Kyudok Hong (Sookmyung Women s University)

Transcription

1 [Preliminary Draft: Not for Citation] Session II: The Korean Peninsula and Denuclearization: A South Korean Perspective A position paper submitted to the 17 th Meeting of the CSCAP on Countering the Proliferation of WMD in the Asia Pacific June 2-3, 2013 The Peninsula Manila Hotel, Philippines Kyudok Hong (Sookmyung Women s University) Pyongyang s feverish threats of pre-emptive nuclear attacks In spite of UN Security Council resolutions requiring a long-range missile flight moratorium and an end to additional nuclear testing, North Korea launched a satellite into orbit on December 12, 2012, and conducted the third nuclear test on February 12, These violations prompted additional condemnations by the international community along with additional sanctions in the UN Security Council Resolution However, the unanimous demands of the international society provoked an unprecedented level of threats throughout March and April directed at the United States and South Korea while two allied states conducted an annual military exercise. It was quite a shock to Seoul when North Korea through its North Korean Central News Agency announced its intention to launch a pre-emptive nuclear strike against the United States and South Korea. This is truly a game changer for the strategists in Seoul. North Korea said that the moment of explosion is approaching fast and the North Korean forces were entering into the stage of war preparation. It then declared an end to the 1953 armistice treaty and announced it was withdrawing from all nonaggression pacts with South Korea, closing its border crossing, and disconnecting the hotline between the two Koreas. 1

2 Moreover, North Korean leader Kim Jong-un paid a visit to the artillery units in Jang-je/Moo Islands and Wolae Islands to instruct his frontline soldiers the priority of striking targets and how to attack effectively the combined forces defending South Korean territories. The northwestern islands he visited are a likely location of future military conflict between the North and South given their location and history. Adding to the potential for armed conflict in northwestern islands, North Korea escalated further by expressing its willingness to fire upon its so-called Musudan ballistic missiles to major U.S. bases in the U.S. Pacific Command by putting the missiles on road mobile launchers to a test site on the eastern coast. Their provocations continued in various ways. Pyongyang had blocked the Kaesong Industrial Park and had not allowed South Korean reinforcement to provide resources and food for more than three weeks. As a result, the Park government finally decided to withdraw all the manpower safely from Kaesong. Pyongyang again test fired six guided missiles from May 18 through May 20. The ROK intelligence source said that the device was presumed to be an upgraded version of KN-02 short-range missile with a range of around 120 km. However, other intelligence source estimated that the weapons could be a rocket fired by a long-range artillery piece, named as Juche 100 which can extend its range far south to reach Pyongtaik area, where the U.S. forces will be stationed after leaving Seoul by Anyway, the launches came on the same day the Rodong Shinmun, the ruling Worker s Party s official news paper denounced the U.S. plan to test its intercontinental ballistic missile Minutemen III as a security threat to the country. Interestingly, it signified that Pyongyang is carefully attracting attention rather than posing a real nuclear threat against the United States. It would like to show Washington that it can surely be able to take South Korea and Japan as nuclear hostages. Pyongyang s leadership kept demanding that it would not give up the nuclear option unless the United States recognizes the DPRK as a nuclear power state and open nuclear disarmament negotiation one on one at the table. 2

3 I would like to remind you that North Korean provocations do not limited to the excessive rhetoric of using nuclear weapons. As witnessed in March, system breakdown of the major banks and broadcasting companies in Seoul turned out to be done by North Korean hackers. After the home grown terrorist bomb attack made in the Boston Marathon on April 15, vulnerabilities were also found in Seoul when white powder and a letter to threaten Minister Kim Kwanjin were delivered to the mail room of the Ministry of National Defense. We strongly believe that the North Korea is capable of sending its welltrained Special Operation Forces (SOF) unit and would increase the level of asymmetric threat in a way we never imagine. We also expect that Pyongyang s bellicose rhetoric and hostile move would continue until July 27 (the anniversary of the armistice agreement and the North calls this as total victory day ). We are particularly concerned about recent shake up of military leadership in North Korea. General Hyun Young-chul, former chief of staff was suddenly nominated as the Commander of 5 th Corp which covers the middle part of the frontline over DMZ. It becomes a new pattern that a top military leader demoted to local commander and picked up after making a successful provocation against South Korea. Gen. Kim Gyuksik, a new Chief of Staff was the case. He once purged and bounced back after making a series of provocations against the Cheonan sinking and Yonpeyong shelling in 2010 as the Commander of 4 th Corp. Chief Political Commissar of the NKPA Choe Ryong-hae s visit to Beijing We understand that North Korean delegation led by Choe Yong-hae was expressing Pyongyang s willingness to open dialogue with surrounding states by hinting that they would return to six-party talks. It is indeed an encouraging sign since Park Geun-hye government tried hard to keep the door open for North Korea to solve the crisis peacefully. Yet, there is no evidence that North Korea is willing to give up its nuclear option and committed to denuclearization they had promised in At the plenary meeting of the KWP Central 3

4 Committee on March 31, 2013, the North adopted a national strategy of simultaneously developing national economy and nuclear armed forces. Moreover, North Korea amended its Constitution in December 2012 to include an article that it is a nuclear state. Pyongyang laid out further legal basis for a nuclear state by passing a decree on further consolidation of the self-defense nuclear power states at the 7 th session of the 12 th Supreme People s Assembly on April 1, In spite of increasing hope among the officials of China and the concerned states for opening another round of six-party talks to discuss denuclearization, Pyongyang s Military Commission on May 26, 2013 publicly stated that it would maintain national strategy of developing nuclear weapons. And it said that it is only possible way to stop American nuclear threat and an aggressive policy against North Korea. Increasing North Korea s Nuclear Capability South Korea believes that North Korea has developed nuclear capabilities by carrying out more than 100 high explosive tests since the late 1980s and likely obtained nuclear weapon design information through secret networks with Pakistan and Iran. Considering the fact that North Korea made a progress in computer simulation and software technologies, Pyongyang must had acquired the necessary skills of miniaturizing the nuclear weapons. As a matter of fact, Pyongyang claimed that it had succeeded in making nuclear weapons smaller, lighter, and diversified and enhancing its nuclear deterrence capabilities on February 12, Whether or not North Korea used highly enriched Uranium (HEU) in its third test is debatable since we could not scientifically demonstrate the use of HEU. Although we were not able to detect Xenon after the nuclear test, we strongly believe that Pyongyang detonated HEU-based nuclear weapons in the third test. From Seoul s point of view, the North Korea s announcement to use nuclear weapons preemptively is a huge strategic challenge and Seoul has to rely further upon the United States nuclear umbrella through extended deterrence. Seoul has been working hard to increase its missile capability to overcome the North Korea s strategic superiority. It is too unfortunate that North Korea has continuously 4

5 improved nuclear capabilities during the past 20 years while the United States and South Korea were not able to stop them at all. Can the Six-Party Talks be resumed? President Park will definitely support nuclear negotiations within the context of the Six-Party Talks if Pyongyang truly honors its commitment to denuclearization as promised. As she aptly pointed out at the press conference at the White House on May 8, 2013, and her address before the members of U.S. House and Senate on May 9, 2013 at the U.S. Congress, the prior pattern of rewarding the bad behavior should not be repeated. Seoul finds that it is very important to make a same voice among the five partners in dealing with backsliding North Korea that has threatened to reverse the denuclearization process. What are the alternatives to those talks? The frank acknowledgement of failure in the past certainly raises a question for all of us: how do we do the job better this time? How can we possibly have Pyongyang to make a strategic choice to give up, once and for all, its nuclear option? President Park was suggesting to building a mechanism of peace and cooperation in Northeast Asia. We need to have creative ideas and supporters among friends and partners in the region to induce North Korea to follow the steps of Myanmar. However, if her idea can be a realistic option, North Korea must show its sincerity by participating into the six-party talks and fully cooperate with concerned parties. North Korea has been consistent in seeking incomplete declaration and reversible disablement and so far they may think they are successful in buying time and quadrupling its nuclear capability and its delivery power of long-range missile system during the process of denuclearization. Therefore, this could be North Korea s golden opportunity to get the supports from the international society including Washington, Beijing, Seoul, Tokyo and other capitals to move things forward. 5

6 What can be done to improve the negotiating process? In concluding, five parties at the six-party talks should not give an impression that they are searching the peace mechanism in a hasty manner or simply exhausting the time without having a workable way out. The idea that peace through negotiation can be exploited to break the stalemate of denuclearization is only achievable when we are fully prepared to show our willingness and capability to deter North Korean threats of asymmetric warfare. It should avoid the temptations of a quick-fix and strictly carry out the United Nations Security Resolutions 2094 unless the North honors its commitment to denuclearization. The Park Geun-hye government needs to take the initiative away from the North by offering what she can do as a part of Trust politk. At the same time, she needs to stand up firmly against the North Korea. If they do test her will, she must threaten to saturate Youngbyon and other nuclear facilities in order to protect South Korean and allied interests before too late. 6