Entire contents 2011 Praetorian. All rights reserved. Information Security Provider and Research Center
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1 Entire contents 2011 Praetorian. All rights reserved. Information Security Provider and Research Center
2 Threat Modeling "Threat modeling at the design phase is really the only way to bake security into the SDLC. Michael Howard, Microsoft Nathan Sportsman Founder and Chief Executive Officer 2 Entire contents 2011 Praetorian. All rights reserved. Your World, Secured
3 Introduction Process Overview Current State Analysis Workshop Agenda 3 Entire contents 2011 Praetorian. All rights reserved. Your World, Secured
4 INTRODUCTION 4 Entire contents 2011 Praetorian. All rights reserved. Your World, Secured
5 Secure Development Lifecycle Activities Core Security Planning Requirements and Analysis Architecture and Design Development Testing Deployment Maintenance Functional Requirements Non Functional Requirements Technical Requirements Design Guidelines Architecture and Design Review Unit Tests Code Review Daily Builds Integrated Testing System Testing Deployment Review Security Objectives Threat Modeling Architectural Risk Analysis Security Code Review Security Testing Penetration Testing Risk Assessment 5 Entire contents 2011 Praetorian. All rights reserved. Your World, Secured
6 Estimates provided by IEEE Computer Society Requirements $139 Design $455 Development $977 Testing $7,136 Deployment $14,102 6 Entire contents 2011 Praetorian. All rights reserved. Your World, Secured
7 Threat Modeling Is a security control performed during the architecture and design phase of the SDLC to identify and reduce risk within software» Also called architectural risk analysis depending what camp you talk to» Sit down between security experts and architects & development leads» Performed through white boarding and thoughtful discussion» Accomplished over 2 to 5 day time period depending on application complexity 7 Entire contents 2011 Praetorian. All rights reserved. Your World, Secured
8 Threat Modeling Benefits Improves Security» Champions threat analysis» Uncovers logical/architectural vulnerabilities» Reduces risk and minimizes impact Drives Testing» Validates design meets security requirements» Reduces scope of code inspection» Serves as a guide for verification testing Reduces Cost» Identifies expensive mistakes early on» Improve understanding and structure of application» Decreases new hire ramp up time 8 Entire contents 2011 Praetorian. All rights reserved. Your World, Secured
9 THREAT MODELING PROCESS 9 Entire contents 2011 Praetorian. All rights reserved. Your World, Secured
10 Threat Modeling Approaches Attack Centric» Evaluates from the point of view of an attacker Defense Centric» Evaluates weakness in security controls Asset Centric» Evaluates from asset classification and value Hybrid» Evaluates application design using combination of methodologies to meet security objectives 10 Entire contents 2011 Praetorian. All rights reserved. Your World, Secured
11 Threat Modeling Process» Identify Security Objectives» Application Overview» Decompose Application» Identify Threats (and Countermeasures)» Identify Vulnerabilities» Repeat 11 Entire contents 2011 Praetorian. All rights reserved. Your World, Secured
12 APPLICATION UNDERSTANDING 12 Entire contents 2011 Praetorian. All rights reserved. Your World, Secured
13 Application Overview Review any related documentation provided before the threat model Documentation is usually out of date, but can still provide an overview of the application Developers should give an overview of the applications purpose and key features Review security requirements and how the design fulfills those specifications 13 Entire contents 2011 Praetorian. All rights reserved. Your World, Secured
14 Characterize The System Scenarios are very useful in identifying threats Common use and abuse cases should be understood Cases should come from security requirements, If cases are not available, create and analyze your own abuse cases with developers 14 Entire contents 2011 Praetorian. All rights reserved. Your World, Secured
15 APPLICATION DECOMPOSITION 15 Entire contents 2011 Praetorian. All rights reserved. Your World, Secured
16 Application Modeling Flow Chart» Less commonly used» Difficult to overlay threats Data Flow Diagrams (DFD)» Hierarchical in nature» Focused on data input» Representation used by Microsoft Universal Modeling Language (UML)» Familiar to developers» OO and component diagramming 16 Entire contents 2011 Praetorian. All rights reserved. Your World, Secured
17 Flow Chart 17 Entire contents 2011 Praetorian. All rights reserved. Your World, Secured
18 Data Flow Diagram 18 Entire contents 2011 Praetorian. All rights reserved. Your World, Secured
19 Universal Modeling Language (Functional) Client Teller Authenticate Authorize Process Deposit Check Balance Update Account Log Transaction Withdrawal 19 Entire contents 2011 Praetorian. All rights reserved. Your World, Secured
20 THREAT IDENTIFICATION 20 Entire contents 2011 Praetorian. All rights reserved. Your World, Secured
21 Microsoft STRIDE Categorization Spoofing Example: Session identifiers are incremental. Another users session id can be guessed and used Tampering Example: Data validation of user input does not occur. Database entries can be modified via SQL injection Repudiation Example: System does not have audit functionality of user operations to trace an improper request Information Disclosure Example: Verbose error messages reveal database schema Denial of Service Example: Application crashes from unexpected user input Elevation of Privilege Example: User is able to obtain administrative access to application through variable change 21 Entire contents 2011 Praetorian. All rights reserved. Your World, Secured
22 Application Security Frame Categorization Configuration Management Authentication Authorization Data Protection In Storage & Transit User & Session Management Error Handling & Exception Handling Data Validation & Parameter Manipulation Auditing & Logging 22 Entire contents 2011 Praetorian. All rights reserved. Your World, Secured
23 Threat Trees Steal money Stick up bank teller I Bribe bank teller P Impersonate client P Intimidate client I P Probable I - Improbable 23 Entire contents 2011 Praetorian. All rights reserved. Your World, Secured
24 VULNERABILITY PRIORITIZATION 24 Entire contents 2011 Praetorian. All rights reserved. Your World, Secured
25 General Risk Approach Risk = Threat X Vulnerability X Cost Threat = An action intended to do damage or harm Vulnerability = Likelihood of success of a threat Cost = Total impact or cost of the incident 25 Entire contents 2011 Praetorian. All rights reserved. Your World, Secured
26 Microsoft DREAD Categorization Damage How much damage would occur if the attack was successful Reproducibility How difficult is it to reproduce the attack Exploitability What is the likelihood the threat can moved from a theoretical attack to a functional exploit Affected User What percentage of the user would be affected if the vulnerability was exploited Discoverability How difficult would it be for an attacker to discover the vulnerability 26 Entire contents 2011 Praetorian. All rights reserved. Your World, Secured
27 Round table discussion Structured Lists Prioritization based on consensus Utilize Praetorian Risk Approach Numbered list generated 27 Entire contents 2011 Praetorian. All rights reserved. Your World, Secured
28 CURRENT STATE ANALYSIS 28 Entire contents 2011 Praetorian. All rights reserved. Your World, Secured
29 Activities Organizations Are Doing Now Only a handful of companies are actually introducing security into the SDLC in any meaningful way Prior focus by vendors, security service providers, and clients tended to be on back end security controls Other than industry thought leaders, little effort is being paid to the importance of front end controls such as security requirement reviews and threat modeling Backwards approach due to lack of awareness, preexisting systems, and legacy code 29 Entire contents 2011 Praetorian. All rights reserved. Your World, Secured
30 Adoption Constraints In its current form threat modeling generally requires outside security expertise Expensive cost limits threat modeling to one off expenditures for only the most critical applications Difficult to internalize and reproduce process across application portfolios Tools limited functionality and to scalability inhibits development team empowerment 30 Entire contents 2011 Praetorian. All rights reserved. Your World, Secured
31 Future Predictions Software security initiatives at more and more organizations will mature and incorporate threat modeling Threat modeling tools will become more sophisticated and enterprise ready 31 Entire contents 2011 Praetorian. All rights reserved. Your World, Secured
32 References Frank Swiderski and Window Snyder. Threat Modeling. Microsoft Press, Michael Howard and David LeBlanc. Writing Secure Code 2 nd Edition. Microsoft Press,. Microsoft Application Threat Modeling Blog Microsoft SDL Threat Modeling Tool Building Maturity in Security Model OWASP Application Threat Modeling 32 Entire contents 2011 Praetorian. All rights reserved. Your World, Secured
33 Unlock Conundrum Workshop Cell Phone Manufacturer is caught with its pants down and has found out that $6,000,000 worth of unlock codes have been sold by their overseas support personnel Using a internal, web based tool, support personnel are able to query unlock codes used to unlock the phone for diagnostic purposes Unfortunately, employees are abusing the system and setting up websites and selling unlock codes out of band to customers for personal profit Manufacturer has asked a threat model be performed on the new design of the application which they hope will stop the abuse 33 Entire contents 2011 Praetorian. All rights reserved. Your World, Secured
34 Threat Modeling In fact, during the Windows Security Push (and all pushed that followed at Microsoft, we found that the most important aspect of the software design process, from a security viewpoint, is threat modeling. Michael Howard, Microsoft, Writing Secure Code 2 nd Edition Nathan Sportsman Founder and Chief Executive Officer 34 Entire contents 2011 Praetorian. All rights reserved. Your World, Secured
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