Problem Set 2 Due Date: March 7, 2013

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1 Problem Set 2 Due Date: March 7, 2013 Question 1 Consider a group of countries that di er in their preferences for public goods. The utility function for the representative country i is! NX U i = y g i + i H g i + g i j=1;j6=i where y is income, g i is national public spending, H g () > 0, and H gg () < 0: The parameter i > 0 captures how much a country i values public consumption relative to private consumption. Countries are ordered such that 1 2 :::. Public spending creates cross-country spillovers captured by 2 (0; 1) : Only members of the union receive the externalities. 1. Characterize the rst best allocation that maximizes the unweighted sum of utilitiesof all countries, and interpret. 2. Suppose that every member adopts the same policy ("rigid union"). Find the level of spending chosen by a N-sized union. How does it vary with N and? 3. Now analyze an "initial stage" of union formation in which any country can unilaterally join a single union. [Hint: nd the utility of country i in a union of N members Vi in (; N) : An equilibrium union is one in which all members prefer to be members and viceversa for outsiders]. Which countries are going to join? Interpret. Explicitly characterize the equilibrium for H (g) = g1 : 1 How the equilibrium size of the union changes with? 4. Under which conditions will the members of an existing equilibrium union decide to accept a new candidate country (once and for all)? What are the e ects of accepting a new member? 1

2 5. Consider now the repeated version of the game. Each country maximizes the discounted sum of stage payo s. At each point in time members of the union decide which country to accept and the policy to implement. Characterize the Markov Perfect Equilibrium. 6. Consider the one-shot version of the model. Let s now extend the model to consider the case of multiple policies. Imagine F di erent policies providing di erent public goods ordered by the intensity of spillovers, 1 > 2 > ::: > F : The utility function is now " # FX FX U i = y gi k + i H k gj k k=1 k=1 g k i + X j6=i Consider two rules. Rule A: the provision of each public good by the union is voted with majority rule. Rule B: the union can commit to centralize just a subset of policies. In this case, the union votes rst on the number of policies to centralize and then a second vote takes place on how much of each public good should be provided. Compare the size of the union under the two rules. Interpret. Question 2 Consider a society consisting of r rich agents, m > r middle-class agents and p > m + r poor agents. All individuals are in nitely lived in discrete time and maximize the net present discounted value of their lifetime income with discount factor 2 (0; 1). There are three political states: oligarchy (O), in which the rich agents are in power, limited franchise (L) in which the rich and the middle class vote, and full democracy in which all individuals are enfranchised (D). The society starts with oligarchy. The political game is as follows: in each period the median voter of the prevailing political regime decides a policy 2 T R, and also what the political regime should be tomorrow (from the set fo; L; Dg). Each agent s income depends directly on the regime (for example, because di erent economic relationships are possible within di erent regimes) and on the policy. In particular, let y i (S; ) be the income of individual of class i 2 fr; m; pg in political state S 2 fo; L; Dg when the policy is. Assume that the following are uniquely de ned: p = arg max p(d; )g 2T m = arg max m(l; )g 2T r = arg max r(o; )g 2T 2

3 Individuals do not take any other action than the political actions described above. 1. De ne a Markov Perfect Equilibrium (MPE) of this dynamic game. 2. Show that when y r (O; r ) > maxfy r (D; p ), y r (L; m )g, the unique MPE involves the society remaining in oligarchy forever with policy r. Explain the intuition for this result. 3. Suppose that y r (O; r ) < y r (L; m ) and y m (D; p ) < y m (L; m ). Show that in this case the unique MPE involves the society immediately switching to limited franchise and remaining there forever with policy m. Interpret this result. 4. Suppose that y r (D; p ) < y r (O; r ) < y r (L; m ), that y m (D; p ) > y m (L; m ), and that y p (D; p ) > maxf y p (O; r ),y p (L; m ) g. Show that there exists such that, when <, the unique MPE involves the society becoming a limited franchise in the rst period, then democracy in the following period, and remaining in democracy with policy p thereafter. When >, the unique MPE involves then a society remaining in oligarchy forever with policy r. Explain why limited franchise cannot persist as the equilibrium regime in this case. Why is a higher discount factor making democracy less likely? 3

4 Question 3 Consider a society consisting of jnj groups, and denote the set of groups by N. Each group is identi ed by its political (voting) power i 2 R +. Rank the groups, without loss of any generality, in ascending order with respect to i. Throughout suppose that the groups have solved all of their internal collective action problems and act as single agent in the game. The society has a resource normalized to 1, which will be divided between these groups. Let an allocation of resources between NX the groups be fx i g i2n such that x i 0 for all i and x i 1. Each group i has strictly increasing preferences over their share of the resource, x i. Consider the following game: The group with the highest i, group N, makes an allocation o er fx i g i2n. All groups vote over this allocation. Each Xgroup s vote is equivalent to its power. If the allocation is accepted (i.e., i > X i ; where Yes denotes i2y es i=1 i2no the set of groups that vote yes and No denotes the set of groups that vote no), it is implemented. Otherwise, we move to the next stage, and the next group with the highest power makes an o er. The game continues until one of the o ers is accepted or the last group makes an o er. If the last o er is also rejected, then all groups receive the allocation NX fx d i g i2n such that x d i 0 for all i and x d i 1: There is no discounting. 1. Explain why this game has a subgame perfect equilibrium. Is it necessarily unique? 2. Next suppose that x d i = 0 for all i: Also assume that society consists of 5 groups with powers 1 = 1, 2 = 2; 3 = 4; 4 = 8 and 5 = 9:5: Characterize the subgame perfect equilibria of this game. 3. Now suppose that groups cannot make o ers of the form fx i g i2n. Instead, they can make coalition o ers. For example, group 5 can make an o er of f1; 2; 5g, which would mean that these three groups form a ruling coalition. A ruling coalition divides the resource among its members according to their power. That is, if X is the ruling coalition, each i 2 X receives x i = i = X i. Find i2x i=1 4

5 the subgame perfect equilibrium of this game with the ve groups as speci ed in part Discuss what would happen in part 4 if once a coalition is formed, there is one more round of voting within the coalition to form yet another ruling subcoalition. For example, if the original coalition was f1; 2; 5g; group 5 can now o er f5g as the ruling coalition, and win against groups 1 and 2 (since it has 5 votes versus their 3 combined). Characterize the equilibrium ruling coalitions in this case. 5. Let us now return to the original game with o ers fx i g i2n but modify the game so that after the least powerful group makes an o er and it is rejected, the cycle of o ers starts again. Payo s are only realized once agreement is reached and at that point the game ends (it continues inde nitely if no o er is accepted). Does there exist a subgame perfect equilibrium. If yes, give an example. If no, explain why not. Is there any relationship between this game and the non-existence of the core in cooperative games of resource division? 6. Now consider an in nite-horizon version of the game discussed in 5 above, where at each stage the current coalition can votes to include further members or exclude existing members. At the end of each date, payo s are realized as speci ed in 4 above (i.e., each i 2 X receives x i = i = X i ): What types of i2x problems do you foresee if you were to try to characterize the Markov perfect equilibria of this game. [Do not attempt to characterize such equilibria unless you feel particularly inspired. Simply state what the di culties would be if you tried to characterize them and if you have ideas about how to overcome these di culties feel free to suggest them.] 7. Discuss whether games of this form may be useful in understanding coalition formation in real-world political environments. For example, consider the following concrete situation. There are three groups; unionized workers, bankers and monopolists, and they are trying to decide over labor market reforms (disliked by unionized workers), nancial reforms (disliked by bankers) and product market reforms (disliked by monopolists). Suppose that each reform is liked by groups that do not dislike it and, if two groups agree, they can become the ruling coalition and decide on all the reforms. Could you use a model along the lines of that described above to decide what type of coalition will form and which reforms will pass? How would you enrich or simplify the model here if you wanted to make more progress on this speci c question? 5

6 Question 4 Suppose the society consists of N individuals ranked i = 1; 2; :::; N and stage payo s are de ned over clubs/states which are of the form s k = f1; 2; :::; kg for some integer k less than N. Suppose that stage payo s are single peaked with the following structure: s k+1 k s k k s k 1 : Each individual maximizes the discounted sum of stage payo s and suppose that the discount factor is close to 1. All clubs make decisions by absolute majority and can choose to expand or contract. Characterize the set of stable clubs. [Hint: s 2, s 3 and s 4 are stable but s 1 or s 5 is not]. 6

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