Application of Nuclear and Aerospace Industry Experience to Offshore Barrier Integrity Management

Transcription

1 Application of Nuclear and Aerospace Industry Experience to Offshore Barrier 8 th International Conference on Integrated Operations in the Petroleum Industry Bill Nelson, Mariana Dionisio, Sondre Øie, and Koen van de Merwe Trondheim, September, 2012

2 Background situation Continued occurrence and recurrence of major accidents across many industries -Three Mile Island (TMI) -Columbia -Macondo -Fukushima -Costa Concordia 2

3 Lessons Learned from Three Mile Island Pilot-operated relief valve 3

4 Lessons Learned from Three Mile Island Major errors in understanding and responding to the event - Operators were unaware that a critical barrier had failed there was no direct information regarding position of the PORV - Operators believed that the pressurizer was going solid pressurizer level instrumentation was misleading - Operators were unaware of the status of the core cooling safety function reference to a simple steam table would have corrected the misperception - Based on their training, operators turned off the emergency cooling system which had activated automatically Post accident changes - Critical safety function concept - Group of actions that prevent core damage or radiation release- e.g. core cooling, containment isolation - Accurate diagnosis of the event is not required - Provides guidance for the full spectrum of operational events - Complements event- and barrier-based perspectives - Severe accident Emergency Procedure Guidelines combining event- and function-based guidance - Analytic tools for assessing health of critical functions and selecting a success path 4

5 Response Trees provide guidance to select a success path to restore critical safety functions Injection point Route Pump Water source Heat sink Path number Severe accident procedures for Loss of Fluid Test nuclear reactor ca Preferred path Unavailable equipment 5

6 Resource assessment tree for monitoring critical function health, and selecting and monitoring a success path Function Mode Conditions Source Motive Path Success Criteria Guideline 6 Combustion Engineering emergency procedure guidelines ca. 1982

7 NASA Flight Control Room

8 Flight Control Room Crew MMT NASA s Approach to Integrated Operations CAPCOM Flight Director Flight Controller A Flight Controller B Flight Controller C Flight Controller D MPSR A1 MPSR B1 MPSR C1 MPSR D1 MPSR A2 MPSR B2 MPSR C2 MPSR D2 Multi-Purpose Support Room MPSR B3 MER A MER B MER C SAFETY CONSOLE Mission Evaluation Room MER Manager

9 Inside the Flight Control Room During Columbia Reentry 9

10 Lessons Learned from Columbia Foam Impact

11 Lessons Learned from Columbia Major errors in understanding and responding to the event - Mission managers were not aware of the breach in the wing leading edge there was no direct indication of foam impact or loss of structural integrity - Computational analysis was not conducted for foam impact on the wing leading edge - Requests to use military assets to image the wing were denied - Mission managers were unaware that the thermal protection critical function had been defeated Post accident changes - Forensic examination of foam impact and loss of integrity - Increased use of risk-based approaches for mission management - Proposal for Mission Success Framework based on critical function concepts for the Mission Evaluation Room 11

12 Looking across these events leads to the following insights for offshore drilling and production operations Offshore operators need three types of information to effectively prevent and mitigate major accidents - Condition of the barriers that can be used to control event progression - Awareness of the health of the well control and containment critical functions - Guidance for selecting a pathway to maintain or restore the critical functions A visual, intuitive common language is needed to combine these types of information for effective decision support in the operational environment Properly implemented, this language will support communication, consensus, and action across disciplines, organization, and geographical boundaries 12

13 Proposed solution: An Integrated Operations framework to combine barrier and critical function methods to support critical decisions Maintain critical functions Containment maintained Continuous and Safe Production Containment restored Detect and control transient Pathways provide guidance to restore critical functions Control leak Uncontrolled hydrocarbon release Maintain barriers 13

14 Representing barriers: Example bow tie diagram for loss of containment 14

15 Representing critical safety functions: Safety objective tree for a nuclear power plant Safety Objectives Prevent core dispersal from reactor vessel Prevent containment failure Mitigate fission product release from containment Critical Safety Functions Maintain temperature control Maintain pressure control Maintain mechanical integrity Challenges Slow pressurization Rapid pressurization Mechanisms Strategies Insufficient energy removal Fan cooler systems Spray systems Vent Noncondensable gas buildup Vent Recombiners/ignitors 15

16 A coordinated effort is needed provide effective decision support for offshore drilling and production operations Objectives: Combine proven methods from oil and gas, nuclear power, and aerospace to form a robust IO framework for operational decision support DNV is seeking industry partners to develop and demonstrate this approach - Internal DNV research programs on critical decision making, guidelines for BOP automation, and performance requirements for well control - Ongoing collaboration focused on well control with a drilling company and other government and industry partners - Next step - Develop a project through the IO Center to focus on Integrated Operations applications for production operations Initial Phase: Proof of Concept - Combine operational expertise from industry with risk management expertise to develop and conduct a pilot application through the IO Center - The pilot will refine and test the combined barrier-oriented and function-oriented approaches for accident prevention and mitigation, tailored to meet the needs of the industry partners Secondary Phase: Formulate the decision support and HMI solutions - Develop and test prototype decision support tools suitable for further development and implementation by IO Center members 16

17 Safeguarding life, property and the environment