1 Journal of Automated Reasoning 24: , Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands. 165 Logical Cryptanalysis as a SAT Problem Encoding and Analysis of the U.S. Data Encryption Standard FABIO MASSACCI Dipart. di Informatica e Sistemistica, Università di Roma I La Sapienza, Italy and Dipart. di Ingegneria dell Informazione, Università di Siena, Italy. LAURA MARRARO Dipart. di Informatica e Sistemistica, Università di Roma I La Sapienza, Italy Abstract. Cryptographic algorithms play a key role in computer security and the formal analysis of their robustness is of utmost importance. Yet, logic and automated reasoning tools are seldom used in the analysis of a cipher, and thus one cannot often get the desired formal assurance that the cipher is free from unwanted properties that may weaken its strength. In this paper, we claim that one can feasibly encode the low-level properties of state-of-theart cryptographic algorithms as SAT problems and then use efficient automated theorem-proving systems and SAT-solvers for reasoning about them. We call this approach logical cryptanalysis. In this framework, for instance, finding a model for a formula encoding an algorithm is equivalent to finding a key with a cryptanalytic attack. Other important properties, such as cipher integrity or algebraic closure, can also be captured as SAT problems or as quantified boolean formulae. SAT benchmarks based on the encoding of cryptographic algorithms can be used to effectively combine features of real-world problems and randomly generated problems. Here we present a case study on the U.S. Data Encryption Standard (DES) and show how to obtain a manageable encoding of its properties. We have also tested three SAT provers, TABLEAU by Crawford and Auton, SATO by Zhang, and rel-sat by Bayardo and Schrag, on the encoding of DES, and we discuss the reasons behind their different performance. A discussion of open problems and future research concludes the paper. Key words: cipher verification, Data Encryption Standard, logical cryptanalysis, propositional satisfiability, quantified boolean formulae, SAT benchmarks. 1. Introduction Providing computer security in large open networks such as the Internet is one of the frontiers of computer science today [2, 38, 35]. Yet, providing security is not so simple, and many technical challenges need to be solved to provide the high assurance that such an enterprise requests. These challenges are sketched in the excellent introduction by Anderson and Needham  and require the use of partic- This is a longer and revised version of . It contains also some of the experimental data reported in  for rel-sat. Further details, problem instances, and the encoder program can be found at the URL: massacci/cryptosat.
2 166 F. MASSACCI AND L. MARRARO ular security protocols for communication [1, 19, 45] and advanced cryptographic techniques . Notwithstanding the amount of research and development work, the literature is full of how to break a secure... examples [10, 28, 43]. A protocol can be proven formally secure  and still be broken because the cipher used for its implementation has unwanted algebraic properties . So, the use of logical encodings and automated reasoning tools for the analysis of cryptographic algorithms seems to be the next step toward greater assurance of security. Yet, in contrast with the large literature on formal verification of cryptographic protocols (see, e.g., [10, 39, 28, 34]), we find little or no use of logics and automated reasoning tools in the proper cryptographic literature. Sophisticated and successful techniques such as linear cryptanalysis [33, 32] or differential cryptanalysis  use only statistical tools for solving cryptanalysis problems. The presence or absence of algebraic properties that may substantially weaken a cipher, such as algebraic closure, is often determined by ad hoc methods or huge experiments [12, 26, 45]. In the absence of formal verification, the properties of many cryptographic algorithms are subject to intense debates and speculations. Cryptographic key search has become THE search problem for many governments and large corporations, and the (lack of) resistance to key search is often the main concern behind the licensing of a cipher . Thus, a new field of potential applications comes to mind: Can we encode low-level properties of ciphers into logic? Can we do it in such a way that finding a model of the encoded formula is equivalent to finding a key so that AI search techniques can be used to validate the strength of an algorithm? Can we do it in such a way that other problems, such as cipher integrity or existence of trapdoors, can also be formally verified by complete automatic reasoning tools? Last, but not least, can we do it by using a feasible encoding, which might give hard-to-analyze formulae but not overwhelming? In this paper we claim that propositional logic and automated reasoning tools can be efficiently used to model and verify state-of-the-art cryptographic algorithms such as the (U.S.) Data Encryption Standard. Among the various possibilities, we have chosen to encode cryptographic properties as SAT problems for a number of factors that are well summarized by Selman, Kautz, and McAllester : First new algorithms were discovered, including ones based on stochastic local search as well as systematic search, that have better scaling properties than See, e.g., [45, Chapter 12] for a survey of the long-lived debate on whether the Data Encryption Standard has hidden trapdoors that would allow the U.S. National Security Agency to decrypt all traffic.
3 LOGICAL CRYPTANALYSIS AS A SAT PROBLEM 167 the basic Davis Putnam algorithm. Second, improvement in machine speed, memory size and implementations extended the range of the algorithms. Third, researchers began to develop and solve prepositional encodings of interesting, real-world problems such as planning and diagnoses, with others on the horizon [...]. Between 1991 and 1996 the size of hard satisfiability problems grew from ones involving less than 100 variables to ones involving over 10,000 variables. As we shall see, a number of interesting and challenging cryptographic problems are now at the border of tractability for SAT-based approach CONTRIBUTIONS OF THIS PAPER In a nutshell, we show how to encode the abstract, functional properties of a cryptographic algorithm in a suitable logic so that, for instance, finding a model of the corresponding formulae is equivalent to recovering a key in a cryptanalytic attack. Once the properties of the algorithm are represented as (propositional) formulae, we can use efficient and effective automatic (SAT) reasoning tools for the analysis and the verification of the algorithm. We call this approach logical cryptanalysis. To make our claims concrete, we show that by combining clever reverse engineering, advanced CAD minimization, and propositional simplification, it is possible to encode in propositional logic the properties of the U.S. Data Encryption Standard, DES for short, [36, 45]. The Data Encryption Standard, designed by IBM and NSA in the 1970s, is the current U.S. government standard, has been adopted for many financial and banking institutions, and is the recommended standard of the international banking transaction services. Although DES is currently under review , its widespread use and the fact that its security has been the subject of an intense scrutiny since its inception [7, 12, 33, 32] make the case study significant. For many years DES has been (and still is) the algorithm on which cryptanalysts tested the final success of their techniques (see [45, pages ] or Section 2 for a discussion and further references). Even partial successes with AI techniques might be of substantial industrial relevance. The encoding of the properties of DES that we have been able to generate is at the border of tractability for current search techniques: it is hard but not impossible. For example, the encoding of a cryptographic attack with a known plaintext (where finding a model is equivalent to finding a key) for the commercial version of DES requires slightly more than 60,000 clauses and 10,000 variables (out of this only 56 are independent control variables, the key bits). We refer only to the analysis of the algorithm itself and not to the verification of the program, software code, or hardware circuit that implements it. Thus, we are not interested in software verification and in showing that an implementation matches a specification. We are interested in showing that the specification itself does not imply hidden, unwanted properties.
4 168 F. MASSACCI AND L. MARRARO To check the effectiveness of AI techniques on this problem, we have used stateof-the-art SAT provers for cryptographic key search with our encoding. Here we focus on complete algorithms based on the Davis Putnam (DPLL) procedure [18, 17] and in particular on TABLEAU, by Crawford and Auton , a reference implementation of the DPLL procedure, SATO, by Zhang , which uses a sophisticated trie data structure for speeding up unit propagation, rel-sat, by Bayardo and Schrag , a combination of the traditional DPLL procedure with back-jumping and learning. In the experiments on the Data Encryption Standard, we didn t expect to be immediately competitive with twenty years of advanced cryptanalysis techniques, especially because AI labs are not equally well funded to afford a specialized hardware machine of USD, or the exclusive use of a network of 12 workstations for 50 days, which have been used to break DES in the last few years [16, 32]. Still, we were pleasantly surprised by the result: a general-purpose search algorithm such as rel-sat using off-the-shelf hardware (Sparcs and Pentium II) can solve limited versions of DES without being told any information on the structure of the problem. Yet, there is a lot of research work that needs to be done, since the commercial version is still out of reach for SAT-based systems, and on intermediate versions we cannot fully compete with the performance of advanced cryptographic techniques based on statistical analysis [3, 7, 32]. Still, we believe that this approach might be beneficial for both the automated reasoning and the computer security communities. For the automated reasoning community, it provides a set of challenging problems of industrial relevance ranging from satisfiability and validity in propositional logic to validity in quantified boolean logic. Thus we claim that this problem could be one of the reference benchmarks for propositional reasoning and search. We should not see such applications as tools for electronic criminals. Verification and cryptanalysis of ciphers are the common practice of institutions responsible for international standards and of cryptographic research. After all, before recommending an algorithm for encoding bank transactions, one may want to thoroughly test and verify it. Moreover, the encoding of Feistel-type ciphers like DES has the same characteristics of challenging hard problems such as the hidden parity bit problem mentioned in : defined and independent variables, a hierarchical and regular Local search algorithms such as GSAT and Walk-SAT do not seem to perform well on this problem. See Massacci  for further details. Note, however, that these cryptographic methods require large amount of data to be effective. See further in Section 2. Most security firms offer cash prizes for those who are able to break their ciphers.
5 LOGICAL CRYPTANALYSIS AS A SAT PROBLEM 169 structure, and large affine subproblems (i.e., formulae with exclusive or). As we shall see, such encodings give the possibility of generating as many random instances as one wants, and still each instance is as real-world as any instance that can be met in commercial cryptographic applications. Thus, we believe that it can be a first step toward an answer to the last SAT challenge proposed by Selman, Kautz, and McAllester . It is also an answer to the problem of generating hard solved instances discussed by Cook and Mitchell in their DIMACS survey . As our experiments shows, our encoding can be used to generate solved instances which are hard to solve, in contrast with the standard generation methods for solved instances. We exploit the fact that cryptographic algorithms are designed to be hard to crack. Our proposal follows the spirit of Cook and Mitchell , where it was proposed to use RSA for generating hard solved instances. For the security community, the formalization of the property of a cipher using logic might offer a simple solution to many issues regarding the strength of a cryptographic algorithm. Consider the hot debate about the existence of trapdoors or key escrow schemes. The formal proof that there is no universal key to escrow a cipher might be provided together with the algorithm. The proof might then be quickly machine checked for correctness by suspicious users. Even if finding the proof takes a long time, this can be done off-line once and for all. Also, to verify the strength of a cipher, one may test it for resistance against SAT solvers and thus possibly avoid the risk of becoming the subject of a how to break a secure... paper at the next crypto conference PLAN OF THE PAPER In the rest of the paper we recall at first some basic things about cryptography, how the Data Encryption Standard works, and some of the main approaches used for the cryptanalysis of DES (Section 2). Then we present the general idea behind logical cryptanalysis, and how different properties can be captured by this approach once we have encoded the functional description of a cipher into propositional logic (Section 3). The details of the encoding of the Data Encryption Standard are presented in Section 4, where we also presents some experimental data on the size and structure of the corresponding SAT-problem. Third, we present some preliminary experiments on the performance of the automated reasoning tools TABLEAU, SATO, and rel-sat for the simplest cryptographic problem that we can encode as a SAT problem (cryptographic key search This contrast, with the most common benchmarks for propositional reasoning and search, which either are totally random such as the Random 3-SAT CNF  or are fixed but have industrial relevance such as the IFIP benchmark for hardware verification . Our proposal follows the line of the work by Gomes et al. on generating structured CSP problems using quasi-group problems [21, 22].
6 170 F. MASSACCI AND L. MARRARO on a limited version of DES) and discuss the reason behind their different performances (Section 5). We conclude the paper with some topics for future research (Section 6). 2. Basics of Cryptography At high level (for a comprehensive introduction to the subject, see ), a cryptographic algorithm transforms a sequence of bits into another sequence of bits with certain (desirable) properties. So, if we denote three vectors of bits by P (the plaintext), C (the ciphertext), and K (the secret key) we have C = E K (P). The important property of this transformation, called encryption, is that it must be difficult to recover P from C if one does not know K. In most cases we have another transformation (decryption) that maps back C into P using K or another sequence of bits K 1, which is related to K. C = D K 1(P). If K can also be used for decryption, we have a symmetric cipher. The first thing a cryptanalyst may wish to do is to search for a key which produced a given ciphertext. This can be done by using only the ciphertext, or a number of known pairs of plaintext and ciphertext (known plaintext attack). This latter attack is not so impossible as one might expect: there are lot of standard parts in encrypted messages and files. In some cases it makes sense to assume that the cryptanalyst could choose such pairs (chosen plaintext attack). The cryptographic techniques we sketch in Section 2.2 can be classified along these lines. There are other, more sophisticated properties that are more interesting though harder to analyze. The basic one regards the existence of trapdoors in a cipher. For instance, we may wonder if there is an universal key to decrypt any message encrypted with DES. As we already noted, this has been the subject of an intense debate till the recent past [45, Section 12.3]. Almost all algebraic properties of a cipher that distinguish it from a pseudorandom permutation affect (weaken) its strength. A fairly simple property is the existence of weak keys, i.e., of keys K such that P = E K (E K (P)). There is little sense in encrypting things twice with a weak key. For instance, DES has an handful of weak keys [45, p. 280]. Even if no weak key exists, we may wish to know whether a cipher is closed [26, 45, 12]; that is, for any plaintext P and for any two key K 1 and K 2 we can always find a third key K 3 such that encrypting a plaintext with the first key and then with the second key is perfectly equivalent to encrypting it is just once with the third key. In other words we want to know whether E K 2(E K 1(P)) = E K (P) for a suitable key K. In general we may wish to find a key K that is independent from the plaintext and just dependent on the other two keys.
7 LOGICAL CRYPTANALYSIS AS A SAT PROBLEM 171 Figure 1. A round of DES. If a cipher is closed, this means that we cannot improve its security by encrypting things twice with different keys. Even worse, the cipher is vulnerable to particular attacks that make it possible to reduce the search space of brute force attacks to half of the key bits . Proving that a cipher is closed is equivalent to proving that the encryption transformations form a group. For instance, it has been proved with a huge number of cyclic experiments that DES is not a group . Another interesting combination of encryption with different keys is Tuchman s triple encryption scheme, which is an encryption of the plaintext with one key, its decryption with a different key, and its final re-encryption with a third key. Again, we wish to known whether we are better off than by using a simple encryption, i.e., whether E K 3(D K 2(E K 1(P))) E K (P) for all plaintexts P and all keys K. As a final example, we may wish to know whether a cipher is faithful , i.e., if different keys can be used to generate the same plaintext-ciphertext pair. In symbols we may ask whether E K (P) = E K (P) implies that K = K.Thisis important if we want to use the data as court evidence THE DATA ENCRYPTION STANDARD As the reader might now want to know how DES works, we start by saying that DES is a block cipher, which enciphers blocks of 64 bits (the plaintext) into blocks of 64 bits (the ciphertext) using a key of 56 bits. We give here only a simple presentation to make the paper self-contained; the interested reader is referred to  or [45, Chap. 12] for more details. The key is usually expressed as a 64-bit number, in which every eighth bit is used for parity checks and is ignored by the algorithm.
8 172 F. MASSACCI AND L. MARRARO DES and many other popular symmetric ciphers such as RC5 are built following a common architecture which is due to Feistel and his group . After some initial preprocessing, the following operations are executed: 1. break the plaintext in two halves, 2. combine one half with the key using a clever function f, 3. XOR the combination with the other half, and 4. swap the two parts. The combination of these operations is called a round. Figure 1 exemplifies the construction. In the case of DES there are 16 rounds (i.e., the above operations are repeated 16 times), which are almost identical except for the keys: for each round a different subset of the 56 key bits is selected and combined with the input of the previous round. The strength of the cipher depends on the way this combination function is designed and on the number of rounds. This design is, to quote Ron Rivest, part art, part science. Following the notation introduced at the beginning of the section, we use superscripts to distinguish two different vectors of bits and subscripts to represents the single element within a vector. So, in L 1, L 2, and as or, L i is the ith vector and not the ith component. The jth component of the ith vector L i is represented as L i j. After an initial permutation, whose purpose is to mix the input bits, the plaintext is divided in two halves, a left one and a right one. The 16 rounds in which the right part of the data is combined with the key can be described as follows: L i = R i 1, (1) R i = L i 1 f(r i 1, K i ), (2) where we indicate by A B the xor of the jth component of the vector A with the jth component of the vector B. After the 16th round, the right and left halves are joined, and a final permutation (the inverse of the initial permutation) finishes the algorithm. For each of the 16 rounds of DES a 48 bits subkey is generated. These subkeys, K i, are generated according a particular scheduling algorithm. Initially we divide the 56 bits key in two 28 bits blocks, C 0 and D 0, and, during the generic iteration, C i 1 and D i 1 are circularly shifted left of one or two bits based on the round i. This produces two blocks, C i and D i, that are joined and permuted to produce the 48 bits subkey K i. The round function f, which DES uses to mix up the key bits with the output of the previous round, takes as arguments the right half R i from the previous round and the subkey from the actual round. Then the 32 bits that compose R i are permuted and expanded to 48 bits and then xored together with the key bits: X i = E(R i 1 ) K i. The 48-bit block X i is then divided in eight subblocks of 6 bits each. Each subblock specifies an entry in a substitution matrix called S-box. Every matrix has six input
9 LOGICAL CRYPTANALYSIS AS A SAT PROBLEM 173 Figure 2. The round function f of DES. bits and four output bits; therefore it has four rows and sixteen columns. The six input bits specify in which row and column to see to find the four output bits. From the S-boxes we obtain eight 4-bit numbers that form a 32-bit block. The pictorial representation in Figure 2 should make it clearer. Substitution and permutation operations realize the properties that Shannon  named confusion and diffusion and that give a cipher its strength. So the S-boxes represent the most critical step that gives DES its strength [45, pp. 284 and 294] EXISTING CRYPTANALYTIC APPROACHES The simplest approach is exhaustive search: try different keys until the right one is found. Testing 2 55 keys on average is not easy unless one has specialized hardware or a large network of machines. This has proved to be finally successful in 1998: a specialized machine costing US$ broke the DES challenge posted by RSA Security in 56 hours . Although the search strategy exploited some of the algebraic properties of DES to cut the size of the search space, we can substantially classify it as exhaustive search. Differential cryptanalysis was introduced in the early 1990s by Biham and Shamir . It considers ciphertext and plaintext pairs presenting particular fixed differences. Then, it analyzes the evolution of these differences as the plaintexts pass through the rounds of DES. Using the differences appearing in the actual ciphertexts, different probabilities can be assigned to different keys. Considering Confusion is created using operations that make an output sequence non-linearly dependent on an input bits sequence. With diffusion an output bit is made dependent on a great number of input bits.
10 174 F. MASSACCI AND L. MARRARO an increasing number of ciphertext and plaintext pairs, a key will emerge as the most probable. Using this approach Biham and Shamir found a chosen plaintext attack that is more efficient than exhaustive search. For a few rounds this approach is still feasible, although it requires larger and larger amounts of data as the number of rounds increase. For instance, DES up to 8 rounds can be broken within few minutes on a PC if a sufficiently large pool of chosen plaintexts (50,000) is available [7, p. 6]. However, for the full DES with 16 rounds, this attack is only theoretical since it requires too many resources. To get the key, it uses 2 47 chosen plaintext. The time complexity of the data analysis is about 2 37 DES equivalent operations. If this approach is converted in a known plaintext attack, its efficiency is worse than exhaustive search. Matsui s linear cryptanalysis [32, 33] works better. This method uses linear approximations (xor) to describe the behavior of a block cipher. By xoring together some plaintext bits with some ciphertext bits, one can get a bit that is the xor of some key bits. This is a linear approximation of a round that is correct with a certain probability. Using an increasing number of plaintext and related ciphertexts, it is possible to guess the value of some key bits. If more data is analyzed, the guess is more reliable. To identify a good linear approximation for DES, it is necessary to find good linear approximations for each round, and then join them together. The base attack uses the best linear approximations for 16-rounds DES, and 2 27 known plaintexts, returning two key bits. A refinement of this method uses the linear approximations of 14 rounds and then guesses the input and output values of the first and last rounds of DES. It can find 26 key bits and for the remaining bits uses exhaustive search. An experimental analysis by Matsui  showed that is possible to get the key of the full version of DES in 50 days using a network of workstations. Davie (unpublished) proposed a potential attack on DES based on the nonuniformity of the distribution of the output of pairs of adjacent S-boxes. This attack is theoretical and requires known plaintexts to discover two key bits. The improved Davie s attack  finds 24 key bits by applying the analysis twice, one considering the odd rounds and the other considering the even rounds. The remaining 32 bits can be found by exhaustive search. The improved version is able to break DES faster than exhaustive search. 3. Logical Cryptanalysis The main intuition behind logical cryptanalysis is that we should view each bit sequence P, C, K as a sequence of propositional variables P, C, K, in which every variable is true when the corresponding bit is 1 and false when it is 0. Then we simply need to encode the properties of the cryptographic algorithm with a logical formula E(P,K,C), which is true if and only if for the corresponding sequences of bits we have that C = E K (P) holds. Propositional logic is the
11 LOGICAL CRYPTANALYSIS AS A SAT PROBLEM 175 straightforward choice, but other logics (such as temporal logic) might give a more compact encoding. The intuition behind logical cryptanalysis is as simple as that. Once we have the formula describing the cipher, the cryptanalysis problems we have described can be easily formalized. However, before going forward to the examples, we need to notice that if E(P,K,C) holds there is no guarantee that E(C,K,P) holds too. E(C,K,P) does not model the fact that we can obtain P by decrypting C using K. Evenfor symmetric ciphers, where the same key is used for encryption and decryption, the algorithm used for decryption is slightly different from the algorithm used for encryption (e.g., in DES we need to change the key scheduling). This slight difference is sufficient to make the formula D(C,K,P)slightly different from E(C,K,P). To model key search, letv C be the truth values (true/false) of the available ciphertext. To find a key with a ciphertext only-attack, it is enough to find a model of E(P,K,v C ). In a known plaintext attack, we also know the values v P of the propositional variables P. So, we only need to search for a model of E(v P,K,v C ). For reason of space efficiency we may need to introduce more variables in E(P,K,C) besides C, P and K to make use of abbreviations and definitions. Indeed, this is what we have done in the encoding of DES in Section 4. Still, if the encoding is well made, then K,C, andp should be the only control variables of the problem; i.e., fixing their values should determine the values of all other variables. Thus, in E(v P,K,v C ) the interesting variables are only K. For instance, in the case of the DES encoding we have only 56 control variables. If we have n plaintext and ciphertext pairs, we can constrain the search further by conjoining the corresponding formulae n E(vP i,k,vi C ). i=1 We can thus encode cryptographic key search as a satisfiability problem. In this way we can generate easily solved instances that might be very hard to solve: we generate randomly a key K and a plaintext P. Then we use the cryptographic algorithm itself to generate C = E K (P). Finally we substitute in E(P,K,C) the corresponding Boolean values v P and v C that we have so far generated. Then the pair v K, E(v P,K,v C ) gives a solved instance of the satisfiability problem. If the encoding is well designed, one could also use E(v P,v K,C) and unit propagation to obtain v C. Our encoding satisfies this property, but using the original encryption algorithm is much faster. Finding a model (v K or another assignment) is then equivalent to break the cipher with a known plaintext attack that uses only one or few plaintext/ciphertext pair. Since the ciphers are designed to be hard to break, this will provide us with the hard solved instances asked for by Cook and Mitchell . For the analysis of the strength of a cipher, we are often interested in other important properties that can be encoded as SAT problems or at worst as quantified
12 176 F. MASSACCI AND L. MARRARO Boolean formulae (QBF) [9, 11]. For instance, if we use QBF, finding a key would correspond to a constructive proof of ( n K. E(vC i,k,vi P ). ) i=1 The simplest property (but for importance) that can be encoded as a SAT problem is the property that a cipher is faithful : for any pair of plaintext and ciphertext there is only one key that could have produced them. This property is captured by the following formula: ( ) E(P,K,C) E(P, K,C) K i K i. In the case of DES, by analyzing the algorithm it is possible to detect some (six) key pairs K and K that do not satisfy this property. They are called semi-weak keys. It is not known whether they are the only ones (see, e.g., [45, p. 281]). In some cases (e.g., when discussing the value of encrypted evidence in a court case), we may be interested in knowing whether a semi-weak key exists for given plaintexts and ciphertexts. This problem is just a slightly harder variant of the key search problem: we want to know whether E(v P,K,v C ) has a unique solution. Another problem that can be expressed as a SAT problem is the (non) existence of weak keys: we want to prove that E K (E K (P)) P for all values of P. Ifwe denote the result of the first encryption by C, this property can be captured by the propositional formula below: E(P,K,C) E(C,K,P). If the formula above is propositionally valid, then no weak key exists for all values of the plaintext. We can restrict it further by looking at particular instances of v P or v K, if we suspect v K to be a weak key. Since DES has few weak keys, this problem has a known answer. It might be interesting to see whether SAT-based approaches can find other weak keys automatically. If the strong property above is not valid, we can weaken it by using a 2-QBF formula. Now we just require that for every key there is at least a plaintext that is not mapped into itself. K. P.(E(P,K,C) E(C, K, P )). Notice that we do not need to quantify over C: it should be uniquely determined by the values of K and P if the encoding is well designed. If we want to prove that a cipher is not closed, the formula we have to prove is slightly more complicated. Recall that we have to prove that for any pair of keys For instance, including the parity bits (every eighth bit), the keys 01FE 01FE 01FE 01FE and FE01 FE01 FE01 FE01 are a pair of semi-weak keys. i
13 LOGICAL CRYPTANALYSIS AS A SAT PROBLEM 177 K 1 and K 2 we can never find a third key K such that E K 2(E K 1(P)) = E K (P). If we denote by C 1 the result of the first encryption and by C the result of the final encryption, we get the following formula: ( E(P, K 1,C 1 ) E(C 1,K 2,C) ) E(P,K,C). If this formula is valid, then the cipher is not closed: encrypting twice (with different keys) is better than encrypting once. Notice that this property has never been formally proven for DES. There is only an indirect proof based on cyclic experiments  of the weaker property that the encryption with DES does not form a group, which is equivalent to the following one: K 1 K 2. K P. ( E(P, K 1,C 1 ) E(C 1,K 2,C) ) E(P,K,C). Proving that Tuchman s triple encryption is stronger than single encryption can also be done by proving the following formula: ( E(P, K 1,C 1 ) D(C 1,K 2,C 2 ) E(C 2,K 3,C) ) E(P,K,C). This property can also be weakened using QBF. Theexistence of universal keys which can decrypt all traffic can be characterized by a QBF formula. If we denote by C the result of the encryption, we have K u. K. P. ( E(P,K,C) D(C, K u,p) ). Of course, we might be more interested in the negation of this formula, i.e., in proving that no universal key exists. It is easy to check that if a cipher is faithful, then no universal key exists. Among these problems, we believe that the encoding of key search as a SAT problem deserves particular attention as a SAT benchmark. The main advantage behind our proposal is the combination of the seemingly contrasting needs of using real-world problems (possibly with a lot of structures) and of generating a huge number of instances which can only be (pseudo) randomly generated. Real problems are important because solving them is what one expects from SAT solvers. Yet, dealing with them is not simple : Care must be taken when experimenting with real world instances because the number of instances available for experimentation is often limited. Crawford and Auton  noted that working with random instances might be preferable because [...] random problems are readily available in any given size and virtually inexhaustible numbers. For example,...[their experiments] required several million problems and it is hard to imagine collecting that many problems any other way.
14 178 F. MASSACCI AND L. MARRARO Our main point is that by changing the plaintext and the key we can generate as many solved instances as we want. If we encode the full-fledged version of the cryptographic algorithm (such as the Data Encryption Standard), each instance would be identical to an actual plaintext and ciphertext used by a bank, financial institution, or government department. In the case of the Data Encryption Standard we can generate instances that are fairly enough. Indeed, if we consider the encryption of binary or compressed data, we can substantially span the whole message space. If we restrict ourselves to ASCII plaintexts, the number of different plaintexts shifts from 2 64 to 2 56, since every 8th bit of the 64 message bits will be fixed. To generate unsatisfiable instances, it is sufficient to generate a plaintext and ciphertext pair and then give it to the encoder together with a wrong ciphertext (by randomly flipping few bits). Our experimental analysis (Section 5) on the Data Encryption Standard shows that few rounds or few plaintext and ciphertext pairs are sufficient to constraint the search to only one model. Changing one bit of the ciphertext would make the problem unsatisfiable. Of course, the hard part is getting a manageable translation. We have done this for the Data Encryption Standard. 4. Encoding the Data Encryption Standard The generation of the formula E(C,K,P)that describes the logical characteristics of DES has been a substantial operation of reverse logical engineering. The straightforward approach would be describing the VLSI circuit implementing DES and transforming the circuit into a logical formula. Unfortunately, the resulting formula is too big to be of any use. Our basic idea is to walk through the DES algorithm, generating along the way the formulae corresponding to each operation that DES performs, with a clever trick. The trick to obtain manageable formulae is that not all stages of DES should be explicitly represented by a circuit and then encoded as formulae. Whenever possible, operations should be executed directly on the propositional variables representing the input bits. For instance, a permutation is not encoded; rather we execute the permutation of the input bits and provide as output the permuted propositional variables. Intuitively, to generate the encoding our programs must transform into Boolean formulae the fixed matrix operations corresponding to the round function f (Figure 2), and minimize them off-line using state-of-theart CAD tools; encode each bit of the ciphertext, the plaintext and the key as a propositional variable; simulate the DES algorithm, and generate formulae corresponding to each DES operation on the way by
15 LOGICAL CRYPTANALYSIS AS A SAT PROBLEM 179 encoding complex transformations (previously minimized off-line); encoding exclusive or and equivalences; calculating simple operations and permutations; if requested, read from files the known values of the plaintext and ciphertext and substitute the corresponding Boolean values in the formula; finally, simplify the formula, propagate and eliminate Boolean values, equivalences, duplicate variables, tautological or inessential clauses, and so furth. This process can be logically divided in three parts, one dealing with the general structure of Feistel-like ciphers, one dealing with the permutations and the key scheduling, one treating the S-boxes ENCODING THE GENERAL FEISTEL ARCHITECTURE The encoding of the general Feistel-like structure of DES is straightforward. For every round i of the algorithm we generate the formulae L i j Ri 1 j, j = 1,...,32, Rj i Li 1 j Fj i, j = 1,...,32, Xj i E(Ri 1 ) j Kj i, j 1,...,48, Fj i P(Si ) j, j = 1,...,32. In the previous formulae, the expression E(R i 1 ) represents a permutation and an extension from 32 to 48 bits of the initial vector of 32 propositional variables represented by R i 1. In practice this means that some variables in R i are duplicated. The expression P(S i ) represents the permutation of the S-boxes outputs. The vector of variables F i is the output of the f function. The vector of propositional variables K i represents the ith subset of the initial key that is chosen by the algorithm for each round. In the future we plan to study some possibility of off-line minimization for these formulae, using the CAD minimization tool we have used for the generation of the S-boxes in Section 4.3, since they are common to many other ciphers and are repeated for many rounds ENCODING PERMUTATIONS AND THE KEY SCHEDULING The encoding of the permutations and the generation of the subkeys K i have been the subject of the trick we mentioned at the beginning of the section. So, let M be a permutation matrix and A the vector of propositional variables to be permuted. If m j is the element j in the matrix M, then the variable M j representing the element j of the matrix M will be equal to the variable A mj representing the element m j of the vector A. Then we can simply consider the permuted variables as the input of the next stage of the algorithm.
16 180 F. MASSACCI AND L. MARRARO To generate the subkey K i we consider a 64-element vector in which every element is an integer representing the index of the variable that locates a particular key bit. The DES algorithm applies a permutation (the one that eliminates eight parity bits) and reduces these elements to 56. These 56 elements are divided in two halves, and the shift operation is performed for each round. The two shifted parts are then joined and permuted again to give the subkey. To encode the shift operation, suppose that the number of shifts that have to take place at round i is denoted by s i. Then, for each element in the vector to be shifted we calculate the position p j with (j = 1,...,28) that each element occupies in the shifted vector. The new positions can be obtained using the following algorithm: 1. p j = (j s i). 2. If p j 0 then p j = 28 p j else p j = p j. With the new positions, the shift can be encoded as a permutation. For instance, suppose that the processed round is the first round. Then s i is equal to 1, and one of the two vectors containing half of the key bits to be shifted is C 0 : [ ]. Using the previous criteria it is possible to see that j = 1 p 1 = 1 1 = 0 p 1 = 28 j = 2 p 2 = 2 1 = 1 p 2 = 1. j = 28 p 28 = 28 1 = 27 p 28 = 27 In this way we have obtained a permutation vector that has to be applied to C 0. Performing this permutation we obtain the shifted vector C 1 : [ ]. In the final formula, rather than adding a formula corresponding to the permutation relating the input variables K 1,K 2,...,K 64 and the output variables of the permutation circuit K1 2,K2 2,...,K2 64 and then using the output variables K1 2,Ki 2,...in the rest of the circuit, we use the corresponding permuted variables K 49,K 41, etc. This is the twist that makes the encoding feasible ENCODING THE S-BOXES The fundamental problem in processing the S-boxes is to determine a representation that is adequate to translate these matrices into formulae. The simplest approach is to use programmable logic arrays (PLAs) since these matrices are addressed by bits and their entries are bits too. Once every S-box is represented as a PLA, we get formulae of this kind: 48 Mkh i ±Xjkh i, k = 1,...,max M ih j=1
17 LOGICAL CRYPTANALYSIS AS A SAT PROBLEM 181 max M ih Sh i j=k 1 M i k j h, h = 1,...,32, where M i are the minterms generated in the round i, the vector of propositional variables S i represents the 32 output bits of the S-boxes for the round i, and max M ih is the number of minterms generated in the round i for the hth output bit of the S-boxes. If we do this translation without using minimization techniques, we introduce a lot of redundant minterms, which make the search harder. To minimize the PLAs representing the S-boxes, we used a CAD program for PLA minimization [42, 41] named Espresso, a minimization tool for two-level binary functions and multiple-valued logic functions. Espresso accepts as input a two-level description of a Boolean function. This function is represented as a character matrix with keywords embedded in the input to specify the size of the matrix and the logical format of the input function. In our case we automatically generate the inputs for Espresso from the standard S-box descriptions. We tried two different approaches to minimization. In the first one every S-box was considered as a single PLA with multiple valued outputs. In the second one we modeled each output bit of each S-box as a separate PLA and minimized each PLA independently. The rationale behind the first choice is that we expected to have minterms common to different outputs. In the first case we have 8 PLAs with six input variables and four output variables. After the minimization, the entries of the matrixes are reduced from 64 to 52 (51 for the eighth S-box). The distribution is presented in the first four columns of Table I. The column represents each S-box outputs. Considering each output bit of an S-box as a single output we got 32 PLAs with six input variables and one output variable. With this kind of minimization we obtain a further improvement in terms of the number of minterms associated with each output and the average number of variables associated with each minterm. The distribution of the number of minterms is presented in the last four columns of Table I. As for the number of variables, we note that in the first case we have on average variables per minterm and in the second case variables per minterm. Clearly, we have chosen the second approach for the final generation BUILDING THE FINAL FORMULA After every step of DES has been encoded, we obtain a set of formulae whose conjunction is exactly the formula E(C,K,P) that characterizes DES. To give an intuitive feeling of how it looks we present a sketch in Figure 3. For sake of readability, we have dropped the subscript corresponding to single bits and use only the superscript i to indicate the ith round of DES.
18 182 F. MASSACCI AND L. MARRARO Table I. Number of minterms per output. S-box Multiple Outputs Single Outputs o 1 o 2 o 3 o 4 o 1 o 2 o 3 o 4 S S S S S S S S L i = R i 1, R i = L i 1 F i, F i = P(S i ), S i = M i, M i = ±X i, X i = E(R i 1 ) K i. Figure 3. Formulae encoding DES. At this point, if we are interested in a known plaintext attack, it is necessary to introduce the values of particular (plaintext, ciphertext) pairs. This is done by setting each variable in L 0,R 0,L r,andr r to true or false, where r represents the total number of rounds considered. Then a simplification phase composed by two operations starts: 1. A substitution of the variables defined by atomic equivalences with the corresponding values to reduce the number of variables in other formulae, and to introduce the truth values. 2. A propositional simplification of the formulae using the rules listed in Table II. Propositional simplification may introduce other atomic equivalences, and therefore the overall process is iterated until there are changes. The formulae in Figure 4 are the result of the elimination of equivalences, and we have given some emphasis to the plaintext and the ciphertext, represented respectively by the values of the first and last rounds of the algorithm. In a known plaintext-attack this formula can be simplified further, since L 0,R 0, L r,andr r are known, and we obtain the results in Figure 5. We define an atomic equivalence as a formula of the form V F,whereV is a variable and F is either another variable or a truth value.
19 LOGICAL CRYPTANALYSIS AS A SAT PROBLEM 183 Table II. Propositional simplification rules. Initial Fml Simplified Initial Fml Generated Fml A X X A X 1 A B A 1; B 1 A X 0 A 0 0 A B A 0; B 0 A X 1 A X 0 A B A B A X X A 0 1 A B A B A X X A X A A B B 0 A X 0 A X A A B B 1 A X 1 A 1 A X X A 1 A X X A 0 A X X A 1 A X 0 A X A X 1 A X R 1 = L 0 S 1, R 2 = R 0 S 2, R i = R i 2 S i, j = 3,...,r 2, R r 1 = R r 3 S r 1, R r = R r 2 S r, S i = M i, i = 1,...,r, M i = ±X i, i = 1,...,r, X 1 = R 0 K 1, X i = R i 1 K i, i = 2,...,r 1, X r = R r 1 K r. Figure 4. DES formulae for r rounds. The final outcome of the encoder is a formula that represents the logical relations between the key bits, the known plaintext, and the known ciphertext. Its structure is shown in Figure EXPERIMENTAL DATA Since it makes no sense to do this encoding by hand, a program has been designed and implemented to generate formulae encoding DES in an entirely modular and automatic way. More details on the encoder can be found in  and at the cited Web site.
20 184 F. MASSACCI AND L. MARRARO R 3 =±S 1 S 3, R 4 =±S 2 S 4, R i = R i 2 S i, i = 5,...,r 4, S i = M i, i = 1,...,r, ±S r 1 = R r 5 S r 3, ±S r = R r 4 S r 2, M 1 = ±K 1, M i = ±X i, i = 2,...,r 1, M r = ±K r, X 2 =±S 1 K 2, X 3 =±S 2 K 3, X i = R i 1 K i, i = 4,...,r 3, X r 2 =±S r 1 K r 1, X r 1 =±S r K r. Figure 5. DES formulae for r rounds with known plaintext and ciphertext. Definitions M i ±X i, 2 i r 1, S i M i, 2 i r, X i+1 S i K i, 1 r 1. Constraints M 1 ±K, M r ±K r, ±S r 1 i Si, i even, ±S r i Si, i odd. Figure 6. The final encoding of the data encryption standard. We can easily generate the formulae describing DES-like cryptosystems for any number of rounds up to 16, for any key and any pair of plaintext and ciphertext. All the permutation and substitution matrices (S-boxes) are read from external files so that one can change them according to one s wishes. In this manner one can evaluate the strength of DES when the number of rounds and the values of the matrices vary. The use of Espresso  to generate minimal covers for the S-boxes is the only part in our approach where human intervention is necessary: due to interface
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