Non-Cooperative Game Theory

Similar documents
6.207/14.15: Networks Lecture 15: Repeated Games and Cooperation

6.254 : Game Theory with Engineering Applications Lecture 2: Strategic Form Games

Game Theory and Algorithms Lecture 10: Extensive Games: Critiques and Extensions

Lecture V: Mixed Strategies

Théorie de la décision et théorie des jeux Stefano Moretti

Games Manipulators Play

Computational Learning Theory Spring Semester, 2003/4. Lecture 1: March 2

AN INTRODUCTION TO GAME THEORY

ECON Game Theory Exam 1 - Answer Key. 4) All exams must be turned in by 1:45 pm. No extensions will be granted.

Microeconomic Theory Jamison / Kohlberg / Avery Problem Set 4 Solutions Spring (a) LEFT CENTER RIGHT TOP 8, 5 0, 0 6, 3 BOTTOM 0, 0 7, 6 6, 3

Game Theory 1. Introduction

Oligopoly: Cournot/Bertrand/Stackelberg

Infinitely Repeated Games with Discounting Ù

Competition and Regulation. Lecture 2: Background on imperfect competition

Optimization in ICT and Physical Systems

Backward Induction and Subgame Perfection

Price competition with homogenous products: The Bertrand duopoly model [Simultaneous move price setting duopoly]

1 Nonzero sum games and Nash equilibria

Rent-Seeking and Corruption

How to Solve Strategic Games? Dominant Strategies

0.0.2 Pareto Efficiency (Sec. 4, Ch. 1 of text)

MobLab Game Catalog For Business Schools Fall, 2015

Week 7 - Game Theory and Industrial Organisation

Lecture 28 Economics 181 International Trade

Economics 159: Introduction to Game Theory. Summer 2015: Session A. Online Course

Game Theory in Wireless Networks: A Tutorial

ECO 199 B GAMES OF STRATEGY Spring Term 2004 PROBLEM SET 4 B DRAFT ANSWER KEY

Chapter 7. Sealed-bid Auctions

Rutgers University Economics 102: Introductory Microeconomics Professor Altshuler Fall 2003

Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium

6.254 : Game Theory with Engineering Applications Lecture 1: Introduction

The Prisoner s Dilemma

Equilibrium computation: Part 1

Sequential lmove Games. Using Backward Induction (Rollback) to Find Equilibrium

Game Theory. An introduction to the concepts of dominant strategies, Nash equilibrium and strategic commitment

Homework 3, Solutions Managerial Economics: Eco 685

ECON 459 Game Theory. Lecture Notes Auctions. Luca Anderlini Spring 2015

Simon Fraser University Spring Econ 302 D200 Final Exam Solution Instructor: Songzi Du Tuesday April 21, 2015, 12 3 PM

Cournot s model of oligopoly

Economics 335, Spring 1999 Problem Set #7

21. Unverifiable Investment, Hold Up, Options and Ownership

A Beautiful Mind Meets Free Software: Game Theory, Competition and Cooperation

Game Theory & Oligopoly Market. Decision making environments may be classified into four types:-

i/io as compared to 4/10 for players 2 and 3. A "correct" way to play Certainly many interesting games are not solvable by this definition.

Equilibrium: Illustrations

Working Paper Series ISSN Working Paper No Stability for Coalition Formation Games. Salvador Barberà and Anke Gerber

Econ 101: Principles of Microeconomics

A Game Playing System for Use in Computer Science Education

Aggressive Advertisement. Normal Advertisement Aggressive Advertisement. Normal Advertisement

9 Repeated Games. Tomorrow, and tomorrow, and tomorrow, Creeps in this petty pace from day to day To the last syllable of recorded time Shakespeare

LEVEL I LEADERSHIP ROLE OF THE COACH. September 2007 Page 1

A Game Theoretical Framework for Adversarial Learning

Bayesian Nash Equilibrium

How to Win Texas Hold em Poker

Ch. 13.2: Mathematical Expectation

6.042/18.062J Mathematics for Computer Science. Expected Value I

Oligopoly markets: The price or quantity decisions by one rm has to directly in uence pro ts by other rms if rms are competing for customers.

6.1 What is a Game? 156 CHAPTER 6. GAMES

14.74 Lecture 12 Inside the household: Is the household an efficient unit?

Game Mining: How to Make Money from those about to Play a Game

The Plaintiff s Attorney in the Liability Insurance Claims Settlement Process: A Game Theoretic Approach

The Football Association Laws for 9v9 Football Law 1 Playing Area

Minimax Strategies. Minimax Strategies. Zero Sum Games. Why Zero Sum Games? An Example. An Example

Universidad Carlos III de Madrid Game Theory Problem Set - Dynamic Games

Dynamics and Equilibria

Game Theory. CDAM Research Report LSE-CDAM October 8, What is game theory? 4. 2 Definitions of games 6.

Intro to Simulation (using Excel)

Games of Incomplete Information

6. Let X be a binomial random variable with distribution B(10, 0.6). What is the probability that X equals 8? A) (0.6) (0.4) B) 8! C) 45(0.6) (0.

Australian School of Business School of Economics ECON 5111 ECONOMICS OF STRATEGY

A Dutch Book for Group Decision-Making?

Notes V General Equilibrium: Positive Theory. 1 Walrasian Equilibrium and Excess Demand

The Game of Blackjack and Analysis of Counting Cards

9.916 Altruism and Cooperation

Solutions for Practice problems on proofs

Labor Economics, Lecture 3: Education, Selection, and Signaling

MULTIPLE CHOICE. Choose the one alternative that best completes the statement or answers the question.

Decentralised bilateral trading, competition for bargaining partners and the law of one price

Why Plaintiffs Attorneys Use Contingent and Defense Attorneys Fixed Fee Contracts

1 Representation of Games. Kerschbamer: Commitment and Information in Games

Industry profit in an oligopoly (sum of all firms profits) < monopoly profit.

GAME THEORY. Thomas S. Ferguson

University of Oslo Department of Economics

Working Paper An exact non-cooperative support for the sequential Raiffa solution. Working papers // Institute of Mathematical Economics, No.

Oligopoly and Strategic Pricing

ACL Soccer 4 v 4 Small Sided Games (SSG s)

5 Market Games For Teaching Economics

Decision Making under Uncertainty

One pile, two pile, three piles

Youth for Good Governance distance learning program. Module IV. Causes of Corruption

Chapter 14. Oligopoly

Duo County Pool League Rules

Chapter 5 - Practice Problems 1

LESSON PLANS. Contents

6.207/14.15: Networks Lectures 19-21: Incomplete Information: Bayesian Nash Equilibria, Auctions and Introduction to Social Learning

Biform Games: Additional Online Material

Player Development Guideline U11 & U12 Boys and Girls Soccer.

The Binomial Distribution

10 Evolutionarily Stable Strategies

Strategy and Football: A Game Theoretic Model of a Football Match

Transcription:

Non-Cooperative Having Fun with Strategic Games Ph.D. Candidate, Political Economy and Government TEDy

Outline 1 What Is A Non-Cooperative Game? Motivating Examples Formal and Informal Definitions of Non-Cooperative Games 2 Formal and Informal Definitions of Nash Equilibrium Examples of Nash Equilibrium 3

Motivating Examples Definitions Real World Examples of Non-Cooperative Games Games assigning property rights: rock-paper-scissor; various drinking games; etc. Games in sports: penalty kick in soccer; batter-pitcher duel; etc. Games in media: The Dark Knight, ferryscene;friends, Season 5, Episode The One Where Everybody Finds Out ; 1 etc. Games at school: moral hazard in team for group assignments; cleaning up after a party; etc. In short, game theory is very much a part of our lives, and all of us have been introduced to many of its underlying intuitions. Much of the theoretical work in game theory is formalizing these intuitions. Let s put your intuition to work. 1 See clip.

Motivating Examples Definitions Real World Examples of Non-Cooperative Games Games assigning property rights: rock-paper-scissor; various drinking games; etc. Games in sports: penalty kick in soccer; batter-pitcher duel; etc. Games in media: The Dark Knight, ferryscene;friends, Season 5, Episode The One Where Everybody Finds Out ; 1 etc. Games at school: moral hazard in team for group assignments; cleaning up after a party; etc. In short, game theory is very much a part of our lives, and all of us have been introduced to many of its underlying intuitions. Much of the theoretical work in game theory is formalizing these intuitions. Let s put your intuition to work. 1 See clip.

Motivating Examples Definitions Real World Examples of Non-Cooperative Games Games assigning property rights: rock-paper-scissor; various drinking games; etc. Games in sports: penalty kick in soccer; batter-pitcher duel; etc. Games in media: The Dark Knight, ferryscene;friends, Season 5, Episode The One Where Everybody Finds Out ; 1 etc. Games at school: moral hazard in team for group assignments; cleaning up after a party; etc. In short, game theory is very much a part of our lives, and all of us have been introduced to many of its underlying intuitions. Much of the theoretical work in game theory is formalizing these intuitions. Let s put your intuition to work. 1 See clip.

Motivating Examples Definitions Real World Examples of Non-Cooperative Games Games assigning property rights: rock-paper-scissor; various drinking games; etc. Games in sports: penalty kick in soccer; batter-pitcher duel; etc. Games in media: The Dark Knight, ferryscene;friends, Season 5, Episode The One Where Everybody Finds Out ; 1 etc. Games at school: moral hazard in team for group assignments; cleaning up after a party; etc. In short, game theory is very much a part of our lives, and all of us have been introduced to many of its underlying intuitions. Much of the theoretical work in game theory is formalizing these intuitions. Let s put your intuition to work. 1 See clip.

Motivating Examples Definitions Real World Examples of Non-Cooperative Games Games assigning property rights: rock-paper-scissor; various drinking games; etc. Games in sports: penalty kick in soccer; batter-pitcher duel; etc. Games in media: The Dark Knight, ferryscene;friends, Season 5, Episode The One Where Everybody Finds Out ; 1 etc. Games at school: moral hazard in team for group assignments; cleaning up after a party; etc. In short, game theory is very much a part of our lives, and all of us have been introduced to many of its underlying intuitions. Much of the theoretical work in game theory is formalizing these intuitions. Let s put your intuition to work. 1 See clip.

Formal Definition of a Game Motivating Examples Definitions Definition Agameisspecifiedbythefollowingcollection: Γ N, A, I, p( ), α( ), H, H( ), ι( ), ρ( ), {u i ( )} i I p : N {N /0 } α : N {x 0 } A H : N H ι : H I ρ : H 0 A [0,1] u i : T R, wheret x N : p 1 (x)=/0

Formal Definition of a Game Motivating Examples Definitions Definition Agameisspecifiedbythefollowingcollection: Γ N, A, I, p( ), α( ), H, H( ), ι( ), ρ( ), {u i ( )} i I p : N {N /0 } α : N {x 0 } A H : N H ι : H I ρ : H 0 A [0,1] u i : T R, wheret x N : p 1 (x)=/0

Formal Definition of a Game Motivating Examples Definitions Definition Agameisspecifiedbythefollowingcollection: Γ N, A, I, p( ), α( ), H, H( ), ι( ), ρ( ), {u i ( )} i I p : N {N /0 } α : N {x 0 } A H : N H ι : H I ρ : H 0 A [0,1] u i : T R, wheret x N : p 1 (x)=/0

Formal Definition of a Game Motivating Examples Definitions Definition Agameisspecifiedbythefollowingcollection: Γ N, A, I, p( ), α( ), H, H( ), ι( ), ρ( ), {u i ( )} i I p : N {N /0 } α : N {x 0 } A H : N H ι : H I ρ : H 0 A [0,1] u i : T R, wheret x N : p 1 (x)=/0

Formal Definition of a Game Motivating Examples Definitions Definition Agameisspecifiedbythefollowingcollection: Γ N, A, I, p( ), α( ), H, H( ), ι( ), ρ( ), {u i ( )} i I p : N {N /0 } α : N {x 0 } A H : N H ι : H I ρ : H 0 A [0,1] u i : T R, wheret x N : p 1 (x)=/0

Formal Definition of a Game Motivating Examples Definitions Definition Agameisspecifiedbythefollowingcollection: Γ N, A, I, p( ), α( ), H, H( ), ι( ), ρ( ), {u i ( )} i I p : N {N /0 } α : N {x 0 } A H : N H ι : H I ρ : H 0 A [0,1] u i : T R, wheret x N : p 1 (x)=/0

Formal Definition of a Game Motivating Examples Definitions Definition Agameisspecifiedbythefollowingcollection: Γ N, A, I, p( ), α( ), H, H( ), ι( ), ρ( ), {u i ( )} i I p : N {N /0 } α : N {x 0 } A H : N H ι : H I ρ : H 0 A [0,1] u i : T R, wheret x N : p 1 (x)=/0

Informal Definition of a Game Motivating Examples Definitions Players Actions Strategies: [A] complete contingent plan, or decision rule, that specifics how the player will act in every possible distinguishable circumstance in which she might be called upon to move... Outcomes/payoffs: The key to game theory is that my payoff is contingent on the action/strategy of the other players playing the game: u i (σ i,σ i ),where σ i is player i s strategy and σ i =[σ 1...σ i 1 σ i+1...σ I ] is the other players strategies

Informal Definition of a Game Motivating Examples Definitions Players Actions Strategies: [A] complete contingent plan, or decision rule, that specifics how the player will act in every possible distinguishable circumstance in which she might be called upon to move... Outcomes/payoffs: The key to game theory is that my payoff is contingent on the action/strategy of the other players playing the game: u i (σ i,σ i ),where σ i is player i s strategy and σ i =[σ 1...σ i 1 σ i+1...σ I ] is the other players strategies

What Is a Nash Equilibrium? Formal and Informal Definitions of Nash Equilibrium Examples of Nash Equilibrium Once you define the players, actions, possible strategies, and the payoffs of a game, you have set up the rules of the game. Now what? We could ask: which player within the set I will win the game? For example, if the game you have defined is a penalty kick, you could ask who will win the penalty kick by virtue of getting the higher payoff? Will it be the goal-keeper or the shooter? Another interesting question might be what is the optimal strategy for a player i I given that all of the other players j = i and j I \{i} are also playing their optimal strategies. This is the question that underlies the most fundamental concept in : the Nash Equilibrium.

What Is a Nash Equilibrium? Formal and Informal Definitions of Nash Equilibrium Examples of Nash Equilibrium Once you define the players, actions, possible strategies, and the payoffs of a game, you have set up the rules of the game. Now what? We could ask: which player within the set I will win the game? For example, if the game you have defined is a penalty kick, you could ask who will win the penalty kick by virtue of getting the higher payoff? Will it be the goal-keeper or the shooter? Another interesting question might be what is the optimal strategy for a player i I given that all of the other players j = i and j I \{i} are also playing their optimal strategies. This is the question that underlies the most fundamental concept in : the Nash Equilibrium.

What Is a Nash Equilibrium? Formal and Informal Definitions of Nash Equilibrium Examples of Nash Equilibrium Once you define the players, actions, possible strategies, and the payoffs of a game, you have set up the rules of the game. Now what? We could ask: which player within the set I will win the game? For example, if the game you have defined is a penalty kick, you could ask who will win the penalty kick by virtue of getting the higher payoff? Will it be the goal-keeper or the shooter? Another interesting question might be what is the optimal strategy for a player i I given that all of the other players j = i and j I \{i} are also playing their optimal strategies. This is the question that underlies the most fundamental concept in : the Nash Equilibrium.

What Is a Nash Equilibrium? Formal and Informal Definitions of Nash Equilibrium Examples of Nash Equilibrium Once you define the players, actions, possible strategies, and the payoffs of a game, you have set up the rules of the game. Now what? We could ask: which player within the set I will win the game? For example, if the game you have defined is a penalty kick, you could ask who will win the penalty kick by virtue of getting the higher payoff? Will it be the goal-keeper or the shooter? Another interesting question might be what is the optimal strategy for a player i I given that all of the other players j = i and j I \{i} are also playing their optimal strategies. This is the question that underlies the most fundamental concept in : the Nash Equilibrium.

Formal Definition of Nash Equilibrium Formal and Informal Definitions of Nash Equilibrium Examples of Nash Equilibrium Definition In game where the n player set is I,thestrategyprofile(σ1,...,σ I ) is a Nash Equilibrium if, for each player i, herstrategyσi is a best response to the strategies specified for the other n 1players,or for σ i =[σ 1...σ i 1 σ i+1...σ I ].Formally, or u i (σ i,σ i ) u i (σ i,σ i ), i, σ i Σ i, σ i = arg max u i (σ i,σ i ) i I σ i σ i =(σ 1,...,σ i 1,σ i+1,...,σ I )

Nash s Existence Theorem Formal and Informal Definitions of Nash Equilibrium Examples of Nash Equilibrium Theorem Kakutani s Fixed Point Theorem: Suppose that A R n is a nonempty compact, convex set, and that f : A A is an upper hemi-continuous correspondence from A unto itself with the property that the set f (x) A is nonempty and convex for every x A. Thenf( ) has a fixed point, or there exists an x A such that f (x )=x. Based on Kakutani s Fixed Point Theorem, follows Nash s theorem: Theorem There exists a mixed strategy Nash Equilibrium for all games with a finite number of players and a finite number of strategies

Informal Definition of Nash Equilibrium Formal and Informal Definitions of Nash Equilibrium Examples of Nash Equilibrium Huh?? Given what others are doing, thereisnoprofitabledeviation for any player. Given what all of the players are doing, check to see whether there are any changes that would be profitable for any of the players assuming that the strategies of the other players do not change.

Informal Definition of Nash Equilibrium Formal and Informal Definitions of Nash Equilibrium Examples of Nash Equilibrium Huh?? Given what others are doing, thereisnoprofitabledeviation for any player. Given what all of the players are doing, check to see whether there are any changes that would be profitable for any of the players assuming that the strategies of the other players do not change.

Informal Definition of Nash Equilibrium Formal and Informal Definitions of Nash Equilibrium Examples of Nash Equilibrium Huh?? Given what others are doing, thereisnoprofitabledeviation for any player. Given what all of the players are doing, check to see whether there are any changes that would be profitable for any of the players assuming that the strategies of the other players do not change.

Prisoner s Dilemma Formal and Informal Definitions of Nash Equilibrium Examples of Nash Equilibrium The story behind the Prisoner s Dilemma is of two suspects who are caught by the police and are now being interrogated. However, we can apply this to a number of settings. Consider a group project for class. Assume that the payoffs below are in terms of utilities. Table: Prisoner s Dilemma Cooperate Defect Cooperate 2,2 0,3 Defect 3,0 1,1

Prisoner s Dilemma Formal and Informal Definitions of Nash Equilibrium Examples of Nash Equilibrium The story behind the Prisoner s Dilemma is of two suspects who are caught by the police and are now being interrogated. However, we can apply this to a number of settings. Consider a group project for class. Assume that the payoffs below are in terms of utilities. Table: Prisoner s Dilemma Cooperate Defect Cooperate 2,2 0,3 Defect 3,0 1,1

Prisoner s Dilemma Continued Formal and Informal Definitions of Nash Equilibrium Examples of Nash Equilibrium We solve for the Nash Equilibrium by looking at the best response of each player given astrategyoftheotherplayer.forexample, given Player 2 s strategy of Cooperate, Player 1 s best response is Defect. Let s underline the payoffs corresponding to each players best response. Table: Prisoner s Dilemma Cooperate Defect Cooperate 2,2 0,3 Defect 3,0 1,1

Prisoner s Dilemma Continued Formal and Informal Definitions of Nash Equilibrium Examples of Nash Equilibrium ANashEquilibriumcorrespondstothecellwherebothpayoffsare underlined. Let s check to see whether any of the players can do better by changing her strategy. Table: Prisoner s Dilemma Cooperate Defect Cooperate 2,2 0,3 Defect 3,0 1,1 If either player 1 or 2 deviates to Cooperate, their payoffs fall to 0 from 1. Therefore, Defect and Defect is the Nash Equilibrium and this is the predicted outcome of this game. However, is this truly what we expect to happen given the group project story?

Prisoner s Dilemma Continued Formal and Informal Definitions of Nash Equilibrium Examples of Nash Equilibrium ANashEquilibriumcorrespondstothecellwherebothpayoffsare underlined. Let s check to see whether any of the players can do better by changing her strategy. Table: Prisoner s Dilemma Cooperate Defect Cooperate 2,2 0,3 Defect 3,0 1,1 If either player 1 or 2 deviates to Cooperate, their payoffs fall to 0 from 1. Therefore, Defect and Defect is the Nash Equilibrium and this is the predicted outcome of this game. However, is this truly what we expect to happen given the group project story?

Battle of the Sexes Formal and Informal Definitions of Nash Equilibrium Examples of Nash Equilibrium The story behind the Battle of the Sexes is that a man and a woman are trying to decide where to go on their date. They both want to spend time together, but they have preferences over where to go. Assume that player 1 is woman and player 2 is man. Again assume that the payoffs below are in terms of utilities. Table: Battle of the Sexes Musical Football Muscial 2,1 0,0 Football 0,0 1,2

Battle of the Sexes Formal and Informal Definitions of Nash Equilibrium Examples of Nash Equilibrium The story behind the Battle of the Sexes is that a man and a woman are trying to decide where to go on their date. They both want to spend time together, but they have preferences over where to go. Assume that player 1 is woman and player 2 is man. Again assume that the payoffs below are in terms of utilities. Table: Battle of the Sexes Musical Football Muscial 2,1 0,0 Football 0,0 1,2

Battle of the Sexes Continued Formal and Informal Definitions of Nash Equilibrium Examples of Nash Equilibrium Again we solve for the Nash Equilibrium by underlining the payoffs corresponding to each players best response. Table: Battle of the Sexes Musical Football Musical 2,1 0,0 Football 0,0 1,2 The Nash prediction of this game is that the man and woman will end up together at either the Musical or the Football match. The key is that the two players stay together, despite differing preferences.

Battle of the Sexes Continued Formal and Informal Definitions of Nash Equilibrium Examples of Nash Equilibrium Again we solve for the Nash Equilibrium by underlining the payoffs corresponding to each players best response. Table: Battle of the Sexes Musical Football Musical 2,1 0,0 Football 0,0 1,2 The Nash prediction of this game is that the man and woman will end up together at either the Musical or the Football match. The key is that the two players stay together, despite differing preferences.

ABeautifulMind Formal and Informal Definitions of Nash Equilibrium Examples of Nash Equilibrium Let s watch a short clip from A Beautiful Mind, where John Nash figures out the Nash Equilibrium. Note that there are four players (the four men); five possible strategies (choice of four of the brunettes and one blonde); blonde gives the highest payoff; and the key assumption that no one wants to be the second choice. While watching the clip, considering the following two questions: What is the equilibrium solution of the game identified by John Nash? Is this solution a Nash Equilibrium?

ABeautifulMind Formal and Informal Definitions of Nash Equilibrium Examples of Nash Equilibrium Let s watch a short clip from A Beautiful Mind, where John Nash figures out the Nash Equilibrium. Note that there are four players (the four men); five possible strategies (choice of four of the brunettes and one blonde); blonde gives the highest payoff; and the key assumption that no one wants to be the second choice. While watching the clip, considering the following two questions: What is the equilibrium solution of the game identified by John Nash? Is this solution a Nash Equilibrium?

Ultimatum Game Rules of the game: The Offeror offers a split of 1 dollar with the Offeree, for example, x cents for Offeree and 1 x cents for herself, the Offeror; The Offeree can Accept or Reject the Offeror s offer. If Offeree Accepts, the two get the money. If the Offeree Rejects, then both parties get nothing.

Ultimatum Game Rules of the game: The Offeror offers a split of 1 dollar with the Offeree, for example, x cents for Offeree and 1 x cents for herself, the Offeror; The Offeree can Accept or Reject the Offeror s offer. If Offeree Accepts, the two get the money. If the Offeree Rejects, then both parties get nothing.

Ultimatum Game Rules of the game: The Offeror offers a split of 1 dollar with the Offeree, for example, x cents for Offeree and 1 x cents for herself, the Offeror; The Offeree can Accept or Reject the Offeror s offer. If Offeree Accepts, the two get the money. If the Offeree Rejects, then both parties get nothing.

Ultimatum Game Continued What is the Nash Equilibrium of this game? There are multiple Nash Equilibria of this game based on empty threats. We won t have time to consider this. There is a unique subgame perfect Nash Equilibrium of the game: Offeror offers 1 cent to the Offeree and the Offeree Accepts. Check that there are no changes that would increase the payoffs to either player. Akeyassumptionofgametheoryisthatallplayersare perfectly rational. However, as the ultimatum game shows, people are also motivated by a sense of fairness. In the lab, Offerors usually offer 60-40 splits.

Ultimatum Game Continued What is the Nash Equilibrium of this game? There are multiple Nash Equilibria of this game based on empty threats. We won t have time to consider this. There is a unique subgame perfect Nash Equilibrium of the game: Offeror offers 1 cent to the Offeree and the Offeree Accepts. Check that there are no changes that would increase the payoffs to either player. Akeyassumptionofgametheoryisthatallplayersare perfectly rational. However, as the ultimatum game shows, people are also motivated by a sense of fairness. In the lab, Offerors usually offer 60-40 splits.

Ultimatum Game Continued What is the Nash Equilibrium of this game? There are multiple Nash Equilibria of this game based on empty threats. We won t have time to consider this. There is a unique subgame perfect Nash Equilibrium of the game: Offeror offers 1 cent to the Offeree and the Offeree Accepts. Check that there are no changes that would increase the payoffs to either player. Akeyassumptionofgametheoryisthatallplayersare perfectly rational. However, as the ultimatum game shows, people are also motivated by a sense of fairness. In the lab, Offerors usually offer 60-40 splits.

Ultimatum Game Continued What is the Nash Equilibrium of this game? There are multiple Nash Equilibria of this game based on empty threats. We won t have time to consider this. There is a unique subgame perfect Nash Equilibrium of the game: Offeror offers 1 cent to the Offeree and the Offeree Accepts. Check that there are no changes that would increase the payoffs to either player. Akeyassumptionofgametheoryisthatallplayersare perfectly rational. However, as the ultimatum game shows, people are also motivated by a sense of fairness. In the lab, Offerors usually offer 60-40 splits.

Ultimatum Game Continued What is the Nash Equilibrium of this game? There are multiple Nash Equilibria of this game based on empty threats. We won t have time to consider this. There is a unique subgame perfect Nash Equilibrium of the game: Offeror offers 1 cent to the Offeree and the Offeree Accepts. Check that there are no changes that would increase the payoffs to either player. Akeyassumptionofgametheoryisthatallplayersare perfectly rational. However, as the ultimatum game shows, people are also motivated by a sense of fairness. In the lab, Offerors usually offer 60-40 splits.

Generalized Beauty Contest Rules of the game: Write down your name; Pick a non negative integer between, and including, 0 and 100; I will collect the cards and the number(s) closest to 1 2 the average of the 10 numbers will win a prize Play again with a different group of 10 players

Generalized Beauty Contest Rules of the game: Write down your name; Pick a non negative integer between, and including, 0 and 100; I will collect the cards and the number(s) closest to 1 2 the average of the 10 numbers will win a prize Play again with a different group of 10 players

Generalized Beauty Contest Rules of the game: Write down your name; Pick a non negative integer between, and including, 0 and 100; I will collect the cards and the number(s) closest to 1 2 the average of the 10 numbers will win a prize Play again with a different group of 10 players

Generalized Beauty Contest Rules of the game: Write down your name; Pick a non negative integer between, and including, 0 and 100; I will collect the cards and the number(s) closest to 1 2 the average of the 10 numbers will win a prize Play again with a different group of 10 players

Generalized Beauty Contest Rules of the game: Write down your name; Pick a non negative integer between, and including, 0 and 100; I will collect the cards and the number(s) closest to 1 2 the average of the 10 numbers will win a prize Play again with a different group of 10 players

Generalized Beauty Contest Continued What is the Nash Equilibrium of this game? The unique Nash Equilibrium is where all 10 players choose 0. Check to see that no player can win by deviating from 0. Consider one player deviating to x = 0. Then half of the average is x 20.Forallx [0,100], 0 is closer to x 20 than x. Iterated reasoning: Because the average can never be greater 100, the numbers from 51-100 are dominated for all the players. If no player will submit numbers greater than 51, then the average can never exceed 50. Since the average cannot exceed 50, the numbers 26-50 are dominated for all players... The result is that all players should play 0 at the equilibrium.

Generalized Beauty Contest Continued What is the Nash Equilibrium of this game? The unique Nash Equilibrium is where all 10 players choose 0. Check to see that no player can win by deviating from 0. Consider one player deviating to x = 0. Then half of the average is x 20.Forallx [0,100], 0 is closer to x 20 than x. Iterated reasoning: Because the average can never be greater 100, the numbers from 51-100 are dominated for all the players. If no player will submit numbers greater than 51, then the average can never exceed 50. Since the average cannot exceed 50, the numbers 26-50 are dominated for all players... The result is that all players should play 0 at the equilibrium.

Generalized Beauty Contest Continued What is the Nash Equilibrium of this game? The unique Nash Equilibrium is where all 10 players choose 0. Check to see that no player can win by deviating from 0. Consider one player deviating to x = 0. Then half of the average is x 20.Forallx [0,100], 0 is closer to x 20 than x. Iterated reasoning: Because the average can never be greater 100, the numbers from 51-100 are dominated for all the players. If no player will submit numbers greater than 51, then the average can never exceed 50. Since the average cannot exceed 50, the numbers 26-50 are dominated for all players... The result is that all players should play 0 at the equilibrium.

Generalized Beauty Contest Continued What is the Nash Equilibrium of this game? The unique Nash Equilibrium is where all 10 players choose 0. Check to see that no player can win by deviating from 0. Consider one player deviating to x = 0. Then half of the average is x 20.Forallx [0,100], 0 is closer to x 20 than x. Iterated reasoning: Because the average can never be greater 100, the numbers from 51-100 are dominated for all the players. If no player will submit numbers greater than 51, then the average can never exceed 50. Since the average cannot exceed 50, the numbers 26-50 are dominated for all players... The result is that all players should play 0 at the equilibrium.

Generalized Beauty Contest Continued Predicted outcome of the game: With the first group of players, the winning number was not equal to 0. In lab run experiments, researchers find that the number is usually around 25. With the second group, notice (hopefully) that the winning number decreased when compared to the first group s winning number. Although the Nash Equilibrium was not a great predictor of the first outcome, we might expect to see convergence to the Nash Equilibrium as we continue the learning process.

Generalized Beauty Contest Continued Predicted outcome of the game: With the first group of players, the winning number was not equal to 0. In lab run experiments, researchers find that the number is usually around 25. With the second group, notice (hopefully) that the winning number decreased when compared to the first group s winning number. Although the Nash Equilibrium was not a great predictor of the first outcome, we might expect to see convergence to the Nash Equilibrium as we continue the learning process.

Generalized Beauty Contest Continued Predicted outcome of the game: With the first group of players, the winning number was not equal to 0. In lab run experiments, researchers find that the number is usually around 25. With the second group, notice (hopefully) that the winning number decreased when compared to the first group s winning number. Although the Nash Equilibrium was not a great predictor of the first outcome, we might expect to see convergence to the Nash Equilibrium as we continue the learning process.

Generalized Beauty Contest Continued Predicted outcome of the game: With the first group of players, the winning number was not equal to 0. In lab run experiments, researchers find that the number is usually around 25. With the second group, notice (hopefully) that the winning number decreased when compared to the first group s winning number. Although the Nash Equilibrium was not a great predictor of the first outcome, we might expect to see convergence to the Nash Equilibrium as we continue the learning process.

Drinking Games with Two Players Rules of the game: Starting from 21 pennies, the first player removes 1, 2, or 3 pennies; Thereafter, the second player then also removes 1, 2, or 3 pennies; The process is repeated until only 1 penny remains and the player who removes the last penny wins and the opponent drinks shot of beer. Play again, but change the sequence of moves.

Drinking Games with Two Players Rules of the game: Starting from 21 pennies, the first player removes 1, 2, or 3 pennies; Thereafter, the second player then also removes 1, 2, or 3 pennies; The process is repeated until only 1 penny remains and the player who removes the last penny wins and the opponent drinks shot of beer. Play again, but change the sequence of moves.

Drinking Games with Two Players Rules of the game: Starting from 21 pennies, the first player removes 1, 2, or 3 pennies; Thereafter, the second player then also removes 1, 2, or 3 pennies; The process is repeated until only 1 penny remains and the player who removes the last penny wins and the opponent drinks shot of beer. Play again, but change the sequence of moves.

Drinking Games with Two Players Rules of the game: Starting from 21 pennies, the first player removes 1, 2, or 3 pennies; Thereafter, the second player then also removes 1, 2, or 3 pennies; The process is repeated until only 1 penny remains and the player who removes the last penny wins and the opponent drinks shot of beer. Play again, but change the sequence of moves.

Drinking Games with Two Players Rules of the game: Starting from 21 pennies, the first player removes 1, 2, or 3 pennies; Thereafter, the second player then also removes 1, 2, or 3 pennies; The process is repeated until only 1 penny remains and the player who removes the last penny wins and the opponent drinks shot of beer. Play again, but change the sequence of moves.

Drinking Games with Two Players Continued What is the Nash Equilibrium of this game? The unique Nash Equilibrium is where the first player removes 1 penny at her first move so that 20 pennies remain. Thereafter, player 1 must make sure that 16, 12, 8, and 4 pennies remain. Given player 1 s strategy, player 2 is indifferent because he will always lose! Player 2 randomizes.

Drinking Games with Two Players Continued What is the Nash Equilibrium of this game? The unique Nash Equilibrium is where the first player removes 1 penny at her first move so that 20 pennies remain. Thereafter, player 1 must make sure that 16, 12, 8, and 4 pennies remain. Given player 1 s strategy, player 2 is indifferent because he will always lose! Player 2 randomizes.

Drinking Games with Two Players Continued What is the Nash Equilibrium of this game? The unique Nash Equilibrium is where the first player removes 1 penny at her first move so that 20 pennies remain. Thereafter, player 1 must make sure that 16, 12, 8, and 4 pennies remain. Given player 1 s strategy, player 2 is indifferent because he will always lose! Player 2 randomizes.

Drinking Games with Two Players Continued What is the Nash Equilibrium of this game? The unique Nash Equilibrium is where the first player removes 1 penny at her first move so that 20 pennies remain. Thereafter, player 1 must make sure that 16, 12, 8, and 4 pennies remain. Given player 1 s strategy, player 2 is indifferent because he will always lose! Player 2 randomizes.

Drinking Games with Two Players Continued Illustrates the importance of the first mover advantage in some types of games. Illustrates the idea of moving backwards from the conclusion of the game to the beginning of the game to find Nash Equilibria.

Drinking Games with Two Players Continued Illustrates the importance of the first mover advantage in some types of games. Illustrates the idea of moving backwards from the conclusion of the game to the beginning of the game to find Nash Equilibria.

Conclusion and Questions If you are interested in game theory, a great non-technical introductory text of game theory is: Dixit, Avinash and Susan Skeath, 2004, Games of Strategy, 2nd ed. New York: W.W. Norton. For a more technical exposition of game theory for non-economists, see Gibbons, Robert, 1992, for Applied Economists, Princeton, NY: Princeton University Press. Thank you!

Conclusion and Questions If you are interested in game theory, a great non-technical introductory text of game theory is: Dixit, Avinash and Susan Skeath, 2004, Games of Strategy, 2nd ed. New York: W.W. Norton. For a more technical exposition of game theory for non-economists, see Gibbons, Robert, 1992, for Applied Economists, Princeton, NY: Princeton University Press. Thank you!

Conclusion and Questions If you are interested in game theory, a great non-technical introductory text of game theory is: Dixit, Avinash and Susan Skeath, 2004, Games of Strategy, 2nd ed. New York: W.W. Norton. For a more technical exposition of game theory for non-economists, see Gibbons, Robert, 1992, for Applied Economists, Princeton, NY: Princeton University Press. Thank you!