Marine Terrorism - A Quick Introduction

Transcription

1 Centre for Security Studies Occasional Paper 2

2 It is with great pleasure that we introduce a new series of papers published here at the University of Hull in our Centre for Security Studies. The topic under investigation is that of IEDs, perhaps one of the most important security issues for the beginning of the Twenty First century. IEDs pose a threat not just on the battlefield but to civilians in warzones and civilians in societies under threat from extremist groups. These papers examine the many dimensions, historical, political and technical of the IED phenomenon. Over the course of this project workshops have taken place within the United Kingdom, the Republic of Ireland and Spain. I would like to thank the University of Cranfield, the University of Hull, the University of St Andrews and University College, Cork for hosting seminars. We remain grateful for the ONR United States for funding this work. Caroline Kennedy-Pipe Director, Centre for Security Studies Chris Martin Deputy Director, Centre for Security Studies Acknowledgments This research was funded under an award from the Office of Naval Research, Contract # N , and we would like to acknowledge them for their support. We would like to thank our collaborators at Penn State (Kevin Murphy, John Horgan, and Frank Ritter) and at Georgia Tech (Lora Weiss, Elizabeth Whitaker, Erica Briscoe, and Ethan Trewhitt) for providing guidance and insight into some of the behaviors and processes associated with the perpetration of IEDs. i

3 Table of Contents Table of Figures...iii Maritime Terrorism Introduction Potential Maritime Terrorism Terrorist Intent Potential Culprit Target Location Strategy of Attack Prioritising Maritime Security Nuclear Explosion Small Boat Threat Liquefied Natural Gas Security Measures Against Small Vessel Threat... 6 Works Cited... 9 Table of Figures Figure 1: Small Craft Intrusion Barrier... 7 i

4 Maritime Terrorism 1. Introduction Within the last decade a large area of concern for global security services has been to provide adequate protection to all transportation systems from potential terrorist attacks due to explicit incidents including aircraft, train and ferry bombings. Throughout recent years particular concern has risen over the possible impact maritime attacks may have. This is due to the vast areas of unregulated water and complex links with rivers and territorial water, all of which may provide significant assistance to the logistics and functionality of terrorist operations. With continually improving security measures at land based sites, many who analyse terrorist procedures believe future attacks are as equally likely to originate from nautical settings as they are from land. When considering potential maritime attacks there are a wide range which exist, therefore resulting in a variety of consequences. For example, planned attacks on passenger vessels may be developed to cause a magnitude of fatalities whilst those on cargo vessels can produce a large economic impact. Furthermore, maritime attacks may also target vulnerable land based sites, such as public arenas, causing mass casualties, a financial and structural impact and producing extensive media coverage. With a wide range of potential circumstances for maritime attacks, it is of great importance to examine all possible actions against characteristics of known terrorist groups and the data from the limited number of historical attacks to develop a firm understanding of all potential risks. Although developing the ability to prevent any attack may be viewed to be impossible, this will assist strongly when arranging pre and post attack security measures, therefore minimising the impact. 2. Potential Maritime Terrorism In order to facilitate full understanding of the extensive threat which the maritime attacks take account for, it is important to consider the broad range of activities held within the definition of maritime terrorism. In February 2002 the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific (CSCAP) defined maritime terrorism as the undertaking of terrorist acts and activities (1) within the marine environment, (2) using or against vessels or fixed platforms at sea or in port, or against any one of their passengers or personnel, (3) against coastal facilities or settlements, including tourist resorts, port areas, and port town or cities. (Quentin, 2003). Although under this definition there is a large quantity of potential attack scenarios, the amount of terrorist attacks to take place from water has remained minimal in comparison to other forms of radical activity. A wide variety of reasons can be considered responsible for this, a few of particular importance include: Page 1 of 9

5 Global positioning: Many terrorist organisations have been located too far from coastal regions to make this a tactically viable option, particularly as extending beyond their local area of control may induce a large risk. Equipment and skills: Due to the vehicles, equipment and skills required completion of maritime attacks can become a costly and complex activity which requires extensive training in comparison to other methods of terrorist attack. Limited media impact: Particularly when carrying attacks out against large commercial vessels the level of media impact can often be much less than those committed on land where more people are aware of, or in close vicinity to, the target location. With such an extensive variety of potential attack scenarios it is important to characterise the attacks under an array of dimensions based on historical activity, expected group activity and potential aspects of future attacks Terrorist Intent When considering the reasoning behind possible maritime terrorist attacks, counterterrorist organisations have identified a range of conceivable intentions which result in such activity. Firstly, with continuous improvement of land based security measures acts of terrorism have become increasingly difficult to plan and successfully achieve, often with intended targets under high level security being almost impossible to attack. Although maritime security has also improved, the rate of improvement does not equal that on land, therefore the potential for success of a maritime attack with a large scale impact is considered to be of limited risk. Whilst terrorist activity is often viewed as a purpose for causing physical violence, this is not always the primary aim. Often further measures are used to induce a damaging impact on the nation also. With a large quantity of today s freight carried at sea, frequently in excess of 85% for many nations, maritime attacks provide the opportunity for a significant economic disruption. With Al Qaeda being a typical organisation aiming to cause economic disturbance, their attack on MV Limburg in October 2002 is a prime example. Although 90,000 barrels of crude oil were damaged (Whitaker, 2002) and spilt into the Gulf of Aden, only a limited number injuries were caused along with three fatalities, two of which being the suicide attackers carrying the explosives on their small vessel. However, the intention of their attack, being to induce economic disruption, was clearly successful with oil prices rising by $0.48 per barrel and growing insurance premiums introducing a loss in port revenue of $3.8 million per month (Lorenz, 2007). One aspect to bear in mind with regards to possible scenarios is the importance of media coverage to many terrorist organisations. Although for many years maritime attacks far from land have been avoided due to the limited media impact, modern technology such as satellite communication has evolved and such attacks may now gain full media coverage in a very short space of time. Therefore, in addition to attacks on cargo vessels for financial impact, large cruise liners are considered to be a feasible target due to the extensive number of passengers they cater for. Furthermore, educated guesses may be made by analysts about decisions made by an Page 2 of 9

6 organisation for the time and location in which they will make an attack to gain amplified media coverage Potential Culprit Ability to identify potential perpetrators is essential when considering the nature and scale of an attack. Those from a large scale insurgency may have access to an extensive range of weapons and all the necessary equipment, often using highly trained terrorists to carry out a well structured plan. Therefore, the latent risk may be of a much larger degree than it would from a small group of separatists. When attempting to identify potential offenders an indication can often be provided as to the type of attack which may be carried out. For example, in 2000 and 2002 maritime attacks were successfully carried out on vessels USS Cole and MV Limburg, both of which were the responsibility of Al Qaeda and both were due to a collision with a small boat operated by suicide attackers carrying explosives. However, it is imperative that this must not be taken as script for any future attacks they may complete which, due to the adaptation of disrupted terrorist networks and formation of smaller groups, still requires broad consideration Target Location Depending on the target location and the area from which an attack may commence, scenarios and the potential success of the activity can vary greatly. For example, certain areas of sea with congested traffic, often known as bottleneck sections, have been identified by analysts as key targets for maritime attack due to the increased damage which may be caused and difficulty for terrorists to be traced. Furthermore, an attack in which the plan is to carry out a large scale explosion in a busy port may involve smuggling of extensive weapons on departure from one port and entry to another, therefore increasing the complexity of the operation. When considering such scenarios an initial temptation can be to believe terrorist organisations will target areas with the greatest impact on human life, economy and media such as populated areas on land and at busy ports. However, due to the reduced intricacy of the operation one must also consider attacks at sea, or on foreign ports in which their target nation has a large degree of interaction Strategy of Attack With the ability to target nations with a large degree of land open to water and often complex territorial waterways, terrorists can use a broad range of tactics depending on their intention and target location. A statement constructed by The Department for Homeland Security, and published in The National Strategy for Maritime Security summarises many of the potential tactics: Terrorists can also develop effective attack capabilities relatively quickly using a variety of platforms, including explosives-laden suicide boats and light aircraft; Page 3 of 9

7 merchant and cruise ships as kinetic weapons to ram another vessel, warship, port facility, or offshore platform; commercial vessels as launch platforms for missile attacks; underwater swimmers to infiltrate ports; and unmanned underwater explosive delivery vehicles. Mines are also an effective weapon because they are lowcost, readily available, easily deployed, difficult to counter, and require minimal training. Terrorists can also take advantage of a vessel s legitimate cargo, such as chemicals, petroleum, or liquefied natural gas, as the explosive component of an attack. Vessels can be used to transport powerful conventional explosives or Weapons of Mass Destruction for detonation in a port or alongside an offshore facility. (Department of Homeland Security, 2005) 3. Prioritising Maritime Security Considering the range of dimensions and extensive variety of attack scenarios which may be formed based on interactions between each one, provision of security measures to cover all possible maritime threats will become both impossible and impractical. Therefore, it is important to use the array of scenarios to prioritise security measures. This may be carried out in a number of ways, two examples include: To emphasise on all diversity, in order to devote the majority of counter-terrorism resources against a scope of plausible attack scenarios. Focus counter-terrorism resources on scenarios of greatest concern based on factors such as risk, potential consequence, scale and possibility. Certain maritime threats which are more prominent than others may not always be the most likely to occur. However, they must often be taken to be as serious due to the large scale of destruction Nuclear Explosion When analysts consider the possibility of a maritime attack using Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) and occurring within the not too distant future, there appears to be a mixed range of opinions. For the attack to take place under a typical terrorist organisation the first obstacle they face is the ability to create on operational nuclear device, which is more difficult than a chemical, biological or radiological weapon. Although the basic technical information needed to produce a nuclear device can be found in open literature, the main impediment is the difficulty to obtain Special Nuclear Material (SNM), particularly Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) (Medalia, 2005). Therefore, as construction is considered implausible the probability of obtaining a weapon, or necessary elements, varies greatly as it relies completely on confidence that no nation would knowingly supply to terrorists. Furthermore, if a workable device was created, or obtained, the organisation still face the technical difficulty of operating such a device in an act of maritime terrorism which has proved complex for other nations in controlled facilities. Page 4 of 9

8 Determining potential procedures for transportation of a nuclear weapon for maritime attack shows the terrorist organisations have more than one option. Loading into a shipping container can be carried out from numerous sites, regardless of distance inland, and sent to a port for the container to be loaded on to a vessel, therefore providing a challenge for authorities to ensure only legitimate cargo is carried. Alternatively, cargo can be carried by trucks which reach the port and are loaded directly on to a vessel, which improves the control the organisation has over the operation. Although a maritime attack may be considered as difficult to achieve and potentially unlikely within the next few years it remains imperative to class this as an important attack of high priority, solely due to the large scale of disruption it may cause. Depending on the target location and method of attack there is potential to cause mass casualties, widespread structural damage and an estimated economic impact of up to $1.3 trillion in lost trade (Buky, 2007) Small Boat Threat When investigating the possible danger from an attack caused by a large vessel such as an oil tanker, although large scale explosions may be induced the threat is often limited due to slow speed of the vessel, poor manoeuvrability and restricted proximity to land based targets. However, use of a small boat is more difficult to track and expected to remain preferential with many terrorist organisations because of simplicity of use, low cost and the previously successful operations such as those against USS Cole and MV Limburg. With the primary concern over small boat attacks being focussed on a boat loaded with explosives striking a large vessel or facility, attention must also be paid to alternative methods of maritime attack which may consist of a small vessel being used for smuggling of WMDs or terrorists into another country. For example, on 26 th November 2008 this occurred in Mumbai when ten Islamic terrorists from Pakistan entered in rubber dinghies carrying excessive armour. Over a period of three days they carried out aggressive attacks on 11 different sites including hotels, hospitals, cinemas, stations and colleges claiming a total of 166 lives (Basrur, Hoyt, Hussain, & Mandal, 2009). Therefore, caution needs to be taken to prevent terrorists gaining fast access to valuable targets close to water. Furthermore, due to the improved manoeuvrability small boats provide opportunity to launch targeted explosives from water to a variety of vulnerable targets including shopping centres, sports stadiums, larger vessels and overhead aircraft which may be leaving or approaching airfields. Overall improvement of small boat security is difficult in a country such as the UK when surrounded by water, or in the US which has extensive coastlines and large areas of inland water generating regular use of over 17 million small boats. The US has set four specific goals in a coherent system known as Small Vessel Security Strategy (Department of Homeland Security, 2008) to improve awareness, and therefore security: Page 5 of 9

9 Develop and leverage a strong partnership with the small vessel community and public and private sectors in order to enhance maritime domain awareness. Enhance maritime security and safety based on a coherent plan with a layered, innovative approach. Leverage technology to enhance the ability to detect, determine intent, and when necessary, interdict small vessels. Enhance coordination, cooperation, and communications between Federal, state, local, and Tribal partners and the private sector as well as international partners Liquefied Natural Gas Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) is predominantly Methane converted to liquid to simplify transportation and storage. Although non-explosive and non-flammable in its liquid state, if vaporised and mixed with air it becomes highly flammable. Therefore, with LNG carried by tankers and facilities in a number of ports large concerns have developed over the disruption an attack could cause to the port and surrounding areas. Although no land or sea based LNG facilities have yet been targeted by terrorists previous disasters, such as Algeria in 2004, have displayed the large scale of damage which may be caused. Whilst there is necessity for strong security measures at port based LNG facilities, protection of LNG tankers at sea is also of great importance as potential attacks include those from small boats carrying Water-Borne Improvised Explosive Devices (WBIED) for suicide attacks and deliberate aircraft collision. Although many specialists argue that LNG attacks should not be of primary concern, as impact from other potential targets may be greater, in a similar way to nuclear attacks this should not be dismissed due to the extensive damage which may be inflicted. 4. Security Measures Against Small Vessel Threat When introducing and improving security measures to minimise danger, account must be taken for detection, surveillance and methods of restriction. These can take place in numerous ways with a varied range of complexity. Some examples to prove this which are currently in operation or development for action against small vessel threat include: Surface Warfare (SUW) Mission Package: This is a self contained set of remote sensors and precision attack weapons designed in conjunction with the US Navy, in order to combat small fast moving boats which pose a threat. Having been developed for the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS), which is currently in operation, it uses off-board sensors which enable surveillance to be carried out both in and beyond the line of sight. The sensors used are fitted to an Unmanned Aerial Vehicle capable of vertical takeoff, therefore used for surveillance without risking the life of any personnel. Many sensors, weapons and software components are contained in a modular package to allow simple maintenance and replacement. The weapons consist of 30mm guns for close range use and launching systems for targets beyond the line of sight. In addition the package includes a fully armed helicopter capable to carryout attack and surveillance missions. Page 6 of 9

10 In a much more simplified manner, a range of products developed by private companies exist which are used as barriers to mark designated zones with restricted access, or to prevent intrusion from small unauthorised vessels. An example of which has been displayed in Figure 1. In the US, the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO) are currently carrying out an assessment known as the west coast maritime pilot program, in which buoys have been fitted with radiation sensors and are being used to detect radiation levels amongst commercial and recreational vessels which arrive and depart. The primary aim of the program is to assess this as a feasible option for minimising the risk of WMDs carrying excessive radiation levels being smuggled into, or operated in, an area. The sensitivity of the sensors is an important element as, although radiation levels of a radiological weapon will be excessive those of a nuclear weapon will be much less and therefore more difficult to detect. Figure 1: Small Craft Intrusion Barrier (Wave Design Technologies Inc.) 5. Conclusion When considering the attacks against large scale targets which are achievable by terrorists, it seems sole improvement of security measures will provide an impractical prevention due to the extensive range of attack scenarios in relation to the limited security resources. For this reason detailed surveillance and comparison against previous terrorist activity from specific organisations are essential in order to prioritise use of important security resources. Page 7 of 9

11 A significant threat which must be labelled of high priority is that introduced from small vessel attacks, particularly as this is likely to remain the primary selection by many terrorist groups for the foreseeable future. Various countermeasures have been introduced based upon identification, situational awareness and defence against such vessels. However, as with all methods of terrorist attack these will need to be consistently improved in order to minimise the threat from scenarios which terrorist organisations will regularly adapt. Page 8 of 9

12 Works Cited Basrur, R., Hoyt, T., Hussain, R., & Mandal, S. (2009). The 2008 Mumbai Terrorist Attacks: Strategic Fallout. Singapore: S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies. Buky, M. (2007). Maritime Terrorism: The Threat from Small Vessels. Maritime Studies: Issue No. 157, Department of Homeland Security. (2007, September 5). DHS Announces West Coast Maritime Radiation Detection Project. Retrieved September 3, 2010, from Homeland Security: Department of Homeland Security. (2008, April). Small Vessel Security Strategy. Retrieved September 03, 2010, from Homeland Security: Department of Homeland Security. (2005, September). The National Strategy for Maritime Security. Retrieved September 01, 2010, from Homeland Security: Lorenz, A. J. (2007, April 15). Al Qaeda s Maritime Threat. Retrieved August 31, 2010, from Maritime Terrorism Research Center: Medalia, J. (2005, January 24). Terrorist Nuclear Attacks on Seaports: Threat and Response. Retrieved September 02, 2010, from Congressional Research Service: Quentin, S. (2003, January 20). Shipping Activities: Targets of Maritime Terrorism. Retrieved August 25, 2010, from MIRMAL, Issue 2: Wave Design Technologies Inc. (n.d.). Maritime Homeland Defense & Force Protection Port Security Solutions. Retrieved September 6, 2010, from WhisprWave: Whitaker, B. (2002, October 17). Tanker blast was work of terrorists. Retrieved August 31, 2010, from The Guardian: Page 9 of 9