Physics 280: Session 17
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1 Physics 280: Session 17 Plan for This Session Question Next session, Thursday, pm, March 17 th : Midterm Exam in 1000 Lincoln Hall Office hours: Wednesday noon to 6pm in 404 Grainger News Module 6: Nuclear Arsenals 16p280 Programs and Arsenals, p. 1 MGP, Phys. Dep. 2016
2 The Guardina North Korea announces additional nuclear and missile tests. 16p280 Programs and Arsenals, p. MGP, Phys. Dep. 2016
3 International Business Times Indian Ballistic Missile Test 16p280 Programs and Arsenals, p. MGP, Phys. Dep. 2016
4 Physics/Global Studies 280 Module 6: Nuclear Arsenals and Proliferation Part 1: Overview of Programs and Arsenals Part 2: Arsenals of the NPT Nuclear-Weapon States: The United States, Russia, the United Kingdom, France, and China Part 3: Arsenals of non-npt and Emerging Nuclear-Weapon States: India, Pakistan, Israel and North Korea Part 4: Threat Perceptions 16p280 Programs and Arsenals, p. 4
5 Module 6: Programs and Arsenals Part 1: Overview of Programs and Arsenals 16p280 Programs and Arsenals, p. 5
6 Module 6: Nuclear Arsenals and Proliferation 16p280 Programs and Arsenals, p. 6
7 World Nuclear Weapon Stockpiles Source: The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientist Nuclear Notebook, written by Hans M Kristensen and Robert S. Norris, Federation of American Scientists 17,300 9,920 total nuclear weapons in p280 Programs and Arsenals, p. 7 MGP, Phys. Dep. 2016
8 World Nuclear Weapon Stockpiles Source: The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientist Nuclear Notebook, written by Hans M Kristensen and Robert S. Norris, Federation of American Scientists USA and Russia 16p280 Programs and Arsenals, p. 8 MGP, Phys. Dep. 2016
9 World Nuclear Weapon Stockpiles Source: The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientist Nuclear Notebook, written by Hans M Krsitensen and Robert S. Norris, Federaion of Amercina Scientists UK France Source: The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientist Nuclear Notebook, written by Hans M Krsitensen and Robert S. Norris, Federaion of Amercina Scientists China Israel India Pakistan North Korea Tests Only! Other Nuclear Weapon States 16p280 Programs and Arsenals, p. 9 MGP, Phys. Dep. 2016
10 World Nuclear Weapon Stockpiles Source: The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientist Nuclear Notebook, written by Hans M Kristensen and Robert S. Norris, Federation of American Scientists UK France China Pakistan Israel India North Korea Tests Only! Other Nuclear Weapon States 16p280 Programs and Arsenals, p. 10 MGP, Phys. Dep. 2016
11 States With Nuclear Weapons in 2014 NPT States China France Russia UK USA Non NPT States India Israel North Korea Pakistan 16p280 Programs and Arsenals, p. 11 MGP, Phys. Dep. 2016
12 Global Nuclear Weapon Inventory 2014 (Important) NPT Nuclear Weapon States (Total Weapons) China: ~ 250 France: ~ 300 Russia: ~ 4,300 UK: ~ 225 US: ~ 4,760 Source: The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientist Nuclear Notebook, written by Hans M Kristensen and Robert S. Norris, Federation of Americsn Scientists 16p280 Programs and Arsenals, p. 12 MGP, Phys. Dep. 2016
13 Global Nuclear Weapon Inventory 2014 (Important) Non-NPT Nuclear Weapon States (Total Weapons) Pakistan: ~ 120 Israel: ~ 80 India: ~ 110 North Korea: < 10 Source: The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientist Nuclear Notebook, written by Hans M Kristensen and Robert S. Norris, Federation of American Scientists 16p280 Programs and Arsenals, p. 13
14 States With Nuclear Weapons in 2012 NPT Non-NPT 14 16p280 Programs and Arsenals, p. MGP, Phys. Dep. 2016
15 Nuclear Warheads on Alert United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research UNIDIR/2012/6 Hans Kristensen, Matthew McKinzie 16p280 Programs and Arsenals, p. MGP, Phys. Dep. 2016
16 Ballistic Missile Threats Map of ICBM Threats National Intelligence Council (NIC) Assessment) 16p280 Programs and Arsenals, p. 16
17 Ballistic Missiles: Range Capabilities for Different Countries 1000 km 5500 km 16p280 Programs and Arsenals, p. 17 Range
18 Reductions in Ballistic Missile Numbers After the Cold War Cirincione, Deadly Arsenals, p280 Programs and Arsenals, p. 18
19 Non-U.S. Nuclear Cruise Missiles 2009 Sources: 2009 NASIC Report, Arms Control Association 16p280 Programs and Arsenals, p. 19
20 Module 6: Programs and Arsenals Part 2: Arsenals of the NPT Nuclear-Weapon States Will cover impact of New Start in Arms Control Module The United States, Russia, the United Kingdom, France, and China 16p280 Programs and Arsenals, p. 20
21 Evolution of US and SU-Russian Nuclear Stockpiles USA SU/Russia Source: The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientist Nuclear Notebook, written by Hans M Kristensen and Robert S. Norris, Federation of American Scientists 16p280 Programs and Arsenals, p. 21
22 Evolution of US and SU-Russian Strategic Nuclear Warhead Numbers Source: NRDC (Nov. 2002) 16p280 Programs and Arsenals, p. 22
23 Evolution of US and SU-Russian Strategic Nuclear Launcher Numbers Source: NRDC (Nov. 2002) 16p280 Programs and Arsenals, p. 23
24 U.S. and Russian Tactical Weapons in Europe The U.S. is thought to have tactical nuclear weapons based in Europe, in the form of aerial bombs. Most are based in Italy and Turkey, but some are based in Germany, Belgium, and the Netherlands. Russia is thought to have about 2,000 operational tactical nuclear weapons in its arsenal. 16p280 Programs and Arsenals, p. 24
25 Tactical Nuclear Weapons in Europe 16p280 Programs and Arsenals, p. 25
26 Evolution of US Nuclear Bomber Forces 1 Source: NRDC 16p280 Programs and Arsenals, p. 26
27 Evolution of US Nuclear Bomber Forces 2 Source: NRDC 16p280 Programs and Arsenals, p. 27
28 Evolution of US SSBN Nuclear Forces Source: NRDC 16p280 Programs and Arsenals, p. 28
29 Evolution of US ICBM Nuclear Forces Source: NRDC 16p280 Programs and Arsenals, p. 29
30 Locations of U.S. Nuclear Weapons SSBN Silos Silos B-52 Silos Silos Silos Storage B-2 Storage SSBN B-52 16p280 Programs and Arsenals, p. 30 Frederick K. Lamb & Jürgen 23 NRDC, Where the Bombs are, 2006, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Nov-Dec 2006
31 2010 U.S. Nuclear Posture Review 16p280 Programs and Arsenals, p. 31
32 2010 U.S. Nuclear Posture Review 16p280 Programs and Arsenals, p. 32
33 iclicker Question About when did the total worldwide nuclear arsenal peak? (A) 1955 (B) 1965 (C) 1975 (D) 1985 (E) p280 Programs and Arsenals, p. 33
34 16p280 Programs and Arsenals, p. 34
35 iclicker Answer About when did the total worldwide nuclear arsenal peak? (A) 1955 (B) 1965 (C) 1975 (D) 1985 (E) p280 Programs and Arsenals, p. 35
36 iclicker Question About how many nuclear weapons were there at the peak? (A) 10,000 (B) 30,000 (C) 50,000 (D) 70,000 (E) 90,000 16p280 Programs and Arsenals, p. 36
37 16p280 Programs and Arsenals, p. 37
38 iclicker Question About how many nuclear weapons were there at the peak? (A) 10,000 (B) 30,000 (C) 50,000 (D) 70,000 (E) 90,000 16p280 Programs and Arsenals, p. 38
39 iclicker Answer About how many nuclear weapons are in the global inventory today? (A) 5,500 (B) 8,500 (C) 13,500 (D) 15,700 (E) 17,300 16p280 Programs and Arsenals, p. 39
40 16p280 Programs and Arsenals, p. 40
41 iclicker Answer About how many nuclear weapons are in the global inventory today? (A) 5,500 (B) 8,500 (C) 13,500 (D) 15,700 (E) 17,300 16p280 Programs and Arsenals, p. 41
42 iclicker Answer About how many nuclear weapons does China now have in total? (A) 50 (B) 100 (C) 240 (D) 3,000 (E) 5,000 16p280 Programs and Arsenals, p. 42
43 16p280 Programs and Arsenals, p. 43
44 iclicker Answer About how many nuclear weapons does China now have in total? (A) 50 (B) 100 (C) 240 (D) 3,000 (E) 5,000 16p280 Programs and Arsenals, p. 44
45 iclicker Question About how many nuclear weapons does France now have in total? (A) 50 (B) 100 (C) 300 (D) 1,000 (E) 5,000 16p280 Programs and Arsenals, p. 45
46 16p280 Programs and Arsenals, p. 46
47 iclicker Question About how many nuclear weapons does France now have in total? (A) 50 (B) 100 (C) 300 (D) 1,000 (E) 5,000 16p280 Programs and Arsenals, p. 47
48 16p280 Programs Programs and and Arsenals, Arsenals, p. p Frederick K. Lamb & Jürgen FKL, Scheffran Phys. Dep
49 SU-Russian Nuclear Warheads Source: NRDC (Nov. 2002) 16p280 Programs and Arsenals, p. 49
50 Russian Nuclear Forces (2011) 16p280 Programs and Arsenals, p. 50
51 Russian Nuclear Forces 16p280 Programs and Arsenals, p. 51
52 Russian Nuclear Forces 16p280 Programs and Arsenals, p. 52
53 Russian Nuclear Forces (2010) 16p280 Programs and Arsenals, p. 53
54 Recent Evolution of Russian Nuclear Forces Evolution of Russian total warheads is very similar to the evolution of US nuclear forces (because of START and New START limits). Unlike the US, for geopolitical reasons Russia deploys more warheads on its ICBMs than on its SLBMs. 16p280 Programs and Arsenals, p. 54
55 Physics 280: Session 18 Plan for This Session Midterm grades before the end of the week RE4v1 due Thursday March 31 st RPv1 will be due Thursday April 7 th News and Discussion Module 6: Nuclear Arsenals (cont d) 16p280 Programs and Arsenals, p. 55
56 4 th Nuclear Summit in Washington starts Thursday 16p280 Nuclear Terrorism, p. 56
57 4 th Nuclear Summit in Washington starts Thursday 2016 Progress report from the Nuclear Threat Initiative Progress has slowed assessed risk from sabotage on nuclear facilities 16p280 Nuclear Terrorism, p. 57
58 China s Nuclear Infrastructure 16p280 Programs Programs and and Arsenals, Arsenals, p. p Frederick K. Lamb & Jürgen FKL, Scheffran Phys. Dep
59 Total Chinese Nuclear Warheads vs Time Traditional Chinese nuclear posture: No first strike use limited assured 2 nd strike capability Source: The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientist Nuclear Notebook, written by Hans M Kristensen and Robert S. Norris, Federation of American Scientists 16p280 Programs and Arsenals, p. 59 MGP, Phys. Dep. 2016
60 Chinese Nuclear Forces (2008): 7,200 11,200 16p280 Programs and Arsenals, p. 60
61 Ranges of China s Missiles 16p280 Programs and Arsenals, p. 61
62 Chinese Nuclear Forces (2008): Currently: Modernizing nuclear forces to strengthen assured 2 nd strike capability road mobile ICBM launchers submarine based missiles See for example: China s Transition to a More Credible Nuclear Deterrent: Implications and Challenges for the United States Michael S. Chase in Asia Policy, July ,200 11,200 16p280 Programs and Arsenals, p. 62 MGP, Phys. Dep. 2016
63 French and British Nuclear Forces Source: The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientist Nuclear Notebook, written by Hans M Kristensen and Robert S. Norris, Federation of American Scientists UK France 16p280 Programs and Arsenals, p. 63
64 French Nuclear Forces 16p280 Programs and Arsenals, p. 64
65 U.K. Strategic Nuclear Forces Source: NRDC (Nov. 2002) The United Kingdom and France (largely) rely on a nuclear deterrent in form of a naval submarine based nuclear arsenal 16p280 Programs and Arsenals, p. 65
66 Module 6: Programs and Arsenals Part 3: Arsenals of non-npt and Emerging Nuclear-Weapon States India, Pakistan, Israel and North Korea 16p280 Programs and Arsenals, p. 66
67 Estimates for Arsenals in India, Israel, North Korea and Pakistan Source: The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientist Nuclear Notebook, written by Hans M Kristensen and Robert S. Norris, Federation of American Scientists North Korea < 10 16p280 Programs and Arsenals, p. 67 MGP, Phys. Dep. 2016
68 16p280 Programs Programs and and Arsenals, Arsenals, p. p Frederick K. Lamb & Jürgen FKL, Scheffran Phys. Dep
69 India s Nuclear and Missile Programs 1 India s nuclear weapons use plutonium India s first nuclear explosive device used explosive material diverted illegally from a civilian nuclear reactor provided by Canada Estimated to have produced kg of weapons-grade plutonium Estimated to have produced a smaller, but publicly unknown, quantity of weapons-grade uranium This quantity of plutonium is thought to be enough for India to produce ~50-90 nuclear weapons The FAS estimates that India has about 110 warheads India is thought to have the components to deploy a small number of nuclear weapons within days No nuclear weapons are known to be deployed among active military units or deployed on missiles 16p280 Programs and Arsenals, p. 69
70 India s Nuclear and Missile Programs 2 India s nuclear weapon tests Source: NRDC 16p280 Programs and Arsenals, p. 70
71 India s Nuclear and Missile Programs 3 India s nuclear delivery capability India has developed several types of ballistic missiles capable of carrying and delivering a nuclear payload Three versions of the short-range, liquid-propellant, road-mobile Prithvi have been developed Army (range = 150 km, payload = 500 kg) Air Force (range = 250 km, payload = kg) Navy (range = 350 km, payload = 500 kg) India has developed and successfully tested 3 medium range missiles Agni I-III, with a declared range of up to 3,000 km. The payload for the Agni III missile is assumed to be 1.5 tons. Longer range missiles Agni IV and V are under development. Prior to 2010 the main delivery vehicles where bomber planes 16p280 Programs and Arsenals, p. 71
72 Indian Nuclear Forces (2008) 16p280 Programs and Arsenals, p. 72
73 Pakistan s Nuclear and Missile Programs 1 Pakistan s current nuclear weapons mainly use HEU Pakistan stole uranium enrichment technology from Urenco; has since supplied it to many other countries of concern Is estimated to have produced kg of highly enriched uranium FAS estimates that it could have 120 HEU nuclear weapons May possess enough weapon-grade plutonium to produce 3 5 nuclear weapons Nuclear weapons are thought to be stored in component form, with the fissile core stored separately from the non-nuclear explosives Thought to possess enough components and material to assemble a small number of nuclear weapons in a matter of hours or days 16p280 Programs and Arsenals, p. 73
74 Pakistan s Nuclear and Missile Programs 2 Pakistan s nuclear weapon tests Source: NRDC 16p280 Programs and Arsenals, p. 74
75 Pakistan s Nuclear and Missile Programs 3 Pakistan s nuclear delivery capability Thought to have about 30 nuclear-capable short-range Chinese M-11 surface-to-surface missiles, which have a range of km Announced deployment of the Shaheen I in 2001 Tested Ghauri I (range > 1,300 km, payload = 700 kg) Tested Ghauri II (range = 2,000 km, payload = 850 kg) Displayed but never tested the 2,000-km Shaheen II Primary nuclear capable aircraft is the F-16, which can deliver a 1,000-kg bomb to a distance of 1,400 km 16p280 Programs and Arsenals, p. 75
76 Pakistani Nuclear Forces (2009) 16p280 Programs and Arsenals, p. 76
77 Pakistani Ra ad Air-Launched Cruise Missile 16p280 Programs and Arsenals, p. 77
78 Summary of India s and Pakistan s Ballistic Missile Systems Source: CNN (May 2003) 16p280 Programs and Arsenals, p. 78
79 Israel s Nuclear Weapons Complex 16p280 Programs and Arsenals, p. 79 Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Deadly Arsenals (2002),
80 Israel s Nuclear and Missile Programs 1 Israel s nuclear weapons primarily use Pu Is thought to have completed its first nuclear device by late 1966 or early 1967, probably using HEU stolen from the United States Is reported to have hurriedly assembled deliverable devices just before the 1967 six-day war. Is estimated to have produced ~ kg of weapons-grade plutonium Is thought to have enough plutonium to fabricate ~ nuclear weapons Is thought to have ~ fission weapons, FAS estimate: 80. (Some sources disagree, claiming much more capability, including modern thermonuclear weapons) 16p280 Programs and Arsenals, p. 80
81 Israel s Nuclear and Missile Programs 2 Israel s nuclear delivery capability Jericho I: short-range, solid-propellant (range = 500 km, payload = 500 kg). Developed with the French. Deployed in Land- and rail-mobile. Jericho II: medium-range, solid-propellant (range = 1,500 km, payload = 1,000 kg). Developed with the French. Deployed in 1990; currently has ~ 100. Land- and rail-mobile. Jericho III: intermediate-range, solid-propellant (range approx. 4,000 km, payload = 1,000 kg). Indigenous. Tested. Israel could also deliver nuclear weapons using its U.S.-supplied F-4E and F-16 aircraft. Israel could also deliver nuclear weapons using its cruise missiles (the U.S.-supplied Harpoon, range = 120 km, payload = 220 kg, or a new 1,200-km cruise missile). 16p280 Programs and Arsenals, p. 81
82 Summary of Israel s Nuclear Delivery Systems Source: Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (Sept./Oct. 2002) Dolphin class submarines, if nuclear armed, provide secure nuclear 2 nd strike capability. 16p280 Programs and Arsenals, p. 82
83 iclicker Question Based on the range of its delivery systems the nuclear weapons arsenal in Pakistan responds to strategic threats from A. China B. India C. China and India D. China, India and Russia E. Russia 16p280 Programs and Arsenals, p. 83 MGP, Phys. Dep. 2016
84 iclicker Question 16p280 Nuclear Terrorism, p. 84
85 iclicker Answer Based on the range of its delivery systems the nuclear weapons arsenal in Pakistan responds to strategic threats from A. China B. India C. China and India D. China, India and Russia E. Russia 16p280 Programs and Arsenals, p. 85 MGP, Phys. Dep. 2016
86 iclicker Question Which countries have Uranium enrichment plants that are monitored by the IAEA? A. Pakistan and India B. The Netherlands and Germany C. Pakistan D. India 16p280 Programs and Arsenals, p. 86 MGP, Phys. Dep. 2016
87 iclicker Question 16p280 Nuclear Terrorism, p. 87
88 iclicker Question Which countries have Uranium enrichment plants that are monitored by the IAEA? A. Pakistan and India B. The Netherlands and Germany C. Pakistan D. India 16p280 Programs and Arsenals, p. 88 MGP, Phys. Dep. 2016
89 North Korea s Nuclear Complex 16p280 Programs and Arsenals, p. 89
90 North Korea s Nuclear Program 1 History 1950s: NK nuclear research reportedly begins. At this time NK was a Soviet Client state and its nuclear engineers were largely trained at Soviet scientific institutes. 1965: NK begins operating a small research reactor it received from the USSR. mid-1980s: Concerns over NK s nuclear weapons program grow when US intelligence satellites reportedly photograph construction of a research reactor and the beginnings of a reprocessing facility at Yongbyon. 16p280 Programs and Arsenals, p. 90
91 North Korea s Nuclear Program 2 History (cont d) 1985 April: NK accedes to the NPT after a concerted sales effort by the USSR, which hopes to sell light-water reactors (LWRs) to NK for electrical power generation. These are never built, in part due to the collapse of the Soviet Union. 1986: NK publicly makes withdrawal of US nuclear weapons from SK a condition of its completion of the safeguard agreement required by the NPT, completes negotiation of the safeguard agreement with the IAEA within 18 months after acceding to the NPT, as the NPT requires. 1991: US signals it will withdraw its nuclear weapons from SK as part of its global return of tactical nuclear weapons to United States territory. (The United States had stationed a large number sometimes more than 700 nuclear weapons in SK as part of its alliance with SK and its Cold War strategy of flexible response to a possible attack by the USSR or its allies.) 16p280 Programs and Arsenals, p. 91
92 North Korea s Nuclear Program 3 History (cont d) 1989: NK is reported to have shut down its main research and plutonium production reactor for approximately 100 days. The US Intelligence Community judges that this was enough time for NK to extract enough nuclear material to build a nuclear device and to refuel the entire reactor Neither the US nor any other country takes any direct action in response to this development. Instead, the international community presses NK to join the NPT and come into full compliance with its obligations under the NPT and makes this a condition for further progress on diplomatic issues. NK is believed to have extracted enough Pu for 1 or 2 nuclear bombs. 16p280 Programs and Arsenals, p. 92
93 North Korea s Nuclear Program 3 Source: NRDC (April 2003) 16p280 Programs and Arsenals, p. 93
94 North Korea s Nuclear Program 5 History (cont d) 1992 April 9: NK finally approves its NPT safeguard agreement May: Inspections to verify the accuracy of NK s initial declaration begin. NK informs the IAEA it conducted a one-time Pu extraction experiment on damaged fuel rods removed from the reactor at Yongbyon in 1989 but extracted only 90 grams of Pu (< 1/40 of the amount needed to produce a nuclear device). IAEA chemical analysis indicates NK had separated plutonium in four campaigns over a 3-year period beginning in 1989 and that NK possesses more Pu than it had declared to the IAEA or to the international community. 1993: NK announces it is withdrawing from the NPT. 1994: US threatens war with NK. President Carter flies to NK and negotiates a nuclear agreement to avoid war. 16p280 Programs and Arsenals, p. 94
95 Key Elements of the 1994 Agreed Framework 16p280 Programs and Arsenals, p. 95
96 North Korea s Nuclear Program 6 History (cont d) 1994 October: The US and NK sign the 1994 Agreed Framework. A key goal of the Agreed Framework is for NK to replace its indigenous gas-graphite reactors with imported LWRs, which are good for electrical power generation but less useful for making bomb material November: The new Republican majority in the US Congress rejects the Agreed Framework and refuses to fund its execution : Execution of the Agreed Framework is plagued with political and technical problems and fails to make much progress August: NK launches a 3-stage Taepo Dong-1 rocket with a range of 1,500 2,000 km; 3rd stage explodes at ignition September: NK agrees to a moratorium on testing of long-range missiles as long as arms talks with the US continue. 16p280 Programs and Arsenals, p. 96
97 North Korea s Nuclear Program 7 History (cont d) 2000 September: US and NK resume direct talks in New York on nuclear weapons, missiles, and terrorism October: NK 2nd in command visits Washington, DC, meets President Clinton and US Secretaries of State and Defense October: US and NK issue Joint Communique: Neither government has hostile intent toward the other. Both commit to building a new relationship free from past enmity October: NK states that it will not further test the Taepo Dong-1 missile; President Clinton announces he will travel to NK December: Clinton announces he will not leave US to travel to NK during the constitutional crisis created by the Presidential election dispute; time runs out. 16p280 Programs and Arsenals, p. 97
98 North Korea s Nuclear Program 8 History (cont d) Secretary of State Colin Powell says President Bush will continue the engagement with NK currently in progress June: President Bush announces desire for serious discussions with NK January (post 9-11): President Bush labels NK part of an axis of evil October: Visiting US official publicly challenges NK, US claims NK has uranium enrichment effort that violates the 1994 Agreed Framework November: KEDO (Korean Energy Development Organization) consortium suspends fuel oil deliveries to NK, alleging NK has violated the Agreed Framework. 16p280 Programs and Arsenals, p. 98
99 North Korea s Nuclear Program 9 History (cont d) 2002 December: NK announces it is restarting its reactor because US violated the Agreed Framework, ends its cooperation with the IAEA, orders inspectors out January: NK announces it is withdrawing from the NPT. 2004: NK tells visiting US experts it has separated the Pu in the spent reactor fuel at Yongbyon and is making nuclear weapons, shows Pu to visiting experts. NK is believed to have extracted kg of Pu, enough for 6 12 nuclear bombs October 9: NK tests a Pu nuclear explosive device February 28: New 6-party agreement announced (see separate slide) April 5: NK launches a long-range rocket, is condemned by the UN, announces it will build its own LWR without outside help May 25: NK tests a second nuclear explosive device. 16p280 Programs and Arsenals, p. 99
100 Six-Party Agreement (2007 Feb 28) An important first step toward complete, verifiable, and irreversible denuclearization of the Korean peninsula and the establishment of a more stable, peaceful, and prosperous Northeast Asia. The D.P.R.K. agreed that it will, within 60 days: Shut down and seal Yongbyon nuclear facility for eventual abandonment Invite IAEA to conduct necessary monitoring and verifications Discuss with the other parties a list of all its nuclear programs, including plutonium extracted from used fuel rods, that would be abandoned The other Parties agreed that they will: Provide emergency energy assistance to North Korea in the initial phase Make an initial shipment of emergency energy assistance equivalent to 50,000 tons of heavy fuel oil (HFO) within the first 60 days of the agreement Five working groups will be established to carry out initial actions and formulate specific plans to implement the agreement, leading to a denuclearized D.P.R.K. and a permanent peace. 16p280 Programs and Arsenals, p. 100
101 North Korea s Nuclear Program 10 History (cont d) 2011 Dec 17 Kim Jong-un ascends to Supreme Leader of NK 2012 Feb 29: NK agrees to freeze nuclear program in exchange for energy and food relieve Apr. 12: Unsuccessful NK missile test leads to cancellation of food and energy relieve agreement May 4: Reports that NK has resumed construction of LWR for Pu production at Yongbyon Dec. 12: Successful test of long range missile launching satellite into orbit 2013 Feb. 12: NK tests third nuclear explosive device Jan. 6: NK tests fourth nuclear war head, 7-9kt, claimed thermo nuclear device 2016 Feb. 7: NK tests long range missile launching a satellite into orbit. 16p280 Programs and Arsenals, p. 101 MGP, Phys. Dep. 2016
102 Agreement Aid for Stopping Nuclear Work in February 2012 => 240,000 metric tons of food aid 13p280 Nuclear Weapons, p. 102 MGP, Dep. Of Physics 2016
103 Impact of Aid Famine in North Korea unknown number of victims estimates 600,000 3,000,000 in a population of 23 million Minimum needed to avoid starvation impact of food aid p280 Nuclear Weapons, p. 103 MGP, Dep. Of Physics 2016
104 North Korea s Nuclear Program 11 Recent situation (see the assigned reading written by Hecker) 2010 November: NK showed visiting U.S. experts (Carlin, Hecker, and Lewis) An openly constructed, recently completed small but industrial-scale centrifuge uranium-enrichment facility An experimental light-water reactor (LWR) under construction NK claimed 2,000 P-2 centrifuges in 6 cascades in the modern facility at Yongbyon (build with external help from Khan) Publicly displayed facility is sufficient to produce 2 tons of LEU/year, enough to supply the LWR under construction 1 bomb/year of HEU, if slightly reconfigured Experts believe NK has undisclosed centrifuge facilities at other sites, probably producing weapon-grade HEU. NK has fundamentally changed its nuclear strategy. New leadership under Kim Jong-un appears to continue nuclear weapons program aggressively. 16p280 Programs and Arsenals, p. 104
105 North Korea s Nuclear Program 12 NK s new nuclear strategy Appears to have abandoned its Pu program, shutting down its 5 MWe gasgraphite reactor and giving up on external assistance for LWRs Is attempting to construct an experimental MWe LWR of indigenous design as part of an electrical power program (probably not for bomb Pu) Major concerns about NK s new nuclear strategy Can NK construct its own LWR safely? Will NK s enrichment program lead to additional weapons or export? 16p280 Programs and Arsenals, p. 105
106 North Korea s Nuclear Program 13 Can NK construct its own LWR safely? NK appears to have no experience with key LWR design and safety issues. Radiation-resistant steels and stringent construction are needed to withstand the intense, long-term radiation produced by LWRs. NK has little experience with uranium oxide fuels and fuel-cladding alloys. The concrete reactor foundation is insufficiently robust. The concrete containment shell is being poured in small sections from a small concrete mixer. These safety concerns will increase dramatically if NK builds larger LWRs, because the risks would extend well beyond NK s borders. 16p280 Programs and Arsenals, p. 106
107 North Korea s Nuclear Program 14 Will NK s enrichment program lead to additional weapons or export? Bomb-grade HEU can be produced by slightly reconfiguring the existing centrifuge cascade NK has indigenous U ore and all the know-how and equipment needed to make feedstock for its centrifuge cascades NK can ratchet up the current nuclear threat by Greatly expanding its HEU production at undisclosed sites Increasing substantially the size of its nuclear arsenal Conducting additional nuclear tests to increase the sophistication of its nuclear weapon designs Exporting nuclear weapon materials or technology NK s categorical denial of any earlier enrichment activities, when they clearly existed, complicates diplomatic reengagement 16p280 Programs and Arsenals, p. 107
108 What to Do About NK s Nuclear Program? Top priority: prevent NK from expanding its arsenal or exporting its nuclear technologies Long-term goal: denuclearize the Korean peninsula Few options but to reengage NK diplomatically Hecker advocates 3 No s supported by 1 Yes: No more bombs No better bombs (which means no more testing) No export of bombs or bomb technology and materials Yes to meeting NK s fundamental security concerns What are NK s fundamental security requirements? Normalization of relations with the United States Energy and economic aid / Regime survival 16p280 Programs and Arsenals, p. 108
109 North Korea s Ballistic Missile Capabilities Source: NRDC (April 2003) Unha-2 rocket for Satellite launch derived from Tepodong-2 Unsuccessful test launch Unha-3 Test launches (unsuccessful) and (successful) 16p280 Programs and Arsenals, p. 109
110 Ranges of North Korea s Missiles 16p280 Programs and Arsenals, p. 110
111 Physics 280: Session 19 Questions Plan for This Session News Module 6: Nuclear Arsenals (cont d) Video Presentation: Kim s Nuclear Gambit 16p280 Programs and Arsenals, p. 111
112 Kim s Nuclear Gambit Video Presentation: Kim s Nuclear Gambit 16p280 Programs and Arsenals, p. 112
113 End of Module 6: Programs and Arsenals 16p280 Programs and Arsenals, p. 113
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