PIPELINE EMERGENCIES. Chapter 7 Tactical Response Guidelines For Pipeline Emergencies. Michael Callan

Transcription

1 PIPELINE EMERGENCIES Tactical Response Guidelines For Michael Callan

2 Tactical Response Guidelines For 1. Describe The General Hazard And Risk Issues That Must Be Evaluated When Responding To Pipeline Emergencies. 2. Given An Emergency Scenario Involving A Pipeline, Identify And Describe The Key Considerations To Be Evaluated In Developing An Incident Action Plan, Including: a. Type Of Pipeline b. Product(s) Involved c. Nature Of The Incident d. Exposures e. Isolation Or Repair Of The Pipeline f. Safety Considerations g. Environmental Conditions h. Possible Escalation Of The Incident 3. Given The Following Response Scenarios Involving Natural Gas Pipelines, Identify And Describe The Critical Safety And Tactical Considerations To Be Evaluated And Implemented For Each Scenario. a. Unknown Source Of Leak In A Residential Area- No Fire b. Gas Distribution Line Leak In A Commercial Area No Fire c. Gas Distribution Line Leak In An Industrial Area With Fire d. Gas Transmission Line Rupture In A Residential Area No Fire e. Gas Transmission Line Rupture With Fire f. Given The Following Response Scenarios Involving Liquid Pipelines, Identify And Describe The Critical Safety And Tactical Page 2 of 65

3 Considerations To Be Evaluated And Implemented For Each Scenario. g. Liquid Transmission Line Rupture In Urban Area- No Fire h. Liquid Transmission Line Rupture Major Fuel Spill On Waterway 4. Given The Following Special Operations Scenarios Involving Pipelines, Identify And Describe The Critical Safety And Tactical Considerations To Be Evaluated And Implemented For Each Scenario a. Improvised Explosive Device Placed On A Liquid Transmission Line Break No Rupture b. Gas Distribution Pipeline Trench Collapse CHAPTER 7 Instructor Overview 1. Describe the general hazard and risk issues that must be evaluated when responding to pipeline emergencies. i. The hazard and risk process should be viewed as three distinct interrelated tasks: hazard assessment; risk evaluation; and development of the IAP. ii. General hazard issues responding to a pipeline emergency include the same level of risk factors. These include: 1. Nature of the hazard flammable liquid or gas leak with or without fire. Toxic vapor cloud releases? Trench rescue? 2. Location of the incident and surrounding exposures is the problem location in a Page 3 of 65

4 populated area? What types of exposures are in proximity to the incident? People impacted? Special needs? 3. Size and type of pipeline What type gathering, transmission or distribution pipeline? Diameter? Operating pressure? 4. Product(s) involved and the associated hazards what products are being transported? Physical and chemical properties? 5. Size of the release and area impacted how much has been spilled and where is it going? 6. Level of available resources personnel and their level of training, equipment and supplies, leak and spill control resources and firefighting foam. 2. Given an emergency scenario involving a pipeline, identify and describe the key considerations to be evaluated in developing an Incident Action Plan, including: i. The IAP is developed based upon emergency responder s assessment of the incident potential and the initial operational strategy. (pp 116 &117 of text book) ii. Type of pipeline must be determined if it is a gathering line, transmission or distribution pipeline. Page 4 of 65

5 iii. Products involved identify the products in the pipeline. Use pipeline markers for assistance. iv. Nature of the incident - flammable liquid or gas leak with or without fire and is there a vapor cloud? Is there trench rescue involved? v. Exposures structures and different occupancies in the area and is it in an urban or rural area. What special needs will there be for people? vi. Isolation or repair of the pipeline can the pipeline be isolated? Will the pipeline contents backflow to the breach point and how much product can be expected and for what duration of time will the backflow continue? vii. Safety Considerations any unique safety hazards or considerations associated with the incident? viii. Environmental conditions will weather conditions affect the incident? What about runoff and waterways, wells, lakes, etc. will they be affected? ix. Possible escalation of the incident can the incident get worse, escalate into a more serious event? 3. Given the following response scenarios involving natural gas pipelines, identify and describe the critical safety and tactical considerations to be evaluated and implemented for each scenario. Page 5 of 65

6 i. Unknown source of leak in a residential area no fire. (Scenario 1) ii. Identify and describe critical safety The natural gas leak was expanding in the immediate area. Safety of people in there homes was immediate and elimination of sources of ignition. Maintain security and keep area isolated. iii. Tactical considerations Isolate area and deny entry; Identify the problem; Determine if atmosphere conditions for safety. All this was accomplished via ICP. iv. Gas distribution line leak in a commercial area no fire. (Scenario 2) v. Identify and describe critical safety Natural gas leak and determine level of atmospheric conditions; Isolate area and eliminate sources of ignition. What is the problem? vi. Tactical Considerations Isolate the area and deny entry; Prevent ignition; Notify Gas Company for response to correct the problem. vii. Gas distribution line leak in an industrial area with fire. viii. Identify and describe critical safety Fire was expanding by the means of brush and burning towards petroleum storage tanks. Burned workers required rescue and treatment. Backhoe fire could result Page 6 of 65

7 in larger fire but not necessarily increasing the gas leak fire. ix. Tactical Considerations Rescue the burned equipment operator and provide emergency medical care; Attack and extinguish the brush fire; Isolate the area and deny entry; Protect exposures until the gas company can isolate and control the pipeline. x. Gas transmission line rupture in a residential area with fire. (Scenario 4) xi. Identify and describe critical safety Rescue and evacuate citizens in immediate area; Adequate resources to handle the incident; Isolate area and prevent entry; Control exposures. xii. Tactical Considerations Primary tactics are: rescue citizens in damaged apartment complex and provide medical care; Evacuate apartment complex; Isolate the area and deny entry; Protect exposures until Gas Company corrects problem. These tactical objectives established via IC with ICP. xiii. One scenario missing due to inconsistent statement for scenario. 4. Given the following response scenarios involving liquid pipelines, identify and describe the critical safety and tactical considerations to be evaluated and implemented for each scenario. a. Liquid transmission line rupture in rural area no fire. (Scenario 6) Page 7 of 65

8 i. Identify/describe critical safety Identify and locate the source of the odor. ii. Tactical Considerations Isolate the area and deny entry; establish a unified command organization between responding agencies; develop an incident action plan to confine the spilled crude oil and control ignition. b. Liquid transmission line rupture in urban area no fire. (Scenario 7) i. Identify/describe critical safety - evacuation all buildings closest to the spill and eliminate sources of ignitions. ii. Tactical Considerations Isolate the area and control all ignition sources; implement public protective actions to protect the general pubic by evacuating buildings closest to the ruptured pipeline; apply class B firefighting foam to the spill to prevent ignition and notify the pipeline operator. c. Liquid transmission line rupture major fuel spill on waterway. (Scenario 10) i. Identify/describe critical safety lack of effective and up to date Incident Action Plan for dealing with spills on waterways; lack of organization for unification of all resources to deal with the incident; time and lack of training. ii. Tactical considerations none. There were no tactics to be Page 8 of 65

9 considered not trained to work together. There was no up to date plan in dealing with a spill on the waterway. Basically everything was out of date and touch with the real world. 5. Given the following special operations scenarios involving pipelines, identify and describe the critical safety and tactical considerations to be evaluated and implemented for each scenario; a. Improvised explosive device placed on a liquid transmission line no rupture. (Scenario 5) i. Identify/describe critical safety suspicious activity recognized and associated the situations with suspicious package. IED should never be touched, handled or getting near such suspicious packages. ii. Tactical considerations isolate the area and deny entry; establish unified command between responding agencies; develop an incident action plan to evaluate the suspicious package. Page 9 of 65

10 Slide [1] Tactical Response Guidelines For P-133 [2] Objectives a) Describe The General Hazard And Risk Issues That Must Be Evaluated When Responding To. b) Given An Emergency Scenario Involving A Pipeline, Identify And Describe The Key Considerations To Be Evaluated In Developing An Incident Action Plan, Including: i) Type Of Pipeline ii) Product(s) Involved P-134 iii) Nature Of The Incident iv) Exposures [3] Objectives a) Isolation Or Repair Of The Pipeline b) Safety Considerations c) Environmental Conditions d) Possible Escalation Of The Incident e) Given The Following Response Scenarios Involving Natural Gas Pipelines, Identify And Describe The Critical Safety And Tactical Considerations To Be Evaluated And P-134 Implemented For Each Scenario. f) Unknown Source Of Leak In A Residential Area- No Fire Page 10 of 65

11 [4] Objectives a) Gas Distribution Line Leak In A Commercial Area No Fire b) Gas Distribution Line Leak In An Industrial Area With Fire c) Gas Transmission Line Rupture In A Residential Area No Fire d) Gas Transmission Line Rupture With Fire P-134 e) Given The Following Response Scenarios Involving Liquid Pipelines, Identify And Describe The Critical Safety And Tactical Considerations To Be Evaluated And Implemented For Each Scenario. [5] Objectives a) Liquid Transmission Line Rupture In Urban Area- No Fire b) Liquid Transmission Line Rupture Major Fuel Spill On Waterway c) Given The Following Special Operations Scenarios Involving Pipelines, Identify And Describe The Critical Safety And Tactical P-134 Considerations To Be Evaluated And Implemented For Each Scenario d) Improvised Explosive Device Placed On A Liquid Transmission Line Break No Rupture e) Gas Distribution Pipeline Trench Collapse [6] Introduction a) In This Chapter We Will Build On The Material Previously Covered In The Textbook By Introducing Ten Different Tactical Scenarios Involving. P-135 b) In Each Scenario We Will Briefly Provide Background Information On The Hypothetical Page 11 of 65

12 Tactical Problem, Then Summarize The Incident Action Plan (IAP). c) We Will Also Provide Some Commentary Following The Scenario To Highlight Important Safety Issues And Lessons Learned. [7] Hazard Assessment And Risk Evaluation a) The Cornerstone Of The Eight Step Process Is Hazard Assessment And Risk Evaluation. b) Consider A Scenario Where Gasoline Is Leaking From A Flange On An Aboveground Pipeline Entering A Petroleum Storage Tank Facility. c) What Hazards Are Present In This Scenario? d) What Are The Physical And Chemical P-135 Properties Of Gasoline? e) What Are The Risks Involved In Using Offensive Tactics Vs. Defensive Tactics? f) What Happens If We Do Nothing And Simply Wait For The Incident To Run Its Course? [8] Hazard Assessment And Risk Evaluation a) Each Course Of Action We Choose Presents A Different Set Of Risk Factors That Must Be Evaluated Before Specific Tactical Options May Be Selected. b) For Every Incident We Must Develop And Implement An IAP That Will Produce A More Favorable Outcome. P-135 Page 12 of 65

13 [9] What Is A Hazard Assessment? a) When Discussing The Tactical Decision Making Process, The Terms Hazard And Risk Are Often Used Interchangeably. b) The Hazard Side Of The Evaluation Focuses On The Materials Known Physical And Chemical Properties And Characteristics. P-135 i) For Example, Characteristics Like Flammable Range, Vapor Density, Expansion Ratio, Ignition Temperature, Etc. ii) Remember The Properties And Characteristics Of Hazardous Materials Transported In Pipelines Are Not Constant And Change From One Emergency To The Next Depending On The Product [10] What Is Risk Evaluation? a) Risk Refers To The Probability That The Emergency Will Cause Harm Or Loss To People, Property, Or The Environment. b) Emergency Responders Must See Their Role As Risk Evaluators, Not Risk Takers! c) Factors That Influence The Level Of Risk Include: P-136 i) Nature Of The Incident. ii) Location Of The Incident And Surrounding Exposures. iii) Size And Type Of Pipeline. iv) Product(s) Involved And The Associated Hazards. v) Size Of The Release And Area Impacted. vi) Level Of Available Resources. Page 13 of 65

14 [11] Hazard And Risk Evaluation Process P-137 [12] Pipeline Emergency Response Safety Issues a) Full Protective Clothing And Self-contained Breathing Apparatus Is Required For All Pipeline Firefighting And Control Operations. b) Successful Pipeline Firefighting Requires An Adequate And Reliable Water And Foam Concentrate Supply. P-138 [13] Pipeline Emergency Response Safety Issues a) Products Flowing From Liquid Pipeline Ruptures Can Be Large And Create Significant Runoff Control Problems. b) Do Not Extinguish An Unisolated Flammable Gas Fire On A Pipeline. P-139 Page 14 of 65

15 [14] Pipeline Emergency Response Safety Issues a) Can Present Multiple Hazards. i) Flammable Atmospheres ii) Toxic iii) Oxygen Deficient/Enriched Atmospheres iv) Mechanical, Pneumatic, And Electrical v) Wildlife P-140 vi) Rural And Remote Areas [15] Tactical Scenarios a) What The Scenarios May Do For You b) Provide A Framework For Discussing Safety Issues As They Relate To The Hazards And Risks Presented By. c) Discuss Tactical Options For Handling A Pipeline Emergency. P-141 d) Provide An Opportunity To Think About And Discuss Pipeline Emergency Preparedness And Planning Issues Within Your Community. [16] Tactical Scenarios a) What The Scenarios Cannot Do For You b) Establish A Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) For Any Individual Or Emergency Response Organization. c) Describe Every Hazard And Risk That May Be Present At A Pipeline Emergency. P-141 d) Describe Every Tactical Option For Dealing With The Problem Presented. Page 15 of 65

16 [17] Scenario 1 Unknown Source Of A Natural Gas Leak In A Residential Area a) At 9:00 Am On Monday, A Postal Worker Delivering Mail On A Residential Street Smelled A Strong Odor Of Gas After Stepping Outside Of Her Parked Delivery Truck. She Immediately Shut Off The Engine And Walked To An Area Where She No Longer Smelled Gas. Using Her P-142 Cell Phone, She Notified The Fire Department. [18] The First Arriving First Responder Was A Deputy Sheriff. The Postal Worker Met The Deputy Sheriff And Described The Problem. The Deputy Sheriff Also Smelled A Strong Odor Of Gas. He Then Walked Clear Of The Area And Notified His Dispatcher To Call The Gas Company And Alert The Fire Department. P-142 [19] A Single Engine Company Was Dispatched By The Fire Department With Four Firefighters. Upon Arrival At The Scene The Company Officer Was Briefed By The Deputy Sheriff On What He Learned From The Postal Worker. As This Meeting Was Taking Place, The Odor Of Gas Grew Stronger. P-142 Page 16 of 65

17 [20] Scenario 1 Unknown Source Of A Natural Gas Leak In A Residential Area P-142 [21] Scenario 1 Unknown Source Of A Natural Gas Leak In A Residential Area P-142 [22] Tactical Objectives a) The Primary Tactical Objectives Are To: b) Isolate The Area And Deny Entry c) Identify The Problem d) Determine If The Atmosphere In The Area Is Safe, Unsafe, Or Dangerous. P-142 [23] Summary Of Action Taken a) Established An Incident Command Post (ICP) A Significant Distance Up Wind From Their Original Location b) Call For Additional Resources P-144 Page 17 of 65

18 c) Additional Law Enforcement Officers Were Requested To Control Traffic Into The Area [24] Summary Of Action Taken a) With Full Turnouts And SCBA, Fire Department Personnel Used A Calibrated Four Gas Meter b) 5% Of The Lower Explosive Limit (LEL). Based On This Reading, The Decision Was Made To Evacuate Homes In The Immediate Area And Wait For The Arrival Of The Gas Company. P-144 [25] Summary Of Action Taken a) Unified Command Organization b) The Gas Company Entered The Area And Took Additional Readings To Confirm The Previous CGI Readings c) Gas Was Highest In Front Of A Home Located On 114 Maple Street. P-144 [26] Summary Of Action Taken a) The Fire Department IC Determined That The Best Course Of Action Was To Maintain The Isolation Perimeter, Expand The Area Of Evacuation As A Precaution b) With The Electricity And Gas Pipeline Isolated, Gas Company Personnel Excavated The Gas Line Along Maple Street While The Fire Department Stood By With Fully Charged Hose lines c) Electrical Utility Personnel Confirmed That Electricity To Each Home Was Off Page 18 of 65

19 [27] Comments And Observations a) Natural Gas Is Odorless And Colorless, So Tertiary Butyl Mercaptan Is Added To Provide The Odor Emergency Responders Commonly Call Gas. b) You Must Use A Direct Reading Instrument Like A Combustible Gas Indicator (CGI) Or A Flame Ionization Detector (FID) To Determine The Flammability Risks. c) Natural Gas Will Act Similar To An Inert P-144 Gas And Will Displace Oxygen. d) Natural Gas Has A Flammability Range Of 4% To 15% In Air By Volume. Page 19 of 65

20 [28] Scenario 2 - Puncture Of A 2-inch Polyethylene Natural Gas Pipeline In A Commercial Area At 2:15 PM On A Weekday, Cable TV Contractors Using An Auger To Install A Post Accidentally Drilled Into A 2-inch Polyethylene Natural Gas Pipeline Located In A Commercial Area. The Strong Smell Of Natural Gas Immediately Alerted The Cable TV Technicians That They Might Have Breached A Gas Pipeline. They Then Called 911 And Waited For The Fire Department To Arrive. [29] The Fire Department Dispatched One Engine Company With Four Personnel To The Scene. The Call Was Dispatched As A Natural Gas Leak In The Street. Upon Arrival At The Incident, The Engine Company Officer Interviewed The Cable TV Technicians To Determine The Area Affected. P-145 [30] Scenario 2 - Puncture Of A 2-inch Polyethylene Natural Gas Pipeline In A Commercial Area P-145 [31] Scenario 2 - Puncture Of A 2-inch Polyethylene Natural Gas Pipeline In A Commercial Area a) Combustible Gas Indicator (CGI) To Monitor The Atmosphere In The Area Where The Hole Was Page 20 of 65

21 Being Drilled And Found Flammability Readings Of 20% Of The LEL. [32] Tactical Objectives a) Isolate The Area And Deny Entry b) Prevent The Ignition Of The Natural Gas Leaking From The Breached 2-inch Polyethylene Underground Pipeline c) Notify The Gas Company So That They Can Respond To The Scene And Block In The Pipeline To Control The Leak. P-145 [33] Summary Of Action Taken a) Based On The Information Obtained From The Initial Size-up, The Engine Company Officer Implemented Standard Site Management Procedures By: b) Establishing Command In A Safe Area c) Establishing An Outer Perimeter To Control Access To The Scene. P-146 d) Setting Up Hazard Control Zones (Hot, Warm, And Cold) By Using CGI Flammability Readings To Determine Safe, Unsafe, And Dangerous Areas e) Controlling Ignition Sources [34] Summary of Action Taken a) While Waiting For The Gas Company To Arrive And Close In The Pipeline, The Engine Company Officer Ordered Two Firefighters To Pull A Hand Page 21 of 65

22 line And Use A Fog Pattern Up Wind From The Hole To Help Dissipate The Gas. [35] Summary of Action Taken a) A Second Engine Company And A Ladder Company, And A Battalion Chief Were Called To The Scene To Initiate Evacuation Of Nearby Homes And Help Control Ignition Sources P-146 [36] Summary of Action Taken a) When The Gas Company Arrived, The Incident Commander Briefed Them On What Had Occurred And The Site Management Procedures Taken. b) The Fire Department Continued To Apply Water Fog And Monitor The Area Using A CGI While The Gas Company Isolated The Leaking Pipeline. c) Fire Department Remained On The Scene Until The Incident Was Safely Resolved. [37] Comments And Observations a) Initial Flammability Readings Were 20% Of The LEL. Remember That Natural Gas May Follow Disturbed Soil And Enter Into Basement And Below Grade Areas Around The Pipeline. b) Controlling Ignition Sources Is A Priority. Some Examples You May Not Have Thought About: P-147 Page 22 of 65

23 c) Doorbells, Flashlights, Telephones, Burglar Alarms, Pagers, Light Switches, And Garage Door Openers. [38] Comments And Observations a) Full Turnout Gear Must Be Worn At All Times Until The Atmosphere Is Established To Be Safe. This Includes SCBA, Hood, And Gloves. b) Emergency Responders Have Been Seriously Burned And Injured In Scenarios Just Like This Because They Didn t Use Their Protective Clothing And Equipment. P147 i) Remember - Protective Clothing Is Your Last Line Of Defense. Avoid Entering Atmospheres When Flammable Gas Is Present. Page 23 of 65

24 [39] Scenario 3 - Puncture Of A 6-inch PVC Natural Gas Distribution Pipeline In An Industrial Area P-147 At 11:45 AM, Construction Workers Are Excavating A Trench For A Storm Drain In A Heavily Industrialized Area. While Using A Backhoe To Remove Dirt From The Trench, The Workers Accidentally Strike A 6-inch PVC Underground Natural Gas Distribution Pipeline. [40] A Blast Of Natural Gas Immediately Escapes From The Trench, And All Of The Contractors Immediately Run From The Area. Workers Do Not Shutdown The Backhoe And The Diesel Engine Continues To Run. P-148 Realizing That The Backhoe Was Still Running, The Operator Re-entered The Area, Climbed On Top Of The Backhoe And Turned The Engine Off. [41] While The Operator Was Still On The Backhoe The Natural Gas Ignited, Creating A Flash Fire And Setting The Operator And His Backhoe On Fire. P-148 He Dropped To The Ground And Extinguished The Fire With The Assistance Of A Co-worker. Another Co-worker Called The Fire Department Using His Cellular Telephone After Walking Clear Of The Area. Page 24 of 65

25 [42] Upon Arrival At The Scene, The Fire Department Incident Commander Found Heavy Fire Involving The Backhoe, Its Fuel, And Rubber Tires. One Person Was Badly Burned And Required Immediate Medical Attention. P-148 [43] A Brush Fire Along The Roadway Was Rapidly Spreading To Nearby Field Located Next To A Petroleum Storage Tank Facility. Fire Was Burning Intensely From The Excavation Pit As The Pressurized Gas Escaped And Verbal Communications Were Difficult Due To The High Noise Levels. P-149 [44] Scenario 3 - Puncture Of A 6-inch PVC Natural Gas Distribution Pipeline In An Industrial Area Page 25 of 65

26 [45] Tactical Objectives a) Rescue The Burned Equipment Operator And Provide Emergency Medical Care b) Attack And Extinguish The Brush Fire c) Isolate The Area And Deny Entry d) Protect Exposures Until The Gas Company Can Isolate And Control The Pipeline. P-148 [46] Summary Of Action Taken a) Upon Arrival And Size-up, The Incident Commander Ordered The First Arriving Engine Company To Use Hand Lines To Cover The Evacuation Of The Burned Operator While He Was Removed To A Safe Area Where Paramedics Stabilized The Patient. The Second Engine Company Was Ordered To Establish A Water Supply b) The First Engine Company Redeployed Its Hand Lines To Attack And Extinguish The Brush Fire Before It Spread To The Adjacent Field And Threatened The Tank Farm. [47] Incident Action Plan a) The Incident Commander Made The Determination That The Best Course Of Action From This Point Was To Maintain Control Of The Incident Site Using Site Management Principles And Allow The Fire To Continue To Burn b) The Incident Commander Consulted His Preincident Fire Plan For The Industrial Area And Discovered That A 6-inch Underground Natural Gas Distribution Pipeline Ran Along The Road That Paralleled The Petroleum Storage Tank Farm. Page 26 of 65

27 [48] Comments And Observations a) The Recon Crew Confirmed That A Natural Gas Pipeline Marker Was Within 75 Yards Of The Incident Scene And A Toll Free Emergency Contact Telephone Number Was Relayed. P-149 b) In The Scenario Described Above, The Fire Department Correctly Placed Its Highest Tactical Priority At Rescue And Providing Emergency Medical Care. c) Emergency Responders Should Never Extinguish A Flammable Gas Fire Coming From A Pipeline Without The Approval Of The Pipeline Company. [49] Comments And Observations a) Unconfined Gas Can Enter Structures, Storm Drains, And Open Drainage Systems. Ignition Inside Of A Structure Can Cause An Explosion That May Destroy Or Seriously Damage The Building. Isolating The Pipeline Using The Gas Company And Letting The Residual Gas In The Pipeline Burn Off Is Usually The Safest And Most Effective Tactic. Page 27 of 65

28 [50] Scenario 4 - Rupture Of A 36-inch Natural Gas Transmission Pipeline Near An Apartment Complex P-151 At 11:30 PM, A 36-inch Natural Gas Transmission Pipeline Operating At 900 Psi Ruptured Near An Apartment Complex With 1,500 Residents. The Escaping Gas Ignited And Created A Fireball 500 Feet In The Air And Ripped A Crater In The Ground 50 Feet Deep. A Section Of The Pipeline Was Propelled 250 Feet From The Blast Into An Apartment Building, Injuring An Adult And Two Children. [51] Within Minutes, The Fire Department 911 Center Was Flooded With Emergency Calls Reporting An Explosion, Broken Glass, And Numerous Injuries. Additional Emergency Calls To The Local Police Reported Auto And Burglar Alarms Going Off In The Neighborhood. [52] Due To The Size Of The Fire Which Could Be Seen From Many Vantage Points In The Night Sky, Many Of The Initial 911 Calls Reported Different And Incorrect Locations Of The Incident. Consequently, There Was A Delayed Fire Department Response As Various Fire Companies Were Dispatched To Incorrect Locations. Page 28 of 65

29 [53] Because of The Large Volume Of Emergency Calls From Different Locations, The Chief Of The Fire Department Ordered A General Recall Of All Off-duty Firefighters. In Addition, The Regional Mutual Aid Plan Was Activated. P-151 [54] Meanwhile, Instrumentation At The Pipeline Control Center Located Approximately 40 Miles Away Indicated To Operators That There Was A Low Suction Pressure And Compressor Problem At An Unmanned Compressor Station About 12 Miles West Of The Ruptured Pipeline. Maintenance Personnel Were Alerted And Were Sent To The Compressor Station To Determine The Problem. [55] An Engine Company That Was Dispatched To A Report Of Injuries At The Apartment Complex Eventually Identified The Correct Location Of The Incident And Established That A Pipeline Had Ruptured. Through Pre-incident Planning And Training Provided By The Pipeline Company, The Engine Company Officer Quickly Determined That An Underground Gas Transmission Line Was Involved. He Immediately Requested A Simultaneous First And Second Alarm Response And Requested The Second Alarm Response Report To A Staging Area One Mile Away. Page 29 of 65

30 [56] Tactical Objectives P-152 a) The Primary Tactical Objectives Are To: b) Rescue The Citizens In The Damaged Apartment Complex And Provide Emergency Medical Care c) Evacuate The Apartment Complex d) Isolate The Area And Deny Entry Into The Area e) Protect Exposures Until The Gas Company Can Isolate And Control The Pipeline Fire. [57] Summary Of Action Taken The Fire Chief Assumed Overall Command And Established An Incident Command Post (ICP) Approximately 3/4 Of A Mile From The Incident Scene. Command Organization Was Eventually Established. [58] Summary Of Action Taken Recognizing The Size Of The Problem, The Fire Chief Divided The Incident Into Two Operational Divisions; One To Coordinate Evacuation Of The Apartment Complex, And One To Deal With Exposure Protection At The Site Of The Pipeline Rupture. Page 30 of 65

31 [59] Summary of Action Taken a) Once The Pipeline Control Center Was Aware Of The Exact Location Of The Pipeline Rupture, They Followed Standard Protocol And Dispatched Crews To Shut Off Flow Of Natural Gas Upstream From The Rupture. b) By Working In A Unified Command Organization With Other Public Safety Agencies And The Pipeline Operator, The Incident Commander Was Able To Successfully Coordinate Evacuation Of The Apartment Complex And Isolate The Area To Prevent Traffic From Congesting The Area. [60] Summary Action Taken After Closing The Upstream Valve To The Pipeline, The Fire Continued To Burn For Another 5 Hours As Residual Gas Burned Off. The Fire Department Terminated Emergency Response Operations Approximately 12 Hours After The Incident Started. [61] Comments And Observations a) A Review Of National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) Accident Reports Over The Last 10 Years Shows That Many Pipeline Incidents Involved Delayed Response From Emergency Services. A Common Problem Includes The Initial 911 Call Being For An Odor In The Area. b) When Responding To Citizen Complaints Of Chemical Odors, It Is Important To Look At The Big Picture Of What Is Going On Around The Area, Especially At Night When Visibility Is Limited. P-153 Page 31 of 65

32 [62] Comments And Observations a) Once Initial Rescue And Public Protective Action Strategies Are Addressed, This Incident Is Essentially A Large Pilot Light Fire That Will Continue To Generate High Radiant Heat Levels And Extremely Loud Noise Until The Natural Gas Supply Is Removed. [63] Comments And Observations a) Emergency Response Personnel Should NEVER Attempt To Isolate Any Pipeline Valves On Largediameter Transmission Or Distribution Lines Unless Under The Direction Of, And With Pipeline Operations Personnel Present; Failure To Do So May Actually Create Additional Problems That Are Actually Worse Than The Original Event. b) Large Scale Will Require A Unified Command Organization To Safely And Efficiently Resolve The Problem. Page 32 of 65

33 [64] Scenario 5 - An Act Of Terrorism Prevented On A 20-inch Liquid Transmission Pipeline Transporting Jet Fuel P-154 At 7:30 PM On A Summer Evening, Two Men Were Riding Mountain Bicycles On An Off-road Trail Near A Bike Path That Paralleled A Pipeline Right-of Way. As They Approached An Unmanned Pumping Station, They Observed A Man With A Backpack Attempting To Climb Over A 6-foot Chain Link Fence At The Pipeline Pumping Station. [65] The Pumping Station Is Part Of A 20-inch Refined Petroleum Products Transmission Pipeline That Passes Through The Area. When The Man Saw The Bicyclists He Dropped The Backpack And Quickly Drove Away On A Cross-country Motorcycle Parked Nearby. [66] Having Recently Seen A Public Information Notice From The State Police To Report Suspicious Behavior, The Men Used A Cell Phone To Call The Local Sheriff s Department And Report The Incident. They Were Asked To Meet A Sheriff s Deputy At A Location Near The Site To Obtain More Information. Page 33 of 65

34 [67] After Conducting An Interview With The Men And Obtaining A Description Of The Suspect, The Sheriff s Deputy Walked To The Pumping Station, Observed The Backpack On The Ground, And Returned To His Vehicle To Report What He Learned To His Dispatcher. An All Points Bulletin (BOLO) Was Issued To Area Law Enforcement Agencies With A Description Of The Suspect And His Motorcycle. P-155 [68] Following Standard Protocol, The Sheriff s Department Notified The State Fire Marshal s Bomb Squad And The Pipeline Control Center That A Suspicious Package Was Found At The Pipeline Pumping Station. The Pipeline Control Center Operator Then Notified The Company Security Officer, Who Contacted The Local FBI Office. [69] Tactical Objectives a) The Primary Tactical Objectives Are To: b) Isolate The Area And Deny Entry c) Establish Unified Command Between Responding Agencies d) Develop An Incident Action Plan To Evaluate The Suspicious Package. Page 34 of 65

35 [70] Summary Of Action Taken P-155 a) The Sheriff s Department Established An Incident Command Post (ICP) Approximately 1/4 Mile From The Scene And Assumed Command Of The Incident. b) The Initial Priorities Established By Unified Command Were To Isolate All Roads And Trails Accessing The Area By Posting Law Enforcement Officers At Key Locations Leading To The Pumping Station. c) After Reviewing Aerial Photographs And Maps Of The Area, The Members Of Unified Command Decided To Use The Bomb Squad Robot To Inspect The Suspicious Backpack. [71] Incident Action Plan a) X-rays Taken By The Bomb Squad Robot And Analysis Of Other Technical Information Revealed That The Backpack Contained Some Type Of Improvised Explosive Device (IED). Based On This New Information, The Following Actions Were Taken: b) The ICP Was Relocated To A Fire Station One Mile From The Incident Scene. c) An Operations Section Chief Was Appointed And Staffed By The Fire Marshal s Bomb Squad Commander. The Operations Section Set Up A Safe Distance 1/4 Mile From The Pumping Station. d) The FBI Field Office Was Notified And Was Requested To Report To The ICP. Page 35 of 65

36 [72] Summary of Action Taken P-156 [73] Incident Action Plan a) The Pipeline Company Isolated The Pipeline By Closing Valves Up And Down Stream. b) The Bomb Squad Moved The Device Away From The Pipeline Pumping Station And Rendered It Safe Following Standard Operating Procedures. c) After Stabilizing The Situation At The Pipeline Pumping Station, Unified Command Organized A Search Of All Pipeline Facilities Along The Pipeline Right-of-way Using Teams Of Law Enforcement Fficers With Explosive Detection K- 9 s And Pipeline Company Technicians. [74] Comments And Observations P-156 a) While These Types Of Incidents Have Been Minimal In The Past, The Current Terrorism Threat Justifies Being Well Prepared. Resolving Potential Terrorist Incidents Safely Requires Good Advance Planning, Close Working Relationships With Many Different Agencies, And A Unified Command Organization. b) Never Attempt To Open Or Move A Suspicious Package On Or Near A Storage Tank, Pipeline Or Pipeline Facility. Page 36 of 65

37 [75] Comments And Observations a) If You Observe Suspicious Behavior, Do Not Attempt To Question Or Stop The Person Unless You Are A Law Enforcement Officer. Observe And Write Down A Description Of The Person, Type Of Vehicle, Tag Number, And The Location And Time Of The Event And Pass It On To Local Law Enforcement. Page 37 of 65

38 [76] Scenario #6 - Rupture Of 24-inch Crude Oil Transmission Pipeline At 6:30 AM, A 24-inch Pipeline With A Maximum Operating Pressure Of 780 Psig Was Shut Down For Scheduled Maintenance. At 11:12 AM, The Pipeline Control Center Opened Manifold Valves And The Pipeline Returned To Normal Operations Flowing Crude Oil From A Marine Terminal To An Inland Refinery 75 Miles Away. The Ambient Air Temperature Was 28 F (-2 C) With Six Inches Of Snow On The Ground. [77] At 11:30 Am The Pipeline Control Center Brought Additional Pumping Units On Line And Soon Afterwards, A Pipeline Leak Monitor (PLM) Alarm Sounded In The Pipeline Control Center And Flashed On The Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition (SCADA) Screen. The PLM Alarm Indicated That The Liquids Flowing Into And Out Of The Pipeline Were Out Of Balance. At 11:42 AM The SCADA System Flashed NORMAL On The Screen Indicating That The Alarm Had Cleared And That The Flow Rates Were In Balance. [78] The Controller Continued To Monitor Pressures At Stations Along The Line. At 12:00 Noon, The PLM Alarm Sounded Again, Indicating That The Parameters For The 2-hour And 4-hour Balance Were Still Showing An Imbalance In The System. Feeling Uncomfortable With The Second Alarm, The Controller Started To Shut The System Down. Additional Alarms Came In At 12:45 And 12:54 PM. Page 38 of 65

39 [79] At 2:11 Pm, The Fire Department Located 120 Miles From The Pipeline Control Center Received A 911 Call For An Odor Of Gas Reported From The Clubhouse At The Municipal Golf Course. A Single Engine Company Was Dispatched To The Clubhouse To Investigate. Upon Arrival, The Engine Company Officer Confirmed That There Was A Hydrocarbon Odor Both Inside And Outside Of The Clubhouse, Which Was Closed To The Public For Remodeling. The Engine Company Officer Proceeded To Check The Atmosphere With A CGI And Could Find No Abnormal Readings. [80] Having Cleared The Clubhouse, The Engine Company Officer Decided To Drive Along A Maintenance Road Paralleling The Golf Course To See If He Could Determine The Source Of The Odor. About 1/2 Mile From The Clubhouse, The Officer Observed A Large Cloud Of Steam Coming From An Area On The Golf Course. Using Binoculars, The Officer Noticed A Very Large Area Where The Snow Had Melted And Was Colored Brown. [81] The Hydrocarbon Odor Was Noticeably Stronger In This Area, And The Officer Had Another CGI Reading Taken. The Engine Company Officer Then Ordered Two Firefighters To Don Their PPE And Investigate The Area Where The Snow Had Melted. As The Firefighters Closed In On The Area, The CGI Readings Increased To 2% Of The LEL, And Then 5% Of The LEL. At This Point, The Engine Company Officer Ordered The Firefighters To Withdraw. Page 39 of 65

40 [82] Upon Returning To The Engine, The Firefighters Reported That The Size Of The Spill Of The Brown Liquid On The Golf Course Was In Fact Much Larger Than It Appeared From The Roadway, And Was Gurgling Up And Out Of The Ground And Leaking Into A Drainage Ditch That Flowed Toward A Frozen Pond On The Golf Course. [83] The Engine Company Officer Then Consulted His Map Book For The Area And Discovered That A 24-inch Liquid Transmission Pipeline Passed Along The Golf Course. With This Information, The Engine Company Officer Requested That The Fire Department Hazardous Materials Officer Be Sent To The Scene. [84] At 3:10 Pm, The Fire Departments Hazardous Materials Officer Arrived At The Scene, Surveyed The Spill Area, And Contacted The Pipeline Control Center. The Hazmat Officer Was Teleconferenced With Two Pipeline Company Supervisors And They Confirmed That Their Data Indicated That The Pipeline Had Ruptured And That The Line Had Been Shut Down And Closed In. They Also Confirmed That The Product Was Crude Oil. Having Confirmed The Exact Location Of The Spill, An Emergency Repair Crew Was Dispatched To The Scene. Page 40 of 65

41 [85] Scenario #6: Rupture Of 24-inch Crude Oil Transmission Pipeline [86] Tactical Objectives a) The Primary Tactical Objectives Are To: b) Isolate The Area And Deny Entry c) (Establish A Unified Command Organization Between Responding Agencies d) Develop An Incident Action Plan To Confine The Spilled Crude Oil And Control Ignition Sources. [87] Summary Of Action Taken a) The Hazmat Officer Requested That Four Additional Engine Companies b) Assistant Fire Chief Assumed Command. As Additional State And Local Agencies Arrived Onscene, Unified Command Was Established. The Incident Command Post (ICP) Was Relocated To The Golf Club House. c) The Initial Priority Of The Incident Commander Was To Determine The Scope Of The Incident By Page 41 of 65

42 Estimating The Size Of The Spill And The Sensitive Watershed Areas That May Be Affected. [88] Incident Command Chart at 3:10 pm [89] Summary Of Action Taken a) After Obtaining Input From The Agencies Involved, Including Calculations Made By The Pipeline Company, It Was Estimated That Approximately11, 000 Barrels (462,000 Gallons) Of Crude Oil Were Spilled. b) The Operations Section Used Personnel From Five Engine Companies (20 Personnel) To Form Three Task Forces For Confinement Operations. [90] Incident Command Chart at 4:30 pm Page 42 of 65

43 [91] Summary Of Action Taken a) Based On Local Knowledge, A Reconnaissance Of The Area, And The Limited Fire Department Resources Available, The Unified Command Members Decided To Construct Two Underflow Dams In The Drainage Ditch Which Served As The Outfall To The Golf Course Pond. Warmer Weather Was Predicted Over The Next 24 Hours And Melting Would Create A Significant Runoff Problem And Contaminate The Pond, Which Was Populated By Geese. [92] Summary Of Action Taken a) By 7:00 pm Environmental Contractors Working For The Pipeline Operator Arrived In Full Force, And The Fire Department Transferred Command To The State Environmental Protection Agency. [93] Incident Command Chart at 10:30 pm Page 43 of 65

44 [94] Comments And Observations a) Pipeline Control Centers Are Equipped With Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition (SCADA) Systems To Remotely Monitor And Control Movement Of Product Through The Pipelines. b) A Well Maintained SCADA System Used By Welltrained Pipeline Operators Is An Effective Tool To Prevent Pipeline Accidents And Alert Operators That There Is A Problem Somewhere In The Pipeline System. c) This Scenario Demonstrates The Limited Capabilities That Local Emergency Responders May Have To Deal With During A Major Liquid Pipeline Incident. [95] Comments And Observations a) More Than One Agency Is Required To Resolve A Major Liquid Pipeline Incident, And Local Emergency Responders Play An Important Role In Establishing Command And Control Early In The Incident And To Alert The Various Agencies That Have A Role To Play In Resolving The Problem. b) Big Spills Require Big Resources, And Most Local Emergency Response Capabilities Are Quickly Overwhelmed. c) The Crude Oil Spill Occurred On A Cold Day With Snow On The Ground. Cold Weather And Snow Significantly Complicates Response And Clean Up. Page 44 of 65

45 [96] Comments And Observations a) The Word Oil In The Product Crude Oil Can Incorrectly Imply That This Product Has A High Flash Point (Like Motor Oil) And Therefore Presents A Low Risk Of Ignition. Not True! Crude Oil Is In Fact, A Flammable Liquid And Has A Low Flash Point As Low As 0 F (- 17 C). b) Crude Oils Also Present A Risk Of Exposure To Benzene, While Sour Crude Oils Present The Risk Of Exposure To Hydrogen Sulfide. Monitoring Using Direct Reading Instruments Should Continue Throughout The Incident To Ensure That Risk Conditions Have Not Changed. Page 45 of 65

46 c) [97] Scenario #7: Puncture Of 20-inch Liquid Transmission Line Transporting Gasoline In An Urban Area P-163 a) At 6:30 AM, An Excavation Contractor Started Work On A 200 Foot By 100 Foot Area To Allow A Pipeline Maintenance Contractor To Begin Work On A Buried 8-inch Liquid Refined Products Pipeline. The Excavation Contractor Did Not Verify That There Were No Other Utilities In The Vicinity Of The Excavation By Contacting The States One Call System ( Call Before You Dig! ). [98] At 8:15 Am A Diesel Powered Backhoe Being Operated By The Excavating Contractor Punctured A 20-inch Steel Pipeline Transporting Gasoline, Which Had A Maximum Operating Pressure Of 1,094 Psig. The Operator Smelled Gasoline, Jumped From Backhoe, And Ran To Safety. Fumes From The Gasoline Choked Off The Supply Of Air To The Backhoe Diesel Engine And It Stalled Without Igniting The Gasoline. The Operator Then Ran To A Convenience Store Near The Excavation Site And Called 911. [99] At 8:20 Am The Metro Fire Department Dispatched A Full Assignment For A Hazardous Materials Incident. This Included Four Engine Companies, Two Ladder Companies, A Heavy Rescue Squad, A Paramedic Unit, The Hazardous Materials Response Team (HMRT) With Foam Tender, And Two Battalion Chiefs. Page 46 of 65

47 [100] Upon Arrival At The Incident Scene The Battalion Fire Chief Assumed Command And Ordered Two Engine Companies And The HMRT To The Incident Site. The Second Battalion Chief Was Assigned As The Staging Officer. Staging Was Set Up At A Shopping Center Parking Lot Three Blocks From The Incident. All Other Responding Units Were Directed To The Staging Area. [101] The Incident Commander Found A Very Strong Odor Of Gasoline In The Air Near The Convenience Store. From Her Vantage Point She Could See A Stream Of Gasoline Shooting About 60 Feet Into The Air Out Of The Hole Where The Backhoe Was Located. There Was A Slight Northwesterly Breeze And The Ambient Air Temperature Was 45 F (7 C). Traffic Was Still Flowing Along The Street And People Were Beginning To Leave Surrounding Buildings To See What Was Happening. [102] The Incident Commander Walked To An Upwind Area And Provided An Initial Situation Status Report By Radio. She Also Requested An Immediate Second Alarm To Report To The Staging Area. Page 47 of 65

48 [103] At 8:20 Am, The Pipeline Operator Had Just Completed Operations To Transport A Batch Of 125,000 Barrels Of Low-sulfur Diesel (Behind The Gasoline Currently In The Pipeline.) He Remotely Executed Commands To Introduce The Fuel Into The Line, When The Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition System (SCADA) Reported High Pumpcase Pressure Near The Metro Pumping Station. [104] The SCADA Activated An Audible Alarm That Certain Pumping Stations Had Automatically Shut Down Because Of Low Suction Pressure. At 8:25 AM The SCADA System Alarmed For An Imbalance Of Liquid In The Pipeline. [105] At 8:35 Am The Pipeline Operator Decided To Restart The Pumps That Had Previously Shut Down Automatically. The Pumps Restarted But Shut Down Again. (Authors Note: Normally A Pipeline Company Would Never Restart Pumps That Shut Down Due To Low Suction, However, This Scenario Is Based On An Actual Incident). At 8:45 AM The Operator Consulted With A Supervisor Who Reviewed The Data Readouts From The SCADA System. It Was Determined That The Pipeline Was Leaking Somewhere In The Metro Area. Page 48 of 65

49 [106] A Pipeline Repair Crew Was Dispatched To The General Area To Begin Closing Manual Valves Along A 3.5-mile Segment Of The Pipeline. At 8:50 AM The Pipeline Control Center Contacted The Metro Fire Department, Who Confirmed That There Was A Pipeline Emergency Currently Underway In The City. [107] Tactical Objectives a) The Primary Tactical Objectives Are To b) Isolate The Area And Control All Ignition Sources c) Implement Public Protective Actions To Protect The General Public By Evacuating Buildings Closest To The Ruptured Pipeline d) Apply Class B Firefighting Foam To The Spill To Prevent Ignition e) Notify The Pipeline Operator. [108] Summary Of Action Taken a) The Incident Commander Ordered All First Alarm Companies To Initially Concentrate On Evacuating All Buildings Closest To The Spill. The Incident Commander Assigned The Following Additional Tasks: b) A Ladder Company Was Ordered From The Staging Area To Block Off The Street. c) The HMRT Was Directed To Set Up For Foaming Operations. Page 49 of 65

50 [109] Summary Of Action Taken a) The Staging Officer Requested That An Airport Rescue And Firefighting Vehicle (ARFF) And Foam Tender From The Municipal Airport Be Dispatched To The Scene. b) Second Alarm Companies Were Assigned To Establish A Water Supply To Support Foaming Operations. c) Firefighters Were Ordered To Apply Foam From An Upwind Area To A Gasoline Spill Covering An Area Estimated To Be 100 Feet X 100 Feet. d) A Ladder Company Was Assigned To The HMRT To Assist With Air Monitoring. [110] Summary Of Action Taken a) A Ladder Company was Called for to block off the street. HMRT Was to Begin Foam operations b) The Staging Officer Requested That An Airport Rescue And Firefighting Vehicle (ARFF) And Foam Tender From The Municipal Airport Be Dispatched To The Scene. c) Second Alarm Companies Were Assigned To Establish A Water Supply To Support Foaming Operations. d) Firefighters Were Ordered To Apply Foam From An Upwind Area To A Gasoline Spill Covering An Area Estimated To Be 100 Feet X 100 Feet. [111] Summary of Action Taken a) By 9:10 Am Foaming Operations Were Well Underway And The Pressurized Stream Of Gasoline Had Subsided. b) Recognizing The Long-term Commitment Required From The Fire Department To Maintain A Foam Blanket While Pipeline Crews Developed A Plan For Excavating The Pipeline, The Incident Page 50 of 65

51 Commander Requested The State Emergency Management Agency To Seek Mutual Aid For Firefighting Foam From The Air National Guard. [112] Comments And Observations a) This Scenario Presents Some Unique Decision Making Issues Concerning Hazards And Risks. The Hazards Of Gasoline Are Its Low Flash Point (-45 F), Its Low Flammable Range (1.4 To 7.6%), And Its Relatively High Vapor Pressure (190 Mm/Hg). b) In The Scenario Described Above, There Is A Significant Risk Of Large Loss Of Life And Property If The Gasoline Spill Ignites. There Is Also A Risk To Firefighters. Always Ask Yourself, What Happens If We Decide To Do Nothing And The Spill Ignites? If There Is Much To Be Gained Then Taking A High Risk To Save Lives May Be Justified. [113] Comments And Observations a) The Application Of Firefighting Foam To A Hydrocarbon Liquid Spill Can Significantly Change The Risks Of An Incident In Your Favor. As A General Rule, Foam Solution Should Not Be Applied To A Spill That Is On Fire Until Enough Foam Concentrate Is On Hand To Extinguish The Entire Surface Area Of The Fire. Page 51 of 65

52 [114] Comments And Observations a) Always Apply Firefighting Foam From The Edges Of The Spill. NEVER Allow Emergency Responders To Walk Into A Spill Area Where Flammable Liquids Have Accumulated In Depth. Even With Proper Protective Clothing And SCBA, [115] Comments And Observations a) Mobile Foam Apparatus, Such As Foam Pumpers Found At Petrochemical Manufacturing Facilities And Aircraft Rescue Firefighting (ARFF) Vehicles, Can Be An Excellent Resources When Dealing With Flammable Liquid Spill Scenarios. Page 52 of 65

53 [116] Scenario #8: Worker Trapped In A Trench Collapse Involving A Gas Distribution Line P-168 a) At 11:45 AM A Fiber Optics Cable Was Being Laid In A 6 Foot Deep By 5 Foot Wide Trench That Was Being Excavated By Hand At A Location Where A 2-inch PVC Natural Gas Line Crossed Over A 20-inch Concrete Sewer Line. During Excavation Of The Trench, A Large Rock Was Found That Required Removal To Proceed With The Digging. Three Excavation Contractors Entered The Trench To Strap A Lifting Sling Around The Rock So It Could Be Hoisted Out Of The Trench Using The Arm On A Backhoe. [117] At Approximately 12:05, As The Rock Was Being Lifted, The Sling Broke Dropping It On Top Of The Concrete Sewer Line. The Impact To The Line Ruptured It, Rapidly Filling The Trench With Raw Sewage. The Effluent Quickly Made Mud Out Of The Dirt Walls Of The Trench Causing The Walls To Collapse. As The Three Workers Attempted To Climb Out Of The Hole, The Backhoe s Bucket Impeded Their Escape Trapping Two Men In The Trench. [118] An Emergency Call For A Trench Collapse Was Placed To 911 At 12:10 Pm. A Volunteer Fire Department And Two Volunteer Rescue Squads Were Dispatched To The Scene With An Engine Company, A Heavy Rescue Squad, A Paramedic Unit, Two Basic Life Support Ambulances, And The Deputy Fire Chief. Page 53 of 65