A Reading on the Iraqi National Assembly Election Results: National and Regional Implications

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1 ORSAM REVIEW OF REGIONAL AFFAIRS No.3, MAY 2014 A Reading on the Iraqi National Assembly Election Results: National and Regional Implications Prof. Othman Ali University of Salahaddin and Kurdish-Turkish Studies Center About the author: Dr. Othman Ali is Associate Professor of Modern History of Kurds at Salah Adin University in Erbil. He earned his undergraduate and master s degrees from University of Guelph and University of Toronto. He can read, write and speak English, Arabic, Turkish, and Kurdish fluently, can read French, Farsi and Ottoman Turkish, and French. On Monday 19, the Independent High Electoral Commission (IHEC) announced that 62% of the 22 million eligible voters had cast ballots. The results showed that the State of Law, headed by Prime Minister Nouri Maliki, was in the lead in 10 of the 18 provinces, with a combined total of 95 seats, followed by Muwatin of the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI) with 29, Ahrar Group of the cleric Muqtada al-sadr with 32, Kurds with 62, the Mutahidoun Group of the Sunni Arabs led by Usama al-nujaifi with 23, and Arabiyah list of the Iraqi vice president Dr. Salah Mutlaq with 10. The rest of the seats went to smaller regional parties and minorities. An analysis of the results: an initial reflection A close scrutiny of the results reveals that no radical change had occurred in the political landscape of Iraqi politics compared to the 2010 election results. However, the observers of the Iraqi scene have noted several points. Firstly, the election results confirmed that the Iraqis, by and large, have voted on sectarian and ethnic lines. In spite of numerous political and economic crises that had been deepening, the Prime Minister Maliki s bloc managed to win most of the Shiite votes in Baghdad and southern provinces and reverse the losses that he had suffered in the local elec-

2 A Reading on the Iraqi National Assembly Election Results: National and Regional Implications In spite of numerous political and economic crises that had been deepening, the Prime Minister Maliki s bloc managed to win most of the Shiite votes in Baghdad and southern provinces and reverse the losses that he had suffered in the local elections last year. tions last year. Reversely, the Muwatin bloc of Hakim s ISCI failed to keep the momentum of the success which it had achieved in the local elections only few months ago. Thirdly, the Sunni Arabs have lost a considerable amount of the votes due to the ongoing war in al-anbar province, the government restrictions on the movements of the voters in the six Sunni provinces, and the deliberate flooding of the Sunni Arab belt around Baghdad. Fourthly, the Kurds won more than 70% of the votes in Kirkuk province which may enhance their claim to the disputed status of that province. Fifthly, Turkmen also suffered losses, and this has been attributed to the division of Turkmen votes on sectarian line, the weak leadership of the Turkmen Front, and the fact that some Turkmen vote went to the popular Kirkuk Kurdish mayor who has paid in the past special attention to the improvement of basic services in Turkmen districts in Kirkuk. In Iraqi Kurdistan region, the Patriotic Union of Jalal Talabani has managed to make a surprise come back and eclipse its rival Gorran movement with 21 to 9 seats. It is noteworthy that the PUK had suffered a serious defeat in the regional elections only six months ago and was far behind the Gorran Movement. Sixthly, and finally, the secular Civil Alliance, led by Iraqi Communist party, managed to win 5 seats. Although modest gain, it is an indication of the beginning of the rise of frustration with the Shiite and Sunni Islamic parties, which have contributed to the rise of sectarianism since the fall of the Saddam s regime and have utterly failed to deliver peace and basic services. The reasons behind the elections results There are a multitude of reasons for the way the Iraqis have voted. First and foremost, Iraq is experiencing a heightened sectarian tension which is not a familiar phenomenon in its recent history. Sunnis sectarianism as crystallized in al Qaeda affiliated groups and the influence of Iran-backed Shiite extremism have equally contributed to this phenomena. 2 2

3 ORSAM REVIEW OF REGIONAL AFFAIRS: No.3, MAY 2014 Secondly, The Kurds feel that they have little in common with the Arabicspeaking regions of Iraq, except for a legacy of massacres overseen by Saddam. This memory refers to the past experience when as many as two hundred thousand Kurds were killed in the 1980s and 1990s, a period they call the Anfal campaign which is seen by Kurds as War of Annihilation. Erbil has been transformed by the new oil money and bears almost no resemblance to Baghdad. Therefore, it is no surprise that no Iraqi Arab party (Shiites or Sunnis) had won any seat in the Kurdish regions. Moreover, the victory of Maliki s bloc has been attributed to rigging, and his manipulating of residual Shiite fear of Sunnis, and growing sectarianism among the Shiites. Even groups within his Shiite alliance accuse him of widespread rigging of election results during the counting process which were carried out solely by the pro-maliki appointed employees and far from the eyes of observers or representatives of other groups, and in the absence of any inbuilt mechanism to ensure the non-partisan nature of these employees. Maliki s access to the vast patronage networks that he has established during the past eight years, and his control over the security forces (the army and internal and external security units) and the courts and judiciary were instrumental in influencing the election outcome. Nouri al-maliki has managed to consolidate his power, marginalize the parliament and independent institutions, control the military and security apparatus, subjugate the judiciary, and expand his political patronage at the expense of his rivals. While visiting Washington, in 2013, Salih Mutlaq, the Sunni deputy prime minster of Iraq, had this to say The whole security [apparatus], the intelligence office, the Interior Ministry (there is no interior minister), there is no defense minister, there is no real head of the intelligence office all of these places are being run by some people who have not been voted on in the parliament. So they are being run by almost al-maliki himself. 1 For instance, Maliki s State of Law bloc has the sole control over Iraq is experiencing a heightened sectarian tension which is not a familiar phenomenon in its recent history. 3

4 A Reading on the Iraqi National Assembly Election Results: National and Regional Implications Maliki was also able to tap on the Obama administration s short-sided Middle East and Iraq policies. The US administration rushed to his so-called war on terrorism and managed to alienate Sunni Arabs, and this made Anbar province a bastion of al- Qaida related terrorism. the Independent High Electoral Commission which oversees the elections in Iraq. His appointee Miqdad al-sharifi, the vice chair of this Commission, has been accused of many irregularities in favor of Maliki s bloc. All Iraqi groups have launched legal complaints about the way the Commission had carried out the elections and about the alleged rigging of the results. Even Maliki s close aides had voiced concerns about his growing authoritarian tendencies and monopolization of power. For instance, Ali Adeeb, a veteran politician and a leading member of the State of Law bloc, has complained about the way the election was conducted in Karbala, a Shiite holy city in Iraq. The latter was trailing far behind Maliki s two sons-inlaws in the votes and threatened to leave the bloc should he lose his seat. Furthermore, in order to rally Shiite support before the recent elections, and realizing the extent of his unpopularity due to the decline of basic services, the rampant corruption and nepotism, Maliki decided to start a sectarian war against the Sunnis in Anbar province. He inaugurated this war in Karbala in a speech with an explicit sectarian tone. He said, Our soldiers who are attacking the terrorist extremist groups are the army of Husain (the Shiite Imam) and the enemies are those who are fighting for Yazid. These two men were protagonists in Islamic history which subsequently led to the birth of schism among the Muslims. During the election campaign, he repeatedly accused his rival Shiite groups of being silent on Sunni terrorism, and he went as far as accusing other Shiite groups of being in collision with the terrorists in Anbar to destroy Iraq. Maliki was also able to tap on the Obama administration s short-sided Middle East and Iraq policies. The US administration rushed to his so-called war on terrorism and managed to alienate Sunni Arabs, and this made Anbar province a bastion of al-qaida related terrorism. Writing for the website of the Center for Strategic International Studies in January 2014, veteran regional analyst Anthony Cordesman said, It is the Maliki threat that actually reinvigorated al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) and gave the extremist group a toehold among some alienated and disenfranchised Iraqi Sunnis. Bad as Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) is, far too much of the evidence points to Prime Minister Maliki as an equal threat to Iraq and to U.S. interests. 2 The US support to Maliki gives him some credibility of having an international power behind him and this convinces some Iraqis that he is a strong man of Iraq. Reuter agency reported during the election from Baghdad that some voters still love Maliki and see him as their savior. The agency reporter stated that Maliki is still the strong man who hit al Qaeda inside their den of Anbar and the majority Shiites look to him as their savior from Sunni domination and terrorism. He s the man for tough jobs. 3 Can Maliki have his third term in office? It appears that Maliki would do whatever needed to be done to keep him in power, for the following reasons: his conviction that the Iranians would eventually support him, and his fear that should he lose his power, he would face many legal cases against him for numerous violations of the Iraqi constitution. However, the election results make Maliki s attempt to have his third term as Prime Minister extremely difficult. He has to address many concerns of the Shiite Alliance whom he had alienated. 4 4

5 ORSAM REVIEW OF REGIONAL AFFAIRS: No.3, MAY 2014 Besides, both Kurds and Sunni Arabs have repeatedly stated recently that they do not trust him and should the Shiite Alliance nominate him they will go their way. Sunni Arab leaders and the outgoing speaker of Parliament in Iraq, Usama Nojaifi, went as far as saying another Maliki term would entail the end of Iraq. Our people haven t harvested the national partnership, only the rattle of weapons, the language of blood, the education of revenge, the sectarian inciting, the displaced people, would lead to massacres committed against innocent people. 4 Expressing himself in a similar tone, Masud Barzani said His past record clearly does not warrant confidence. Should he manage to get another term in Baghdad, we have no choice but to ask Kurdish people for a referendum and all options are there. 5 To ensure his third term, Maliki needs to piece together 165 votes in parliament. His bloc has only 95 members. Based on his rhetoric, he wants to form a government of winners with a simple majority. He attributes past failures of his government during the past 8 years to the defects and flaws of the coalition government which tried in vain to appease the representatives of all groups. This approach on the part of Maliki has insurmountable challenges. Iraq has not yet developed a democracy based on merits and citizenship to accept a majority government. Besides, Iraqi constitution is based on what is known as a federal democracy which is run with the consensus of the important segments of the Iraqi population. Furthermore, the practice of governing in Baghdad since the fall of the authoritarian rule of Saddam in 2003 has been based on a system of confessionalism. This is similar to that of Lebananon. Under the disguise of forming majority government Maliki wants to reverse this practice in favor of a centrist government based on Shiite hegemony with token Sunni Arabs and Kurds added. This is an attempt at re-making Saddam s personalist style of rule, and an emulation of the experience of the authoritarian Shiite clerical rule in Iran. It is no surprise that Maliki had to travel Under the disguise of forming majority government Maliki wants to reverse this practice in favor of a centrist government based on Shiite hegemony with token Sunni Arabs and Kurds added. 5

6 A Reading on the Iraqi National Assembly Election Results: National and Regional Implications Political analysts and academics alike are often underestimating Iran s influence in Iraq. Iran enjoys considerable influence in Iraq, unquestionably more than any other foreign country and far more than the United States. twice to Iran in only two weeks to have the blessing of the regime there, and asking them to put pressure on the rival Iraqi Shiite groups to join him. Political analysts and academics alike are often underestimating Iran s influence in Iraq. Iran enjoys considerable influence in Iraq, unquestionably more than any other foreign country and far more than the United States. It was Iran that ultimately engineered Maliki s re-election as prime minister in 2010 by pressuring the Sadrist blocs to back him. It was the Iranians who kept Maliki in power in 2012 by convincing Jalal Talabani to refuse demands to call for a vote of no-confidence -a vote that Maliki seemed likely to lose. 6 Iran has many stakes to keep al- Maliki in power. In a clear defiance to the US and the West, and in spite of his numerous assertions to otherwise, Maliki has provided an air and land bridge to Iran to supply Bashar Assad s regime with war supplies. Besides, the pro-iranian Iraqi groups such as Asa ib Ahl al-haq (a group that broke away from al-sadr s Mahdi Army), Kata ib Hezbollah, and the Badr Organization, have been fighting in Syria in support of the Assad regime. These militias have begun to remobilize inside Iraq and are said to have infiltrated the security forces. These have free hand in Iraq to wage war of sectarian cleansing and sending militias to Syria. Longtime intelligence and national security columnist David Ignatius argued in The Washington Post that Iran has waged a brilliant covertaction campaign that turned al-maliki and Iraq into virtual clients of Tehran. 7 Maliki needs the votes of the Sadrist Ahrar, and Hakim s SICI, and votes of small splinter Sunni Arabs, and probably already has the 21 votes of the members of Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK). It is noteworthy that Maliki stated on the eve of election that he has assured pledges from some Kurdish and Sunni Arab groups to join his bloc in the formation of government. 8 However, all these are dependent on the goodwill of Iran, and the extent to which it will be willing to go to exert influence on the reluctant groups to test Maliki who has 6 6

7 ORSAM REVIEW OF REGIONAL AFFAIRS: No.3, MAY 2014 failed in the past to deliver any of his words with other groups. It is noteworthy that both the state Department and UN have declared that they would like to see the formation of a broad-based government in Iraq which will have representatives of all segments of the Iraqi population. This goes contrary to Maliki s plan and has apparently irritated him. On 23 May 2014, Sadiq al-laban, a leading member of the state of Law bloc, stated that these statements are unwarranted intervention in Iraqi s internal affairs and represent US officials unrealistic appreciation of the situation in Iraq. 9 There is almost consensus among political observers of Iraqi scene that should he mange to hold on to power for another term, the country will witness a meltdown with serious crises that may have cross-border consequences, and the eventuality of the emergence of a situation similar to that of Syria in Iraq is not excluded. Recently Washington Post s editorial wrote unfortunately, the voting appears more likely to accelerate than arrest Iraq s descent into the mass bloodshed and disintegration that has overtaken neighboring Syria. 10 Partly due to an absence of U.S. military power but also because of Maliki s sacrifice of Iraq s stability for his personal gain, Iraq is on a path to disintegration. If there is another Maliki term and he pursues similar policies, the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) may move toward secession and al Qaeda affiliate groups might become more powerful in Sunni areas of Iraq causing the disintegration of the country into three parts. The assessment that Iraq is plummeting rapidly towards civil war is shared by many domestic and foreign observers who blame that situation on the shoulders of al-maliki. As one international observer notes, in response to peaceful Sunni demonstrations in cities like Fallujah and Ramadi, he ordered massive military onslaughts. 11 For this reason, according to an Iraqi analyst, Zaid al-ali, the return of Prime Minister Maliki to power would only worsen the social and political divide in Iraq. 12 Turkey has important stakes in preventing the disintegration of Iraq. Ankara needs to be proactive in this regard by opening lines of communication with the United States and even Iran in order to allow the Iraqis to have an opportunity to elect a prime minister who is capable of taking Iraq out of an imminent civil war and preserve Iraq s territorial unity. Should the Iraqi Shiite groups stick to their declared policy of non cooperation with Maliki and resist Iranian pressure, Iraq has a chance to form a broad-based government to flourish as a democracy in the region. Endnotes 1 Guy Taylor, The U.S. is to blame for violence now spiking in Iraq: deputy prime minister, The Washington Times, 14 Jan 2014 available at com/news/2014/jan/14/deputy-iraqi-prime-minister-blames-us-al-maliki-fo/?utm_ source=rss_feed&utm_medium=rss&%7b%7b$par%7d%7d 2 Anthony H. Cordesman, The Rise of Al Qaeda in Iraq and the Threat from Prime Minister, CSIS, 13 Jan 2014, available at Jan 13,

8 A Reading on the Iraqi National Assembly Election Results: National and Regional Implications 3 Ned Parker, Iraqis vote on Wednesday as violence grips country, Reuters, 30 April 2014, available at 4 OnIslam, Volatile, Divided Iraq Goes to Polls, 30 April 2014, available at مصادر: إيران أبلغت الكرد بعدم موافقتها على )الوالية الثالثة مصادر:% 20 إيران% 20 أبلغت% 20 الكرد% 20 بعدم% 20 مو... al-aalem.com/2014/ 03/ 12 6 Dexter Filkin What We Left Behind», The New Yorker, 28 April 2014 available at Page=all; Al Arabiya, Maliki s crisis with Muqtada al-sadr, 12 March 2014 available at.. 7 David Ignatius, Iran s fingerprints in Fallujah, The Washington Post, 9 Jan 2014 available at prints-in-fallujah/2014/01/08/75db5f1e-77ed-11e3-b1c5-739e63e9c9a7_story. html القانون ل«بالدي اليوم «: ال عالقة لواشنطن بتشكيل احلكومة العراقية وليس بالضرورة أن 8 net/vb/showthread.php?t=78493&p= سيناريوهات% 20 على سيناريوهات على الطاولة» صحيفة العالم اجلديد 9 html.الطاولة 10 The Washington Post, Iraq s elections may accelerate its descent, 1 May 2014 available at 11 Raymond Tanter Snatching Victory from the Jaws of Defeat in Iraq s Elections, Shadow Foreign Policy,29 April 2014 available at posts/2014/04/29/snatching_victory_from_the_jaws_of_defeat_in_iraq 12 Al Jazeera English, Iraq elections explained, 30 April 2014 available at ORSAM is an independent think-tank specializing on Middle Eastern affairs. ORSAM seeks to diversify sources of knowledge on the region and establish a channel of communication between the local experts and Turkish academic and policy circles. Toward that end, ORSAM facilitates the exchanges of officials, academics, strategists, journalists, businesspeople and members of civil society from the region with their Turkish counterparts. ORSAM conducts studies on the regional developments and disseminates their results to the policy and academic circles as well as the wider public through various publication outlets. ORSAM publications include books, reports, bulletins, newsletters, policy briefs, conference minutes and two journals Ortadoğu Analiz and Ortadoğu Etütleri. Ortadoğu Stratejik Araştırmalar Merkezi (ORSAM) Süleyman Nazif Sokak No: 12-B Çankaya / Ankara Tel: 0 (312) Fax: 0 (312)