LINKING HISTORY TO POLICY THE COLUMBIA ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION BOARD. John M. Logsdon Space Policy Ins6tute The George Washington University

Transcription

1 LINKING HISTORY TO POLICY THE COLUMBIA ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION BOARD John M. Logsdon Space Policy Ins6tute The George Washington University

2 WAYS OF LINKING HISTORY TO POLICY CHOICE Someone in the policy process becomes aware of an exis6ng historical study relevant to issue at hand Historian(s) outside of the policy process engage with that process Policy process includes individual(s) providing a historical perspec6ve

3 STS- 107 Mission Summary STS-107 was the 113 th mission in the Space Shuttle program and Columbia s 28 th trip into space STS-107 was a science mission forced on NASA by the scientific community and its allies in Congress STS-107 had 13 separate launch delays between January 2001 and January 2003 STS-107 was launched from Kennedy Space Center, Florida on January 16 th, 2003 for a 16 day research mission 82 seconds after launch, a piece of insulating foam from the external tank struck the left wing of the shuttle orbiter.

4 WHAT HAPPENED? On the morning of February 1 st, Columbia entered with unrecognized damage to lev wing RCC Panel 8; the mission managers had (wrongly) judged that the foam strike could not cause damage Superheated air entered the wheel well Temperature of air was ~3000 degree Fahrenheit; aluminum structure of wing melts at ~1200 degrees Obiter wing collapsed, Columbia went out of control and disintegrated, and seven crewmembers died of blunt force trauma. Columbia was 16 minutes from landing at Kennedy Space Center.

5 Debris Footprint Dallas Nacogdoches Miles

6 Columbia Accident Inves>ga>on Board (CAIB) NASA had a plan in place on how to respond to a shujle accident Most members of accident inves>ga>on board named by the posi>on they held E.g. Commander, Air Force Safety Center; Director, Office of Accident Inves>ga>on, FAA, etc. NASA Administrator chose chairman [Admiral Harold Gehman, USN (ret)] and a senior NASA member At its start, CAIB had eight members - Two senior engineers added in February - Three more members, including me, added in March

7 CAIB

8 WHY ME? Gehman and other CAIB members decided in February that the accident was probably not an anomalous, random event, but rather likely rooted in NASA s history and the human space flight culture. They wanted a CAIB member familiar with that history. A vote was taken among several candidates, and I was selected. I was sworn in as a special government employee to protect me from liability ac>ons This also meant I got paid! Although CAIB opera>ons were based in Houston, Gehman agreed I could work from Washington with trips to Houston and other loca>ons as needed.

9 NOT YOUR USUAL IVORY TOWER CAIB had access to its own airplane. My first trip was on March 24 to KSC CAIB was a large and intense opera>on 13 members supported by 200 staff and 400 NASA engineers There was con>nuing media scru>ny of CAIB ac>vi>es CAIB was not resource- limited; I discovered that could hire a staff to support my inves>ga>on

10 ORGANIZATION OF CAIB Group I Management and Treatment of Materials Group II Training, Opera>ons, and In- Flight Performance Group III Engineering and Technical Analysis Group IV Organiza>on and Policy (Logsdon, Sally Ride, ScoJ Hubbard) Independent Assessment Team

11 STAFF OF GROUP IV Roger Launius, Na>onal Air and Space Museum (part- >me consultant) W. Henry Lambright, Syracuse University (part- >me consultant) Howard McCurdy, American University (part- >me consultant) Dwayne Day, recent GW Ph.D. (inves>gator/senior research assistant - full >me in Houston, then in Washington) Dennis Jenkins, author of The Space Shu7le (full >me in Houston, then Washington; by late May, he had became an assistant to Admiral Gehman) Richard Buenneke, Aerospace Corpora>on (part- >me consultant) David Onkst, American University (research assistant in Washington from June on) Chirag Vyas, GW graduate student (research assistant in Washington through May) Jonathan Krezel, GW graduate student (research assistant in Washington through May) Jill Dyszynski, GW undergraduate student (administra>ve support in Washington)

12 Group IV

13 GROUP 4 SPACE SHUTTLE PROGRAM ORGANIZATION, BUDGET, POLICY PRESENTATION TO CAIB MAY 21, 2003

14 WORKING HYPOTHESIS The ability of the space shucle team to manage the Space Shucle Program effec6vely and efficiently to meet the objec6ves of flying safely, mee6ng the manifest, improving mission supportability, and improving the system has been threatened over the past decade and more by a complex combina6on of factors that have contributed a high degree of uncertainty to the conduct of the program.

15 TODAY WE WILL DISCUSS Reinven6ng NASA (Lambright) NASA and SSP budget history (Logsdon) When will the Shucle be replaced? (Launius) Contract Consolida6on, Priva6za6on and Commercializa6on (Logsdon) Image of the Space Shucle in Na6onal Policy (McCurdy)

16 SOME CONCLUDING THOUGHTS For a decade or more un6l late 2002, NASA leadership has hoped to replace shucle as soon as possible, and has treated program as necessary rather than desirable This has resulted in pressure to reduce shucle costs, transfer opera6ons to private sector, and make minimal investments in upgrading shucle safety and supportability This has created an uncertain opera6ng environment for the program But there has been no na6onal commitment to developing a shucle replacement Integrated Space Transporta6on Plan is an acempt to address this situa6on. Is it the best approach? The result is a shucle, with all its risk and costs, that remains central to U.S. ambi6ons for human space flight. This is a strategic failure of na6onal space policy

17 NEXT STEPS The Group IV presenta6on was well received. Most of the CAIB members and staff had licle familiarity with history of space shucle program, or indeed NASA s history, and welcomed this tutorial. Principal feedback was to de- emphasize the impact of individuals. I spent the June August period draving the main history chapter of the final report, which had these sec6ons: The Challenger Accident and Its AVermath The NASA Human Space Flight Culture An Agency Trying to Do Too Much with Too Licle Turbulence Hits the Space Shucle Program When to Replace the Space Shucle? (draved primarily by Launius) A Change in NASA Leadership The Return of Schedule Pressure

18 WORKING STYLE Ini6ally I was working to a pre- approved outline. Result was a first drav twice as long as wanted There was a modest turf war between Group I and Group IV over boundaries of our areas of focus Requests for informa6on had to be submiced through a formal process (though there was some flexibility) All research material had to be entered into an elaborate documenta6on system In principle, all material had to be read and approved by all CAIB members before being included in the final report.

19 HISTORY IN THE CAIB REPORT The report contained three chapters (out of 11) that were explicitly historical in character Chapter 1 The Evolu6on of the Space Shucle Program, wricen by one of the report editors with inputs from me and Dwayne Day Chapter 5 From Challenger to Columbia, wricen by me with inputs from Group IV members. This chapter was a policy history of the space shucle program. Chapter 8 History as Cause: Challenger and Columbia, wricen primarily by sociologist Diane Vaughn, a consultant to Group II and author of The Challenger Launch Decision In addi6on, the following was part of the causal statement of the report: The organiza5onal causes of this accident are rooted in the Space Shu;le Program s history and culture, including the original compromises that were required to gain approval for the Space Shu;le Program, subsequent years of resource constraints, fluctua5ng priori5es, schedule pressures, mischaracteriza5ons of the Shu;le as opera5onal rather than developmental, and the lack of an agreed na5onal vision...

20 HISTORY AND NASA S FUTURE Members of Congress asked CAIB to include in its report reflec>ons on the appropriate framework for future space decisions. Those reflec>ons are contained in Chapter 9, Implica>ons for the Future of Human Space Flight, and take a historical perspec>ve. For example, the text read The U.S. civilian space effort has moved forward for more than 30 years without a guiding vision, and none seems imminent. Senior policy people in the White House read this chapter and decided to act upon it.

21 The Vision for Space Explora6on January 14, 2004 Complete the Interna6onal Space Sta6on Safely fly the Space Shucle un6l 2010 Develop and fly the Crew Explora6on Vehicle no later than 2014 (goal 2012) Return to the moon no later than 2020 Extend human presence across the solar system and beyond Implement a sustained and affordable human and robo6c program Develop suppor6ng innova6ve technologies, knowledge, and infrastructures Promote interna6onal and commercial par6cipa6on in explora6on It is 5me for America to take the next steps. Today I announce a new plan to explore space and extend a human presence across our solar system. We will begin the effort quickly, using exis5ng programs and personnel. We ll make steady progress one mission, one voyage, one landing at a 5me President George W. Bush January 14, 2004

22 DID THE HISTORICAL INPUTS INFLUENCE POLICY? In terms of returning the shucle to flight and opera6ng it safely only to a modest degree, in terms of providing a context for the report s technical, management, and organiza>onal recommenda>ons In terms of na6onal space policy to a significant degree, in terms of providing the historical context for the lack of a na>onal space strategy leading to a shujle replacement, which the report called a failure of na>onal leadership, and in influencing the White House to make fundamental changes in na>onal space policy, including ending the shujle program aner Interna>onal Space Sta>on assembly and ini>a>ng a program of human space explora>on.

23 SOME POTENTIAL LESSONS FROM THE CAIB EXPERIENCE To be in a posi>on to have an opportunity to influence policy, visibility beyond academic circles is useful Op- eds Media cita>ons and interviews CommiJee memberships beyond one s discipline Understanding what informa>on and analysis is useful to the policy community, and what is not useful, is crucial. Scholars are unlikely to be aware of all influences on policy choice, and ought not to insist on their being correct.

24 SOME POTENTIAL LESSONS FROM THE CAIB EXPERIENCE It is important to be able to simplify without oversimplifying. The ability to communicate clearly and concisely is very important No academic jargon, e.g. Anthropocene, cultural scaffolds, trope, meme The policy process has a different language, and learning how to speak it is extremely useful For younger scholars with an interest in policy engagement, seeking mentoring and being open to the experience of more established scholars is very useful. But being policy- relevant is not a clear path to tenure!