System Specification. Objectives
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1 System Specification cmsc435-1 Objectives To explain how dependability requirements may be identified by analyzing the risks faced by critical systems To explain how safety requirements are generated from the system risk analysis To explain the derivation of security requirements To describe metrics used for reliability specification cmsc435-2
2 Role for specifications Goal is to convert the user-understood functional and non-functional requirements into an explicit set of specifications that can be implemented that meets those requirements. In many contexts, the specification and requirements processes are intermixed often called requirements specification. Emphasis here is on risk reduction methods Risk here does not mean risk of not completing the project, but of the executing program itself having risks. cmsc435-3 Risk-driven specification Two critical but different roles for risk: What are the risks for the system being built? What are the risks in delivering this system? The first approach has been widely used in safety and security-critical systems. The aim of the specification process should be to understand the risks (safety, security, etc.) faced by the system and to define requirements that reduce these risks. cmsc435-4
3 Stages of risk-based analysis Risk identification Identify potential risks that may arise. Risk analysis and classification Assess the seriousness of each risk. Risk decomposition Decompose risks to discover their potential root causes. Risk reduction assessment (Risk mitigation) Define how each risk must be taken into eliminated or reduced when the system is designed. cmsc435-5 Risk identification Identify the risks faced by the critical system. In safety-critical systems, the risks are the hazards that can lead to accidents. In security-critical systems, the risks are the potential attacks on the system. In risk identification, you should identify risk classes and position risks in these classes cmsc435-6 Service failure; Electrical risks;
4 Risk analysis and classification The process is concerned with understanding the likelihood that a risk will arise and the potential consequences if an accident or incident should occur. Risks may be categorized as: Intolerable. Must never arise or result in an accident As low as reasonably practical(alarp). Must minimize the possibility of risk given cost and schedule constraints Acceptable. The consequences of the risk are acceptable and no extra costs should be incurred to reduce hazard probability cmsc435-7 Social acceptability of risk The acceptability of a risk is determined by human, social and political considerations. In most societies, the boundaries between the regions are pushed upwards with time i.e. society is less willing to accept risk For example, the costs of cleaning up pollution may be less than the costs of preventing it but this may not be socially acceptable. Risk assessment is subjective Risks are identified as probable, unlikely, etc. This depends on who is making the assessment. cmsc435-8
5 Risk assessment Estimate the risk probability and the risk severity. It is not normally possible to do this precisely so relative values are used such as unlikely, rare, very high, etc. The aim must be to exclude risks that are likely to arise or that have high severity. cmsc435-9 Risk decomposition Concerned with discovering the root causes of risks in a particular system. Techniques have been mostly derived from safety-critical systems and can be Inductive, bottom-up techniques. Start with a proposed system failure and assess the hazards that could arise from that failure; Deductive, top-down techniques. Start with a hazard and deduce what the causes of this could be. cmsc435-10
6 Fault-tree analysis A deductive top-down technique. Put the risk or hazard at the root of the tree and identify the system states that could lead to that hazard. Where appropriate, link these with and or or conditions. A goal should be to minimize the number of single causes of system failure. cmsc Insulin pump fault tree cmsc435-12
7 Risk reduction assessment The aim of this process is to identify dependability requirements that specify how the risks should be managed and ensure that accidents/incidents do not arise. Risk reduction strategies Risk avoidance; Risk detection and removal; Damage limitation. cmsc Safety specification The safety requirements of a system should be separately specified. These requirements should be based on an analysis of the possible hazards and risks as previously discussed. Safety requirements usually apply to the system as a whole rather than to individual sub-systems. In systems engineering terms, the safety of a system is an emergent property. cmsc435-14
8 Safety requirements Functional safety requirements These define the safety functions of the protection system i.e. the define how the system should provide protection. Safety integrity requirements These define the reliability and availability of the protection system. They are based on expected usage and are classified using a safety integrity level from 1 to 4. cmsc Security specification Has some similarities to safety specification Not possible to specify security requirements quantitatively; The requirements are often shall not rather than shall requirements. Differences No well-defined notion of a security life cycle for security management; No standards; Generic threats rather than system specific hazards; Mature security technology (encryption, etc.). However, there are problems in transferring this into general use; The dominance of a single supplier (Microsoft) means that huge numbers of systems may be affected by security failure. cmsc435-16
9 Stages in security specification Asset identification and evaluation The assets (data and programs) and their required degree of protection are identified. The degree of required protection depends on the asset value so that a password file (say) is more valuable than a set of public web pages. Threat analysis and risk assessment Possible security threats are identified and the risks associated with each of these threats is estimated. Threat assignment Identified threats are related to the assets so that, for each identified asset, there is a list of associated threats. cmsc Types of security requirement Identification requirements. Authentication requirements. Authorization requirements. Immunity requirements. Integrity requirements. Intrusion detection requirements. Non-repudiation requirements. Privacy requirements. Security auditing requirements. System maintenance security requirements. cmsc435-18
10 System reliability specification Hardware reliability What is the probability of a hardware component failing and how long does it take to repair that component? Software reliability How likely is it that a software component will produce an incorrect output. Software failures are different from hardware failures in that software does not wear out. It can continue in operation even after an incorrect result has been produced. Operator reliability How likely is it that the operator of a system will make an error? cmsc Reliability metrics Reliability metrics are units of measurement of system reliability. System reliability is measured by counting the number of operational failures and, where appropriate, relating these to the demands made on the system and the time that the system has been operational. A long-term measurement program is required to assess the reliability of critical systems. cmsc435-20
11 Reliability metrics Metric POFOD Probability of failure on demand ROCOF Rate of failure occurrence MTTF Mean time to failure AVAIL Availability Explanation The likelihood that the system will fail when a service request is made. A POFOD of means that 1 out of a thousand service requests may result in failure. The frequency of occurrence with which unexpected behaviour is likely to occur. A R OCOF of 2/100 means that 2 f ailures are likely to occur in each 100 operational time units. This metric is sometimes called the failure intensity. The average time between observed system failures. An MTTF of 500 means that 1 failure can be expected every 500 time units. The probability that the system is available for use at a given time. Availability of means that in every 1000 time units, the system is likely to be available for 998 of these. cmsc Probability of failure on demand This is the probability that the system will fail when a service request is made. Useful when demands for service are intermittent and relatively infrequent. Appropriate for protection systems where services are demanded occasionally and where there are serious consequence if the service is not delivered. Relevant for many safety-critical systems with exception management components Emergency shutdown system in a chemical plant. cmsc435-22
12 Rate of fault occurrence (ROCOF) Reflects the rate of occurrence of failure in the system. ROCOF of means 2 failures are likely in each 1000 operational time units e.g. 2 failures per 1000 hours of operation. Relevant for operating systems, transaction processing systems where the system has to process a large number of similar requests that are relatively frequent Credit card processing system, airline booking system. cmsc Mean time to failure Measure of the time between observed failures of the system. Is the reciprocal of ROCOF for stable systems. MTTF of 500 means that the mean time between failures is 500 time units. Relevant for systems with long transactions i.e. where system processing takes a long time. MTTF should be longer than transaction length Computer-aided design systems where a designer will work on a design for several hours, word processor systems. cmsc435-24
13 Availability Measure of the fraction of the time that the system is available for use. Takes repair and restart time into account Availability of means software is available for 998 out of 1000 time units. Relevant for non-stop, continuously running systems telephone switching systems, railway signalling systems. cmsc Steps to a reliability specification For each sub-system, analyze the consequences of possible system failures. From the system failure analysis, partition failures into appropriate classes. For each failure class identified, set out the reliability using an appropriate metric. Different metrics may be used for different reliability requirements. Identify functional reliability requirements to reduce the chances of critical failures. cmsc435-26
14 Bank auto-teller system Each machine in a network is used 300 times a day Bank has 1000 machines Lifetime of software release is 2 years Each machine handles about 200, 000 transactions About 300, 000 database transactions in total per day cmsc Reliability specification for an ATM Failure class Example Reliability metric Permanent, non-corrupting. Transient, noncorrupting Transient, corrupting The system fails to operate with any card that is input. Software must be restarted to correct failure. The magnetic stripe data cannot be read on an undamaged card that is input. A p attern of transactions across the network causes database corruption. ROCOF 1 occurrence/1000 days ROCOF 1 in 1000 transactions Unquantifiable! Should never happen in the lifetime of the system cmsc435-28
15 Specification validation It is impossible to empirically validate very high reliability specifications. No database corruptions means POFOD of less than 1 in 200 million. If a transaction takes 1 second, then simulating one day s transactions takes 3.5 days. It would take longer than the system s lifetime to test it for reliability. cmsc Key points Risk analysis is the basis for identifying system reliability requirements. Risk analysis is concerned with assessing the chances of a risk arising and classifying risks according to their seriousness. Security requirements should identify assets and define how these should be protected. Reliability requirements may be defined quantitatively. Reliability metrics include POFOD, ROCOF, MTTF and availability. Non-functional reliability specifications can lead to functional system requirements to reduce failures or deal with their occurrence. cmsc435-30
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