Report on the 2012 JINSA Generals and Admirals Trip to Israel

Transcription

1 Report on the 2012 JINSA Generals and Admirals Trip to Israel by Lieutenant General David P. Fridovich, USA (ret.) Director, JINSA Gemunder Center for Defense & Strategies

2 I was one of eleven recently retired American general and flag officers who participated in JINSA s 2012 Generals and Admirals Trip to Israel, which took place from May 13 to May 22. We were accompanied by a small group of JINSA leaders and professional staff. By design, the JINSA Trip is an intense nine-day program that presents the participants with an extraordinarily candid look at the strategic environment and current challenges facing Israel, one of our most ardent allies in the region and on the global stage. This program brings American Generals and Admirals to Israel on an annual basis to be briefed by and have discussions with Israel s most senior military, intelligence and political leadership. It also provides the opportunity to observe military exercises and to visit key military installations. The delegations also travel to Jordan for meetings with the highest echelon of the Jordanian military and intelligence services. This year s trip took place against vast waves of upheaval in the region. The immediate activity included: 1. The upsurge of the conflict in Syria and fears about the security of the Assad Regime s chemical and biological weapons. 2. Iran s continued sprint toward a nuclear weapons capability and increased Israeli frustration over failed diplomatic efforts and economic sanctions intended to halt Tehran s progress. 3. Uncertainties over Egypt s stability and the future of the Israeli-Egyptian peace agreement. 4. The Arab Spring and its effects on Jordan. 5. The increased number and quality of rockets and missiles targeting Israel. 6. Concerns over the Palestinian s Naqba Day demonstrations. This year s participants included (last commands are included for identification purposes): Gen. Donald G. Cook, USAF (Commander, Air Education and Training Command); Adm. William J. Fallon, USN (Commander, U.S. Central Command); Lt. Gen. Emerson N. Gardner, USMC (Deputy Director, Cost Assessment & Program Evaluation, Office of the Secretary of Defense); Adm. Edmund P. Giambastiani, Jr., USN (Vice Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff); R. Adm. David T. Glenn, USCG (CIO/ Director, C4 Systems (J6) U.S. Cyber Command); Maj. Gen. Mike D. Jones, USA (Chief of Staff, U.S. Central Command); Lt. Gen. Mark D. Shack Shackelford, USAF (Military Deputy, Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition, the Pentagon); Lt. Gen. Guy C. Swan, III, USA (Commanding General, United States Army North); Lt. Gen. George J. Trautman, III, USMC (Deputy Commandant for Aviation); and Lt. Gen. Stephen G. Wood, USAF (Deputy Commander, U.S. Forces Korea and Deputy Commander, United Nations Command). This is an executive summary of my observations from Israel and Jordan. The officials our delegation met with are not named in the interest of providing a frank and accurate portrayal of their comments.

3 Executive Summary Iran Dominates the Security Conversation in Israel Iran s nuclear weapons program is of grave importance to Israel but is viewed as being merely of interest to the United States and others. Only once this is understood did we begin to fully appreciate the transcendent value gap that exists between the relevant countries and Israel. Efforts to halt Iran s development of nuclear weapons are best realized when all options are applied consistently, over time, with the ability to increase or decrease any of the passive and/ or punitive options. Israel understands Iran s predicament better than any other country at this time. The United States has, for all practical purposes, stopped thinking about the ramifications of a nucleararmed Iran. For the past 20 years, the United States ceased dealing with nuclear war issues. It is now difficult to find actual American experts in nuclear tests, nuclear war, or even limited nuclear war. Even terms and concepts such as 1st Strike, 2nd Strike, Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD), Counterforce/Counter-value Strategies, Prisoners Dilemma-Gaming Theory and Strategies are not just passé, they now have no meaning or completely different meanings than when they were applied during the nearly half century of the Cold War. America is out of practice and, in some grand way, out of touch with what matters to the remainder of the world. How does Israel go about making the threats much less about Israel and Iran, and much more about Iran and the international community and the other actors directly affected by the threat of a nuclear-armed, nuclear-war-capable Iran? At what point will it be too late for the other affected nations to help stop the Iranian ticking clock at what point will it become important to so many others but too late to do anything about these developments? Iranian leaders realize this and are counting on the world s inability to counter the inertia Iran has created. Iranian strategy is to get to the bomb as safely as possible, not as quickly as possible. Only with the heaviest possible pressure, consistently exerted by the world against all systems feeding the nuclear beast that is Iran s nuclear development program, does the region and the world have a reasonable chance to slow, though not stop, the program. These strategies, such as engagement, sanctions, covert operations, a very credible threat of military attack, regime change and containment, must be implemented simultaneously. Anyone who takes military action off the table undermines the other options. Multifaceted/Hybrid Warfare and the IDF Israel does a great job of tactically balancing its enemies in a myriad of environments. However, over time, how does an extended, expanded, protracted war on multiple fronts affect the state of Israel? It appeared to the delegation that the IDF was holding up just fine. It dawned on me at about day five that no one had used the term peace. Many briefers and officials made mention of periods between war, periods of relative calm, but there was little discussion of peace, or even the conceptualization of peace. 1

4 Critical to this observation is that, on the surface, it appears Israel is capable of dealing with a myriad of tactical and geographically diffuse challenges. But over time, what will be the effect? There is certainly a spending component to all this, a fiscal constraint. Today, Israel faces a myriad of hybrid threats. Both Hamas and Hezbollah have increased their arsenal of rockets and missiles (through procurement and local development) and improved their range and accuracy. Rockets and missiles are now considered legitimate terror weapons and they have the capability to hit every part of Israel. Gaza is a ticking bomb. After Operation Cast Lead, Hamas understood that it needed to prepare differently for the next battle. All six of Hamas brigades in Gaza are preparing themselves for the next battle with Israel. Hamas is disconnecting itself from Israel and the Palestinian Authority in the West Bank and connecting itself to Egypt. With Hamas headquarters in Damascus closed, the organization is re-organizing until the Egyptian political landscape is ripe. A new challenge for Hamas is the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), which poses a grave terrorist threat to Israel. The PIJ is supported by Iran and it is trying to fill the gap for resistance. Militarily speaking, there are now two heads in Gaza. Such terrorist activities have most recently been seen emanating from the Sinai. Hamas is using the Sinai as a launching pad instead of Gaza in order not to instigate Israeli retaliation against Gaza. Weapons proliferation and smuggling is of grave concern, particularly weapons from Libya and Iran. After the revolution in Egypt, many released prisoners also found their way to the Sinai. Egypt has never invested in the peninsula, and with no infrastructure and limited access to the center of the country, there is a dangerous power vacuum in the Sinai. Potential border attacks, kidnapping, suicide bombers, high trajectory shooting attacks, maritime attacks and SAM threat to Israeli aviation constitute the main threats to Israeli security. The Sinai constitutes a potential for significant escalation with Egypt due to Israeli response to terrorist attacks emanating from the Peninsula. Such concerns are closely linked with developments in Egypt. The Muslim Brotherhood (MB) is a terrorist organization. It may be flexible about tactics, but not about its strategy. The biggest challenge to the new government is the economy. The U.S. should consider investing in Egypt, instead of giving military aid. The Morsi government will need to deliver something, and very fast. Otherwise, we may see a second wave of demonstrations, leading to an extremist Salafist government. If the Salafis come to power, we can expect them to abrogate the peace treaty with Israel. This may put a lot of pressure on Jordan to do the same. Jordan is a key ally for the U.S. and Israel. Throughout the meetings, the Jordanians and Israelis were on the same message, drawing attention to the exceptional level of cooperation between the two countries. They also share the same analysis, concerns and goals vis-à-vis the region. The West should support Jordan economically and provide political backing to King Abdullah. The Muslim Brotherhood is gaining power in Jordan and challenging the monarchy. If Abdullah falls, an Islamist presence is the most likely scenario and this will further destabilize the region. The MB in Jordan is linked to Cairo and if the MB rises in Syria, this will also affect Jordan. 2 Jordan shares its longest border with Syria, and refugees from Syria constitute a major problem for both economic and security reasons. During the time of our visit, there were already

5 110,000 Syrian refugees in Jordan with Jordanian officials having limited information about their backgrounds and whereabouts within the country. These refugees are not in camps, but all over the country. This constitutes a potential national security threat for Jordan. On its northern front, Israel is dealing with two major challenges: Syria and Lebanon. The Assad regime has chemical weapons (mustard, sarin), biological weapons, rockets and missiles, a sophisticated air defense system, a strong coast-to-sea missile system and a large conventional army. What will happen to those capabilities once Assad falls? Hezbollah is guiding, supplying, and supporting the Syrian regime and is preparing Shia communities for the day after. Will these strategic capabilities eventually transfer to Lebanon? Additionally, the MB, Al-Qaeda and the Salafis are also key players in Syria. The Golan has been a quiet border for 38 years but this may change. Since the 2006 war in Lebanon, Hezbollah changed its deployment and capabilities significantly. But Israel has also adopted the lessons-learned from the war and are going back to basics in its war-fighting plans. Today, every village in southern Lebanon is a Hezbollah fighting position with rockets, antitank missiles and soldiers. They now have 30,000 militants, compared to 14,000 in 2006, and possess a very large arsenal of rockets. These caches of weapons are purposely placed in civilian areas to ensure the IDF will be reluctant to attack and otherwise constrain Israeli military operations. Iran provides terror tourism for Hezbollah and Lebanon. As we were observing the border, we could see Iranian flags everywhere. Many things may ignite this area, and it may be prudent for the U.S. and its allies to redefine UNIFIL s mandate to minimize such risks. The U.S. should also be cautious about how it trains and equips the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF). Similarly, U.S. training of Palestinian forces in the West Bank should also continue as long as it remains a security force. Hamas takeover of the West Bank is not beyond the realm of possibility, and the main reason for the calm today is Israel s operations flexibility, which allows for cooperation with the Palestinian Authority (PA). Although reconciliation between Hamas and Fatah is unlikely, a recent poll indicating that 40% of Palestinians living in the West Bank support Hamas is a worrisome sign. An Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank would likely lead to the collapse of the PA, and a Hamas takeover. Therefore, any peace agreement must be acceptable to the Palestinians in the political arena, and acceptable to Israel in the security arena. Subsea natural gas and oil discoveries off the Mediterranean coast have created a new border that Israel will now need to defend. Israel will need to augment its defensive measures for maritime terrorism and against missiles as well as manage competing claims by neighboring states over Israel s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). When one considers that the combined physical size of the energy fields is twice the size of Israel, it becomes obvious that the responsibilities of the Israeli Navy will grow. Continued de-legitimization efforts against Israel through efforts to break the Gaza blockade at sea further complicate Israel s Mediterranean border. Equally harsh is an unseen and unrealized fatigue in Israel to living in a protracted threat environment. Having cognizance of the operational environment in which Israel sits is critically important. Being able to change the environment or gain control of some facet of it is necessary to relieve the pressure that builds daily. To get ahead of this threat through realization and actions, getting into the hybrid enemies decision cycle isn t just necessary, it is absolutely vital. How does the United States help Israel (and Israel help the United States) achieve this? After all, many of the threats Israel faces are threats potentially heading to America. 3

6 America s Role in the Region The U.S. should continue supporting Israel in ensuring that it has the defensive and offensive capabilities needed to deter and fight its enemies. Ensuring and preserving Israel s Qualitative Military Edge (QME) is of utmost importance to the state s survival. American and Israeli cooperation in military capabilities is critical and should continue to include defensive measures, ballistic missile defense being the most important priority. Iron Dome, Arrow and David s Sling critically address the changes in missile defense environment. Additionally, investments in cyber security (both defensive and offensive), air superiority and survivability against terrorism are crucial. In the most immediate future, American and Israeli cooperation visà-vis Iran s nuclear weapons program is vital. JINSA has long argued that the U.S. should come to Israel s defense morally, diplomatically, and militarily. One of the key messages from the region voiced with equal fervor by both Israelis and Jordanians is that the U.S. must remain connected to the region. American leadership role in the region is critical for the stability of the Middle East. This is true vis-à-vis not only Iran, but also all the other countries and regions discussed earlier in this report. Israel Telling Its Story Israel has many, positive and important stories to tell. It appears that there is a less-than-willing international press waiting to write and publish these stories. It was observed that the IDF has a very professional public relations division. They are fast paced, accurate, and have the means to get out ahead of almost any breaking news story. But what about international consumption? What about building the narrative of what Israel wants to achieve by way of its neighbors, Jordan, Egypt, and others? It is a very delicate balance where being aligned and friendly to Israel could spell political doom for other players and other countries. Why is this missing link critical? Clearly, it begins to avail the truth to our wider audience and furthers the narrative that these issues being faced by Israel are issues of humanity and truth. Further, they become over time issues of a regional and international concern, by design and not by default. Concluding Thoughts These annual trips are extremely and equally important to the United States Flag and General Officers who participate and the Israeli decision makers with whom they engage. We can t help but understand more specifically, gather greater details on real life issues, and over the nine days actually grow closer to one another. JINSA s program is unique in its high-level access but more important in its ability to bring and keep our two countries military and civilian leadership that much closer over difficult times and even tougher issues. This engagement is truly one of a kind. 4