Advanced Active & Passive PWR. HPR1000 Overview. Sao Paulo, Brazil Oct, 2015
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1 Advanced Active & Passive PWR HPR1000 Overview Sao Paulo, Brazil Oct, 2015
2 Contents Overview Design Characteristics Proven Technology Engineering Progress Summary
3 1. Overview Roadmap of PWR Domestically-development & Oversea-introduction Construction of the 1st NPP (300MW PWR) Construction of 650 MWe NPP CNP600 Construction of CNP1000 R&D of CP1000 HPR1000 Introduction of Daya Bay NPP Introduction of LingAo NPP Introduction of VVER Introduction of EPR Introduction of AP1000
4 1. Overview Roadmap of HPR1000 R&D 1999 CNP1000 Gen II+ 157 FAs in reactor core Twin-unit layout Single containment 2007 CP1000 Gen III- 177 FAs in reactor core Single-unit layout D.-shell containment Other 19 improvements 2010 s HPR1000 Gen III+ Active + passive safety systems SA countermeasures Protection against external hazards Fukushima feedbacks Latest safety requirement
5 1. Overview 3 rd Generation PWR Satisfying latest nuclear safety codes and standards with advanced technology 3 Design Features 177-fuel-assembly core Single unit layout Double shell containment 3 Active + Passive Systems Residual heat removal from secondary side Containment heat removal Cavity injection and cooling 3 Enhanced Protection Capabilities against Seismic Commercial aircraft crash Plant emergency
6 2. Design Characteristics General Parameters Reactor core thermal output Nominal power Design life 3050 MWt 1150 Mwe 60 years Fuel assembly number 177 Refueling cycle 18 months Average Availability 90% Nuclear island layout Containment Single-unit Double-shell
7 2. Design Characteristics General Parameters Safe shutdown earthquake (SSE) 0.3g Load Following Capability Yes Operator nonintervention period 30 mins Plant autonomy Occupational exposure dose safety systems concept 72 hours <1 m Sv/reactor year Active+Passive CDF <10-6 LRF <10-7 Deployment site Fuqing, Fujian
8 Design Safety Principles 2. Design Characteristics HPR1000 design follows the Defense-in-Depth fundamental principles The redundancy, diversity and independency of SSCs have been improved significantly. Integrated application of active and passive safety measures for prevention and mitigation of accident, which can ensure the fulfillment of three Fundamental Functions and avoid the large release of radioactive materials in practice. 30min nonintervention-72hours autonomy-longterm EP
9 2. Design Characteristics Fundamental Safety Functions Realization 2. Removal of decay Heat Fundamental Safety Functions 3. Confinement of radioactive materials Safety Injection System Auxiliary Feedwater System Atmospheric Steam Dump System Passive Residual Heat Removal System of Secondary Side Feed & Bleed Reactor Cavity Injection and Cooling System Temporary water makeup for the primary and secondary loop 1. Control of Reactivity Control rod Reactor Protection System Chemical and Volume control system Emergency Boron Injection System Double-shell containment Containment Isolation System Containment Spray System Passive Containment Heat Removal System Containment Hydrogen Removal System Containment Filtration and Exhaust System
10 2. Design Characteristics Reactor Core 177 fuel assemblies, with lower liner power density to ensure sufficient core thermal-hydraulic margin Low leakage fuel loading scheme Advanced fuel assemblies, with refueling cycle of 18 months Advanced in-core instrumentation
11 Active + Passive Safety Design Active: proven and reliable 2. Design Characteristics Passive: no need for power Active + Passive: diverse approaches to perform safety function Emergency core cooling PCS CSP SIS CIS PRS Core residual heat removal SIS TFA Cavity flooding and cooling (IVR) CIS IRWST Containment heat removal Red: active Green: passive
12 2. Design Characteristics Emergency core cooling Core residual heat removal from SG shell side
13 2. Design Characteristics Cavity flooding and cooling (IVR) Containment heat removal 13
14 Engineered Safety Features 2. Design Characteristics Chemical Addition Tank Auxiliary Feedwater Pool Heat Exchanger Accumulator Containment Spray Pump Motor-driven Pump LHSI pump Turbine-driven Pump IRWST MHSI Pump
15 2. Design Characteristics BDBA/SA Prevention & Mitigation Measures Passive Containment Heat Removal Containment Hydrogen Combination RPV High-point Venting Containment Filtration and Exhaust Fast Depressu rization Passive Residual Heat Removal (Secondary Side) Cavity Injection and Cooling IRWST
16 Containment Failure 2. Design Characteristics BDBA/SA Prevention & Mitigation Measures Phenomena Hydrogen detonation High pressure molten corium ejection, DCH Long term overpressure Basement melt-through Station blackout Other Countermeasures Containment Hydrogen Combination System Fast Depressurization System for RCS Passive Containment Heat Removal System, Containment Filtration and Exhaust System Reactor Cavity Injection and Cooling System Passive systems, Diverse power sources RPV High-point Venting System, Habitability Design of Main Control Room, SAMG and etc.
17 NI building: Single unit layout 2. Design Characteristics Reactor Building Electrical Building Benefits of single unit layout Providing physical separation, reducing interaction between units Convenient for plant construction, operation and maintenance More flexible for plant siting Operation Service Building Nuclear Waste Building Fuel Building Nuclear Auxiliary Building Safeguard Building
18 2. Design Characteristics NI building: Double Shell Containment Inner shell: prestressed reinforced concrete with a leak-tight steel liner inside Outer shell: reinforced concrete structure Annular space: keeping negative pressure, collection and filtration of the leak Large free volume: >80,000 m 3 long lifetime: 60 years Withstand external events: large commercial aircraft crash, tornado, missile, explosion and etc.
19 Enhanced protection against external events Seismic input with peak ground acceleration of 0.3 g Protection against Large Commercial Aircraft Crash APC shell protection (for Reactor Building, Fuel Building and Electrical Building containing MCR) Physical separation of redundant systems (for Safeguard building) 2. Design Characteristics
20 Diversity of Power Sources 2. Design Characteristics Turbine generator During normal operation Two trains of independent Off-site power If turbine tripped Trains of diesel generators for each unit As emergency power SBO Diesel Generator In case of SBO Extra diesel generator DC Battery: 2hours and 72 hours
21 2. Design Characteristics Fukushima Feedback Additional emergency water makeup and associated interfaces Improvements of power supply: SBO (Station Black Out) generator Extension of nonintervention period More conservative seismic margin Spent fuel pool monitoring and cooling Habitability and availability of emergency facilities
22 Waste Treatment System 2. Design Characteristics Gaseous Waste Liquid Waste Solid Waste Discharge lower than environmental assessment limit Final volume < 50 m 3 /unit year Minimization of waste and environmental influences
23 3. Proven Technology Based on Proven and Verified Technology The configuration and operation of normal operating systems and active engineered safety features have been validated by long term engineering practice from existing PWR NPPs The design concept and technologies adopted for passive systems have been verified by natural science or specific experiments/tests The manufacture and supply capability of almost all key equipments/components is compatible with existing NPPs Benefiting from rich construction experience and outstanding feedback of operating experience, the construction period and performance of HPR1000 can be ensured
24 Passive Systems Verification Test 3. Proven Technology Passive residual heat removal test for secondary side Test of Passive Containment Heat Removal System Test of Cavity Injection and Cooling System
25 Other Verification Tests & Experiments 3. Proven Technology Flow-induced Vibration Simulation Test of Reactor Internals Seismic Test of Control Rod Driven Line (CRDL) Qualification Tests of Electrical Penetration for Double Shell Containment Aging Test of CRDL
26 3. Proven Technology Proven Equipment HPR1000 is an evolution advanced PWR from the operating NPPs. The equipment supply can rely on the current capability. Machining Plant Foundry Plant Forging Plant Founding RPV head
27 Qualification for HPR Engineering Progress Approval of General Design by NEA and NNSA HPR1000 general design was approved by NNSA and NEA after the co-review in Aug Approval by State Council, NEA and NNSA In Nov. 2014, PSAR review meeting was held by NNSA In Nov. 2014, the deployment of HPR1000 to Fuqing Unit 5&6 was approved by NEA. In Apr. 2015, HPR1000 Demonstration Project Fujian Fuqing Unit 5&6 was formally approved by the State Council.
28 IAEA Generic Reactor Safety Review (GRSR) 4. Engineering Progress In Apr. 2014, the Reactor Safety and Environmental Analysis Report of HPR1000 was submitted to IAEA; In Dec. 2014, HPR1000 passed GRSR with IAEA s positive comments. Independent Review by NASA Approval of Pre-Qualification on HPR1000 general design was issued by Argentina Nuclear Electric Utility (NASA) in Jun GDA qualification by UK agency and regulation In the future, aims to the GDA qualification in UK
29 4. Engineering Progress Demonstration Project Progress Contracts for long-lead key equipment have been signed FCD was achieved on 7 th, May 2015 in Fuqing, China
30 4. Engineering Progress Fuqing NPP Unit 5&6 Unit 1&2 CNP1000 Unit 5&6 HPR1000 Permission obtained to implement the pre-project work by Apr After Fukushima accident, HPR1000 was adopted for Fuqing Unit 5&6 Approved by State Council on Apr. 15, 2015 FCD on May 7, 2015 Unit 3&4 CNP1000 Bird view drawing of Fuqing NPP site
31 NI: structure and equipments 4. Engineering Progress
32 NI: building layout and equipments 4. Engineering Progress
33 NI: building layout and equipments 4. Engineering Progress
34 NI: equipments and piping 4. Engineering Progress
35 35 4. Engineering Progress Fuqing NPP Unit 5&6 General Design Basic Design Construction Drawing Done Done On Schedule Construction Drawing Reservation +6 months ahead
36 4. Engineering Progress Fuqing NPP Unit 5&6 Construction: FCD on May 7, 2015
37 4. Engineering Progress Fuqing NPP Unit 5&6 Current Status
38 5. Summary Safe Active + passive design philosophy Increased safety margin Digital IC and advanced MCR Improved configurations of engineering safety features Complete SA prevention & mitigation measures Reinforced protection against external hazards Improved emergency response capability Proven Normal operation system based on mature technology with rich operation experiences and excellent performances Proven equipments and manufacturing capability Mature design tools and data base Evolutionary technical improvements verified and evaluated by a series of experiments and test Economic Extended refueling cycle of 18 months High plant availability 90% Prolonged plant design lifetime of 60 years Construction period and cost under control Mature equipment procurement channel Advanced technology like integrated head assembly, LBB reducing refueling /maintenance cost
39 5. Summary HPR1000 is an advanced PWR which integrated advanced technical features on the basis of proven 2000 technology. HPR1000 satisfies the latest nuclear safety Mature codes, and meets the utility requirements of Generation III NPP. HPR1000 is a safe, clean, economic and reliable global energy solution.
40 Thanks for your Attention!
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