Assessing the Impact of the National Voter Registration Act on Midterm Elections Michael D. Martinez Department of Political Science University of Florida P.O. Box 117325 Gainesville, Florida 32611-7325 email: martinez@polisci.ufl.edu David Hill Department of Political Science Bridgewater State College Bridgewater, Massachusetts 02325 Prepared for delivery at the 1999 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Atlanta Marriott Marquis and Atlanta Hilton and Towers, September 2-5, 1999. Copyright by the American Political Science Association.
Abstract The National Voter Registration Act of 1993 required states to offer voter registration at more convenient venues, including drivers license and motor vehicle offices, public assistance agencies, military recruiting stations, and through the mail. We review the evidence of the effects of the NVRA on turnout in the 1996 presidential election and present new evidence of its effects in the 1998 midterm election. In contrast to what we might have expected (and what supporters had hoped for), midterm election turnout increased between 1994 and 1998 in states that made no significant changes in their registration laws, and decreased in states which made significant changes to comply with the federal mandate. Changes in midterm turnout between 1994 and 1998 are largely a function of mobilization (especially campaign spending), and spending declined in states that made the most significant registration changes. These analyses of NVRA s effects on the 1996 and 1998 electorates suggest that reducing the costs of participation is important, but its effects are likely to be limited so long as citizens are not mobilized and do not see the benefits of participation.
Supporters of electoral reform were heartened when President Clinton signed the National Voter Registration Act in 1993. After being stalled for years by Republican filibusters and a veto by President Bush in 1992, the NVRA was one of the first major legislative achievements for which the Democratic majority in the 103 rd Congress and the new Democratic president could claim credit. The new federal mandate compelled states to offer voter registration at more convenient venues, including drivers license and motor vehicle offices, public assistance agencies, military recruiting stations, and through the mail. At the signing ceremony, the president summed up the intent of the bill s supporters:... the failure to register is the primary reason given by eligible citizens for their not voting. The principle behind this legislation is clear. Voting should be about discerning the will of the majority, not about testing the administrative capacity of a citizen. (Solop and Wonders 1995: 79). The decline in turnout in the presidential election of 1996 was, at the very least, a temporary disappointment to those who had invested political capital in passing the new law. After a sharp increase in 1992, turnout in 1996 dropped to less than fifty percent of the voting age population of the country, the lowest figure for a presidential election in the United States since 1924. Nevertheless, supporters may still hope that time is on their side, and that the NVRA ultimately will increase turnout and change the social composition of the electorate. The 1998 election, the first midterm since the implementation of the law, gives us another opportunity to assess its short term impact. In this paper, we will review the evidence of the impact of the National Voter Registration Act in the 1996 election, and evaluate its impact on turnout in the 1998 election. Did the NVRA Work in 1996? Projections of the potential impact of significant voter registration reform varied considerably. Piven and Cloward believed that providing access to voter registration at public assistance offices would be the first step in a process that might eventually result in turnout rates as high as 90%. Highton and Wolfinger (1998) were much more modest, but still optimistic that some provisions of the NVRA (particularly motor-voter) might stimulate turnout by as much as 10.1%, especially among those with moderate levels of motivation to participate. Other analyses were even more sanguine about the prospective impact of voter registration reform. Franklin s (1996) analysis of 29 democracies found that turnout is affected by electoral salience, compulsory voting, and proportionality, but is not affected at all by voluntary (as opposed to automatic) voter registration systems. Even worse for those sympathetic to Piven and Cloward s vision, Calvert s (1996) county-level analysis suggested that increases in turnout that resulted from Michigan s motor voter law tended to exacerbate rather than alleviate the socioeconomic bias in the electorate. Thus, the range of anticipated outcomes was rather broad. Estimates of the actual effects of NVRA on turnout in 1996 varied somewhat as well. We 1
compared states which previously had active motor-voter programs, those which previously had passive motor-voter programs, and those which had no program in place at all prior to the 1992 election. Since all states (except Vermont) were effectively required to institute election day registration or the motor-voter, public assistance, military recruitment, and mail registration provisions of the law, we hypothesized that the states which had to change the law the most should have more positive changes (or, in this case, less negative changes) on turnout. In fact, with controls for Senate races and presidential election competitiveness, we found small, non-significant effects on turnout. Moreover, our analysis of exit poll data found small, non-significant (and generally negative) effects on the proportions of less educated and Blacks in the electorate. NVRA may have been necessary, but it was not sufficient in 1996 to bring significant numbers of new voters to the polls. (Martinez and Hill 1999) Knack (1999) finds slightly greater effects of the reform measures. Turnout in the five states which did not make any reforms dropped three points more than states which made changes in response to the federal mandate, and turnout in states which adopted new election day registration procedures suffered the least. Reforms (especially election day registration) also were associated with greater participation by young people, but not (as Democrats had hoped but Republicans had feared) greater participation by Democrats or more votes for President Clinton. In this paper, we reassess the impact of the NVRA on turnout changes between the presidential elections of 1992 and 1996, and between the midterm elections of 1994 and 1998. As in our earlier work, as well as Knack (1999), the logic of our analysis is simple. To the extent that the NVRA was successful in changing turnout patterns, we would expect to see greater effects on turnout in the states that changed their laws the most to implement the new federal requirements. 1 Our first cuts at the data are simple comparisons of turnout rates in the presidential elections of three groups of states. The first group consists of states that did not make any changes in state law to comply with the National Voter Registration Act. In 1996, this group included North Dakota (which was exempt from the law because it does not have a voter registration requirement), Wisconsin and Minnesota (which were exempt because they had election day registration systems in place prior to the implementation of the NVRA), Vermont (which delayed implementation of the NVRA until after the 1996 election), and Maine. Though technically not exempt from implementing the NVRA, Maine is regarded as a no-change state because it previously had an election day registration system in place, though voters in some parts of the state were required to register at a place different than the election polling states. We agree with Knack s conjecture that the changes that Maine made to comply with the NVRA were not likely to have dramatically affected turnout. (Knack 1999, 238) Vermont came into compliance with the NVRA for the 1998 midterm elections, and is not included in this group for the analysis of the effect of the NVRA on the 1998 midterm elections. 2 The second group of states includes Idaho, New Hampshire, and Wyoming, which were allowed to adopt election day registration procedures in time for the 1996 elections in lieu of implementing the other registration reform requirements of the NVRA. The third group of states 2
consists of the remaining 42 (43 in 1998, including Vermont) which took various steps to comply with the motor-voter, public agency, and mail-in provisions of the federal mandate. Table 1 shows the weighted turnout rates for each group of states in 1992 and 1996. 3 Turnout declined nationally from 55.2% to 49.1%, and also declined in every state in the union. Turnout in the control group of five states that did not change their laws between the presidential elections in 1992 and 1996 declined 8.7%. Turnout in the new election day registration states declined only 4.5%, a difference which suggests that election day registration had a significant effect, cutting the decline in turnout by nearly half. Turnout in the other 42 states was down 6.0% between the presidential elections, suggesting that the impact of implementing the NVRA provisions was 2.7%, or nearly a third of the decline in the no-change states. Initially, there appears to be an ameliorating effect of the NVRA on the decline in turnout in the 1996 presidential election. Further analysis of the 42 implementing states cast doubt on which of the NVRA provisions had the most significant effects on turnout. Prior to the passage of the NVRA, state motor-voter provisions varied. In nine active states, officials were required to inform drivers license and motor vehicle registration applicants of the opportunity to register to vote, though there was probably a great deal of variation in the degree to which these requirements were actually implemented at the street level (Highton and Wolfinger 1998, 82-83). In eleven passive states, 4 voter registration information and materials were available at drivers license and motor vehicle offices, but officials were not required to ask applicants if they would like to register to vote. In the remaining twenty-two states, no effective motor voter program existed prior to the 1992 election. NVRA also mandated mail registration (previously available in some form in 24 of these 42 states) and public agency registration (previously available in 7 of these 42 states). 5 If the federal mandate had a significant effect on turnout, we would have expected that states which changed their laws the most to comply with its provisions would have experienced less severe turnout declines than states which already had similar programs in place. Table 1 shows that the decline in turnout in states which moved from no motor-voter program at all to compliance was 5.7%, only nine-tenths of a point lower than the states which previously had active motor-voter systems in place. Mail registration had no effect at all, as the turnout decline in the states which previously had a program was 0.1% less than those which implemented a new program. States which previously had public agency registration also had less severe turnout declines than the states just coming into compliance. While the difference between the no-change states and the implementing states suggests that NVRA may have done something to stem the turnout decline, it is not clear which provisions helped the most. Our multivariate analysis presented in Table 2 leads us to be cautious, however. In this regression model, turnout in 1996 is regressed on turnout in 1992, plus dummy variables for new election day registration (EDR) states, states with implementation from prior passive motor-voter programs, states with no prior motor-voter, states with no prior mail-in registration, states with no prior public agency registration, states with implementation delays. 6 Mobilization variables representing the 3
changes in the Senate election calendar, competitiveness in gubernatorial and presidential races in the states, and spending by federal candidates are included in the estimation in the second column of Table 2. 7 States which did not change their implementation and new EDR states were coded as 0 on the NVRA implementation variables. The estimated regression coefficients for the implementation variables reflect their independent effects on turnout, controlling for the effects of the mobilization variables. The regression shows that effects of the registration reform changes were both small and inconsistent in sign. On average, controlling for prior turnout and the effects of mobilization, states that changed to an active motor voter implementation and those that implemented new public agency registration showed small decreases in turnout. States that implemented new mailin registrations and new election day registration showed average increases of less than one percent when the mobilization variables are taken into account. Overall, the effects of registration changes on turnout were difficult to see. It is possible, of course, that the effects of the NVRA were not felt yet in the states which adopted new motor-voter procedures. Knack (1995) found a significant cumulative effect in his analysis of states which had voluntarily adopted motor-voter statutes prior to the federal mandate, suggesting that there may be a significant lag between program implementation and turnout change. As drivers license and motor vehicle renewal requirements bring more people into contact with these agencies, there is a greater possibility of an impact on turnout. Did the NVRA Work in 1998? We examine the possibility of a lagged impact on turnout by repeating our analysis for the 1994 and 1998 midterm elections. Nationally, turnout (as a proportion of the voting age population) declined from 38.5% in 1994 to 36.6% in 1998, not a very auspicious sign for a lagged impact of the NVRA. 8 Table 1 shows that the states that were exempt from the NVRA (plus Maine) showed an increase of 3.3% in turnout between the two midterm elections (in contrast to the 8.7% decline between the 1992 and 1996 presidential elections). Against this baseline, the drops in turnout among the 43 implementing states (-1.3%) and especially among the three new election day registration states (-5.5%) are disappointing. These is just the opposite of the pattern of changes in the preceding presidential election interval, when the new EDR states showed the smallest average decrease in turnout and the no-change states had the largest decrease. Perhaps the relative success of registration reform over no reform was confined in the short run to high stimulus presidential elections. Our further analysis of the 43 implementing states also shows negative zero-order effects of the implementation of NVRA reforms. Those states which established completely new motor-voter programs in response to the NVRA showed turnout declines, while those which previously had active motor-voter programs showed a slight increase in turnout (exactly the opposite of a pattern of implementation success). There is a hint that mail provisions of the NVRA may have had a modest effect on mid-term turnout, but the difference between states with prior public agency registration and 4
those without is very small. All in all, the initial effects of the NVRA on turnout in midterm elections appear to be weak. In Table 3, we regress turnout in 1998 on turnout in 1994 and states legal changes in response to the NVRA. In our simple model (in the first column of Table 3), changes from a prior passive motor voter program to implementation resulted in an average 2.2% decline in turnout in 1998, and changes from no prior motor voter program to implementation resulted in a 5.5% decline, controlling for prior turnout. Implementing a new mailin registration program was associated with an average 1.4% decline, while implementation of a new public agency program was associated with a modest 0.5% increase in turnout. On average, states with new election day registration experienced a 4.3% decline in turnout in the midterm elections. While the magnitudes of the exact effects are a little different than our zero-order effects described in Table 1, the basic lesson is similar: states which appeared to change their laws the most suffered the largest drops in turnout between the midterm elections. In column 2, we add our four variables to reflect changes in mobilization. In general, we expect increases in turnout as a result of heightened public interest and mobilization efforts associated with competitive gubernatorial race, competitive U.S. House races, the Senate election calendar, and campaign spending. 9 (Caldeira, Patterson, and Marrko 1985; Cox and Munger 1989) As anticipated, turnout decreased as winning margins in gubernatorial elections increased, and turnout increased as campaign spending in federal elections increased. The proportion of competitive House elections in each state did not affect turnout appreciably. At first glance, the negative sign on the Senate calendar variable is surprising in that it suggests that the presence of a Senate election depressed turnout, but the ceteris paribus caveat is important in interpreting this coefficient. Senate elections tended to increase turnout when they increased campaign spending in the state. When campaign spending declined, turnout declined. The unsurprising result here is that mobilization matters (cf. Rosenstone and Hansen 1993). The presence of these mobilization variables is important because they soften and begin to explain some of the unexpected negative effects of registration reform. Compare the regression coefficients in columns 1 and 2 of Table 3. In column 1, change from a passive motor voter program to implementation of the NVRA is associated with a decline in turnout, but the more complete equation in column 2 suggests a very modest 0.7% increase in turnout. The effect of a change from no prior motor voter program to implementation is still negative with the inclusion of the mobilization variables, but is only about half the magnitude as the coefficient in column 1. Similarly, the negative effects of new election day registration are reduced when mobilization controls are included. The inclusion of the mobilization variables does not affect the public agency variable at all. Only the mailin registration variable increases in magnitude. On the whole, this analysis suggests that the precipitous decline in turnout between the 1994 and 1998 midterm elections in states which changed their registration laws to comply with the National Voter Registration Act was not due to the Act itself, but is better explained by changes in mobilization 5
patterns. In Table 4, we regress campaign spending per capita in 1998 on the implementation variables and other competition variables. The negative coefficients on the dummy variables for new election day registration states, states with no prior motor voter and prior passive motor voter, and states with no prior public agency registration show that campaign spending per capita dropped in states which had less facilitative registration provisions prior to the NVRA. We are not asserting a causal relationship between the states prior legal facilitation of registration and changes in candidates spending; we are merely pointing out that, on average, most candidates did not behave (spend) as though the millions of new registrants were ripe for mobilization. As a result, those millions of new registrants were not brought to the polls in the 1998 midterm elections. Discussion As we suggested in our first look at the impact of the National Voter Registration Act (Martinez and Hill 1999), we are assessing the short term effects of a law whose sponsors envisioned a long term expansion of the electorate. Undoubtedly, the NVRA reforms were responsible for a burgeoning of the voter registration rolls, and under the right conditions, some number of those who were registered may someday come to the polls. But those conditions have not yet appeared. In 1996, turnout in the baseline states declined precipitously, while new election day registration and motor voter provisions appeared to modestly alleviate the national turnout decline. But in the 1998 midterm elections, the baseline states increased their turnout while the states with new election day registration and motorvoter laws suffered the most severe declines. The contrast of the estimated effects in the presidential election of 1996 and the midterm election of 1998 raises a number of questions, both epistemological and political. It is possible that the positive zero-order effects of election day registration in 1996 (observed by Knack 1999 and in the first part of this paper) and its apparent negative effects in 1998 were the result of random fluctuations in turnout in the three states that implemented EDR in 1995. On the other hand, the finding that registration reform had greater effects in the presidential election than in the midterm election is also consistent with Highton and Wolfinger s prediction that the effects of registration reform would be stronger among voters who were moderately predisposed to participate. They reasoned that registration requirements might not pose a significant barrier to participation for the most politically involved, and easing registration might not be enough to bring the least politically involved to the polls. Thus, the moderately politically involved people would be the group most affected by changes in registration requirements, consistent with our earlier finding that NVRA s effects in 1996 disproportionately fell on the better educated (Martinez and Hill 1999). Applying that reasoning across elections (as well as across people) would suggest that the effects of registration reform would be felt most in elections in which the moderately involved were more engaged. Their interest might be piqued either when the electoral stakes are high (such as in the presidential election) or when lower level elections are especially competitive or exciting. In high stimulus elections, the moderately politically involved may come to the polls if barriers are not too high. In lower stimulus elections, their motivation is lower and easing registration restrictions is not enough. Thus, one possible consequence of easing registration requirements (election day registration, specifically) could be an intensification of the surge and decline variations in turnout. 6
Taken together, the effects of the NVRA on turnout in the 1996 and 1998 elections show that voter registration reform is at best a necessary, but not sufficient, condition to increase and broaden electoral participation in the United States. Reducing the costs of participation is important, but its effects are likely to be limited as long as citizens are not mobilized and do not see the benefits of participation. Other institutional structures, including the lack of proportionality (Jackman 1987, Powell 1986, Franklin 1996) and the fragmentation of power (Franklin and Hirczy ) tend to obscure the benefits of participation for many potential voters. Moreover, for those who think that the low levels of turnout in U.S. elections is a problem to be addressed, those institutional structures are defining features of the American system, and are likely to be even more difficult to change than registration requirements were. Our analysis of the effects of the registration reform on the electorate in 1998 is not yet complete, as we have not analyzed its effects on the social composition of the electorate. We hope to do so when exit poll and census data become available to us through the ICPSR, but we are not optimistic that the NVRA broadened the social composition of the electorate in midterm elections any more than it did in the last presidential election. 7
Table 1 Turnout Change by Election Law Reform Presidential Election Years Midterm Election Years N 1992 1996 Change N 1994 1998 Change No change states 5 70.1% 61.4% -8.7% 4 47.6% 50.9% 3.3% New Election Day Registration 3 62.7% 58.3% -4.5% 3 46.5% 41.0% -5.5% Implementing States 42 54.4% 48.4% -6.0% 43 40.0% 38.7% -1.3% Prior Status of Motor Voter Active 9 58.8% 52.2% -6.6% 9 40.5% 41.0% 0.5% Passive 11 54.5% 48.1% -6.4% 12 37.4% 36.6% -0.8% None 22 53.0% 47.4% -5.7% 22 37.4% 34.0% -3.4% Prior Status of Mail Registration Mail 24 53.6% 47.6% -6.0% 25 38.0% 35.6% -2.4% No Mail 18 55.6% 49.6% -6.1% 18 37.9% 36.3% -1.6% Prior Status of Agency Registration Public Agency 7 55.7% 50.4% -5.3% 7 39.0% 36.7% -2.3% No Public Agency 35 54.0% 47.7% -6.3% 36 37.6% 35.6% -2.0% Weighted by voting age population 8
Table 2 Regression of 1996 Turnout on 1992 Turnout, Election Law Changes, and Mobilization Changes b se b se (Constant) 0.047 0.038 0.070 0.038 Prior Passive Motor Voter -0.012 0.011-0.020 0.009 No Prior Motor Voter 0.002 0.010-0.000 0.008 No Prior Mailin 0.005 0.009 0.003 0.008 No Prior Public Agency -0.016 0.010-0.016 0.010 Implementation Delay 0.028 0.017-0.002 0.007 New Election Day Registration 0.028 0.017 0.002 0.025 Turnout 1992 0.819 0.057 0.781 0.056 Senate Calendar 0.010 0.004 Governor Margin Change -0.000 0.000 Spending Change 0.001 0.002 Presidential Margin Change 0.002 0.001 R 2 0.882 0.924 Number of States 50 50 Table 3 Regression of 1998 Turnout on 1994 Turnout, Election Law Changes, and Mobilization Changes b s.e. b s.e. (Constant) 0.272 0.070 0.250 0.066 Turnout 1994 0.406 0.139 0.465 0.135 Prior Passive Motor Voter -0.022 0.032 0.007 0.033 No Prior Motor Voter -0.055 0.029-0.025 0.029 No Prior Mailin -0.014 0.027-0.047 0.027 No Prior Public Agency 0.005 0.030 0.005 0.028 Implementation Delay -0.026 0.024-0.034 0.023 New Election Day Registration -0.043 0.053-0.013 0.054 Governor Margin Change -0.002 0.001 House Competitive Race Change -0.008 0.037 Spending Change 0.044 0.020 Senate Calendar -0.026 0.024 R 2 0.331 0.491 Number of States 50 50 9
Table 4 Regression of 1998 Campaign Spending log actual b se b se (Constant) 0.974 0.292 3.771 1.077 Senate Race 0.670 0.130 1.738 0.552 No Prior Mailin 0.298 0.179 1.093 0.781 No Prior Public Agency -0.205 0.193-0.599 0.862 Prior Passive Motor Voter -0.231 0.225-0.627 0.997 No Prior Motor Voter -0.463 0.187-1.443 0.830 Governor Margin Change 0.005 0.004 0.016 0.020 House Competitive Race Change 0.312 0.251 2.019 1.172 Log Spending per capita 1994 0.412 0.177 Spending per capita 1994 0.319 0.179 New Election Day Registration -0.661 0.356-2.628 1.678 Implementation Delay 0.009 0.158-0.597 0.703 R 2 0.509 0.33 Number of States 50 50 10
References America Votes (1993). Washington: Governmental Affairs Institute, Congressional Quarterly. America Votes (1995). Washington: Governmental Affairs Institute, Congressional Quarterly. Caldiera, Gregory A., Samuel C. Patterson, and Gregory A. Markko. 1985. The Mobilization of Voters in Congressional Elections. Journal of Politics 47 (2, May): 490-509. Calvert, Jerry W. 1996. Motor Voter Registration: Will It Make a Difference? American Review of Politics 17 (Winter): 365-78. Cox, Gary W., and Michael C. Munger. 1989. Closeness, Expenditures, and Turnout in the 1982 U.S. House Elections. American Political Science Review 83 (1, March): 217-31. Federal Election Commission. 1999. http://www.fec.gov/pages/htmlto5.htm. Franklin, Mark N. 1996. Electoral Participation. In Comparing Democracies: Elections and Voting in Global Perspective. Eds. Lawrence LeDuc, Richard G. Niemi, and Pippa Norris. Thousand Oaks, California: Sage. pp. 216-35. Franklin, Mark N. and Wolfgang P. Hirczy de Mino. 1998. Separated powers, divided government, and turnout in US presidential elections. American Journal of Political Science 42 (1, January): 316-326. Groarke, Margaret. 1997. An Early Assessment of the National Voter Registration Act. Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington. Highton, Benjamin, and Raymond E. Wolfinger. 1998. Estimating the Effects of the National Voter Registration Act of 1993. Political Behavior 20 (2, June): 79-104. Jackman, Robert W. 1987. Political Institutions and Voter Turnout in the Industrial Democracies. American Political Science Review 81 (2, June): 405-23. Knack, Stephen. 1995. Does 'Motor Voter' Work? Evidence from State Level Data. Journal of Politics 57 (3, August): 796-811. Knack, Stephen. 1999. Drivers Wanted: Motor Voter and the Election of 1996. PS: Political Science and Politics 32 (2, June): 237-43. Martinez, Michael D., and David Hill. 1999. Did Motor Voter Work? American Politics Quarterly 27 (3, July): 296-315. Powell, G. Bingham, Jr. 1986. American Turnout in Comparative Perspective. American Political Science Review 80 (1, March): 17-44. 11
Rosenstone, Steven J., and John Mark Hansen. 1993. Mobilization, Participation, and Democracy in America. New York: Macmillan Publishing Company. Solop, Frederic I. and Nancy A. Wonders. 1995. The Politics of Inclusion: Private Voting Rights Under the Clinton Administration. Social Justice 22 (2): 67-87. 12
1. The analyses in this paper do not include the District of Columbia. Although the District was subject to the provisions of the NVRA and has been included in earlier investigations of its efficacy (Martinez and Hill 1999, Knack 1999), the lack of a voting representative in Congress leads us to suspect that the NVRA s impact on the motivations for voting in the District s midterm elections may be somewhat different than those in the states. 2. The Elections Division office in Vermont reported that it had reached an agreement with the U.S. Department of Justice on implementation in time for the 1998 midterm elections. Although Vermont registers voters only after they have taken a Voter s Oath, those who apply for voter registration by means mandated by the NVRA are permitted to take the oath on election day at the polling station. 3. Turnout in the presidential election years is measured as total votes cast in the presidential election divided by the voting age population. The data for turnout in 1992 were taken from America Votes (1993) and the data for 1996 were taken from the Federal Elections Commission website at http://www.fec.gov/pages/htmlto5.htm. 4. Twelve, if Vermont is included. Endnotes 5. States were classified as follows with respect to the registration provisions in effect for the 1992 elections. No prior motor voter: AL, AR, CA, CT, DE, FL, GA, IA, IN, KS, KY, LA, MA, MO, MS, NE, OK, PA, SC, SD, TX, VA Prior passive motor voter: AK, AZ, IL, MD, NJ, NM, NY, RI, TN, UT, VT, WV Prior active motor voter: CO, HI, MI, MT, NC, NV, OH, OR, WA No prior mailin: AL, AR, CO, FL, GA, IL, IN, LA, MA, MI, MO, MS, NC, NM, OK, RI, SD, VA Prior mailin: AK, AZ, CA, CT, DE, HI, IA, KS, KY, MD, MT, NE, NJ, NV, NY, OH, OR, PA, SC, TN, TX, UT, VT, WA, WV No prior public agency: AK, AL, AR, AZ, CA, CO, DE, FL, GA, HI, IL, IN, KS, KY, LA, MA, MI, MO, MS, MT, NC, NE, NM, NV, OK, OR, RI, SC, SD, TN, TX, UT, VA, VT, WA, WV Prior public agency: CT, IA, MD, NJ, NY, OH, PA States which were exempt from the NVRA due to prior election day registration (MN, WI), no registration (ND), new election day registration (ID, NH, WY), and near universal election day registration (ME) were excluded from these classifications. 13
6. Not all states were willing or able to completely implement NVRA procedures by the January 1, 1995, deadline set by Congress (Human Serve 1996; Groarke 1997). Therefore, we must consider the possibility that obstruction on the part of state officials, or delays due to logistics may have depressed the impact of the NVRA on turnout in some states. An implementation dummy variable is coded one for states which delayed implementation (AR, CA, IL, KS, MA, MI, MS, MT, NJ, NY, OH, PA, RI, SC, VA). Vermont delayed implementation so long as to be classified as a no-change state, and is therefore coded zero on this variable in the 1992-96 analysis, as it is in the other NVRA implementation variables. See Human Serve 1996; Groarke 1997, and the Federal Elections Commission website for information regarding states that delayed implementation. 7.The Presidential Margin Change and Gubernatorial Margin Change variables are measured as the actual margin of victory in 1992 subtracted from the actual margin of victory in 1996. Greater numbers indicate a decline in competitiveness, thus the variable is expected to be negatively related to changes in turnout. The data for this variable were taken from Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report. The Senatorial Race variable is coded to reflect the change in the U.S. Senate calendar between 1992 and 1996. The states which had a U.S. Senate election in November 1996 but not in 1992 were coded +1. The states with Senate elections in 1996 but not 1992 were coded -1, and the remaining states were coded zero. The data for this variable were taken from Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report. The Campaign Spending variable measures the change in U.S. Senate and U.S. House campaign spending between 1992 and 1996. The variable is measured as the difference between the log of the per capita level of spending United States Senate and House races in 1992 and the log of the per capita level in spending in 1996. Greater numbers indicate an increase in spending, thus the variable is expected to be positively related to turnout change. The data for this variable were obtained from the Federal Elections Commission website at http://www.fec.gov/finance/ftpdet.htm. 8. In the midterm election years, turnout is measured as votes cast as a proportion of the voting age population. The voting age populations for each state were taken upon Census Bureau projections of state voting age population for each year. The data on votes cast in 1994 were taken from America Votes (1995) and conversations with state elections officials (LA, KY, NC). Data on votes cast in 1998 were collected from the websites of and conversations with elections officials in each state. In each state, data are based on the highest statewide office, except for DE, MS, NJ, VA, and WV. The raw vote counts in these states are based on total ballots cast in all U.S. House races in 1998. 9. The Gubernatorial Margin Change, the Senatorial Race, and the Spending Change variables are comparable to those included in the regression in Table 2 (note 6), but reflect changes between 1994 and 1998. 14
The Percentage of Competitive House Districts variable is measured as the percentage of House districts per state in which the winner won with 55% of the vote or less in 1994 subtracted for the percentage of House districts per state in which the winner won with 55% of the vote or less in 1998. Greater numbers indicate more competition, thus the variable is expected to be positively related to turnout change. The data for this variable were taken from Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report. 15