China's ICBM modernisation alters threat profile

Transcription

1 Jane's Intelligence Review [Content preview Subscribe to IHS Jane s Defence Weekly for full article] China's ICBM modernisation alters threat profile China's continuing ballistic missile modernisation programme is expanding the range of its targeting options. Sean O'Connor examines the implications for the country's nuclear posture towards the United States, as well as regional states such as Russia and India. China held a large military parade in Tiananmen Square, Beijing, on 3 September 2015 to celebrate the 70th anniversary of victory over Japan at the end of the Second World War. The huge event reflected China's growing confidence and military prowess, and the hardware showcased has implications for regional and international theatres of operation. As well as displaying an impressive suite of antiaccess/area-denial assets designed to reinforce its territorial claims in the South China Sea and the East China Sea, Beijing took the opportunity to unveil longer-range assets, including the long-speculated DF-5B, a liquid-fuelled, nuclear-capable intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) that is believed to be armed with multiple warheads. The People's Liberation Army (PLA) Second Artillery Corps' current development efforts have most visibly consisted of solid-fuelled missiles such as the DF-41 and DF-31 variants. However, the upgrading of the older liquid-fuelled DF-5 with a multiple-warhead variant shows not only the growing sophistication of China's capabilities, but also suggests concerns in Beijing over increasing ballistic missile defence (BMD) perceived by opponents such as the United States. Page 1 of 8

2 DF-31A ICBMs pass the Tiananmen Gate, Beijing, during a military parade on 3 September The DF- 31A is a main candidate for future deployment as part of China's road-mobile nuclear deterrent. (PA) Distant threats China's land-based nuclear deterrent is credited by the US as currently employing various cruise and ballistic missile types. If this assessment is correct, these systems would permit a range of targeting options across the theatre and intercontinental levels of operation. All of China's land-based nuclear-armed missile systems are operated by the Second Artillery Corps, which also operates the majority of China's conventionally armed land-based missile systems. Estimates in the 2013 report, Ballistic and Cruise Missile Threat, by the US Department of Defense's National Air and Space Intelligence Center (NASIC), suggest that the total Chinese ICBM force (see Table) has no more than 60 operational launchers. In contrast, the report suggests that the Second Artillery Corps operates nearly 400 shorter-range ballistic missile launchers. Although the NASIC report uses missile launchers to benchmark relative strength, it should be noted that a substantial number of reload missiles are potentially available for use. Nonetheless, this disparity strongly suggests that Beijing has traditionally focused on its perceived regional threats, such as conflict with Taiwan or Japan. Although the bulk of the shorter-range missile force is conventionally armed, it is possible that the DF-21 ballistic missile and DH-10 cruise missile have also been equipped with nuclear warheads. Although China is carrying out missile modernisation, its original design parameters resulted in the commissioning of four missiles in the Dong-Feng (East Wind) series to meet strategically designated targets: the DF-2 was to target Japan; the DF-3, the Philippines; the DF-4, Guam; and the DF-5, the US. Many of China's older missile systems have already been retired - for example, the last unit operating the roll-out DF-4 missile, the 805th Missile Brigade, is undergoing conversion to use the road-mobile DF-31A. Page 2 of 8

3 Force structure All Chinese ICBMs are sited within three of the Second Artillery Corps' bases. These are analogous to a Russian Strategic Rocket Force Missile Army, and each base controls a number of units within a given region. Across these, three or four brigades operate the DF-31 or DF-31A, while an additional four brigades are associated with the DF-5. Possible force structure for Chinese missile brigades. (2015 IHS) At full strength, a given mobile missile brigade operates six battalions; each battalion, in turn, operates two companies with a single transporter erector launcher (TEL) each. Therefore, at full strength, a standard DF- 31 brigade will operate a total of 12 TELs. Based on the identification of silo locations by IHS Jane's, silobased missile units, such as those operating the DF-5, appear to employ a different force structure than road-mobile systems. A standard DF-5 unit likely operates six silos, split into two sub-units. Assuming the mobile missile force structure is loosely retained by silo-based forces, a DF-5 brigade may operate two battalions, with each having three single-silo companies. Using as a guide the 1999 publication, Chinese Strategic Modernization: Implications for the United States, by Mark Stokes, executive director of the Project 2049 Institute, a public-policy think tank, and updated with further imagery analysis, IHS Jane's concludes that within the Second Artillery Corps' 54th Base, the 801st and 804th Brigades operate the DF-5, and the 813th Brigade is the only brigade operating the original DF-31. The 55th Base operates more than half of the assessed 20 silo-based DF-5 force, with 12 silos split evenly between the 803rd and 814th Brigades. The 55th Base also operates the 805th Brigade, a Page 3 of 8

4 DF-31A unit. The 805th Brigade operates out of Shaoyang but formerly operated from Tongdao as a DF-4 unit, before the Shaoyang garrison was completed in Likely composition of mobile and silo missile forces. (2015 IHS) Deployment trends There may be several reasons for the stable ICBM deployment numbers observed between 2009 and First, the lack of new weapons may have been caused by a shortfall in production, caused by shortages in key components or materiel. However, the continued deployment of shorter-range Chinese solidpropellant ballistic missiles, and the commonality in materiel required to produce them, make this explanation unlikely. Second, production centres may have diverted their resources to focus on efforts to bring new systems or variants to flight-test readiness. Given the ability of Chinese industry to produce missile airframes for flighttest programmes, this is also unlikely. A third explanation relates to the DF-31A. Between 2012 and 2014, four flight tests of the DF-31A were reported to have taken place. Four tests within a relatively short period suggest a series of validation flight trials, which, if successful, would permit the system to enter full-rate production. If this is the case, this could lead to increased estimates of deployed forces in A fourth explanation, also relating to the DF-31A, suggests lack of deployment during is because the original DF-31 variant had been supplanted by a further improved variant. If true, this is likely to be the DF-31B, which, according to the Washington Free Beacon news and analysis website, undertook its first flight test on 25 September Differences between the DF-31A and the DF-31B are not conclusively known, but photographs from Chinese military websites appear to show a new TEL design providing better off-road mobility. Previous DF- 31 and DF-31A TELs were unsophisticated and primarily suitable for travel over prepared surfaces. Airbus Page 4 of 8

5 Defence and Space imagery of Taiyuan Satellite Launch Center captured four days prior to the 25 September 2014 flight test shows a towed TEL virtually identical to that used by the DF-31A deployed on a missile test pad (see Airbus Defence and Space imagery). If the Washington Free Beacon website, which has a good track record of reporting on Chinese modernisation efforts, is correct, the vehicle may be associated with the DF-31B trials programme. Although not supporting theories of a new TEL, it does not preclude the possibility, as it may be indicative of a test launcher, rather than an operational one. Airbus Defence and Space imagery shows an apparent DF-31B ICBM mounted on a TEL undergoing prelaunch preparations at Taiyuan Satellite Launch Center, also known as Wuzhai Missile and Space Test Center, in China, four days before a 25 September 2014 test launch. (CNES 2014, Distribution Airbus DS / 2015 IHS) Changing operations? Chinese ICBM forces differ in their operational practices depending on the basing mode. Silo-based missile systems may be kept in an alert status, whereas mobile ICBM forces are reactionary systems intended for dispersal during hostilities. During peacetime, TELs are contained within garrison complexes usually found close to metropolitan areas for access to utilities and other amenities. Neither missiles nor warheads are stored at these garrison complexes. Page 5 of 8

6 During launch preparation, a mobile ICBM brigade disperses its TELs to associated underground complexes where they are mated with missiles and warheads. At this point, the TELs may remain under cover for protection or be dispersed into the field to conduct launch operations. Mobile ICBM brigades maintain field garrisons serving multiple pre-surveyed launch points; loaded TELs can disperse through field garrisons for final checkout and launch-point assignment. Alternatively, unsurveyed launch points may be employed, but these will require additional calibration time prior to launch. China's view of the use of nuclear weapons has long been characterised by Mao Zedong's pronouncement that nuclear weapons were 'paper tigers' - weapons that appear dangerous but lack real power. This approach led to an early emphasis on a small number of thermonuclear weapons, and relatively inaccurate ICBMs to deliver them. With these 'city busters', China pledged never to use nuclear weapons against nonnuclear-armed countries, and never to use them first against other nuclear powers, as part of a policy of 'minimum deterrence'. It was only with the death of Mao in 1976 and the subsequent establishment of Deng Xiaoping as leader that Maoist doctrine was permitted to decline and plausible operational concepts were explored. It was this political change that allowed the development of a range of nuclear capabilities, although pledges of 'no first use' have remained constant. Nonetheless, China faces internal pressures over its political position. The growth in precision strike capabilities means Chinese assets may face considerable damage without an opponent resorting to nuclear weapons. Such concerns may have given rise to considerations of moving away from Beijing's long-held 'no first use' position. For example, in 2010 the Japanese newspaper Kyodo News reported Chinese discussions articulated in The Science of Second Artillery Campaigns that there were plans to abandon 'no first use' should Chinese dams, nuclear power plants, or other civilian targets be attacked. However, such suspicions have been firmly rejected in public forums. China also faces pressure from increasing interest in BMD, currently being pursued by traditional nuclear rivals such as India, Russia, and the US, as well as other regional states such as Japan and South Korea. With a relatively small ICBM inventory, even a small loss to missile defences could have far-reaching implications on perceptions of the credibility of China's strike force. Chinese progress towards deploying missiles with multiple warheads allows it to increase the penetration capability of its missile forces. Despite the focus on thermonuclear warheads, the development of smaller nuclear warheads necessary to provide a tactical and MIRV capability may have occurred during the timeframe. During this period, 11 warhead tests occurred, with yields ranging from 20 to 150 kilotons. IHS Jane's Strategic Weapons Systems assesses that these tests validated smaller warhead designs suitable for MIRV use on weapons such as the DF-31 and the JL-2 submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM). Furthermore, a 1995 test of the DF-31 is reported to have deployed three dummy MIRVs, indicating that a multiple warhead option for the DF-31 and/or the DF-31A may already exist, although the DF-5B is the country's only known operational MIRV-equipped ICBM. Page 6 of 8

7 DF-5B ICBMs presented during a military parade in Beijing on 3 September The multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicle (MIRV)-equipped DF-5B system is likely to have entered service in , and is the country's only known operational MIRV-equipped ICBM. (PA) Conclusion China's ICBM modernisation efforts have ramifications regionally and globally. MIRVs imply a level of miniaturisation in the associated warhead, often corresponding to a reduced yield or amount of energy released. Reduced yield results in a less-effective system unless there is a corresponding increase in accuracy. From this perspective, the addition of MIRVs to the DF-5B and other systems possibly indicates a developing counterforce capability. Previous Chinese ICBMs relied on large 'city buster' warheads less suited for attacking pinpoint targets such as ICBM launch control centres or individual silos. The development of a system including smaller, more accurate warheads able to target such sites may increase the perceived potential for use. Copyright IHS Global Limited, 2015 Page 7 of 8

8 For the full version and more content: IHS Jane's Military & Security Assessments Intelligence Centre This analysis is taken from IHS Jane s Military & Security Assessments Intelligence Centre, which delivers comprehensive and reliable country risk and military capabilities information, analysis and daily insight. IHS country risk and military capabilities news and analysis is also available within IHS Jane s Intelligence Review. To learn more and to subscribe to IHS Jane s Intelligence Review online, offline or print visit For advertising solutions contact the IHS Jane s Advertising team Page 8 of 8