Jimmy Lee. Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University Ph.D. in Accounting, expected June 2011 Master of Science, June 2010

Transcription

1 Jimmy Lee Accounting Information and Management, Northwestern University 6229 Jacobs Center, 2001 Sheridan Road, Evanston, IL Office: (847) Cell: (847) Fax: (847) Webpage: EDUCATION, Northwestern University Ph.D. in Accounting, expected June 2011 Master of Science, June 2010 Nanyang Technological University, Singapore Bachelor of Accountancy (1 st Class Honors), 2002 EMPLOYMENT, Northwestern University Teaching Assistant - Financial Accounting (Executive MBA), (Professors Thomas Lys, Robert Magee and Sri Sridhar) Teaching Evaluation: Mean of 8.6 on a scale of 10 (8 sections) Teaching Assistant - Managerial Accounting (Executive MBA), (Professor Ronald Dye) Teaching Evaluation: Mean of 7.7 on a scale of 10 (8 sections) Research Assistant for Professor Benjamin Lansford, Spring 2007 Fall 2008 Research Assistant for Professor Jayanthi Sunder, Fall 2006 Singapore Management University Lecturer - Managerial Accounting (Undergraduate), Lecturer - Financial Accounting Theory (Undergraduate), 2004 PricewaterhouseCoopers, Singapore Tax Associate, RESEARCH INTERESTS Financial reporting quality, corporate governance, corporate finance and voluntary disclosure TEACHING INTERESTS Financial accounting, financial statement analysis and managerial accounting Page 1 of 5

2 WORKING PAPERS The role of accounting conservatism in firms financial decisions (job market paper) Moral hazard, firms internal governance and management earnings forecasts Disclosure of management guidance in conference calls: Materiality, determinants and consequences with Benjamin Lansford and Jenny Tucker WORK IN PROGRESS Intra-brokerage tournaments of financial analysts: A perspective from mergers and acquisitions with Rafael Rogo and Jayanthi Sunder INVITED CONFERENCE PRESENTATIONS Presented Moral hazard, firms internal governance and management earnings forecasts Presented Disclosure of management guidance in conference calls: Materiality, determinants and consequences INVITED CONFERENCE DISCUSSIONS Discussed How important are earnings announcements as an information source authored by Sudipta Basu, Truong Xuan Duong, Stanimir Markov and Eng Joo Tan Discussed Transparency, ownership and financing constraints in private firms authored by Ole-Kristian Hope, Wayne Thomas and Dushyantkumar Vyas CONFERENCES ATTENDED Journal of Accounting and Economics, Evanston, October 2010 Financial Accounting and Reporting Section (FARS) Annual Meeting and Doctoral Consortium, Phoenix, January 2008 American Accounting Association Annual Meeting, Chicago, August 2007 Journal of Accounting and Economics, Evanston, October 2006 HONORS AND AWARDS Doctoral Fellowship, Present American Accounting Association/Deloitte & Touche/J. Michael Cook Doctoral Consortium Fellow, Lake Tahoe, June 2007 Page 2 of 5

3 KPMG Gold Medal and Cash Award, 2002 (best results in Advanced Financial Accounting and Accounting Theory, and rendered services to the community and shown involvement in campus activities) Monetary Authority of Singapore Book Prize, 2002 (second best student in the final year exam of the Bachelor of Accountancy course) Dean s List at Nanyang Technological University, PROFESSIONAL MEMBERSHIPS AND CERTIFICATIONS Institute of Certified Public Accountants of Singapore (ICPAS) Provisional member Certified Financial Analyst (CFA) Program Passed CFA Level I and II exams REFERENCES Professor Robert P. Magee (Chair) Keith I. DeLashmutt Distinguished Professor of Accounting Information and Management Phone: r-magee@kellogg.northwestern.edu Professor Ronald A. Dye Leonard Spacek Professor of Accounting Information and Management Phone: rdye@kellogg.northwestern.edu Professor Tjomme O. Rusticus Assistant Professor of Accounting Information and Management Phone: t-rusticus@kellogg.northwestern.edu Professor Beverly Walther Professor of Accounting Information and Management Phone: bwalther@kellogg.northwestern.edu Please contact Bonnie Lee (b-lee@kellogg.northwestern.edu) for written references Page 3 of 5

4 Research Abstracts Working Papers: The role of accounting conservatism in firms financial decisions Job Market Paper This paper investigates whether financial reporting conservatism is related to firms financial flexibility and their financial decisions. If conservatism facilitates monitoring and governance by capital providers, they should be more willing to extend financing and increase firms access to capital. However, because conservatism leads to systematic understatement of net worth and weakens the appearance of firms balance sheet strength, it may reduce firms access to capital. This study tests these two opposing views of the relationship between conservatism and financial flexibility and its resultant effect on corporate financial activities. I find that firms with greater reporting conservatism exhibit less financial flexibility in their corporate liquidity management, their debt or equity issuance decisions, the sensitivity of their investments to financing constraints and their payout policies. Overall, the results suggest that while firms enjoy lower debt contracting costs and mitigate agency conflicts by reporting conservatively, they forgo some financial flexibility in future access to capital which affects their financial decisions. Moral hazard, firms internal governance and management earnings forecasts This paper investigates the role of management earnings forecasts in mitigating information asymmetry between investors and managers relating to moral hazard, and explains how earnings guidance facilitates monitoring. I demonstrate that firms that are more susceptible to moral hazard problems and more difficult to monitor are also more likely to issue annual earnings forecasts and they do so more frequently. In addition, I examine how firm internal governance drives forecasting decisions and show that stronger board governance and managerial equity incentives are associated with higher likelihood and frequency of forecast issuance. Finally, I provide robust evidence that managerial equity incentives are associated with more informative and higher quality guidance. In particular, I find that these forecasts are more accurate, unbiased, more specific and timely, consistent with equity incentives aligning shareholders and managers interests regarding disclosure decisions. However, I find mixed evidence on the association between board governance and forecast quality. Disclosure of management guidance in conference calls: Materiality, determinants and consequences with Benjamin Lansford and Jenny Tucker The SEC advises firms to release all material information in their earnings announcement press release before their corresponding conference call. Until May 2009, the NYSE went further by explicitly prohibiting the disclosure of new material information in a conference call. However, we document that the S&P 500 firms, including those that are NYSE-listed, disclose a non-trivial amount of management guidance exclusively in their conference calls. Firms in challenging forecasting environments rely more on the conference call, probably because the call enables managers to flesh out the guidance. In contrast, firms with relatively low investor visibility and high litigation risk rely less on the conference call, likely due to regulatory concerns. Finally, after controlling for the information released at the earnings announcement, we find greater magnitudes of analyst forecast revisions for firms that provide relatively more management guidance exclusively in their conference call. Collectively, our findings highlight the emerging use of non-traditional disclosure channels. Page 4 of 5

5 Work in Progress: Intra-brokerage tournaments of financial analysts: A perspective from mergers and acquisitions with Rafael Rogo and Jayanthi Sunder We investigate analysts career outcome following mergers and acquisitions. Specifically, in a business combination, we consider the scenario where a brokerage firm has one analyst following the target and another analyst following the acquirer. We examine the determinants of analyst retention following the merger and acquisition. Further, we investigate the consequences of this choice on future forecast performance, and whether the choice of analyst retention (acquirer or target analyst) reveals any information about the long-term performance of the merged entity. Page 5 of 5