The Rise of the Opposition in Mexico s New Democratic Regime: Electoral Competition Increasing Success GUSTAVO RIVERA

Transcription

1 The Rise of the Opposition in Mexico s New Democratic Regime: Electoral Competition Increasing Success GUSTAVO RIVERA

2 Introduction What are the sources of the recent success of Mexico s former opposition in national, regional, and local elections? 1 The most obvious though oftentimes overlooked factor is the recent democratization of the regime. This has made possible the formation of a new party system in the absence of the previous state s gross interference in elections that favored only one dominant, hegemonic party; in other words, the formation of a party system that for the first time corresponds with democracy. That being said, the first, unavoidable step in order to identify and evaluate the sources of the recent success of Mexico s former opposition will be to analyze the underlying synergy that made possible the democratization of the regime and the demonopolization of the party system. Figure 1 illustrates this process. Starting from the left, the first column identifies changes in electoral competition and characterizes the different party systems that have emerged since The column to the right describes the main role and the predominant behavior of Mexico s opposition parties during each period. The upper part of the middle section presents a dynamic framework that depicts the main events and factors that made possible the democratization of the regime and the demonopolization of the party system. Correspondingly, the bottom part of the middle section depicts how the democratization process changed the dynamics of electoral competition and illustrates the way in which the electorate evolved from being aligned with the PRI to realigning with Mexico s former opposition parties: the PAN and the PRD. Finally, the column to the right lists the parties that at some point in this process have occupied a testimonial position in the electoral arena. 1 Notice that in this paper I use the terms former opposition and opposition to refer mainly to the Partido Acción Nacional (PAN) and the Partido de la Revolución Democrática (PRD). Although during the nearly seven decades of rule by the Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI) dozens of parties emerged and belonged to the opposition, only these two represented a serious threat and eventually ousted the PRI from the legislative and the executive powers. Not surprisingly, until today, these two parties along with the PRI are by far the most important political actors in Mexican politics. 2

3 Electoral Competition & Party System 1977 Mainly Symbolic Fruitless Programmatic & Catch-All Later 1997/2000 Active Mainly Catch-All & Subtle Programmatic 2006 Active Gradually More Programmatic Economic Crises and Devaluations 1982 & 1994 Neoliberal Development Strategy 1980s & 1990s Electoral & Political Reforms 1977, 1986, , 1993, 1996 Frauds & Political Violence NAFTA 1994 Demonopolization Of Party System Aligned Electorate PRI Dealigned Electorate PRD PAN Ins versus Outs Dynamics (Indicator) PRI vs. PAN PRI vs. PRD Left Center Right Regional Cleavage (Indicator) North and Center-West Vs. South and Federal District Assets for Electoral Competition Leadership, Party Machinery, Governorships, Legislatures, Protests, Mobilizations, Media, Campaigning, Political Maneuvering, Negotiating Underlying Social Cleavages Religious-Secular Class-Economic Realignment Process Build Support Bases & Attract New Partisans 1 st Stage: Creeping Federalist Strategy 2 nd Stage: Programmatic Behavior Catholic Conservative Non-Catholic Liberal Richer Educated Urban Export-Oriented Poorer Undereducated Rural Non-Export Electorate Divided Along Socioeconomic and Ideological Lines 3 No Genuine Competition One-Party System Transition Figure 1 Role & Behavior: Opposition Parties PRI (Monopolized Party System) Repression against Student Protesters Testimonial Political Parties PAN PPS PARM PSUM PSM PRT PFCRN PDM PT PVEM Transition PVEM PT PC PANAL PASDC FC PLM MP PSN PCD DC Nationalized three-party competition (?) Three-Party System (?) Uneven Competition Divided Three-Parry System

4 The Increasing Success of Mexico s Former Opposition: The Numbers The increasing success of Mexico s former opposition parties has surprised observers, academics, journalists, and politicians alike. Due to the opposition s poor electoral performance after the general elections of 1988, by the mid-1990s several experts heralded the extension of the PRI s hegemonic and monopolistic rule for at least another decade (Morris 1992; Smith 1992; Davis and Coleman 1994). However, the results of the 1997 midterm elections sweepingly refuted these forecasts. In what many scholars considered the first fully democratic elections in Mexico s history (Schedler 1998; Mainwaring 1999; Lawson 2000), the opposition parties proved to be not only a viable electoral alternative, but central actors in the country s incipient democratic regime. At stake in 1997 were the entire lower house of the federal legislature, one-quarter of the federal upper house, the Federal District s governorship, 2 six state governorships, and hundreds of lesser state and municipal offices. Among these contests, the most notable one was for the governorship of the Federal District. 3 This race went to Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas, candidate of the PRD and leader of the Mexican left since the late 1980s. His victory allowed the PRD to take root in a historical locus of leftist movements, where the party found a loyal electorate that happened to be the second largest among Mexico s 32 federal entities (Lawson 1997; 8). 4 Moreover, Cárdenas ample victory signaled the revitalization of the Mexican left and the political renaissance of a party that seemed devastated after finishing third in the Although the title is commonly rendered in English as Mayor of Mexico City or as Governor of the Federal District, in reality this position does not correspond exactly to either a mayor of a municipality or the governor of a state. The official though seldom used title is Head of Government of the Federal District. However, to facilitate the flow of the reading, in this paper I will refer to it as Governor of the Federal District. 3 Notice that this was the first time in Mexico s history in which the governorship of the Federal District was contested in a public election. Before 1997, the Regent (as it was called) was directly appointed by the president. 4 As of 2005, the total number of registered voters in the Federal District was 7.2 million, compared to the 8.9 million registered in the state of Mexico (IFE 2006b). 4

5 presidential elections. 5 Thus, after the 1997 midterm elections it became clear that the Mexican left was not in the terminal stage that some experts had diagnosed (Davis and Coleman 1994; Bruhn 1997). To the contrary, the Mexican left belonged to an increasingly important opposition that was beginning to take root in an electorate that was becoming available as consequence of the country s ongoing democratization process. Despite the prominence of the race for governor of the Federal District, in 1997 the most important contest was for the legislature s lower house, the Chamber of Deputies. In Mexico, Chamber representation is determined by a hybrid system that combines 300 Westminster-style, single-member districts (SMDs) with 200 seats allocated based on each party s respective share of the total vote (Becerra et al., 47-50). The complex formula for assigning those 200 proportional-representation (PR) seats means that one party can achieve a majority by either winning more than 250 of the SMDs or securing at least 42.2 percent of the overall tally. As Table 1 shows, in the 1997 midterm elections the PRI fell short of this threshold and thus, for the first time in history, lost its Chamber majority. Table 1: 1997 Federal Election, Chamber of Deputies Party Votes (Percent) Seats Gain/Loss PRI PAN PRD PVEM PT Others Source: IFE In the 1994 presidential election the PRI won 48.69% of the vote, compared to the PAN s 25.92% and the PRD s 16.59% (IFE 1994). 6 PVEM: Partido Verde Ecologista de México. 7 PT: Partido del Trabajo. 8 Others: Partido Popular Socialista (PPS), Partido Demócrata Mexicano (PDM), Partido del Frente Cardenista de Reconstrucción Nacional (PFCRN). 5

6 The positive electoral performance of the opposition continued delivering encouraging results in the years that followed. The PRD displaced the PRI from the governorships of Zacatecas and Tlaxcala in 1998 and Baja California Sur in Similarly, the PAN displaced the PRI from the governorships of Querétaro and Nuevo León in 1997, Aguascalientes in 1998, and Guanajuato, Jalisco, and Morelos in Finally, in coalition with the PAN, the PRD won the governorships of Nayarit in 1999 and Chiapas in The increasing success of Mexico s opposition in the late 1990s suggested that the PRI could be defeated in the 2000 presidential elections. On that occasion, and against many predictions, the PAN s Vicente Fox won convincingly over his main rivals, the PRI s Francisco Labastida and the PRD s Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas. 10 Fox s victory reflected the emergence over the previous decade of a profound new cleavage in Mexican politics, centered not on socioeconomic differences and social issues but on the issue of extending the PRI s hegemonic and monopolistic rule (Schedler 2000; 5-7). 11 Specifically, the ongoing democratization of the regime created incentives for opposition parties to behave less according to ideological or programmatic principles and more according to their capacity to frame an election in anti and pro government terms (Magaloni and Poiré, 18-19). As a result, in 2000, for the first time in history the opposition ousted the PRI from the presidency and, as Table 2 shows, for the second consecutive time stymied the PRI from winning the majority in the Chamber of Deputies. 9 Notice that in these coalitions the PRD occupied a more central position than the PAN, nominating the candidates and having a greater say during the campaigns and after winning the elections. 10 In the 2000 presidential election the PAN won 42.52% of the vote, compared to the PRI s 36.11% and the PRD s PRD 16.64% (IFE 2000b). 11 It is important to highlight that Fox succeeded in attracting the anti-pri, anti-regime, anti-status quo, and antigovernment vote, making the 2000 presidential elections seem like a referendum on the continuation of PRI rule. In fact, Cárdenas received substantially fewer presidential votes than members of his coalition received for the Chamber of Deputies. According to one exit poll (Reforma 2000), only half of those who supported the PRD in the legislative elections voted for Cárdenas, and more than 70 percent of those who did not vote for Cárdenas voted for Fox. 6

7 Table 2: 2000 Federal Election, Chamber of Deputies Party Votes (Percent) Seats Gain/Loss PRI PAN & PVEM Alianza por el Cambio PRD, PT, PAS, PC, PSN Alianza por México Source: IFE 2000a In 2000, another important success for the opposition was the PRD s retention of the governorship of the Federal District. 13 This victory was important because it confirmed the PRD s electoral supremacy in Mexico City and allowed the opposition to stay in control of one of the most strategic positions in Mexican politics (Lawson 1997; 9). Specifically, this position carries immense political significance not only because the governor of the Federal District is in charge of one of the largest urban areas in the whole world, but because he or she is responsible for governing the seat of Mexico s executive, legislative, and judicial powers. This unique situation gives the governor an unprecedented national visibility, meaning that a successful tenure combined with high approval ratings could be sufficient credentials for a presidential bid (Lawson 1997; 13). Finally, and also important, the Federal District represents the second largest electorate after the state of Mexico, which has allowed the PRD to secure at least 1.3 million votes in every federal election since 1997 (Lawson 2000; 18). Thus, by retaining the governorship of the Federal District, the PRD strengthened the opposition s role in Mexico s incipient democratic regime and consolidated itself in a strategic position that proved to be crucial for the party s success in future elections. Not surprisingly, the opposition collected new victories in the years that followed. While the PRD obtained an irrefutable victory in the state of Michoacán in 2001, the PAN won in the 12 PAS: Partido Acción Social; PC: Partido Convergencia; PSN: Partido de la Sociedad Nacionalista. 13 In the Federal District s 2000 gubernatorial election the PRD won 38.3% of the vote, compared to the PAN s 33.9% and the PRI s 23.1% (IEDF 2000). 7

8 states of Baja California and Yucatán in 2001 and in San Luis Potosí and Querétaro in However, despite these positive results, Mexico s opposition suffered a partial setback in the 2003 midterm elections (Lawson 2004; 154). Although on that occasion the PRD recovered 38 of the 57 seats lost in 2000, the PAN lost 60 seats and hence allowed the PRI to become the largest minority in the Chamber of Deputies. As Table 3 shows, the strategic vote that gave the PAN a landslide victory in 2000 was absent in 2003 (Magaloni and Poiré, 26). We can interpret these results in two different ways. On the one hand, they reflected the widespread dissatisfaction with the first years of Fox s presidency, while on the other, they reflected the will of the majority to give the PRD and the PRI a new opportunity in power (Lawson 2004; 144). Thus, just three years after the historic 2000 presidential elections, the PAN suffered an important setback that not only eclipsed the PRD s positive performance, but most importantly, allowed the PRI to recover control of the Chamber of Deputies. Table 3: 2003 Federal Election, Chamber of Deputies Party Votes (Percent) Seats Gain/Loss PRI PAN Left (PRD, PT, PAS, PC, PSN) Source: IFE 2003 Nevertheless, despite the setback suffered in the 2003 midterm elections, Mexico s former opposition managed to crystallize its increasing success in the years that followed. While the PRD won the governorships of Zacatecas (2004), Baja California Sur (2005), Guerrero (2005), the Federal District (2006), and Chiapas (2006), the PAN won in the states of Guanajuato (2006), Jalisco (2006), and Morelos (2006). These positive results at the state level immediately translated to the national level, making the 2006 presidential elections the first time in almost 80 years in which the two leadings candidates belonged to Mexico s former opposition parties and 14 Notice that even though in 2003 the PRD did not forge a formal alliance or coalition with the smaller parties of the left, it is appropriate to include them within the same category because in practice they tended to behave and vote as one, single block. 8

9 not the PRI. 15 As expected, the person to run for the PRD was the Federal District s wildly popular governor, Andrés Manuel López Obrador. With approval ratings topping 80 percent and widespread name recognition from the national rebroadcasting of Mexico City news, López Obrador immediately became the frontrunner in the polls (Mitofsky 2005; Parametría 2005). However, in the end, López Obrador lost the presidency to the PAN s candidate, Felipe Calderón. A little-known politician with some experience as Federal Deputy and as Secretary of Energy, Calderón managed to revert in only 6 months a difference of at least 10 percent between him and his PRD counterpart (Mitofsky 2005; Parametría 2005). As Table 4 shows, the 2006 general elections reaffirmed the opposition s increasing success. Not only did the PRD had its best electoral performance ever winning a total of 160 seats, but the PAN recovered 55 of the 60 seats lost in 2003, and together, the PRD and the PAN relegated the PRI to a third, unfamiliar position in the legislature. In this way, the PAN managed to retain the presidency and the PRD to become the most important opposition party in Mexico, even leading some experts to suggest the proximate collapse of the PRI (Krauze 2006; Montemayor 2006). Table 4: 2006 Federal Election, Chamber of Deputies Party Votes (Percent) Seats Gain/Loss PRI & PVEM Alianza por México PAN PRD, PT, and PC Coalición por el Bien de Todos Source: IFE 2006a Finally, although the results of the past four elections illustrate the PRD s and the PAN s increasing competitiveness and central position in Mexico s incipient democratic regime, they are insufficient to identify the specific sources of this success and the factors that made it 15 Since the creation of the Partido Nacional Revolucionario (PNR) in 1929 PNR was the first name of the party that in 1946 became known as PRI-, not only did one of the leading candidates in every election belonged to the official party, but with the exception of the 2000 presidential elections, these candidates always won the presidency. 9

10 possible. Thus, to solve this puzzle, we need to reach beyond the numbers and try to unravel the intricacies of Mexico s democratization process. Specifically, we need to analyze the way in which the party system changed and electoral competition developed. This task is an inherently complicated one. However, relying on scholarly work concerning political parties, electoral competition, partisanship, and voting behavior, I will craft a more comprehensive account on the sources of the recent success of Mexico s former opposition parties. Demonopolizing the Party System: Eroding the PRI s Hegemonic Rule From the time it was founded in 1929 until the general elections of 1988, the PRI never lost a presidential, gubernatorial or senatorial race it contested. Moreover, even though the Constitution s no reelection clause meant that PRI candidates enjoyed no incumbency effect, 16 the PRI seldom won less than 98 percent of the seats in the Chamber of Deputies. This explains why political scientists usually described Mexico as a hegemonic party system (Sartori 1976; Schedler 1998; Diamond 2002). By using the term hegemonic, they recognized that while opposition parties were allowed to exist legally and politically, for the most part, they posed no genuine challenge to the PRI. Throughout most of the twentieth century, the PRI s hegemonic rule was legitimized by its revolutionary heritage and preserved through a vast corporatist structure that controlled the political participation of Mexico s peasants and unionized workers (Garrido, 421). In addition, PRI leaders had direct access to state resources, which allowed them to build a large clientelist network useful to secure victories at the local, state, and national level (Garrido, 424). In this way, Mexico gradually became what the Peruvian novelist Mario Vargas Llosa called a perfect 16 When allowed to run for reelection, incumbents are believed to have many advantages over newcomers. Two pieces of evidence are that voters tend to prefer candidates with prior experience and that incumbents have better access to funding sources (Krehbiel and Wright 1983). 10

11 dictatorship. It looked like a democracy because officials were regularly elected, power was usually transferred in a peaceful environment, and overall, it was equipped with the institutional bells and whistles usually found in democratic regimes including a liberal constitution. 17 However, in reality, elections were nothing but a symbolic procedure, transitions were negotiated in advance by political elites, and the constellation of institutions was a vacuous arrangement of hollow rituals used to recreate and reaffirm the legitimacy of the Institutionalized Revolution. The regime remained virtually unchanged until the late 1960s, when a wave of repression launched mainly against student protesters began to erode the legitimacy of the PRI s hegemonic rule. Mass mobilizations emerged as result of the violence, demanding the democratization of the regime and the protection of the social, political, and civil rights of the population (Garrido, 431). The situation deteriorated during the 1970s, until finally in 1977 President José López Portillo ( ) accepted a first set of political and electoral reforms to alleviate the pressure (Becerra et al., 21-22). However, although these reforms normalized the electoral and political participation of the opposition, they failed to provide any real mechanism to divest the PRI from its legislative majority (Becerra et al., 25-32). Thus, as Table 5 shows, despite the Reforms of 1977, the opposition remained mostly unable to pose a genuine challenge to the PRI s hegemonic rule. However, the exhaustion of the import substitution development strategy pursued by the government since the late 1930s triggered new problems for the PRI. After the Debt Crisis of 1982, the government was forced to open the economy and adopt the so-called neoliberal development strategy (Gibson, ). Instead of creating stability, the new economic model exacerbated the crisis and derived in further devaluations of the peso in 1988 and 1994 (Becerra 17 The Political Constitution of the United States of Mexico was ratified in 1917 to appease and reorganize the country after the Revolution of This charter is essentially a compilation of the Constitution of 1857 and other documents from the nineteenth century; all liberal in inspiration, essence, and content (Niemeyer 1974). 11

12 et al., 59). The economic tensions were immediately followed by political ones. Domestically, a series of blatant electoral frauds in the late 1980s unleashed nation-wide protests in demand of democracy and political freedom (Becerra et al., 64). 18 Internationally, the negotiations of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) with Canada and the United States represented an external source of pressure for the creation of democratic institutions. Thus, in 1986, the PRI was forced to pass the first of five major political and electoral reforms that made possible the democratization of the regime and the demonopolization of the party system (Becerra et al., 97-99). As Table 5 shows, the reforms that followed in , 1993, 1994, and 1996, substantially increased electoral competition and made possible the formation of a party system that for the first time would correspond with democracy. Table 5: Federal Election, Chamber of Deputies, (Percent of Vote) Party PRI PCM PSUM PMS PRD 19 PAN Source: Becerra et al and IFE 2006a. The Party System: Demonopolization and its Effects on Party Nationalization In order to estimate the real effect that the political and electoral reforms had on the shape of the party system and the quality of electoral competition, we can calculate the degree of 18 Other important domestic tensions were the appearance of the Ejército Zapatista de Liberación Nacional (EZLN) on January 1, 1994, and the magnicidios, later that year, of the PRI s presidential candidate Luis Donaldo Colosio, and the PRI s president José Francisco Ruiz Massieu. 19 PCM: Partido Comunista de México; PSUM: Partido Socialista Unificado de México; PSM: Partido Socialista de México. 12

13 nationalization of each of Mexico s three main political parties. Using Jones and Mainwaring s Party Nationalization Score (PNS) (Jones and Mainwaring 2003), we can identify the types of issues that have dominated political competition in Mexico since the demonopolization of the party system in the late 1990s. The degree of nationalization of the three main parties has been calculated based on their share of the vote in each of Mexico s 32 federal entities during five Chamber elections (1994, 1997, 2000, 2003, and 2006). Using a scale of 0 to 1, a high nationalization score indicates that a party wins a relatively even share of the vote across federal entities, whereas a low nationalization score indicates that a party has widely varying shares of the vote across federal entities (Jones and Mainwaring, 140). Thus, when the degree of party nationalization is high, electoral competition follows a roughly similar pattern across the country s sub-national units. Conversely, when it is low, the parties that fare well in some subnational units are minor electoral competitors elsewhere. Table 6: Mexico's Party Nationalization Party Nationalization Score (PNS), * PRI PAN PRD *Author s calculations using Jones and Mainwaring s formulae (Jones and Mainwaring, 161). As Table 6 shows, the difference in the degree of competitiveness among Mexico s three main political parties has decreased overtime. Specifically, between 1994 and 2006, Mexico s party system transformed from being dominated by a single, highly nationalized hegemonic party the PRI, to a party system with two intermediately nationalized parties the PAN and the PRD and one still highly nationalized the PRI. This change across time entails that although electoral competition is far more even in 2006 than it was in 1994, the degree of evenness is not the ideal one yet. In other words, by carefully analyzing the calculations presented in Table 6, we come to the conclusion that despite important progress, electoral competition at the sub- 13

14 national level is still uneven. While the PRI continues being highly competitive in most federal entities, the PAN and the PRD seem to be competitive only in some specific ones. Table 7: Federal Elections 2003 & 2006, Chamber of Deputies: PRI, PAN, & PRD (Percent of Vote) PRI 2003 PAN 2003 PRD 2003 PRI 2006 PAN 2006 PRD 2006 Aguascalientes Baja California Baja California Sur Campeche Chiapas Chihuahua Coahuila Colima Distrito Federal Durango Guanajuato Guerrero Hidalgo Jalisco Michoacán México Morelos Nayarit Nuevo León Oaxaca Puebla Queretaro Quintana Roo San Luis Potosí Sinaloa Sonora Tabasco Tamaulipas Tlaxcala Veracruz Yucatán Zacatecas Source: IFE 2003, 2006a Table 7 presents the share of the vote for the PRI, the PAN, and the PRD in each of Mexico s 32 federal entities in the two most recent Chamber elections. These numbers are helpful for three reasons. First, they confirm that the share of the vote for the PAN and the PRD 14

15 varies substantially across federal entities. For example, while the PRD receives close to 50 percent of the vote in the Federal District, Tabasco, and Guerrero, it barely wins 10 percent of the vote in Guanajuato, Nuevo León, and San Luis Potosí. Second, they corroborate that the share of the vote for the PRI is mostly homogenous across federal entities. Specifically, with the exception of the Federal District, the share of the vote for the PRI tends to oscillate between 25 and 50 percent. Finally, they indicate that the share of the vote for the three parties is homogeneous only in few federal entities. Specifically, in the last two elections, only in the states of Hidalgo, Morelos, and Veracruz the difference between the first and the third place was less than 10 percent. Thus, although the PAN and the PRD have become increasingly nationalized as a result of the political and electoral reforms of the past decades, across federal entities, competition remains uneven. These findings suggest that the present differences in party nationalization are likely to be the result of a weakly nationalized vote pattern that falls along regional lines; that is, each party performs markedly better in some regions than others (Jones and Mainwaring, 144). That being said, a comprehensive evaluation of each party s historic development could be an important first step to explain the varying degrees of support for the PAN and the PRD. Specifically, since each party s historic presence in a particular region accounts at least partially for its electoral success (Dix 1989), a careful description of the origin and transformation of each of Mexico s three main political parties would allow us to explain and justify the existing regional differences in electoral competition, which have not been substantially reduced despite the democratization of the regime and the demonopolization of the party system For example, Loaeza (2000) argues that the PAN s origin as a party of protest against the government s secularization program of the late 1920s is a fundamental reason for its present success in federal entities with a high density of Catholics. Similarly, Bruhn (1997) argues that the PRD s origin as a coalition of socialist movements with historic roots in Mexico City is a fundamental reason for its present success in the Federal District. 15

16 Thus, in the following sections, first, I will describe the historic development of the PAN and the PRD. In this way I hope to find hints that point to the existence of regional bases of support that developed overtime but did not become visible until after the democratization of the regime and the demonopolization of the party system. Subsequently, I will describe the historic development of the PRI. In this way I hope to determine, at least partially, why in spite of Mexico s democratic transition, the PRI has maintained a homogeneous presence across federal entities. This analysis will be done with the overarching objective of finding new evidence on the sources of the recent success of Mexico s former opposition parties. Historic Development of the PAN: Effects on Electoral Competition 21 The PAN was founded in 1939 by a group of Catholic activists, businessmen, and professionals as a reaction to the government s radical secularization program of the late 1920s and the subsequent wave of violence against Catholic rebels in the states of Yucatán and Puebla and in the Center-West (Meyer 1973). 22 Even though since its origins the PAN was the strongest and better organized opposition party in Mexico, throughout most of the twentieth century, it occupied a merely testimonial position in the political arena (Loaeza, 22). However, the Debt Crisis of 1982 and the nationalization of the banks in November of that same year sparked a renewal in the PAN s internal dynamics. In the years that followed, many infuriated businesspeople and middle-classmen flocked to the PAN in opposition to a PRI that had become an overly populistic and anachronistic party (Loaeza, 81). 21 Notice that in the following sections of this paper I will be using the following regional division of Mexico s 32 federal entities: North: Baja California, Baja California Sur, Chihuahua, Coahuila, Durango, Nayarit, Nuevo León, San Luis Potosí, Sinaloa, Sonora, Tamaulipas, and Zacatecas. Center-West: Aguascalientes, Colima, Guanajuato, Jalisco, and Queretaro. Mexico City Area: Federal District and México. South: Campeche, Chiapas, Guerrero, Hidalgo, Michoacán, Morelos, Oaxaca, Puebla, Quintana Roo, Tabasco, Tlaxcala, Veracruz, and Yucatán. 22 This wave of violence against Catholic rebels is historically known as the Guerra Cristera ( ). 16

17 The new constituents and militants, who mainly came from the North of Mexico, generated the much-needed electoral energy among the PAN s traditional leaders. However, the political alliance between the so-called neopanistas and the PAN traditionalists produced two important ideological tensions. First, the neopanistas enthusiasm for free market economics clashed with the traditionalists skepticism of radical liberalization (Mizrahi, 51). Second, the neopanistas did not conform to a merely testimonial role in Mexican politics, and thus, they were willing to compromise the party s ideological principles in order to win elections and oust the PRI from power (Mizrahi, 64). In the end, the neopanistas pragmatism won the internal battle and imposed itself over the PAN s traditional ideology, pushing the party to adopt a catch-all behavior that gave it a better opportunity to win elections but deviated it from its original educational mission. As a result, since the 1980s, the PAN s electoral campaigns revolved around the claim that their candidates would bring honest and competent government to cities and states that had suffered from the PRI s corruption, cronyism, and mismanagement (Mizrahi, 86). 23 This was part of a creeping federalist strategy that aimed to build the PAN s regional support bases by winning local and state level elections (Lujambio, 52). Inevitably, given the monopolized nature of Mexico s party system, this creeping federalist strategy generated an ins versus outs dynamic with the PRI (Díaz-Cayeros, 14). This dynamic took hold particularly in Yucatán, Puebla, the North, and the Center-West of Mexico, where the PAN found great support among Catholics, industrialists, and the middle-classes in general. Thus, these findings confirm that by evaluating the historic development of the PAN, we can account at least partially for its uneven degree of support across federal entities. Specifically, 23 Notice that before the 1980s, the PAN s electoral campaigns revolved mainly around educational issues, representing no real threat to the PRI and functioning more like a loyal opposition (Mizrahi, 75). 17

18 the PAN s origin as a Catholic party and its development as a party of businessmen and industrialists shed some light to why it has gathered great support in the states of Puebla, Yucatán, the North, and the Center-West of Mexico; states with a high density of Catholics and a high concentration of industrialists and businesspeople in general. Similarly, by evaluating the history and development of the PAN, we can also partly explain the high variation in the degree of support for the PRD. Specifically, the emergence of an ins versus outs dynamic between the PAN and the PRI has alienated the PRD from the states and regions in which the PAN has a historic presence. Naturally, this has frustrated the PRD s efforts to build a homogeneous support base across federal entities. Historic Development of the PRD: Effects on Electoral Competition As a product of the amalgamation of several independent socialist organizations and a group of prominent PRI dissenters, 24 since its foundation in 1989, the PRD was divided internally over ideological and strategic issues (Bruhn, 31). In the mid-1990s, there were two major contending currents within the party. One was a rather social democratic wing headed by Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas and Porfirio Muñoz Ledo, which sought to build the party s support bases among young professionals, unionized workers, intellectuals, and students (Bruhn, ). The other was a more radical wing associated with Andrés Manuel López Obrador, which sought to build the party s support bases among the urban poor, the elderly, informal workers, and peasants (Bruhn, ). This internal division stymied the party from making significant progress in the electoral arena. Thus, in the late 1990s, the PRD decided to pursue something 24 These groups and organizations were the Partido Mexicano de los Trabajadores (PMT), the Partido Socialista Unificado de México (PSUM), the Partido Popular Revolucionario (PPR), the Movimiento Revolucionario del Pueblo (MRP), the Unión de la Izquierda Comunista (UIC), and the Movimiento de Acción y Unidad Socialista (MAUS). Among the PRI dissenters, Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas and Porfirio Muñoz Ledo were the most prominent members. 18

19 more akin to the PAN s creeping federalist strategy, which accordingly generated an ins versus outs dynamic of competition with PRI. The first positive product of the PRD s creeping federalist strategy was Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas election as governor of the Federal District in This victory significantly improved the party s image and signaled that the PRD had acquired greater cohesion along internal lines (Lawson 1997; 17). Subsequently, the PRD took advantage of the existing tensions within the PRI at the state level. Several discouraged PRI candidates for gubernatorial nominations joined the PRD to build coalitions that enabled them to run successful campaigns and win elections. 25 In this way, the PRD displaced the PRI from the governorships of Zacatecas and Tlaxcala in 1998 and Baja California Sur in Moreover, in coalition with the PAN, the PRD won the governorships of Nayarit in 1999 and Chiapas in These positive results entailed that the PRD s version of the PAN s creeping federalist strategy made possible the construction of regional support bases and propelled the party to win local and state level elections. Accordingly, this has also derived in an ins versus outs dynamic with the PRI; however, there are some subtle variations. Instead of running campaigns that revolve around claims of honesty and government competency, the PRD has frequently run confrontational campaigns based on the use of anti-incumbent and anti-system rhetoric (Crespo, 15-17). This has been particularly evident in the South, where the PRD has found great support among the poor and among those who have been historically excluded from the decision-making process in the government Notice that an important reason why the PRD has been able to absorb former PRI members is that there are few ideological differences between the PRD and the traditional wing of the PRI. Specifically, the ideological program of the PRD closely resembles the ideological program of the more traditional wing of the PRI that is usually associated with the presidency of Lázaro Cárdenas ( ) (Bruhn, 174). 26 This includes students, the urban poor, the elderly, informal workers, and leftists in general. 19

20 Thus, in sum, the PRD has built its regional support bases following a creeping federalist strategy akin to the PAN s but with four main variations: 1) in the Federal District, by retaining the governorship and enjoying high approval ratings for the past decade; 2) in states like Zacatecas, Baja California Sur, and Nayarit, by nominating former PRI members as candidates in gubernatorial races; 27 3) in the South, by running confrontational campaigns based on the use of anti-system and anti-incumbent rhetoric; and 4) in general, by garnering support among leftist followers. The PRD s version of the creeping federalist similarly has stymied the PAN from winning an even share of the vote across federal entities. This explains why in states and regions where the Mexican left has a historic presence the PAN has been mostly unable to build support bases, and thus, to win elections. Historic Development of the PRI: Effects on Electoral Competition For the PRI, ideology has long ceased to matter or to provide cohesion. Indeed, although in the past some scholars shoehorned Mexico into the democratic camp discussing the divisions between left and right within the PRI and postulating a pendulum theory of the presidency moving back and forth between them, by the late 1970s this view had become widely discredited (Cline 1962). It was clear that the PRI elites were the most important operative principle in Mexican politics, basing their actions on recruitment and personal loyalty rather than ideology. Throughout the twentieth century, the PRI s most coherent argument for its uninterrupted rule had been that it was the only agent capable of appeasing all the revolutionary factions and thereby maintaining the country s stability (Garrido, 425). As such, the PRI was a catch-all party in one fundamental sense: anyone who aspired to power had to join the PRI. However, in 1987, 27 Notice that the PRD has also nominated former PRI members as candidates in municipal, legislative, and presidential races (considering that both Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas and Andrés Manuel López Obrador are former PRI members). 20

21 a group of dissenters led by Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas and Porfirio Muñoz Ledo produced the first major schism in the party s long history (Bruhn, 97). The leaders of the so-called Democratic Current decided to leave the party after frustrated attempts to reform the PRI s autocratic internal procedures that stymied the democratization of the regime and their personal power aspirations. A second major schism occurred when Ernesto Zedillo chose not to take as active a role in the party during his presidency ( ) (Crespo, 32). This personal decision hit the core of the PRI s discipline, which originated from the combination of one-party, hegemonic rule and presidential domination (Crespo, 9). The first sign of these schisms was the erosion of the PRI s ability to guarantee the victory of its nominees, which consequently evaporated the party s capacity to reward supporters with electoral victories (Crespo, 11-13). The second sign was the abandonment of the PRI s historic revolutionary nationalism and the subsequent implementation of the so-called neoliberal development strategy (Gibson, 340). 28 This shift in economic policy divided the PRI in two ideological camps: those who argued that the party had to pay greater attention to the needs of peasants and unionized workers, who had historically been the PRI s primary support base; 29 and those who expressed their approval of the recently implemented neoliberal economic policies and sought to build new support bases among industrialists, businesspeople, and young entrepreneurs Generally, the PRI s historic revolutionary nationalism refers to the implementation of an import substitution development strategy, which encouraged the government s intervention in the economy and the creation of hundreds of state-owned enterprises. Conversely, the neoliberal development strategy refers to the radical liberalization of the economy in the 1980s. The neoliberal economic model was first implemented during the presidency of Miguel de la Madrid ( ) and deepened during the presidencies of Carlos Salinas ( ), Ernesto Zedillo ( ), and the PAN s Vicente Fox ( ). 29 The members of this ideological camp have been traditionally associated with the state-sponsored labor unions and the PRI s corporatist machinery created in the 1930s by President Lázaro Cárdenas ( ). 30 The members of this ideological camp have been traditionally associated with the technocratic-wing that originated in the 1980s as a result of the Debt Crisis of

22 Consequently, and in order to prevent further internal divisions, the PRI leaders decided to take advantage of the party s broad ideological spectrum. Strategically, this translated in the introduction of primary elections to choose candidates at the state and national level (Crespo, 17). By submitting the nomination of candidates to local and regional supporters, the PRI aspired to preserve its cohesion and to continue competing evenly with the PAN and the PRD across federal entities. This strategy proved to be successful in two different ways. On the one hand, it allowed the PRI to present a renewed image to the electorate, one of a party that abides by strict democratic internal procedures (Crespo, 25). While on the other, it allowed the party to nominate the most fitting and potentially competitive candidate in every election. In other words, by introducing party primaries, the PRI could nominate not only the most popular candidate within its lines, but also a technocratic candidate in the North and a corporatist candidate in the South and be equally competitive in both elections. Thus, the effects on the development of Mexico s opposition parties have been both positive and negative. While the PAN and the PRD built their respective regional support bases through variations of the same creeping federalist strategy, the PRI preserved a large part of its primordial support bases through an incredible flexibility that allowed the party to survive two major schisms along internal lines. This great adaptability enabled the PRI to continue winning a homogenous share of the vote across federal entities, stymieing the PAN and the PRD from making inroads uniformly throughout the country. As a result, although together the PAN and the PRD have defeated the PRI at the local and national level, independently each party has made inroads only in those regions where in the previous decades specific support bases were built. Not surprisingly, these changes in the dynamics of electoral competition have produced a 22

23 divided three-party system that at least initially created incentives for parties to adopt a catch-all behavior instead of an ideological or programmatic one. Supporters and Partisans: General Demographic and Socioeconomic Characteristics By describing the history and development of Mexico s three main political parties we have confirmed that the present differences in party nationalization are the result of a weakly nationalized vote pattern that falls along regional lines. Moreover, we have found concrete evidence that points to the existence of regional support bases for the PAN and the PRD that began developing several decades ago but did not become visible until after the democratization of the regime and the demonopolization of the party system. However, identifying these regional support bases and the conditions under which electoral competition has taken place is not enough to determine what has motivated millions of Mexicans to vote for the opposition rather than for the PRI. Thus, in order to identify the sources of the recent success of Mexico s former opposition parties we need to look beyond the numbers and the changing dynamics in electoral competition and focus in the particular effects that the democratization of the regime and the demonopolization of the party system have had on the electorate. A first, useful step would be to evaluate the profile of the supporters of each of Mexico s three main political parties. To this end, Table 8 presents individual-level data on the general demographic and socioeconomic characteristics of those who participated in the 2006 general elections (Consulta Mitofsky 2006a). According to these data, in 2006, the Mexican electorate divided along the following socioeconomic, demographic, and territorial lines: 23

24 PAN supporters were equally likely to be male or female, somewhat younger and more educated than those who supported other parties, mainly concentrated in the North and Center-West of Mexico, and earned a higher income. PRI supporters were more likely to be female, older, and less educated than those who supported other parties, earned a relatively low income, and were more evenly distributed across regions. PRD supporters were more likely to be male, equally young or old, less educated than those who supported the PAN but more than those who supported the PRI, mainly concentrated in the Federal District and the South, and earned a relatively low income. Table 8: Consulta Mitofsky Exit Poll (2006) PAN (Calderón) PRI (Madrazo) PRD (AMLO) Others Gender Male 32% 19% 35% 15% Female 32% 21% 29% 18% Age % 19% 32% 16% % 20% 32% 15% 50 or More 29% 22% 31% 18% Education Primary 27% 25% 31% 18% Secondary 30% 21% 33% 17% Preparatory 35% 16% 34% 16% University 42% 13% 32% 14% Income 0-3 Times Minimum 26% 23% 33% 17% 7 Times Minimum 35% 17% 34% 14% 7+ Times Minimum 44% 14% 30% 13% 10+ Times Minimum 54% 10% 26% 10% Region North 43% 33% 24% - Center-West 47% 26% 27% - South 27% 33% 40% - Federal District 34% 22% 44% - Source: Mitofsky 2006a 24

25 Table 9: Social Characteristics of PAN, PRI, and PRD Partisans (2006) PAN PRI PRD Mean Age Gender Male 49% 47% 54% Female 51% 53% 46% Education Primary 20% 48% 33% Secondary 22% 24% 16% Preparatory 23% 13% 22% University 35% 15% 29% Income 0-1 Times Minimum 14% 40% 25% 1-3 Times Minimum 18% 23% 31% 3-5 Times Minimum 22% 15% 18% 5-10 Times Minimum 25% 13% 15% 10 or more Minimum 21% 9% 11% Area Urban 91% 69% 78% Rural 9% 31% 22% Source: Mitofsky 2006b However, even though Table 8 presents a good picture of the general demographic and socioeconomic characteristics of the supporters of each of Mexico s three main political parties, we need to analyze yet another sample of individual-level data before reaching final conclusions. To this end, Table 9 presents the results of a poll on partisanship and support conducted four months after the 2006 general elections (Consulta Mitofsky 2006b). This type of sample is useful because it aims to create a general, demographic and socioeconomic profile of those who confess to be partisans of one specific party, instead of only assessing the demographic and socioeconomic differences of those who participated in a single, isolated election. According to these data, as of November 2006, the general demographic and socioeconomic profile of the partisans of each of Mexico s three main political parties is the following: PAN partisans are equally likely to be male or female, are younger, better educated, more highly concentrated in urban areas, and earn a relatively high income. 25