Policies and Procedures as of 10/29/14. Subject to Change. Screening Operations at JFK International Airport



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Screening Operations at JFK International Airport 1

Current Situation Ebola has been identified in New York State (NYS). Ebola is a virus that has worldwide consequences. Confirmed or suspected cases of Ebola present special requirements for disease surveillance, public communications, allocation of medical resources, and expansion of human services. Ebola has been identified in NYS. Mission Statement New York State Department of Health (NYSDOH) and the New York City Department of Health and Mental Hygiene (NYCDOHMH) along with state and local partners will conduct enhanced screening operations in accordance with the NYSDOH Commissioner s Order at the JFK International Airport in order to protect public health from the emerging Ebola Viral Disease (EVD). Purpose The intent of this plan is to provide operational guidance to local, state, and federal stakeholders for implementing the State Screening Protocols at JFK International Airport as directed by the Governor of NYS. Specifically this document will: 1. Will establish a general process that acknowledges and works collaboratively with existing protocols and operations of state, local and federal partners. 2. Ensures a respectful and supportive approach to impacted travelers and assures their confidentiality, health and safety through the duration of the state screening process through to final disposition. 3. Identifies potential scenarios which will require multi-jurisdictional coordination with local and other state authorities. 4. Additional considerations and operational points in this draft are subject to amendment following detailed discussions with CBP, CDC, JFK, PANY-NJ, and NYCDOHMH. 2

Key Stakeholders U.S. Health and Human Services (HHS) Centers for Disease Control and Prevention Division of Global Migration and Quarantine (CDC) U.S. Customs & Border Protection (CBP) New York State Division of Homeland Security and Emergency Services (DHSES) New York State Department of Health (NYSDOH) Port Authority of New York and New Jersey (PANY-NJ) New York City Office of Emergency Management (OEM) New York City Department of Health and Mental Hygiene (NYCDOHMH) Local Health Departments in New York State (LHDs) Local and State Law Enforcement Plan Assumptions 1. All travelers returning from the CDC identified countries with widespread transmission of Ebola (including Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone) will have primary screening upon entry to the U.S. by CBP. 2. If travelers are coming from, or are citizens of, one of the three affected countries, CBP and Coast Guard will perform secondary screening (screening questionnaire and temperature check, respectively). 3. If tertiary screening is required, this will be conducted by staff from CDC. 4. NYSDOH/ NYCDOHMH staff will be embedded in the screening process. This will require security clearances for staff. This will also require a determination by CDC that NYSDOH /NYCDOHMH staff will be able to sit in on interviews with non-new York residents. 5. CBP/CDC will give NYSDOH/ NYCDOHMH copies of completed screening forms in real time. 6. All arriving passengers screened in this protocol will be treated with the utmost respect and concern. 3

7. Preference should be given to quarantining the passenger in his or her residence. Joint State/City Health Team & Evaluation Team Lead Lead Interview Units (2) Terminal 1 Terminal 4 Shift 1 12P-8P Shift 2 8P-4A Shift 1 12P-8P Shift 2 8P-4A Interviewer Interviewer Interviewer Interviewer Escort Escort Escort Escort Team Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) Practices: At the primary passport screen conducted by U.S. CBP no PPE is required. If a passenger has a recent travel history for any of the three (3) EVD affected countries a secondary screening of the passenger will be conducted. The secondary screening worker (CBP/Coast Guard) will use the appropriate mask and gloves, and Coast Guard will use eye protection for temperature checks. If during the secondary screening by CBP/Coast Guard the passenger exhibits symptoms such as fever or answers positive toscreening questions (e.g. provided healthcare to Ebola patients) the following will occur: 4

Fever (Coast Guard): existing protocols will be activated in coordination with FDNY to arrange for transport to the appropriate Designated Center. o NYSDOH staffs do not have contact with the patient. o NYCDOHMH/NYSDOH will conduct follow up with patient when cleared from hospital to determine whether scenario 2 or 3 applies. CBP Screening Questionnaire positive response: Goes to Tertiary Screening (CDC): workers wearppe (gowns, gloves, mask, and face shield). If State/City teams are embedded with CBP and CDC for screening, they will wear comparable PPE. Prior to deployment, any members of the Joint State/City Health team will receive appropriate PPE training including donning and doffing as well as disposal protocols. If State/City teams are located following completion of CBP and CDC screening, then PPE may not be required. Additional considerations and operational points in this draft are subject to amendment following detailed discussions with CBP, CDC, JFK, PANY-NJ, and NYCDOHMH. 5

Passenger Screening Process Passenger arrives from a country or holds a passport from a country where widespread transmission of EVD exists, as determined by CDC. Upon entry at JFK [Terminals No. 1, 4, 7 and 8] Primary Screening: passenger goes to customs, at which point passenger is identified as traveler who originated in one of the identified countries. Risk Determined Referred to CDC Secondary screening: CBP will administer screening questionnaire and Coast Guard will take temperature. Positive results on either screen will lead to referral to tertiary screening by CDC. CDC has desks at Terminal 1 and 4. Possible Risk or Symptoms Referred to CDC for Tertiary Screen Scenario 1 Transport to Designated Center for further evaluation Passengers with fever or symptoms Passengers with CDC-exposure criteria are placed on Do Not Board (DNB) list and released On medical clearance NYSDOH and NYCDOHMH will determine if scenario 2 or 3 applies. Passengers released by CBP and CDC move to the NYC DOHMH/NYSDOH Screen. A copy of the CBP/CDC traveler questionnaire is reviewed with the passenger to confirm details. The passenger is thenhandled depending on the appropriate response scenario. 6

Response Scenarios All passengers arriving from a country or who holds a passport from a country where widespread transmission of EVD exists, as determined by CDC will be flagged by CBP and enter into the screening process. Upon determination that the passenger has fever and symptoms or is classified as having exposure status of higher risk, lower risk or no knownrisk exposure, as defined in the NYSDOH Commissioner s order, the following scenarios will be used to guide the next steps based on the passenger s exposure risk status, travel plans, final destination and other circumstances. Scenario 1 Passenger with fever or symptoms Scenario 1: If a person arrives and has symptoms of the Ebola virus, they will be transported, via medical transportation (in protective gear), to Bellevue Hospital or one of the other New York City hospitals designated by the NYS DOH to treat Ebola patients for further evaluation and treatment. If such persons are found to not have Ebola infection, NYSDOH and NYCDOHMH will take actions described in Scenario 2 or 3, below, as appropriate. Scenario 2 Passenger is asymptomatic but reports direct contact, as defined in the NYSDOH Commissioner Order. Scenario 2: If the passenger is determined to have had direct contact to the Ebola virus and is afebrile and asymptomatic, the following actions will be taken depending on their final destination: 1. Destination: Residence in New York City: a. NYC DOHMH will issue a quarantine order to the passenger requiring them to stay in quarantine in their residence for 21 days from the date of their last exposure; b. NYS DOH will arrange transportation by private vehicle to their residence;. c. NYC DOHMH will implement quarantine protocol in coordination with NYSDOH. 2. Destination: Hotel or other non-residential accommodation in New York City: a. NYC DOHMH will assess the suitability of the hotel or other non-residential accommodation in New York City for quarantine. If not suitable, NYS DOHMH will identify other suitable quarantine location; b. NYC DOHMH will issue a quarantine order to the passenger requiring them to stay in quarantine in a suitable residence for 21 days from the date of their last exposure; c. NYS DOH will arrange transportation by private vehicle to their residence; d. NYC DOHMH will implement quarantine protocol in coordination with NYSDOH. 3. Destination: A location in New York State outside New York City: 7

a. NYC DOHMH and NYSDOH may approve the relocation of such a person to another jurisdiction. b. NYC DOHMHwill notify the local health official in the receiving jurisdiction. c. NYS DOH will arrange suitable transportation to the receiving jurisdiction if the passenger does not have suitable transportation arrangements. d. The receiving jurisdiction will issue a quarantine order pursuant to the NYSDOH Commissioner s Order and assure a suitable location for quarantine giving preference to the passenger s residence. e. If during a screening process that includes personnel of NYSDOH or its designee, such person does not voluntarily consent to an arrangement deemed appropriate by NYSDOH to travel to his or her ultimate destination outside of NYC, DOHMH and its Commissioner shall issue a QO for 21 days from the date of the person s last exposure, consistent with due process of lawand follow the steps in paragraph 2, above. f. If the facts and circumstances of the particular situation warrant, for example if suitable transportation is not available until the next day, NYC DOHMH will issue a quarantine order, consistent with due process of law, and follow the steps in paragraph 2, above. 4. Destination: A location outside New York State. a. NYC DOHMH and NYSDOH may approve the relocation of such a person to another jurisdiction. b. NYS DOH will notify the state health official in the receiving jurisdiction. c. NYS DOH will arrange suitable transportation to the receiving jurisdiction if the passenger does not have suitable transportation arrangements. d. If the facts and circumstances of the particular situation warrant, for example, if suitable transportation is not available until the next day,nyc DOHMH will issue a quarantine order, consistent with due process of law, and follow the steps in paragraph 2, above. Scenario 3 Passenger is asymptomatic and reports no direct contact, as defined in the NYSDOH Commissioner Order. Scenario 3:If a person arrives from one of the affected areas with no symptoms and has had no direct contact with anyone infected with the Ebola virus: a. NYC DOHMH will notify the local health department if the passenger s destination is within in New York State outside New York City, or the NYS DOH will notify the state health department if the passenger s destination is another state; b. The passenger will be allowed to travel to their destination. c. If the facts and circumstances of the particular situation warrant, for example, if suitable transportation is not available until the next day, NYC DOHMH will issue a quarantine order, consistent with due process of law, and follow the steps in paragraph 2, above. 8