). The space shuttle itself had over two and a half million moving parts, 230 miles of wire, 1,060 plumbing valves and connections, 1,440 circuit breakers, and 27,000 insulating tiles (Dismukes 2009, web). The space shuttle would become a machine so complex and so little understood that it would take two tragedies and the loss of fourteen astronauts before its operational mechanics could be understood. Since the initial moon landing, America had been grounded between the end of Apollo and Skylab, between the Apollo-Soyuz Test Program and U.S. Space Policy in the Post Apollo Era O Hara

14 the Space Shuttle maiden flight, following the Challenger accident, and following the Columbia accident. In the forty years since the moon landing, America s failure to create a sustainable vision and purpose for manned space exploration had caused gaps in the program. Starting with the end of the Apollo program through today, America has been without the ability to launch a human into space thirty-one percent of the time. The total gap amounts to 11 ¼ years of the 36 since Apollo 17 in December U.S. Manned Spaceflight Gap Program Gap Months Reason January Projected gap between Space Shuttle and Ares I launch. February 2003 July Columbia Accident January 1986 September 34 Challenger Accident 1988 July 1975 April Apollo-Soyuz Maiden Flight of the Space Shuttle February 1974 July End of Skylab Apollo-Soyuz test Project December 1972 May End of Apollo First flight to Skylab During the period ending with the Apollo program, the Russian space program has continued uninterrupted due to a much narrower focus and continued production and refinement of existing rockets and capsules. U.S. Space Policy in the Post Apollo Era O Hara

15 Summary The current strategy for United States space exploration began shortly after the 1969 Apollo moon landing, but was heavily influenced by post World War II and Cold War politics. Prior to the moon landing America had a well planned space program built on a set of progressive strategies and goals centered on achieving a moon landing before the end of the decade. The program was built on a strategy of showing technical superiority and not with the goal of creating a sustainable space program leaving the program vulnerable to changing political winds. The political dynamics during the Eisenhower and Kennedy Administrations demonstrated how easily the space program could become a political pawn on a global stage. While Kennedy s challenge resulted in an enormous funding boost for NASA few within the agency were able to read that the moon landing was not the beginning of man s prolonged exploration of space, but rather a set objective at a particular point in time. The ascension of Richard Nixon to the Presidency in January, 1969, coincided with the moon landing later that year and would alter and set adrift U.S. manned space policy for decades. Ironically, the man that twelve years earlier fought for the creation of NASA would be the very same man that would cripple the program. The Nixon Presidency shows the enormous influence politics plays in the space program. NASA failed to understand that the commitment to landing on the moon was not an endorsement of a long term space program or strategy. It was merely an objective, a goal, with no promise of sustainability or growth beyond that achievement. Ultimately, Nixon would resign from office shortly into his second term in office, but his policies would set NASA adrift up until the second Space Shuttle accident involving Columbia that forced a new vision to be adopted. Through Presidents Ford, Reagan, Bush, Clinton, Bush and Obama the space program has survived but found it and its mission continually challenged. U.S. Space Policy in the Post Apollo Era O Hara

16 During the forty years since the moon landing, there have been numerous proposed strategies, commissions, and plans to revise the vision for space, including most recently former President George W. Bush s Vision for Space Exploration and President Obama s Augustine Commission. Some of those plans resurrected bold visions and renewed exploration to the moon and Mars, and all have sounded a familiar theme of an underfunded NASA with too many objectives to successfully achieve with limited manpower and resources. The U.S. space program has since its start faced challenges of mission and purpose. As an independent agency falling directly under the President, it has been subject to the political desires of the sitting President. Yet, after its greatest triumph, it would be one President s expense oriented space strategy that would last forty-years and would become nearly impossible to replace. In the end, it was not a brilliant strategy that NASA executed for the past forty years, but rather an expense strategy that no President since Nixon has been willing to or has successfully been able to break. The lack of political and public support has kept NASA and U.S. space policy operating on a minimal budget since the early seventies and without a clear direction and strategy. The space program was born of war, but came of age in an era marked by national rivalries and changing political and social winds. In its fifty year history NASA has yet to develop and execute its own vision for space exploration, but has been relegated to develop and operate systems that operate on the edge of risk and the lowest cost driven by external influences beyond its control. Those influences have had little to do with achieving exploration or scientific objectives in space, but have been political drivers that have left the program adrift for forty years. U.S. Space Policy in the Post Apollo Era O Hara

17 Bibliography Brzezinski, Matthew. Red Moon Rising: Sputnik and the Hidden Rivalries that Ignited the Space Age. New York: Henry Holt and Company, Cadbury, Deborah. Space Race: The Epic Battle Between America and the Soviet Union for Dominion of Space. New York: Harper, Dismukes, Kim. The 21st Century Space Shuttle. Washington, D.C.; NASA, 2009, accessed 11 September 2009, available from internet. Jenkins, Dennis. The Space Shuttle: The History of the National Transportation System. Florida: Dennis R. Jenkins, Lambakis, Steven. On the Edge of Earth: The Future of American Space Power. Kentucky: The University Press of Kentucky, Logsdon, John. Ten Presidents and NASA. Washington, D.C.:NASA, accessed 25 August 2009, available from internet. Nixon, Richard. The Statement by President Richard Nixon on the Space Shuttle. Washington, D.C.: NASA Historical Reference Collection, 1972, accessed 12 August 2009, available from internet. Piszkiewicz, Dennis. The NAZI Rocketeers: Dreams of Space and Crimes of War. Pennsylvania: Stackpole Books, The Post-Apollo Space Program: Directions for the Future. Washington, D.C.: NASA Historical Reference Collection, 1969, accessed 10 August 2009, available ; internet. U.S. Space Policy in the Post Apollo Era O Hara