Genetic Information: Comparing Alternative Regulatory Approaches when Prevention Matters



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Genetic Information: Comparing Alternative Regulatory Approaches when Prevention Matters Francesca Barigozzi and Dominique Henriet August 2008 Abstract We compare the alternative approaches for regulating genetic information in insurance markets in the case where prevention measures are available. In the model firms offer insurance contracts to consumers who are initially uninformed of their risk type, but can obtain such information by performing a costless genetic test. A crucial ingredient of our analysis is that information has decision-making value since it allows to optimally choose a self-insurance action (secondary prevention). We focus on the welfare properties of market equilibria obtained under the different regulatory schemes and, by using an intuitive graphical analysis, we rank them unambiguously. Our results show that disclosure duty weakly dominates the other regulatory schemes and that strict prohibition represents the worst regulatory approach. Keywords: health insurance markets, regulation, information gathering, classification risk, self-insurance. JEL classification: D82; D83; G22. 1 Introduction Recent developments in medical science makes genetic tests for over 1000 diseases available to consumers: genes that imply an elevated risk of several types of cancer, cardiovascular diseases, Alzheimer and Huntington s disease, cystic fibrosis, etc., can be detected. Whenever consumers undertake a test, they acquire more precise information about the probability that the illness related to the tested gene occurs. This means that individuals can learn information Department of Economics, University of Bologna and CHILD, P.zza Scaravilli 2, 40126 Bologna (Italy). E-mail: francesca.barigozzi@unibo.it Department of Economics, Ecole Centrale Marseille, GREQAM and IDEP. E-mail: dominique.henriet@ec-marseille.fr 1

about their risk. If privacy rules are il place to keep such information private, adverse selection can raise endogenously in the health insurance market. The ongoing debate on the use of genetic information in insurance markets (treated, for example, in Hoy and Ruse 2005) sees insurance firms worried that adverse selection and related inefficiencies will increase if consumers can secretly take a genetic test and conceal its result. Adverse selection reduces the ability of firms to estimate future loss costs and to adjust prices appropriately to reflect consumers risk. On the other side, consumers fear that a class of potentially uninsurable individuals, the "bad genetic risks", will be created if insurers can oblige consumers to take a genetic test before policy purchase. This problem is generally referred to as the "discrimination risk". When consumers decide whether to learn information on their risk or not, their choice is influenced by the reaction of the insurance market to such information. In turn, market response obviously depends on whether and how genetic information is regulated in the insurance market. Four major types of market regulations of genetic information exist (see Viswanathan et al. 2007, Hoy and Ruse 2005 and references within both of them). They are listed below from no-regulation to the most strict regulatory scheme. (i) "Under a laissez-faire approach insurers have full freedom to request new tests and the disclosure of existing tests, and to incorporate test results in underwriting and rating". The previous and the following quoted sentences are taken from Viswanathan et al. (2007), page 68. Laissez-faire is practiced in Australia, Canada, China, Japan, Korea, Ireland, Portugal, Russia, Singapore, Spain, and South Africa. (ii) Under the Disclosure Duty approach consumers "have to disclose the results of existing tests, at the insurers request, but cannot be required to take additional tests". This happens in Germany, New Zealand, and the UK. (iii) Under the Consent Law approach consumers "are not required to divulge genetic tests results. If they do, insurers may use this information", as in the Netherlands and in Switzerland. Finally, (iv) under Strict Prohibition, "insurers cannot request genetic tests, cannot require applicant to provide existing tests results, and cannot use any genetic information in underwriting and rating", as in Austria,Belgium,Denmark,France,Israel,Italy,andNorway. IntheU.S.the Genetic Information Non-discrimination Act (GINA) of 2007 has to be voted on in the Senate. The bill places restrictions on insurers, banning the use of genetic information in underwriting health insurance policies. 1 Thus, we can associate the U.S. (federal) approach to strict prohibition. In this paper we consider a simple model which enables us to analyze and compare the previously mentioned regulatory approaches for genetic information. We characterize market outcomes under the different regulatory structures and derive a complete ranking. We believe such a welfare analysis is worthwhile inthedebateongenetictestingtounderstand (i) whether consumers concerns about the discrimination risk are justified and (ii) whether the different regulatory schemes are appropriate tools to reach the implicit objectives of increasing 1 In general, regulation of genetic information aimed to prevent genetic discrimination is much stricter in the health than in the life insurance market. The implicit reason is that health insurance is considered a priority for consumers whereas life insurance is not. 2

consumers welfare by protecting consumers privacy on genetic information. To the best of our knowledge this type of analysis is missing in the literature on genetic testing. A crucial ingredient of our investigation is prevention. Information provided by genetic tests allows consumers to take more efficient decisions: a secondary prevention measure (early detection of disease) is available and its efficacy is increasing in the precision of information about the individuals risk. Secondary prevention corresponds to a self-insurance measure since it reduces the health loss when the illness occurs. As an example, we can consider the BRCA1 and BRCA2 genetic mutations which are implicated in many hereditary breast cancer cases and the genetic mutation responsible for hereditary non-polyposis colorectal cancer (HNPCC). An individual who is positive to a genetic test for one of the mentioned mutations can undertake effective preventive measures to detect the illness at an early stage, in fact screening tests as mammography and colonscopy are available. While some authors investigated the case of primary prevention, that is the availability of measures reducing the probability of illness (see Doherty and Posey 1998, Strohmenger and Wambach 2000, Hoel and Iversen 2002), no one analyzed secondary prevention, even if the latter probably represents the most effective type of prevention genetic tests make available. In our analysis consumers face two different risks: the first risk is standard and is due to the monetary equivalent of the negative health shock in the case of illness. The second one is associated to the risk of being a high-risk and, thus, corresponds to the risk of paying a high premium (classification risk). The real market is not able to provide insurance policies that cover the classification risk, despite the latter would obviously increase consumers welfare. 2 Our model allows to clearly characterize the welfare loss that the lack of coverage against the classification risk produces. Since information has decision-making value, consumers choose whether to become informed taking into account the benefit of information in terms of more efficient prevention measures and its cost in terms of increased risk. Thus, in our model information raises the following trade-off: on the one hand it allows to avoid under- or over-prevention, on the other hand, since no coverage for the classification risk is available, consumers can be worse off when they gather information. How the previous trade-off is solved depends, as we explain, on the regulatory scheme that is in place in the market for insurance. The timing of actions is the following in all the regulatory approaches, except the laissez faire. First, insurancefirms propose contracts to consumers. Second, consumers decide whether to perform the test and, possibly, whether to show it to insurers. Then consumers accept a contract and, finally, they choose prevention given the insurance policy. Under laissez faire the decision whether to perform the test is taken by insurance firms and the timing of the first two actions is reversed. Our results show that, from a social welfare point of view, the disclosure 2 A policy covering the classification risk has been called "genetic insurance" by Tabarrok (1994). We will discuss genetic insurance in subsection 2.3.1. 3

duty approach weakly dominates all the other regulatory schemes. The laissez faire and the consent law approaches lead to the same equilibrium allocation. The equilibrium allocation under strict prohibition is dominated by all the other regulatory schemes. Under consent law and strict prohibition consumers always learn information, whereas disclosure duty leads to information gathering only when the benefit of better prevention choices prevails over the cost raised by the classification risk. This is precisely why disclosure duty maximazes consumers welfare. When consumers decide to learn information under disclosure duty, the latter regulatory scheme leads to the same equilibrium allocation than consent law and laissez faire. In general laissez faire, consent law, and strict prohibition all bring to information disclosure at the equilibrium. Under consent law information is certifiable and it is transmitted at no cost by low-risks showing to insurers the test result. Whereas, under strict prohibition, the equilibrium corresponds to the Rothschild-Stiglitz separating allocation and thus implies a welfare loss since the low-risks receive partial insurance. Strict prohibition results to be the only regulatory scheme that endogenously generates adverse selection. Concerning prevention choices under the different regulatory schemes, when consumers always learn information, that is with laissez faire, consentlaw, and strict prohibition, choices are always efficient (in a sense that will be specified in the paper). Obviously, under disclosure duty they are efficient only when consumers learn information. In the paper we also derive the private and social value of information under the alternative regulatory approaches. Concerning the related literature, all the papers dealing with genetic testing are clearly relevant. 3 However, the papers most closely related to our analyze endogenous information in insurance markets and are mentioned below. Crocker and Snow (1992) first showed that, if coverage against the classification risk is not available and if insurers can observe consumers information status and test result, the private value of information is negative and consumers prefer to remain uninformed. Doherty and Thistle (1996) developed a model where some consumers are initially informed on their risk type and other are not. They showed that information has positive private value only when insurers cannot observe consumers information status, that is if consumers can conceal that they performed the test. Both when information provided by the test is not verifiable and when the test result is certifiable (that is under strict prohibition and consent law, respectively), at the equilibrium all consumers learn their type. In Doherty and Posey (1998) information has decision-making value. However, as already noticed, the latter authors analyze the case of selfprotection; we instead consider the case of self-insurance. Moreover, all the previously mentioned authors analyze one or two regulatory schemes at most, 3 For example, in Hoel and Iversen (2002) genetic information allows to take better primary prevention measures and the health insurance market is characterized by a mix of compulsory and voluntary insurance. Hoel et al. (2006) analyze a model where consumers are characterized by preferences for late resolution of uncertainty concerning their health risk. Strohmenger and Wambach (2000) analyze a model with state contingent utility functions. Hoy and Polborn (2000) consider a life insurance model. Interesting empirical analysis can be found in Hoy and Witt (2007), Viswanathan et al. (2007). 4

we instead compare all the alternative regulatory approaches and are able to rank them unambiguously. Finally our paper is also related to the more general literature on information gathering before contracting (among others Hirshleifer 1971 and Khalil and Cremer 1992) 4 and, more closely, to the literature on privacy (Stigler 1980 and Posner 1981). In line with the latter two cited works, our results show that privacy is harmful to efficiency. In our model this basically happens because, if privacy is assigned to consumers on their information status and on tests results (as in consent law and strict prohibition), consumers decide to learn information also when it is inefficient to do so. Our paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the model set-up and analyses the decision-maker s problem without insurance. Subsection 2.2 describes how insurance coverage affects consumers choice of prevention and defines the interim optimal allocation. Subsection 2.3 shows the ex-ante optimal allocation and discusses how to decentralize such allocation in the market. Both the interim optimal and the ex-ante optimal allocations will be used to rank market outcomes in the subsequent sections. In section 3 market equilibria are obtained and characterized under the different regulatory schemes. In Section 4 we compare the alternative regulatory structures and derive a complete ranking; finally, section 5 provides some final remarks and policy implications. We relegate almost all the proofs in the appendix. 2 The model Decision-makers are endowed with a fixed amount of wealth w, and are characterized by the von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function u(w), increasing and concave. They face the risk of a monetary loss L (a), where 0 <L(a) <w. The action a is a self-insurance measure. By interpreting L(.) as the monetary equivalent of a negative health shock, the action a refers to secondary prevention or early detection of disease. In the real world screening tests which allow early curative action (and hence a low cost of treatment) are generally observable and certifiable; thus, we assume that insurers observe the action a. As a consequence, all the insurance contracts analyzed in the paper are contingent on the level of secondary prevention. The action can take only two values, 0 and 1 (either decision-makers perform the screening test or not) with L(1) = l<l(0) = L. Moreover, the action a is taken before the realization of the risk and implies a utility cost Ψ (a), withψ(0) = 0 and Ψ(1) = Ψ. We consider two decision-makers types, the high- and the low-risks, respectively characterized by the probability p L and p H to incur in the loss, with 0 <p L <p H < 1. We assume that p L and p H are fixed, so that no ex-ante moral hazard problem exists. The proportion of high- and low-risk types in the population is λ and (1 λ) respectively. These parameters are assumed to be common knowledge. 4 See Bennardo (2008) for a recent analysis along these lines. 5

Consumers do not know their type ex-ante. The loss probability of uninformed individuals is p U = λp H +(1 λ)p L. Information can be gathered without cost by performing a genetic test. Risk neutral insurance companies propose contracts to consumers. 2.1 The decision-maker s problem without insurance In this subsection we focus on the decision whether to gather information when the risk of the loss L(a) is not covered in the insurance market. Consumers decide whether to learn information or not by anticipating that, in the subsequent stage, they will choose whether to perform prevention given the information possibly acquired. Proceeding backward, let us consider the second stage, that is the choice of the preventative action. An individual characterized by loss probability p i {p L,p U,p H } who chooses action a, achieves the following expected utility level: V (p i,a)=p i u(w L(a)) + (1 p i )u(w) Ψ(a) The decision-maker chooses a positive amount of prevention if V (p i, 1) V (p i, 0), that is if p i u(w l)+(1 p i )u(w) Ψ p i u(w L)+(1 p i )u(w), or: Ψ p i u(w l) u(w L) = Ψ (1) 0 The term 0 is positive and measures the benefit from prevention. When this term is large and/or the cost of prevention Ψ is low, inequality (1) is easily verified. Put differently, inequality (1) shows that decision-makers choose to perform prevention when their loss probability is sufficiently high. Remark 1 The uninsured decision-makers choose prevention if inequality (1) holds. This implies that incentives to perform prevention are increasing in the risk. Let us define ba(p i ) the action chosen by an individual characterized by probability of loss p i and b V (p i ) the individual s indirect expected utility when the probability is p i and the chosen action is ba(p i ). In the first stage, uninformed decision-makers compare expected utility when they remain uninformed to expected utility when they gather information, that is ˆV (p U ) to λ b V (p H )+(1 λ) b V (p L ). The following remark illustrates consumers choices about information when insurance is not available. Remark 2 Without insurance, (i) when prevention is optimal for low-risks (p L Ψ 0 ) or when no-prevention is optimal for high-risks (p H Ψ 0 ),decisionmakers are indifferent between remaining uninformed and gathering information. (ii) When p L < Ψ 0 <p H uninformed decision-makers acquire information on their risk-type. 6

Proof. See Appendix 6.1. Remark 2 states that, when prevention costs are such that the optimal action for informed low-risks is a positive level of prevention, prevention is optimal also for uninformed and informed high-risks: uninformed individuals are indifferent between acquiring and not acquiring information. The same reasoning applies when informed high-risks choose no-prevention. 5 On the contrary, when p L < Ψ 0 <p H, positive prevention is optimal for high-risks whereas noprevention is the optimal choice for low-risks. This implies that information is useful for appropriate prevention decisions such that uninformed consumers acquire information. Note that, since no insurance is available, when deciding whether to gather information individuals do not face any classification risk, they simply anticipate the positive effect of information in terms of better prevention choices. Social welfare when insurance is not available, W0, is represented in Figure 1 as a function of prevention cost Ψ. Notethat,for0 Ψ 0 p L, both types perform prevention; for 0 p L < Ψ < 0 p H high-types only perform prevention; for Ψ 0 p H no one perform prevention. We conclude this section by observing that, without insurance, the private and social value of information are positive for 0 p L < Ψ < 0 p H. 6 In all the other cases the private and social value of information are zero and decisionmakers are indifferent between remaining uninformed and gathering information. 2.2 Interim optimal insurance We analyze here optimal insurance contracts from an interim perspective, that is when decision-makers performed the test and the test result is public information. Together with the ex-ante optimal allocation, the interim optimal one will be useful to characterize and rank market outcomes under the different regulatory schemes. In the following P i indicates the insurance premium and I i the indemnity reimbursed by insurers when the negative shock realizes. Assuming competing, risk-neutral insurance firms, this contract is feasible if the premium is not lower than the expected indemnity. The optimal contract is hence the solution of the following program: ( max p i u (w P i L (a i )+I i )+(1 p i ) u (w P i ) Ψ (a i ) P i,i i,a i s.t.: P i p i I i where i = L, H. Obviously the optimal contract provides full-insurance: I i = L (a i ). Under full actuarial insurance the level W (p i,a) of utility achieved by a 5 Note that, when the action a is not available, uninsured decision-makers are always indifferent between remaining uninformed and learning their type. In other words, when the decision-maker is uniquely concerned with information gathering and insurance coverage is not available, V (p U ) = λv (p H )+(1 λ)v (p L ) always holds. 6 Note that, for the Law of Large Number, consumers expected utility and social welfare are the same such that the private and social value of information are equivalent. 7

decision-maker characterized by risk p i and action a is: W (p i,a)=u(w p i L(a)) Ψ(a) Prevention is positive if W (p i, 1) W (p i, 0): u(w p i l) Ψ u(w p i L) or: (p i )=u(w p i l) u(w p i L) Ψ (2) Remark 3 In the interim optimal allocation: (i) prevention is performed if inequality (2) holds; (ii) incentives to perform prevention are increasing in the decision-maker s risk; (iii) given a risk p i, incentives to perform prevention are lower than without insurance. Proof. See Appendix 6.2. Note that, if (p i ) < Ψ p i 0, type-p i does not exert prevention when fully insured whereas he chooses positive prevention when uninsured. Thus, as we expected, insurance reduces the benefits from the preventative action and discourages prevention for a given risk. Total welfare in the interim optimal allocation is: W I = λu(w p H L(ã(p H )))+(1 λ)u(w p L L(ã(p L ))) λψ(ã(p H )) (1 λ)ψ(ã(p L )) (3) where ã(p i )=1if inequality (2) holds and to 0 otherwise. From Remark 3: Definition 1 (Interim optimal allocation) The interim optimal allocation WI is the allocation such that decision-makers are informed and fully insured. Premium is type-dependent and equal to P i = p i L(ã(p i )). Moreover: when 0 Ψ (p L ), ã(p L )=ã(p H )=1. when (p L ) < Ψ (p H ), ã(p L )=0, ã(p H )=1. when Ψ > (p H ), ã(p L )=ã(p H )=0. Figure 1 below describes total welfare under interim optimal insurance as a function of the cost of prevention Ψ and offers a graphical representation of expression 3. Insert figure 1 here 2.3 Ex-ante optimal insurance (the first-best) We now define the ex-ante optimal allocation as the allocation maximizing exante expected utility under the feasibility constraint and such that decisionmakers acquire information after the contract is offered. Both coverages for the classification risk and for the risk of the loss are thus available. Everything is observable and contractible. 8

The first-best contract solves: max λ (p H u(w P H L(a H )+I H )+(1 p H )u(w P H ) Ψ(a H )) + P H,I H,P L,I L,a H,a L (1 λ)(p L u(w P L L(a L )+I L )+(1 p L )u(w P L ) Ψ(a L )) s.t.: λp H +(1 λ)p L λp H I H +(1 λ)p L I L Obviously the first-best implies full insurance: I i = L(a i ),i= L, H. Moreover, since the ex-ante optimal insurance covers the classification-risk, the optimal premium is uniform: P = λp H L(a L )+(1 λ)p L L(a L ). 7 The optimal values of prevention, a i,i= L, H, are the solutions of: max W EA (a H,a L )=u(w λp H L(a H ) (1 λ)p L L(a L )) λψ(a H ) (1 λ)ψ(a L ) a H,a L (4) Depending on who performs prevention, four cases are possible: WEA 1 = u(w p U l) Ψ (5) WEA 2 = u(w λp H l (1 λ)p L L) λψ (6) WEA 3 = u(w λp H L (1 λ)p L l) (1 λ)ψ (7) WEA 4 = u(w p U L) (8) Welfare is WEA 1 4 (WEA) when both types (no type) perform prevention. Whereas WEA 2 3 and WEA correspond to the cases where only high-types and only low-types respectively make prevention. Between WEA 2 3 and WEA the most natural case to analyze is the one where prevention is performed by high-types, as in the interim optimal allocation. Thus, we assume that Ψ, WEA 2 W EA 3. It can be easily checked that this happens when the following assumption holds: Assumption 1: ½ a) λph (1 λ)p L b) λ (1 λ) Inequalities 1a and 1b are sufficient conditions such that it is socially optimal that only high-risk decision-makers perform prevention in the interval of prevention cost Ψ specified below in Definition 2. Note that, according to assumption 1b, the proportion of high-risks in the population must be lower than that of low-risks: λ 1/2. Assumption 1a and 1b together indicate that the loss probability p H must be sufficiently higher than p L,inparticularp H 1 λ λ p L where 1 λ λ 1. We define the ex-ante optimal allocation as follows: 7 Note that, since both types pay the same premium irrespective of their action and get utility u(w P ), when the action performed by the two types is different, those performing prevention suffer the disutility loss Ψ and, thus, are characterized by a lower utility. In this case the social planner may want to introduce two transfers aiming at redistributing between the two groups the monetary equivalent of prevention cost. We do not model such transfers here. 9

Definition 2 (Ex-ante optimal allocation) The first-best WEA is the allocation such that both the classification risk and the risk of the loss are fully covered. Consumers learn their risk, pay the uniform premium P = λp H L(a H )+(1 λ)p L L(a L ) and, under assumption 1: when 0 Ψ u(w p U l) u(w λp H l (1 λ)p L L) 1 λ = Ψ 1, a H = a L =1. when Ψ 1 Ψ u(w λp Hl (1 λ)p L L) u(w p U L) λ = Ψ 2, a H =1,a L =0. when Ψ Ψ 2, a H = a L =0. Definition 2 shows that, as in the interim optimal allocation, when the cost of prevention is low both types perform prevention; as the cost of prevention increases only high-types make prevention; finally, when the cost is sufficiently high, no prevention is performed. Obviously, in the two optimal allocations thresholds values for Ψ differ. Figure 2 below describes social welfare in firstbest WEA as a function of the cost of prevention Ψ. Insert figure 2 here Note that, since in the ex-ante optimal allocation the classification risk is covered, the ex-ante optimal allocation dominates the interim one. 2.3.1 How to implement the first-best: "genetic insurance" Tabarrok (1994), discussing the issue of genetic testing, proposes to decentralize the ex-ante optimal allocation by creating a market selling insurance against the classification risk. Such a policy, "genetic insurance", should be mandatory for those who decide to gather information: information acquisition should be possible only after insurance against classification risk has been purchased. That can be enforced by making it illegal for physicians and laboratories to run tests without proof that genetic insurance has been bought. In this way welfare losses due to adverse-selection problems can be avoided. Let us see what happens when insurers offer both coverage against the health risk and against the classification risk in our model. As mentioned before, decision-makers must purchase genetic insurance if they want to learn information. If consumers decide to make the test (recall that they are all equal ex-ante), as in the ex-ante optimal allocation they pay the premium P = λp H L (a H )+(1 λ) p LL (a L ) and commit to perform action a i,i= L, H, whenever the test certifiesthatthetypeisi, as according to (4). Once genetic insurance has been bought, decision-makers perform the test and exhibit the test result to the insurer. Informed high-types receive reimbursement p H L (a H ) and, with that amount, purchase fair, full insurance against the risk of the loss and choose the optimal action a H ; informed low-types receive reimbursement p L L (a L ), purchase fair, full insurance as well and choose action a L. Thus, when deciding whether to learn information, consumers must compare their utility when they remain uninformed to what they obtain when they perform the test, that is expected utility (4). 10

Let us call WU consumers utility when they remain uninformed and are fully insured and ã(p U ) their optimal action, where ã(p U )=1if inequality (2) holds and ã(p U )=0otherwise. Thus, WU = u (w p UL (ã(p U ))) Ψ (ã(p U )). In Figure 2 utility WU is represented by the dotted line: according to inequality (2) uninformed, fully insured individuals make positive prevention for Ψ (p U ) and do not prevent for Ψ > (p U ). Note that when Ψ Ψ 1 and Ψ Ψ 2 both informed types choose the same action, thus decision-makers are indifferent between learning information and remaining uninformed (WU W EA )andp = p U L (a U )=p UL (ã(p U )). On the contrary, when Ψ 1 < Ψ < Ψ 2,P 6= p U L (ã(p U )) and WU is dominated by WEA. Obviously this happens since, with information gathering, prevention choices are more efficient. We can conclude that the availability of compulsory genetic insurance for those who want to gather information does allow the first-best to be decentralized since decision-makers will choose to buy genetic insurance and learn information. 8 3 The insurance market under the alternative regulatory approaches Ex-ante all decision-makers are uninformed; they can remain uninformed or they can perform a genetic test. As in the real world, insurance against classification risk is not available, in this sense the insurance market is inefficient. Moreover, the insurance market is assumed to be competitive and characterized by free entry. Competition brings insurers profits to zero at the equilibrium, thus, by analyzing the welfare properties of market outcomes we focus on consumers welfare. The sequence of actions slightly changes according to the regulatory approach analyzed. We will describe the timing in details in each of the following subparagraph. We will start with the disclosure duty approach. 3.1 The disclosure duty approach Under this regulatory approach decision-makers are obliged to disclose the result of previously performed genetic tests to insurers, but cannot be required 8 Insurance against classification risk presents some similarities with Cochrane s (1995) "time-consistent insurance". As Cochrane writes, time-consistent insurance provides insurance against classification risk as well as insurance against the uncertain component of one period health expenditures. Moreover, the key feature for time-consistent insurance contracts is a severance payment: a person whose premium increases (for example because a long-term illness is diagnosed) receives a lump sum equals to the increased present value of his premium. The severance payment scheme compensates for changes in premium and allows every consumer to purchase insurance at his actuarially fair premium. Apart the the fact that we do not consider any dynamic in our model, an important difference with respect to time-consistent insurance is that, in the present framework, consumers decide whether to gather (possibly) private information on their risk, whereas in Cochrane s model information on consumers risk is publicly disclosed in each period. 11

to take additional tests. Thus, consumers decide whether to become informed and insurance firms observe both the decision-makers informational status and, possibly, the test result. Note that this regulatory approach implies symmetric information between consumers and insurance firms (however the insurance market is not efficient since no coverage for the classification risk exists). Insurance contracts can be contingent on informational status and risk. The timing of actions is the following: first, insurers propose contracts, then consumers decide whether to perform the test. If the test is performed, information is fully disclosed. Then, consumers accept a contract and choose prevention. 9 Insurance firms can offer three different types of contract: the full coverage contract for the uninformed, the full coverage contract for informed high-risks and the full coverage contract for informed low-risks. If consumers choose to remain uniformed, they obtain with certainty the full coverage contract for uninformed and achieve the level of utility WU represented in Figure 2 and described in the previous subsection. When, on the contrary, decision-makers choose to perform the test, they obtain the full coverage contract for high-risks with probability λ and the full coverage contract for low-risks with probability 1 λ. That is, they obtain the interim optimal allocation WI defined in section 2.2 and represented in Figure 1. Thus, information gathering depends on the comparison between utility when decision-makers remain uninformed WU and expected utility corresponding to the interim optimal allocation WI. Two antagonistic effects are at stake to determine the relative positions of WU and W I. On the one hand, information gathering results in facing the classification risk and hence has a negative effect on welfare; on the other hand, it allows a more efficient choice of prevention which is beneficial. Intuitively, when the classification risk is not too large (p H p L low) and/or when consumers are not too risk-averse, and/or when the benefits from prevention are high (L/l large), consumers should prefer to perform the test. It is easy to verify that two cases are possible: either WU always dominates WI ; we call it Equilibrium of type 1. Or W U and W I cross each other inside the interval [ (p L ), (p H )] and values of Ψ for which WI dominates W U exist; we call it Equilibrium of type 2 (see the kinked bold line in Figure 3). In particular, Remark 4 can be stated given the following inequality: u(w p U l) u(w p H l) (p H p U )l u(w p LL) u(w p U L) (p U p L)L < L l (9) Remark 4 Under the disclosure duty approach, (i) if the reverse of inequality (9) is satisfied, expected utility with the test is always dominated by utility without the test; (ii) if inequality (9) is satisfied, expected utility with the test dominates utility without the test in the interval Ψ 3 < Ψ < Ψ 4 and is dominated 9 Under disclosure duty the analysis and the results do not change if we reverse the first two actions in the timing such that: first, consumers decide whether to perform the test, and then insurers propose contracts. 12

elsewhere, with: Ψ 3 = 1 1 λ [u(w p Ul) λu(w p H l) (1 λ)u(w p L L)] Ψ 4 = 1 λ [λu(w p Hl)+(1 λ)u(w p L L) u(w p U L)], Proof. See Appendix 6.3. Insert figure 3 here Remark 5 Inequality (9) is verified if p H p L is smaller than a threshold function α L l which is increasing in L/l. Proof. See Appendix 6.4. The previous remark shows that, when the classification risk is low and/or when the potential gain from prevention is high, decision-makers learn information for Ψ 3 < Ψ < Ψ 4 since, in that interval, the gain due to information is larger than the loss due to increased risk. From Remark 4 and from the previous discussion: Lemma 1 (Equilibrium allocation under disclosure duty) Underthedisclosure duty approach two different equilibria are possible: (i) Equilibrium of type 1 is reached if the opposite of inequality (9) holds. At this equilibrium decision-makers always remain uninformed. (ii) Equilibrium of type 2 is reached if inequality (9) holds. At this equilibrium decision-makers perform the test for Ψ 3 < Ψ < Ψ 4 and remain uninformed elsewhere. Croker and Snow (1992) show that, when insurance against the classification risk is not available and information between insurance firms and decisionmakers is symmetric, the private value of information is negative. Lemma 1 extends Croker and Snow s result to the case where information has decisionmaking value: when secondary prevention is available, for intermediate values of prevention cost consumers may prefer to acquire information. In fact, when prevention cost is close to (p U ) ignorance can make decision-makers prevention choices very inefficient: for Ψ 3 Ψ (p U ) uninformed low-types perform prevention despite prevention cost is too high given their risk and, for (p U ) Ψ Ψ 4, uninformed high-types do not perform prevention despite prevention cost is sufficiently low given their risk. As Remark 5 shows, preference for information gathering can occur only when the classification risk is low and/or the benefit of prevention is high. Note that, the lower the proportion of high-risk in the population, the less negative the slope of the line λu(w p H l)+(1 λ)u(w p L L) λψ (see Figure 1), and the higher the probability that WI and W U cross each other inside the interval [ (p L ), (p H )]. In fact a low λ implies that social welfare WI decreases slowly with Ψ when high-risks only perform prevention: close to (p U ) the social cost of prevention λψ is low. The following corollary summarizes the welfare properties of the equilibrium allocations described in Lemma 1. 13

Corollary 1 (Welfare properties of equilibrium allocations under disclosure duty) When insurance against classification risk is not available and a disclosure duty rule is in place: (i) in Type 1 Equilibrium social welfare is W U : with respect to the first-best over-prevention arises for Ψ 1 < Ψ (p U ) whereas under-prevention arises for (p U ) < Ψ < Ψ 2. (ii) in Type 2 Equilibrium, in the interval Ψ 3 Ψ Ψ 4 the interim optimal allocation W I is reached and prevention choices are interim efficient; whereas for Ψ < Ψ 3 and Ψ > Ψ 4 social welfare is W U with over-prevention arising for Ψ 1 < Ψ < Ψ 3 and under-prevention arising for Ψ 4 < Ψ < Ψ 2. (iii) Welfare losses (with respect to the first-best) are lower in type 2 Equilibrium than in that of type 1. In both equilibria first-best is reached for Ψ Ψ 1 and Ψ Ψ 2. Proof. (i) The welfare comparison between Equilibrium of type 1, WU, and first-best WEA can be easily performed from Figure 2. (ii) The welfare comparison between Equilibrium of type 2 and first-best can be performed by comparing WEA in Figure 2 with the kinked bold line in Figure 3 and noting that Ψ 1 < Ψ 3 < Ψ 4 < Ψ 2. As a final observation, in our graphical analysis the vertical distance between the kinked lines WI and W U just describes the welfare loss that decision-makers suffer when they face the classification risk because of information gathering. In this last paragraph we consider the private and social value of information under disclosure duty. For the Law of Large Numbers, WI and W U correspond both to consumers expected utility and to social welfare. Thus, the private and social value of information are here equivalent. Corollary 2 (The value of information under disclosure duty) Under disclosure duty, the private and social value of information are the same. When Equilibrium of type 1 arises the value of information is always negative. When Equilibrium of type 2 arises the value of information is positive for Ψ 3 Ψ Ψ 4 and negative elsewhere. 3.2 The consent law approach Here, we assume that decision-makers can secretly take the test before insurance purchase and are then free to show the test result or to conceal it. If they show the test result to insurers, the latter can use such information for rating. Thus, insurers offer contracts contingent on information possibly disclosed by consumers. Figure 4 shows the decision-makers decision tree. Insert figure 4 here Informed individuals who learn to be low-types have incentives to show the test result to insurers to buy the policy at a low premium. On the contrary, individuals who receive bad news prefer to conceal the test result pretending to be uninformed. Since insurers are not able to ex-ante separate the informed high-risks from the uninformed, they must offer the same contract to both of them (see Figure 4). 14

In this situation, if decision-makers choose to perform the test, insurance firms can easily screen consumers types by offering full-insurance at a fair premium to low-risks showing the test result. Decision-makers pretending to be uninformed are necessarily high-risks and, at the equilibrium, they also receive full-insurance at a fair premium. This screening mechanism works only if performing the test is a dominant strategy for uninformed consumers. We show in the proof of the following lemma that decision-makers prefer to acquire information if firms offer to uninformed individuals a partial insurance policy such that with such a policy informed high-risks receive the same utility they would reach showing the test result. The intuition is that, by performing the test, decision-makers can always obtain the same policy as uninformed (when they learn to be high-risk) or they may be able to choose a policy that is strictly preferred (when they learn to be low-risk). Lemma 2 (Equilibrium allocation under consent law) Undertheconsent law approach, at the equilibrium decision-makers perform the test and show the test-result to insurers when they learn to be low-risk. Both types receive fullinsurance at a fair premium. 10 Proof. See the Appendix 6.5. Lemma 2 extends Doherty and Thistle (1996) s Proposition 2 to the case of secondary prevention. However our proof is different since in Doherty and Thistle some consumers know their risk ex-ante, whereas here all consumers are ex-ante uninformed. Lemma 2 shows that, under consent law, the insurance market provides good incentives for information acquisition. From the previous discussion: Corollary 3 (Welfare properties of the equilibrium allocation under consent law) When insurance against the classification risk is not available and consent low is in place, the equilibrium allocation corresponds to the interim optimal allocation and prevention choices are interim efficient. In the equilibrium allocation welfare losses are exclusively due to the lack of insurance against classification risk. 11 10 The described equilibrium is unique. In fact, no other fully revealing equilibrium exists, nor an equilibrium where decision-makers remain uninformed. To see the latter point recall that, as in the free entry equilibrium analyzed by Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976), only "fair contracts" are sustainable such that firms make zero profits at the equilibrium. Thus, fair full insurance contracts must be offered to people showing the test result, since new firms would enter the market and make positive profits on low-risks otherwise. Moreover, we already observed that the same policy must be offered to informed consumers not showing the test result and to the uninformed. Thus, remaining uninformed can never be a dominant strategy. 11 Note that, when information structure is such that insurers observe decision-makers information status but not the test result, a different equilibrium allocation arises. In fact, different contracts can be offered to informed high-risks and to uninformed decision-makers. Moreover, informed consumers not showing the test result are necessarily high-risks. Such that both uninformed and informed high-risks consumers receive full-coverage at a fair premium (respectively p U l/p U L and p H l/p H L). Thus, when deciding whether to learn their type, decision-makers must choose between full coverage at premium p U l/p U L with certainty and 15

Since, under consent law, acquiring information is a dominant strategy for decision-makers, the private value of information is positive. As for the social value of information, it corresponds to the difference between the equilibrium allocation and the allocation that would emerge when consumers remain uninformed and are fully insured. 12 Thus, we must compare WI and W U and the following corollary can be stated: Corollary 4 (The value of information under consent law) Under consent law (i) the private value of information is positive; (ii) when the opposite of condition (9) holds, the social value of information is always negative. When condition (9) holds, the social value of information is positive for Ψ 3 < Ψ < Ψ 4 and negative elsewhere. 3.3 The strict prohibition approach Under strict prohibition insurers cannot request any genetic test and cannot use genetic information for rating. This implies that the decision-makers information status is not observable and the test provides soft (not certifiable) information: the informed low-risks do not show the test result to insurers. The same information structure can also describe a situation where insurers associations have adopted a voluntary moratorium on the use of genetic tests. We prove that, as under the consent law approach, information gathering is a dominant strategy for decision-makers. However, here the equilibrium corresponds to the Rothschild-Stiglitz separating allocation. As before, insurers are able to screen consumers type and the information acquired is fully disclosed at the equilibrium. Differently from before, informed low-risks receive partial insurance. The Rothschild-Stiglitz separating contracts work as a screening mechanism only if performing the test is a dominant strategy for uninformed consumers. We show in the following lemma that, if firms offer to consumers a set of selfselective contracts involving partial insurance at a fair premium, decision-makers choose to acquire information. In particular, as under disclosure duty, insurance firms offer three different types of contract: one for uninformed consumers, one for informed high-risks and one for informed low-risks. Differently from disclosure duty, since the consumers informational status is private information, here contracts must be self-selecting. Lemma 3 (Equilibrium allocation under strict prohibition) Underthe strict prohibition approach, decision-makers perform the test. The equilibrium corresponds to the Rothschild-Stiglitz separating allocation. the lottery assigning full coverage at a high premium with probability λ and full coverage at a low premium with probability 1 λ. So that we are back to the equilibria obtained under the disclosure duty approach. 12 To calculate the social value of information we do not compare the market outcome under consent law with the ex-ante optimal allocation. In fact, since the classification risk is not covered in our market, first-best can never be reached (except when compulsory genetic insurance is enforced). 16

Proof. See Appendix 6.6. This result extends Doherty and Thistle (1996) s Proposition 1 to the case of secondary prevention. Again our proof is different since in our model all decision-makers are ex-ante uninformed. Lemma 3 shows that strict prohibition provides good incentives for information gathering. Concerning market outcome under strict prohibition we can say the following: Corollary 5 (Welfare properties of the equilibrium allocation under strict prohibition) When insurance against the classification risk is not available and strict prohibition is in place, the equilibrium allocation is such that highrisks receive full insurance at a fair premium, whereas low-risks receive partial insurance. Prevention choices are interim efficient for high-risks, whereas lowrisks perform prevention more often than in the interim efficient allocation. 13 Proof. See Appendix 6.7. We showed that under strict prohibition decision-makers perform the test. Again this implies that the private value of information is positive. As for the social value of information we compare the Rothschild-Stiglitz separating allocation and WU. The following corollary can be stated: Corollary 6 (The value of information under strict prohibition) Under strict prohibition (i) the private value of information is positive; (ii) when the opposite of condition (9) holds, the social value of information is always negative. When condition (9) holds, the social value of information is lower than under consent law for Ψ 3 < Ψ < Ψ 4 and negative for Ψ < Ψ 3 and Ψ > Ψ 4. 14 We saw that under consent law the equilibrium allocation W I dominates W U only if condition (9) holds and prevention costs belong to the interval [Ψ 3, Ψ 4 ]. Under the same conditions with strict prohibition social welfare is lower than with consent law because of the welfare cost paid by (partially insured) low-risks in the Rothschild-Stiglitz equilibrium. This explains point (ii) in the previous corollary. 13 Note that, when the information status is observable but the information provided by the test is not verifiable (or it cannot be used for rating), insurers offer self-selective (Rothschild- Stliglitz) contracts to informed decision-makers. Thus, when deciding whether to learn their type, decision-makers must choose between full coverage at premium p U l/p U L with certainty and the lottery assigning full coverage at a high premium with probability λ and partial coverage at a low premium with probability 1 λ. This leads to equilibria similar to the ones we obtained with consent law under the same informational structure (see footnote 3.2), that is type-1 and type 2 equilibria as with disclosure duty. We expect, however, that consumers will prefer to remain uninformed more often than under disclosure duty since here information gathering leads to lower welfare for low-types because of partial insurance. 14 Contrary to us, Doherty and Posey (1998) find that the social value of information is always positive under strict prohibition. This difference essentially depends on the fact that, in their model, a part of consumers is ex-ante informed. Thus, to evaluate the social value of information, they compare the equilibrium allocation (where all consumers become informed) with the allocation that would arise without information gathering (where the uninformed remain uninformed and informed consumers receive the Rothschild-Stiglitz separating contracts). 17

3.4 The laissez-faire approach Under the laissez-faire approach insurers are free to request new tests and the disclosure of existing tests. Since in our setting consumers are ex-ante uninformed, this regulatory approach implies that insurers decide whether consumers should perform the test or not. Given that the test is costless and useful for rating, insurers will always ask consumers to perform the test. Obviously, and as for disclosure duty, the laissez-faire approach implies symmetric information between consumers and insurance firms. A natural interpretation of the timing of actions is the following: first insurers ask potential consumers to perform the test. Then the test result is disclosed to both consumers and insurers. The latter offer full insurance contracts at a fair premium to high- and low-types. Consumers accept contracts and, finally, prevention choices are made. 15 Lemma 4 (Equilibrium allocation under laissez faire) Underthelaissezfaire approach the equilibrium allocation corresponds to the interim efficient allocation and prevention actions are interim efficient. Note that market equilibrium under the laissez-faire approach is equivalent to the equilibrium under consent law: welfare losses are exclusively due to the lack of coverage against classification risk. Since under the laissez-faire approach consumers are requested to gather information by insurance firms, the private value of information has no meaning. Regarding the social value of information, as under consent law, we must compare allocations WI and W U. Thus, part (ii) in Corollary 4 also applies to the laissez-faire approach. 4 A comparison of the alternative regulatory approaches In this section we compare the different regulatory approaches analyzed before and derive a complete ranking. From the discussions in the previous subsections we can state the following: Proposition 1 (Welfare comparison of the alternative regulatory approaches) From a social welfare point of view the disclosure duty approach weakly dominates all the other regulatory schemes. The laissez faire and the consent law approaches lead to the same equilibrium allocation, that is the interim efficient allocation. The equilibrium allocation under strict prohibition is dominated by all the other regulatory schemes. 15 Note that, if the first two actions in the timing were reversed (first insurers offer contracts, then they ask consumers to perform the test and the test result is disclosed), the first best allocation would be obtained. In fact, in such a case the insurance contract offered by insurers would also cover the classification risk. However, as mentioned before, in the real world the classification risk is not covered, thus we exclude such a sequence of actions. 18

First, we summarize our results as regards prevention choices: under the laissez faire and the consent law approaches prevention choices are interim efficient. With strict prohibition they are interim efficient for high-risks, whereas low-risks choose prevention under partial insurance. This implies that low-risks perform prevention more often under strict prohibition than in the interim efficient allocation. Under disclosure duty prevention choices are interim efficient only in Equilibrium of type 2 for prevention costs belonging to the interval [Ψ 3, Ψ 4 ]. Importantly, in such a case disclosure duty, laissez faire and consent law all lead to the same equilibrium allocation and, thus, to the same social welfare. Whereas, in all the other cases disclosure duty strongly dominates the other regulatory schemes even thought it leads to less efficient prevention choices. Note that the effectiveness of secondary prevention, the importance of the classification risk as well as the cost of prevention, all affect the decision to gather information under disclosure duty and, thus, the possibility that Equilibrium of type 2 prevails. 16 Second, we summarize our results as regards information disclosure to insurance firms at the equilibrium: laissez-faire, consent law and strict prohibition always lead to information disclosure at the equilibrium. Disclosure duty, again, leads to information disclosure only in Equilibrium of type 2 and for prevention costs belonging to the interval [Ψ 3, Ψ 4 ]. In general, either the informational structure is such that insurers observe the test result, if any (as in the laissez faire and in the disclosure duty approach), or insurers learn information on consumers risk ex-post by using self-selective contracts. Under consent law information is certifiable and it is transmitted at no cost by low-risks showing to insurers the test result. On the contrary, under strict prohibition, screening requires a welfare cost since self-selecting contracts provide partial insurance to the low-risks. Put differently, strict prohibition is the only regulatory scheme which endogenously produces standard adverse selection. 5 Conclusion In this paper we contributed to the literature on genetic testing by (i) considering the availability of secondary prevention measures such that genetic information has decision-making value and by (ii) providing a welfare analysis of the alternative schemes used to regulate genetic information. In particular we investigated the four main regulatory approaches we find today in health insurance markets: laissez faire, disclosure duty, consent law and strict prohibition. Our simple and tractable model allows to rank them unambiguously. 16 For example we expect that Equilibrium of type 1 prevails under disclosure duty in the case of genetic test for Huntington s disease since, for such an illness, classification risk is high and early detection of disease is ineffective. Thus, disclosure duty should strongly dominate the other regulatory schemes in that case. Whereas, Equilibrium of type 2 could prevail under disclosure duty in the case of tests detecting BRCA1, BRCA2 or HNPCC genetic mutations. Thus, for those tests and for some values of prevention costs, disclosure duty could be equivalent to consent law and laissez faire. 19

In our model consumers may gather information on their risk type before insurance policy purchase, insurance firms offer policies covering the risk of the monetary loss associated to the illness but not the classification risk. We put ourselves in the context which seems more natural when considering information provided by genetic testing: we assumed that all consumers are ex-ante uninformed and that information allows early detection of disease (secondary prevention). Our model makes some assumptions that it could be worthy to relax in the future: genetic tests have no cost and consumers prevention choice is observable by insurance firms. However, the first assumption is common to almost all the literature on genetic testing 17 and the second one is indeed plausible for secondary prevention which indicates a certifiable medical procedure. Our results show that market and health authorities aiming at maximizing consumers welfare should implement a mild type of regulation such as the disclosure duty scheme. With this regulatory approach consumers are free to decide whether to perform genetic tests but have no privacy rights on tests results. We proved that only under disclosure duty consumers remain uninformed when the cost imposed by the classification risk prevails over the benefit of information in terms of better prevention measures, that is when gathering information is not efficient. The result that the insurance market performs better under mild regulation than under strong regulation of genetic information is not new: in different models Hoel and Iversen (2002) and Hoel et al. (2006) have reached the same conclusion. What clearly emerges from our analysis is that strict prohibition, imposed in many countries with the objective of avoiding genetic discrimination, leads indeed to a market outcome where high-risks are not better off and where low-risks are worse off; or in general, where consumers welfare is low. A strong regulatory scheme assigning to consumers privacy on genetic information and banning information transmission is detrimental to consumers welfare since it leads to adverse selection and thus prevents efficient exchange in the health insurance market. Consent law performs better since it assigns to consumers both privacy on genetic information and control rights on information provided by the genetic tests. To conclude, governments aiming at protecting "bad genetic risks" should not impose strict regulation of genetic information, they should instead opt for a disclosure duty rule and then provide a specific public program, or expand the existing ones, offering (subsidized) coverage for the high-risks. 18 Or, even better, governments should try to promote the market for "genetic insurance", as proposed by Tabarrok (1994). At this regard, in our paper the welfare loss due to the lack of coverage against the classification risk is characterized and the importance of "genetic insurance" provision clearly stated. However, it would be interesting to formally investigate reasons why, in the real world, insurance markets are not able to provide coverage for the classification risk. We leave 17 An exception is Doherty and Thistle (1996). 18 Possible redistributional policies aimed at remedy existing inequality in health risk and in insurance premium produced by genetic testing are analyzed in Rees and Apps (2006). 20