It is tempting for the modern historiographer, looking back at completed actions, to see the events

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1 THE QUESTION OF THE INEVITABILITY OF THE FALL OF THE ROMAN REPUBLIC It is tempting for the modern historiographer, looking back at completed actions, to see the events of the past as having been able to unfold in only one way. According to this view, major episodes in history, such as the fall of the Roman Republic, seem unavoidable or inevitable. However, this view is flawed in that it tends to simplify very complex issues by ignoring other possible courses of action available to the people of the time. One can challenge the legitimacy of such a claim by studying the fall of the Roman Republic. By determining what events comprise the fall of the Republic, one can begin to ascertain the factors that led to these events. By questioning whether these factors led inexorably to one conclusion, I shall demonstrate that although the fall of the Republic seems inescapable, it was by no means inevitable. The fall of the Republic refers to the failure of the existing political system in the first century BCE, and the changeover to the autocratic government that characterized the period of the Empire. The republican government, because its collaborative nature often gave rise to disputes, had been built upon the settlement of disputes by legal means in a system of jury courts, through mediation and political debate, and [...] with the help of elaborate mechanisms and public rituals of voting. 1 In this way the political system was meant to allow effective management of the state by keeping the conflicts between individual politicians in check; but in the first century BCE, this system was no longer sufficient to restrain the competing ambitions of powerful individuals, and civil war ensued. This civil war thus demonstrated that a republican system of government had ceased to function and that the rules had been broken. 2 However, there was not one civil war to clearly demarcate the fall of the Republic, but rather a series of successive civil wars in the first century BCE, each pointing to a failure of the republican system, suggesting that the fall was a long, complex process. This complexity is due in part to the facade, maintained by the most prominent politicians, of restoring the Republic after its failure had brought, or was brought by, civil war. After his second march on Rome, Sulla was named dictator legibus scribundis et reipublicae constituendae. 3 Forty years later, Octavian, Antony and Lepidus, after the battle of Mutina, formed the Second Triumvirate, the so-called triumviri reipublicae constituendae (triumvirate for the re-founding of the Republic), with a similar nominal purpose. 4 After eliminating Antony, Octavian, as Augustus, continued in the role of restorer of the Republic, now as princeps, ostensibly a peer of the Senate. Even Caesar, after winning his war against Pompey and the Senate, made some effort to cloak his monarchical aspirations in republican offices, accepting the title of dictator, but refusing the royal diadem when offered it by Antony, so that there is really no way to know whether Caesar truly aspired to become rex in the sense of the early kings of Rome. 5 However, while each of these men promoted the Republic, they all were acting outside of the republican constitution, having used military force to gain autocratic rule. After his second march on Rome in 83/82 BCE, Sulla gained the office of dictator without a time limit, whereas previously dictatorship was voted only in emergencies and with maximum tenure of six months. 6 Caesar went a step further, and had himself declared dictator-for-life in 44 BCE. Augustus took on a variety of titles and offices in order to strengthen his unofficial sole rule, such as imperium proconsulare maius (power/command greater than that of proconsuls) in 23 1 Flower, 2007, Flower, 2007, App. B. Civ. 1.99: dictator for the writing of laws and the re-founding of the Republic. 4 Le Glay et al., 2009, Le Glay et al., 2009, Le Glay et al., 2009, 135.

2 2 BCE, which gave him power over the proconsuls in all the provinces of the Empire. Thus, there is an overlap in the first century of two political systems: the traditional republican system that gradually lost its efficacy in ruling the state as it was continually circumvented, and the new trend towards autocratic rule by ambitious individuals who used military force and personal influence to gain unparalleled political power. This overlap is the source of the complexity in trying to determine when Rome ceased to be a Republic and became an Empire. One way to determine when the Republic finally ended is to ascertain when autocratic rule was officially accepted as the political norm. The key characteristic that distinguishes the Republic from the Empire is that the latter involved dynastic rule. 7 Therefore, it can be said that the Empire began, and the Republic came to an end, when Tiberius succeeded Augustus as emperor in 14 CE. However, the beginning of the Republic s demise is much earlier, and much more contested. The most convincing date is 88 BCE, when Sulla first marched on Rome. This action began the first of the civil wars which mark the failure of the republican system of government, when for the first time a Roman general [turned] the swords of his soldiers against his country and his government, and for the first time the army had overruled the decision of the forum. 8 At the end of this civil war, after Sulla s second march on Rome several years later, Sulla gained a dictatorship with no time limit. Although Sulla used this office to seemingly restore power to the Senate through various policies, such as limiting the power of the tribunes of the plebs, his policies also seem to have supported his own dominance over the Senate: his proscription of 82 BCE eliminated his senatorial enemies, and he enlarged the Senate by filling it with his own equestrian clients, giving him great political influence. 9 Thus, Sulla s dictatorship provided a model for autocratic rule, and his violent manner of obtaining this office set a dangerous precedent, one which others, such as Caesar and Octavian, would soon follow. Sulla s civil war therefore represents the beginning of the complex and gradual process of the fall of the Republic, which would finally end with the succession of Tiberius. Having determined when the Republic began to fall, one can investigate the factors that led to this fall, and from there, whether any of these factors ought to have led inexorably to one outcome and thus rendered the fall inevitable. One factor is the alleged moral decline of the Romans in the early first century. Certainly contemporary writers ascribed Rome s political difficulties during the last century of the Republic to failures of character, specifically to ambitio (ambition), avaritia (greed), luxuria (extravagance), and libido (lust). 10 For example, in his De Republica, Cicero cries, Quid enim manet ex antiquis moribus, quibus ille dixit rem stare Romanam? 11. Sallust explains the source of this moral decline in his monograph De Bello Catilinae: Therefore as the result of riches, luxury and greed, united with insolence, took possession of our young manhood. They pillaged, squandered; set little value on their own, coveted the goods of others; they disregarded modesty, chastity, everything human and divine; in short, they were utterly thoughtless and reckless. 12 Therefore, according to Sallust, wealth had brought about the deterioration of the Romans character. Sallust sees the source of this wealth, and the subsequent luxury and license foreign to the manners of the Romans forefathers 13 as a result of Sulla s campaigns in Asia, where allegedly the 7 McDonald, 1966, Marsh, 1922, Le Glay et al., 2009, Levick, 1982, Cic. Rep. 5.2: For what remains from the old morals, on which that man said the Roman state stood firm? 12 Sall. Cat Sall. Cat

3 Fall Of The Roman Republic 3 Roman people first learned to indulge in women and drink, [...] to pillage shrines, and to desecrate everything, both sacred and profane. 14 Overall, Sallust sees a general trend towards greed, and not just for riches: The lust for money first, then for power, grew upon [the Romans]. 15 It is not surprising that Sulla s second march on Rome, which led to his gaining political power as a dictator, followed his campaigns in the East, those which Sallust considers the main source of the degeneration of Roman morals. Thus, according to Sallust and Cicero, the decline in traditional morality, including the rise of greed for power (ambitio), is closely linked to the beginning of the fall of the Republic, and can be considered an important factor in bringing about this fall. However, this moral decline on its own does not account for the fall of the Republic. It is mistaken to think that riches were only introduced to Rome during Sulla s Eastern campaigns, when in fact wealth was nothing new. From the time of the Macedonian and Punic wars, through which Rome had gained control over much of the Mediterranean world, wealth and luxury were available to the victorious Romans. Indeed, even though the Romans learnt about certain amenities, luxury goods and delicacies of the table from the East, the pursuit of wealth and comfort had already begun before Manlius Vulso s triumph [in 186 BCE], nor was ambitio anything new. 16 Thus the greed for money and power had existed long before Sulla s campaigns in the East, and yet the Republic had remained strong even under the influence of these vices. Therefore, while moral decline, in particular the prevalence of personal ambition, seems to have played a role in the fall of the Republic, other factors must have also contributed to this decline. Another factor was the inability of the republican system of political administration to effectively govern its expanding empire, due in large part to the self-interest of the oligarchic Senate. Although theoretically offices in the republican government could be held by any citizen, in point of fact, they were almost entirely monopolized by a ring of noble families. 17 These nobles, in order to maintain their unrivalled position of great influence, were interested in limiting the number of offices capable of bestowing nobility, 18 which were any that bestowed the imperium necessary to govern a province. Thus, when new provinces were annexed and governors needed to be found, the Senate allowed a consul or praetor [to continue to hold imperium] beyond his regular term; 19 because this policy was based on precedent, the Senate was able to furnish the provinces with governors without disturbing any of the existing rules and regulations. 20 However, this policy limited the number of provinces that could be governed due to the fixed number of magistrates with imperium elected each year, while the size of the empire, and thus the number of provinces, continued to increase. Because the senators were interested in preserving their unrivalled influence in the existing political system, they were reluctant to modify this system in order that it could adapt to continual territorial expansion, preferring instead to make only small changes to the constitution, thus limiting the ability of the republican system to effectively govern the growing empire. Furthermore, the system of provincial administration that the Senate pursued did not promote their authority, but rather demonstrated their lack of control over the empire. The problem was the short duration of the governorship, for the rapid turn-over of governors, if there should be more bad men than good ones, not only broke any continuity of policy but established a convention of oppressive rule. 21 This oppressive quality was due to the Senate s inability to restrain the actions of the provincial governors. 14 Sall. Cat Sall. Cat Lintott, 1972, Marsh, 1922, Marsh, 1922, Marsh, 1922, Marsh, 1922, McDonald, 1966, 158.

4 4 Because the republican constitution stipulated that a magistrate could not be called to answer for his conduct while he remained in office, 22 the Senate lacked central control over the personal conduct of administration. 23 Therefore the provincial governors were able to act however they liked while in office. One can see that as the number of provinces, and their distance from Rome and the influence of the Senate, continued to increase in the second century, it was becoming more difficult to keep the [governor] in his restricted place. 24 Overall, the republican system of government was unable to support the growth of the empire, due to the Senate s close adherence to a relatively inflexible constitution that limited the number of provincial governors, and also due to the Senate s lack of control over those governors. Therefore, this defective system of administration was an important factor that led to the decline of the Roman Republic. A further in the decline was the changes to the military enacted at the end of the 2nd century CE. The problem was that, while there was a great need of soldiers, there was a great lack thereof. The success of the Roman army in conquering other lands led to the dispossession of the lower classes from their small properties, and, subsequently, their disqualification from military service. 25 At the same time, fear of losing their livelihoods made citizens increasingly reluctant to do their military duty. 26 To solve this problem, Marius introduced two reforms to the army. First, he abolished the land requirement, in order to draw on the large body of the landless proletarii; second, in order to attract the necessary recruits to his standard he [gave] the promise that the soldiers should be rewarded with lands at the close of their service. 27 These reforms had an ominous consequence: because the soldiers fortunes depended on the success of their leader, from this time on [...] the army was bound to its commander by a tie that replaced the former loyalty to the state and to its constitution. 28 The Roman soldier therefore no longer fought for the state, but rather for his general and himself. Generals now had personal armies, which they could use to further their own ambitions. The reform to the military had made it possible for them to seek their achievement outside the settled arrangements for gaining power within the Republic. 29 Thus, the ability to seize power by military force that the reforms to the army had made possible played an important role in the fall of the Republic. By looking at Sulla s civil war, one can see how the three factors discussed above the rise of personal ambition and greed for power entailed in the decline of Roman morality the inefficacy of republican administration, and the reforms to the army are linked to the beginning of the fall of the Republic. The Senate s increasing lack of control over its governors meant that those with political ambitions felt themselves less and less subject to the institutional rules that were enforced with ever decreased effectiveness. 30 Sulla was one of these ambitious men who did not feel bound to institutional rules: when the command of the Mithridatic war was taken away by the popular assembly, he became the first general to make use of the army reforms to change their decision through military force. His march on Rome in 88 BCE was the first time a Roman general had turned the swords of his soldiers against his country and his government, and [...] the first time the army had overruled the decision of the forum. 31 Several years later, Sulla marched on Rome again, and this time seized 22 Marsh, 1922, McDonald, 1966, Levick, 1982, Le Glay et al., 2009, Ibid. 27 Marsh, 1922, Marsh, 1922, Le Glay et al., 2009, Ibid. 31 Marsh, 1922, 47.

5 Fall Of The Roman Republic 5 the dictatorship. His actions exemplify the decline in morality that contemporary writers saw as the main cause of the civil strife of the first century BCE, in that his motivation was his greed for power. Sallust claims that Sulla acted as a negative example for Romans of that period: But after Lucius Sulla, having gained control of the state by arms, brought everything to a bad end from a good beginning, all men began to rob and pillage 32. Overall, Sulla provided a dangerous precedent for others in the first century BCE; he provided a model for ambitious generals to circumvent the Senate using military force, and for seizing unconstitutional autocratic power. Therefore, moral decline, ineffective government, and army reform together led to the fall of the Roman Republic. The question remains: did these factors lead inexorably to one conclusion, or was the fate of the Republic at all avoidable? A common argument for the inevitability of the fall is that there were inherent flaws in the republican constitution that could only lead to the failure of the political system. Marsh claims that, having begun her career as a city-state, Rome found her machinery of government inadequate to perform the work which world dominion imposed upon her. 33 Indeed, as discussed above, the constitution was inadequate in that it only provided a limited number of provincial governors, while the empire continued to expand. However, this inadequacy was not so much that of the republican constitution as that of the human element of government. It wasn t a matter of the Senate being unable to establish new offices to adapt to the growing empire, so much as it was a matter of the nobles within the Senate wishing to maintain their exclusivity and influence. Admittedly, in order to avoid the consequences of the limitations of the constitution, reform of the political system was necessary. However, it is a flawed assumption that this revolution would inevitably bring the fall of the Republic; if the Senate had addressed the limitations of the constitution to the program of expansion, and gained better control over the provinces and their governors, it is quite possible that the Senate could have continued ruling effectively even as more territory was gained. This possibility may not have been likely, but it shows that there was at least one other course of action available, meaning that from a political standpoint, the fall of the Republic was not necessarily inevitable. Another argument for the inevitability of the fall of the Republic is that Marius s military reforms, which seemed necessary due to the lack of manpower, were without alternative, to the point that it has been claimed, If Marius had never lived, some other man would surely have met a pressing need by a measure of reform so obvious. 34 Certainly these reforms were quite effective in raising manpower, and in a state of emergency they were likely the most practical. However, the consequence of personal armies loyal to one general may not have been inescapable, had other reforms and policies been put in place at the same time to somehow limit the power of the general and his personal influence over the soldiers in his legions - perhaps by cutting the tie between the soldiers fortunes and the success of the general by offering a different incentive to join the army - or at least to put some legions at the Senate s disposal to protect it from the assaults of ambitious generals like Sulla. Finding a system that could have prevented the outbreak of the civil wars due to the advent of personal armies may have been extremely difficult, even improbable, but it was by no means completely impossible. The overall decline of Roman morality may have been unavoidable, greed and ambition being part of human nature, but it is by no means certain that this decline would by itself have led to the fall of the Republic. Since at least the beginning of the second century BCE, there was a pursuit of wealth and luxury, as demonstrated above, but the Republic remained strong for much of that century. It was only in conjunction with the factors of the ineffective system of government and the personal armies enabled by Marius military reforms that vices were no longer restrained, and greed for power could be indulged through civil war. Since none of these factors linked to the decline of the 32 Sall. Cat Marsh, 1922, Marsh, 1922, 45.

6 6 Republic entail only one inescapable conclusion, there is therefore no argument for the inevitability of the fall of the Roman Republic that is very convincing WORKS CITED Cicero. De Republica, ed. C.F.W. Mueller (Leipzig, Teubner, 1889; Perseus Project), %3D2%28fr%29. Flower, H.I. Rome s First Civil War and the Fragility of Republican Political Culture. In Citizens of Discord: Rome and Its Civil Wars, ed. by B.W. Breed, C. Damon, and A. Rossi, New York: Oxford University Press, Le Glay, M., Jean-Louis V., and Y. Le Bohec. The Late Republic: The First Century BCE. In A History of Rome. 4th ed. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, Levick, B. Morals, Politics, and the Fall of the Roman Republic. Greece & Rome Second Series (1982): Lintott, A.W. Imperial Expansion and Moral Decline in the Roman Republic. Historia: Zeitschrift für Alte Geschichte (1972): Marsh, F.B. The Founding of the Roman Empire. Austin: University of Texas Press, McDonald, A.H. Republican Rome. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Sallust. The War with Catiline (Loeb Classical Library, 1921: University of Chicago), uchicago.edu/thayer/e/roman/texts/sallust/bellum_catilinae*.html.