D Fragility functions for fire fighting system elements. WP3 Fragility functions of elements at risk. University of Pavia (UPAV)

Transcription

1 D 3.11 DELIVERABLE PROJECT INFORMATION Project Title: Acronym: Systemic Seismic Vulnerability and Risk Analysis for Buildings, Lifeline Networks and Infrastructures Safety Gain SYNER-G Project N : Call N : FP7-ENV Project start: 01 November 2009 Duration: 36 months DELIVERABLE INFORMATION Deliverable Title: D Fragility functions for fire fighting system elements Date of issue: 30 April 2011 Work Package: Deliverable/Task Leader: Reviewer: WP3 Fragility functions of elements at risk Aristotle University of Thessaloniki (AUTH) University of Pavia (UPAV) REVISION: Final Project Coordinator: Institution: fax: telephone: Prof. Kyriazis Pitilakis Aristotle University of Thessaloniki kpitilak@civil.auth.gr

2

3 Abstract This deliverable provides the technical report on the assessment of fragility functions for firefighting system elements. A short review of past earthquake damages on fire-fighting system elements is provided in the first part, including the description of physical damages, the identification of main causes of damage and the classification of failure modes. The vulnerability and seismic loss assessment of fire-fighting system is performed according to what is proposed to Deliverable 3.5 (Fragility functions for water and waste-water system elements). For fire stations the methodologies proposed in Deliverables 3.1 (Fragility functions for common RC building types in Europe) and 3.2 (Fragility functions for masonry building types in Europe) could be used. Keywords: fragility functions, vulnerability, fire-fighting system i

4

5 Acknowledgments The research leading to these results has received funding from the European Community's Seventh Framework Programme [FP7/ ] under grant agreement n iii

6

7 Deliverable Contributors [AUTH] Kalliopi Kakderi Sotiris Argyroudis Maria Alexoudi Dimitrios Raptakis Dimitrios Pitilakis Kyriazis Pitilakis v

8

9 Table of Contents 1 Introduction Past earthquake damages on fire-fighting system elements PHYSICAL DAMAGES / MAIN CAUSES OF DAMAGEERROR! BOOKMARK NOT DEFINED. 3 Methodology for the vulnerability assessment of fire-fighting system elements IDENTIFICATION OF THE MAIN TYPOLOGIES GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF EXISTING METHODOLOGIES DAMAGE STATES INTENSITY INDEXES PERFORMANCE INDICATORS Fragility functions for fire-fighting system elements STATE-OF-THE-ART FRAGILITY CURVES PER COMPONENT VALIDATION / ADAPTATION / IMPROVEMENT FINAL PROPOSAL vii

10

11 List of Figures Fig. 2.1 View of the destruction brought about by the San Francisco Earthquake, Fig. 2.2 Fires to San Francisco (Marina area) after the 1989 Loma Prieta earthquake Fig. 2.3 Conflagration after the 1989Loma Prieta earthquake Fig. 2.4 Extent of fires after the 1995Kobe earthquake Fig. 2.5 Bypass system using above ground flexible hoses (Eidinger, 2004) Fig. 2.6 Flex hose attachment to fire hydrant (Eidinger, 2004) Fig. 2.7 Failures of fire-fighting system in Lefkas, Marina area (Alexoudi, 2005) Fig. 2.8 Local failures of fire-fighting tanks and connected pipelines (Marina Lefkas 2003) ix

12

13 List of Tables Table 2.1 Seismic response of fire-fighting systems during strong earthquake events Table 2.3 Interactions of fire-fighting system with lifeline networks and infrastructures Table 4.1 Fire-fighting systems (not separate from water network) Table 4.2 Fire-fighting systems (separate from water network) xi

14

15 D Fragility functions for fire fighting system elements 1 Introduction Fire is a common consequence of large earthquakes in urban and industrial areas. Fire fighting activities can be prevented due to damages in the water or other (e.g. roadway) networks after large earthquakes, resulting to serious loss of life and property. Losses from such fires can vary from insignificant (e.g. Izmit earthquake 1999, Turkey; ChiChi earthquake 1999, Taiwan) to disastrous (e.g. San Francisco 1906, USA; Tokyo 1923, Kobe 1995, Japan). In the other hand, fire following earthquake is an extremely variable phenomenon, due to variability in the number of ignitions and in the extent of fire-spread from each ignition. In the following chapters, a short review of past earthquake damages on fire-fighting system elements is given, including the description of physical damages, the identification of main causes of damage and the classification of failure modes. The methodology for the vulnerability assessment of fire-fighting system elements includes the identification of the main typologies, the general description of existing methodologies, damage states, intensity indexes and performance indicators. Finally fragility functions for the independent components proposed. The /vulnerability and seismic loss assessment of fire-fighting system is performed according to what is proposed to Deliverable 3.5 (Fragility functions for water and waste-water system elements). For fire stations the methodologies proposed in Deliverables 3.1 (Fragility functions for common RC building types in Europe) and 3.2 (Fragility functions for masonry building types in Europe) could be used. 2 Past earthquake damages on fire-fighting system elements The fire-fighting system plays a major role in the management of crisis situations, such as floods and strong earthquake events. It is comprised not only by the pipeline network and fire faucets (either separate or dependent on the water supply system), but also a whole crisis management system (special units, fire fighters, etc). In case of an earthquake event, the primary role of the fire-fighting system is: a) Rescue of people from collapsed buildings. b) Rescue of trapped people to non-structural elements due to interactions of the lifeline systems with the urban fabric (e.g. loss of electric power supply may cause entrapments in elevators). c) Suppression of fires caused by the earthquake. Interactions between lifelines and infrastructures with the urban fabric affect significantly the response of the fire-fighting system. For example, damages to fire stations may lead to destruction or blockage of fire vehicles. Fire response may be hampered due to incurred damages to tanks, fire pipelines, or fire hydrants, resulting in loss of pressure or water supply. Moreover, failures of the road network (roadways, bridges) or collapses of buildings in major roads may cause important hindrances in the movements of fire-fighting means. 13

16 D Fragility functions for fire fighting system elements Fire following earthquakes may be the result of: breaks and ignitions of gas or oil pipelines, electric short circuits causing ignition, failure of gas or oil tanks, leakage of dangerous industrial flammable materials. Leaks of natural gas pipelines and short circuit damages are the main causes of fire after the 1994 Northridge and 1995 Kobe earthquakes (Borden, 1996; Ohnishi, 1996). Those factors can also lead to the expansion of initially ignited fires, as well as the resulting losses. Historical earthquake records show that the subsequent losses due to fires following earthquakes may be even more important than the incurred damage due to ground shaking, as for example is the case of the 1906 San Francisco and the 1923 Great Kanto earthquakes (Chen et al., 2004). During the San Francisco earthquake more than 28,000 buildings in an area of 12 km 2 were destroyed from the conflagration, and more than 3,000 people lost their lives. The estimated cost is 250 million dollars (in 1906 prices), and the losses due to fire were ten times higher than those caused by the earthquake (Charles, 2003). During the 1923 Tokyo earthquake, more than 140,000 people were killed and 575,000 buildings destroyed, 77% of which due to fire. The 1995 Kobe earthquake is the most representative example of the more recent earthquake events. In the prefecture of Hyogo, in total 181 fires occurred between 17~19 January, 96 of which were recorded in a single building, while the rest 85 have been expanded to greater regions (Ohnishi, 1996). In the following figures some representative examples of major earthquake events followed by fire ignitions and considerable losses are provided. The seismic response of fire-fighting or/and water systems affected significantly the size of losses. Fig. 2.1 View of the destruction brought about by the San Francisco Earthquake,

17 D Fragility functions for fire fighting system elements Fig. 2.2 Fires to San Francisco (Marina area) after the 1989 Loma Prieta earthquake. Fig. 2.3 Conflagration after the 1989Loma Prieta earthquake. Fig. 2.4 Extent of fires after the 1995Kobe earthquake. 15

18 D Fragility functions for fire fighting system elements In the majority of the cases, fire-fighting needs of urban areas are covered by the water supply system. There are only very few references of separate fire-fighting systems, as well as reporting of incurred seismic damages. In general, the assessment of vulnerability and seismic losses to fire-fighting systems could be performed according to what is mentioned to Deliverable 3.5 (Fragility functions for water and waste-water system elements). For fire stations the methodologies proposed in Deliverables 3.1 (Fragility functions for common RC building types in Europe) and 3.2 (Fragility functions for masonry building types in Europe) could be used. Seismic response of fire-fighting systems during strong earthquake events is summarized in Table 2.1. Table 2.1 Seismic response of fire-fighting systems during strong earthquake events. Earthquake Seismic response and induced damage of port facilities Reference(s) San Francisco, 18/04/1906, Mw=7.9 Coalinga, California, 2/5/1983, Μ=6.5 Loma Prieta, 18/10/1989, M=7.1 Cape Mendocino, California, 25/4/1992, Μ=7.1 and 26/4/1992, M=6.6 Hokkaido, 12/7/1993, Μ=7.8 It is the greatest earthquake induced fire loss in U.S. history, with 492 destroyed city blocks and more than 3,000 deaths. The city had a completely separate fire-fighting system, with tanks exclusively for fire-fighting needs. During the earthquake, a pipeline broke near the post-office of Mission street, having as a result the full outflow of the water from the network in less than 15 minutes. Since most of the fires and damages occurred at areas near the coastline, fireboats were able to pump water from the sea at a distance up to 1.6km from the shore. After the earthquake several fires have been initiated, including a fire at a building in the central commercial district. Despite the fact that water supply was not significantly affected, the building s debris hindered the flow of water from the hoses, resulting in the expansion of fire to the neighboring buildings. 22 fires occurred in San Francisco as a result of the earthquake. The water supply at the densely populated Marina District was completely cut off; water from the bay was pumped by a fireboat, to engines on the shore and used to douse the burning buildings. For this purpose, a special system of large diameter hoses was used for the transfer of water. After the earthquakes, the largest part of the commercial district in Scotia city was destroyed by the fire. Breaks incurred to pipelines resulted in loss of normal water pressure. At the same time, damage to back up power caused the loss of the high pressure fire loop. Finally, some delays in response were due to damage sustained to a fire station. Fire receptions in the city were not able to work due to insufficient capacity of the main water pipelines, resulting in inadequate supply and pressure of water for the fire suppression. nr.edu/ftp/pub/l ouie/class/100/ effectskobe.html EERI, 1984 EERI, 1990 EERI, 1995a EERI, 1995a 16

19 D Fragility functions for fire fighting system elements Earthquake Seismic response and induced damage of port facilities Reference(s) Hyogo-ken Nanbu (Kobe), 17/1/1995, M=7.9 Northridge 17/1/1994, Mw=6.7 A total of 148 fires have been reported between 17 and 20 January causing damage to 6,900 buildings (660,000m 2 ) and 500 deaths. Fire response was hampered by the numerous simultaneous fires in combination with the damages to water supply network and the road closures. The main reason was the breaks to gas pipelines and ignitions at broken electric lines. Fire stations sustained damage, while water pressure at the locations of the hydrants was insufficient due to damages to the water supply system (approximately 1,750 breaks in the underground distribution system). Approximately 110 fires were reported, 80% of which were structure fires. Ignitions were all brought under control within several hours of the earthquake, despite the significant damages to the telecommunication system and the extensive losses to the water supply network (at least six breaks at trunk lines and approximately 3,000 leaks) used also for fire-fighting. Fire stations sustained slight to moderate damage, while three fire stations have been evacuated. NIST, 1996 EERI, 1995b Special reference should be made to the existence of multiple interactions of fire-fighting system with lifeline networks and infrastructures. For example, during the 1995 Kobe earthquake, firemen couldn t reach the locations of fire ignitions caused by gas pipeline breaks, due to incurred damages to lifelines and infrastructures facilities. Large parts of the city were burnt, increasing human casualties initially caused by the earthquake. A classification of these interactions is given in Table 2.3. Table 2.2 Interactions of fire-fighting system with lifeline networks and infrastructures. Fire ignition Fire-fighting Natural gas system Electric power system Potable water system - Waste-water system - - Telecommunication system - Roadway system - Railway system - Port facilities - Airport - 17

20 D Fragility functions for fire fighting system elements Quick restoration of water supply in cases of fire following earthquake is of major importance. Effective mitigation strategies and policies for pre and post earthquake actions should be defined and undertaken in order to have efficient water supply in critical nodes of the system. If the cost for such techniques is too high, an alternative solution could be the installation of a bypass system to allow the rapid restoration of water service using above ground flexible hoses (Eidinger, 2004). With this method, a rapid (less than 24 hours) restoration of water to large areas could be achieved. Fig. 2.5 shows the actual deployment of above ground flexible hoses used to bypass a 24" diameter pipeline that crosses a fault. Large diameter hoses can also be attached to fire hydrants as shown in Fig Fig. 2.5 Bypass system using above ground flexible hoses (Eidinger, 2004). Fig. 2.6 Flex hose attachment to fire hydrant (Eidinger, 2004). 18

21 D Fragility functions for fire fighting system elements A representative example of fire-fighting system damages in Europe is the Lefkas earthquake (Greece, 14/09/2003, Ms=6.5). Failures were reported to five fire faucets in the Marina area and also parts of the fire-fighting system (pipelines connected to fire faucets) due to the occurrence of liquefaction phenomena. Damages were also observed to the connection points between above ground pipelines and tanks. Fire-fighting tanks experienced elephant buckling failures as well as permanent displacements of 10cm. Fig. 2.7 Failures of fire-fighting system in Lefkas, Marina area (Alexoudi, 2005). Fig. 2.8 Local failures of fire-fighting tanks and connected pipelines (Marina Lefkas 2003). (Alexoudi, 2005) 19

22 D Fragility functions for fire fighting system elements 3 Methodology for the vulnerability assessment of fire-fighting system elements 3.1 IDENTIFICATION OF THE MAIN TYPOLOGIES Usually fire-fighting system is part of water system and the same pipelines and storage tanks are used. In the case that is a separate network, storage tanks are usually made of steel, and pipes are made of PVC. Separate fire-fighting systems are more common to find in harbors, in hospitals (small, well- defined area, with known needs) and not in large regions or in urban cities. For fire-fighting buildings the same typological categories proposed in D3.1, D3.2 can be used. 3.2 GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF EXISTING METHODOLOGIES As already mentioned, the fire fighting system is characterized by strong interactions with other lifelines such as the water supply, gas, electric power and communicationtransportation networks. However, the supply of water and the functionality of fire hydrants employ the major role for the functionality of the fire fighting system. It is possible that the water pressure will be reduced after an earthquake due to pipe breaks/leaks or/and tank failures, aggravating the fire effects in case of lack or inadequacy of alternative water supplies. Fire-station buildings and tanks are also important components, as they house the fire fighting vehicles and engines, they provide the necessary water quantities and they constitute administrative and management centers in cases of crisis. Consequently, the vulnerability of fire fighting system is strongly related to water system. The literature review of available approaches for the seismic risk analysis of water system is described in D3.5. A short review of available methods for the estimation of fire ignitions and fire spreading is presented in the following. Cousins et al. (1991) developed a methodology for the assessment of areas susceptible to fire conflagrations and estimation of induced losses due to post-earthquake fires in central New Zealand. The fire losses are estimated in comparison to losses due to ground shaking based on empirical earthquake data from North America. More recently, a model for postearthquake fires spreading was elaborated for Wellington City, by Cousins et al. (2002). The life-safety risk against post-earthquake fires from the perspective of gas and electricity distribution systems was investigated by Williamson and Groner (2000), based on data from 11 earthquake events. A study by Robertson and Mehaffey (2000) recommends that performance based building codes should contain a framework to prevent undue reliance on sprinkler and other life safety systems that are dependent on seismically vulnerable water and electrical services. A two-level design procedure is proposed to be applied to the fire safety design of buildings located in areas of high seismicity. The first level assumes normal operational conditions for 20

23 D Fragility functions for fire fighting system elements detection and suppression systems as well as fire service response, while the second level is based on impaired lifelines services and fire service response following a major earthquake. At the individual building level, Chen et al. (2004) proposed a performance-based seismic analysis procedure considering earthquake and subsequent fires. It consists of four major steps: hazard analysis, structural and/or non-structural analyses, damage analysis and loss analysis. Further details are provided in the next section. Scawthorn (1986, 1987), Scawthorn et al. (1991, 1997), NDC (1992), ICLR (2001), developed different models for simulation of post earthquake fire spread in urban areas. The annual expected loss is estimated considering the building density, the wind speed, the adequacy of fire fighting response and the seismic intensity. Himoto and Tanaka (2002) have been focused on fire spread based on the physics of fire, assuming building- tobuilding fire spread due to thermal radiation and fire-induced plume. Several computer codes were developed for the estimation of Burnt Area, such as HAZUS (NIBS, 2004), URAMP (2002), SERA (Ostrom, 2003) and RiskLink (2008). HAZUS (NIBS, 2004) proposed a relationship for the estimation of ignition rate per square meter of built area as a function of PGA, based on the study of Eidinger et al. (1995). HAZUS except of the prediction of the fire ignitions, estimates the potential dollar loss caused by fires assuming wind speed, fire engine response time etc. The URAMP software (Utilities Regional Assessment of Mitigation Priorities) estimates losses and incorporates avoid losses as benefits in a benefit cost framework to determine the most effective seismic risk reduction program for water utility. URAMP incorporates the functionality of EPANET, a hydraulic modeling software package. URAMP analysis modules include modern hazard models to facilitate regional network analysis and consider both deterministic and probabilistic seismic risk assessment. Moreover, it calculates potential damage and economic losses due to fire-following earthquake and other economic impacts on the provider utility and community such as lost revenue, business impacts of fire and cost of sewage cleanup. In a simplified way, the procedure provided includes an identification of the neighborhoods as high, medium or low density residential, commercial or industrial occupancies. Final, the burnt areas are determined using Monte-Carlo simulation. The SERA (System Earthquake Risk Assessment) fire model incorporates detailed analysis of the seismic vulnerability of the water system, time dependent hydraulic performance of the water system after an earthquake, and a detailed fire ignition, fire spread and fire suppression model. The RiskLink fire following earthquake model estimates probability of fire loss at the city/ward level, calibrated extensively against the Tokyo fire department estimates of fire ignitions A recent monograph (Scawthorn et al., 2005) details the current state of the art in modeling fire following earthquake. Post earthquake ignitions for a particular locality can be calculated as a random Poisson process with mean probability determined as a function of MMI or PGA and building inventory (i.e. millions of building floor area). All previous post-earthquake fire spread models are based on the use of empirical approaches. Recent efforts combine physical laws and empirical data, attempting to simulate separately the different modes of fire spread (Lee et al., 2008). In several studies a detailed examination of the causes of ignitions is also illustrated based on the building contents, type of use, usage hours, structural types and time of day. Tokyo Fire Department (1997) has developed a set of curves (six) considering the building 21

24 D Fragility functions for fire fighting system elements occupancies (residential, commercial, industrial) and materials (wood and non-wood). These curves have been calibrated against recent US earthquakes such as San Fernando (1971), Morgan Hill (1984), Whittier (1987), Loma Prieta (1989) and Northridge (1994). Moreover, four ignition curves were produced considering the effect of time and season based on fuzzy approach. In addition, Tokyo Fire Department developed the TOSHO model that determines the fire spreading speed in four directions as a function of time. It requires a specific description of the exposure at risk and is therefore location independent. 3.3 DAMAGE STATES As in potable water system (D3.5) and buildings (D3.1, D3.2). 3.4 INTENSITY INDEXES As in potable water system (D3.5) and buildings (D3.1, D3.2). 3.5 PERFORMANCE INDICATORS As in potable water system (D3.5) and buildings (D3.1, D3.2). 22

25 D Fragility functions for fire fighting system elements 4 Fragility functions for fire-fighting system elements 4.1 STATE-OF-THE-ART FRAGILITY CURVES PER COMPONENT A reporting of the deliverables from where information on fragility functions for the components of fire fighting systems (i.e. fire-station buildings, pipes, storage tanks, firefaucets) can be obtained is presented, for two cases: a) Fire-fighting systems which are not separate from the water supply network (Table 4.1). b) Fire-fighting systems which are separate from the water supply network (Table 4.2). A comment should be made here that the fragility of fire-fighting system is closely connected with the possible fires just after the earthquake. The interaction between the road closure and the serviceability of water network with fire-fighting system (if it is not separate from water system) is essential. Table 4.1 Fire-fighting systems (not separate from water network) Component Reference Methodology Classification Earthquake descriptor Damage States and Index Fire-station buildings Pipes Storage tanks Fire-faucets As common buildings in D3.1, D3.2 As in potable water system As in potable water system Calculation of the functionality taking into account the connectivity with water system failures Connectivity can be estimated based on the functionality of direct or indirect water pipes links. Thus, the fire-faucet functionality is calculated based on the followings: water system topology, systems condition after the earthquake (failure modes), pressure and supply of water, using e.g. quantitative methods. 23

26 D Fragility functions for fire fighting system elements Table 4.2 Fire-fighting systems (separate from water network) Component Reference Methodology Classification Earthquake descriptor Damage States and Index Pipes Storage tanks Pumping Station Fire-faucets As in potable water system As in potable water system As in potable water system Calculation of the functionality taking into account the connectivity with fire-fighting pipes. Connectivity can be estimated based on the functionality of direct or indirect water pipes links. Thus, the fire-faucet functionality is calculated based on the followings: water system topology, systems condition after the earthquake (failure modes), pressure and supply of water, using e.g. quantitative methods. 4.2 VALIDATION / ADAPTATION / IMPROVEMENT As in potable water system (D3.5) and buildings (D3.1, D3.2). 4.3 FINAL PROPOSAL As in potable water system (D3.5) and buildings (D3.1, D3.2). 24

27 D Fragility functions for fire fighting system elements References Alexoudi, M. (2005). Contribution to seismic assessment of lifelines in urban areas. Development of holistic methodology for seismic risk. PhD Thesis, Civil Engineer Department, Aristotle University of Thessaloniki, Greece (in Greek). Borden, F.W. (1996). The 1994 Northridge Earthquake and the Fires That Followed. Thirteenth Meeting of the UJNR Panel on Fire Research and Safety, NISTIR 6030: Charles, S. (2003). Fire following earthquakes. Earthquake Engineering Handbook, W.F. Chen (editor). Chen, S.W., G.C. Lee, M. Shinozuka (2004). Hazard Mitigation for Earthquake and Subsequent Fire. MCEER, progress report. Cousins, W.J., D.J. Dowrick and S. Sritharan (1991). Fire Following Earthquake. In Institution of Fire Engineers Conference, New Plymouth. Cousins, W.J., G.C. Thomas, D.W. Heron, S. Mazzoni and D. Lloydd (2002). Modelling the spread of post-earthquake fire in Wellington City. In 2002 Technical Conference and AGM, New Zealand Society for Earthquake Engineering, Napier: EERI (1984). Fire-Related Aspects of the Coalinga Earthquake. Coalinga, California, Earthquake of May 2, 1983: Reconnaissance Report, Report EERI (1990). Performance of the san Francisco Auxiliary and Portable Water Supply Systems in the 17 October 1989 Loma Prieta Earthquake. In 4 th U.S. National Conference on Earthquake Engineering. EERI (1995a). Fire. Hokkaido Earthquake Reconnaissance Report, Earthquake Spectra, 11(S1): EERI (1995b). Fire-related aspects. Northridge Earthquake Reconnaissance Report, Earthquake Spectra, 11(S2): Eidinger, J. M. (2004). Fire Following Earthquake Flex Hose. In 13 th World Conference on Earthquake Engineering, Vancouver, BC Canada, paper No Eidinger, J.M., K.A. Goettel and D. Lee (1995). Fire and Economic Impacts of Earthquakes. In Fourth U.S. Conference of Lifeline Earthquake Enginnering, TCLEE, Monograph No.6, Edited by M.J. ORourke: Himoto and Tanaka (2002). A Physically Based model for Urban Fire Spread. In 7 th International Symposium on fire safety science, Worcester. Institute for Catastrophic Loss Reduction (ICLR) (2001). Assessment of Risk due to Fire Following Earthquake. Lower Mainland, British Columbia, report prepared for the Institute for Catastrophic Loss Reduction, Toronto, by Swawthorn, C. and F. Waisman, EQE International, Oakland, CA. Lee, S., R. Davidson, N. Ohnishi and C. Scawthorn (2008). Fire following earthquake Reviewing the state-of-the-art of modeling. Earthquake Spectra 24(4):

28 D Fragility functions for fire fighting system elements National Institute of Building Sciences (NIBS) (2004). Earthquake loss estimation methodology. HAZUS. Technical manuals, Federal Emergency Management Agency, Washington, D.C. National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) (1996). The January 17, 1995 Hyogoken-Nanbu (Kobe) earthquake. Performance of Structures, Lifelines, and Fire Protection Systems. NIST special publication 901, 544p. NDC, (1992). Fire Following Earthquake Conflagration Potential in a Greater Los Angeles, San Francisco, Seattle and Memphis Areas, prepared for the Natural Disaster Coalition by C. Scawthorn and M. Khater, EQE International, San Francisco, CA. Ohnishi, K. (1996). Causes of the Seismic Fires Following the Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake-Survey. Thirteenth Meeting of the UJNR Panel on Fire Research and Safety, NISTIR 6030: Ostrom, D. (2003). System Earthquake Risk Assessment (SERAII), Technical Council on Lifeline Engineering Research, Long Beach, CA: RiskLink (2008). Computer software, Technical Manual, Risk Management Solutions, Inc. Robertson, J. and J. Mehaffey (2000). Accounting for Fire Following Earthquakes in the Development of Performance Based Building Codes. In 12 th World Conference on Earthquake Engineering, Auckland. Scawthorn, C. (1986). Simulation Modelling of Fire Following Earthquake. In Third US National Conference on Earthquake Engineering, Charleston. Scawthorn, C. (1987). Fire Following Earthquake: Estimates of the Conflagration risk to insured Property in Greater Los Angeles and San Francisco. All-Industry Research Advisory Council. Scawthorn, C., A. Cowell and F. Borden (1997). Fire-related Aspects of the Northridge Earthquake. Report by EQE International for the National Institute of Standards and Technology, San Francisco. Scawthorn, C., H. Iemura and Y. Yamada (1991). Model for Urban Post-earthquake Fire Hazard Disaster. International Journal of Disaster Studies and Practice (London) 5(2): Scawthorn, C., J.M. Eidinger and A.J. Schiff (2005). Fire Following Earthquake. TechnicalCouncil on Lifeline Earthquake Engineering Monograph No. 26, American Society of Civil Engineers, Reston. Tokyo Fire Department (1997). Determinations and Measures on the Causes of New Fire Occurrence and Properties of Fire Spreading on an Earthquake with a Vertical Shock, Fire Prevention Deliberation Council Report, p 42. URAMP (2002) Technical Manual, prepared for the California Governor s Office of Emergency Services by ABS Consulting and ImageCat, Inc. Williamson, R.B. and R. Groner (2000). Ignition of Fires Following Earthquakes Associated With Natural Gas and Electric Distribution Systems. Pacific Earthquake Engineering Research Center, University of California. 26