Spampots Project Mapping the Abuse of Internet Infrastructure by Spammers

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Spampots Project Mapping the Abuse of Internet Infrastructure by Spammers Klaus Steding-Jessen jessen@cert.br Cristine Hoepers cristine@cert.br CERT.br Computer Emergency Response Team Brazil NIC.br Network Information Center Brazil CGI.br Brazilian Internet Steering Committee 2010 Annual Meeting of CSIRTs with National Responsibility, Miami, US June, 2010 p. 1/32

About CERT.br Created in 1997 as the national focal point to handle computer security incident reports and activities related to networks connected to the Internet in Brazil. http://www.cert.br/mission.html 2010 Annual Meeting of CSIRTs with National Responsibility, Miami, US June, 2010 p. 2/32

Our Parent Organization: CGI.br Among the diverse responsibilities of The Brazilian Internet Steering Committee CGI.br, the main attributions are: to propose policies and procedures related to the regulation of the Internet activities to recommend standards for technical and operational procedures to establish strategic directives related to the use and development of Internet in Brazil to promote studies and technical standards for the network and services security in the country to coordinate the allocation of Internet addresses (IPs) and the registration of domain names using <.br> to collect, organize and disseminate information on Internet services, including indicators and statistics 2010 Annual Meeting of CSIRTs with National Responsibility, Miami, US June, 2010 p. 3/32

CGI.br/NIC.br Structure 01- Ministry of Science and Technology 02- Ministry of Communications 03- Presidential Cabinet 04- Ministry of Defense 05- Ministry of Development, Industry and Foreign Trade 06- Ministry of Planning, Budget and Management 07- National Telecommunications Agency 08- National Council of Scientific and Technological Development 09- National Forum of Estate Science and Technology Secretaries 10- Internet Expert 2010 Annual Meeting of CSIRTs with National Responsibility, Miami, US June, 2010 p. 4/32 11- Internet Service Providers 12- Telecom Infrastructure Providers 13- Hardware and Software Industries 14- General Business Sector Users 15- Non-governamental Entity 16- Non-governamental Entity 17- Non-governamental Entity 18- Non-governamental Entity 19- Academia 20- Academia 21- Academia

Agenda SpamPots Project Objectives Architecture Overview New Developments Partners/Members Portal Mining Spam Campaigns Ongoing Work 2010 Annual Meeting of CSIRTs with National Responsibility, Miami, US June, 2010 p. 5/32

SpamPots Project Objectives Better understand the abuse of the Internet infrastructure by spammers measure the problem from a different point of view: abuse of infrastructure X spams received at the destination Help develop the spam characterization research Measure the abuse of end-user machines to send spam Use the spam collected to improve antispam filters Develop better ways to identify phishing and malware identify botnets via the abuse of open proxies and relays 2010 Annual Meeting of CSIRTs with National Responsibility, Miami, US June, 2010 p. 6/32

Architecture Overview Spammers, bots malware, etc Honeypots emulating open proxies and open relays Data Collection: Data Analysis: Collects all data periodically; Checks honeypots status. Data mining process; Generate analysis based on spam content. Storage Storage Members Portal: Statistics; Global distribution of spam campaings; Sample e mails, URLs, etc. Data Warehouse 2010 Annual Meeting of CSIRTs with National Responsibility, Miami, US June, 2010 p. 7/32

Parterns Hosting Sensors Sensors hosted by: AT: CERT.at AU: AusCERT BR: CERT.br BR: CSIRT-USP CL: CLCERT NL: SURFcert TW: TWCERT/CC US: Univ. of Washington Tacoma UY: CSIRT Antel Coming soon: AE (aecert), AR (CSIRT Banelco and Univ. de La Plata), DE (Telekom-CERT), EC (Univ. de Loja), GR (FORTH, ICS), MY (MyCERT), PL (CERT Polska), UK (OX-CERT) and two others in US (Univ. of Alabama at Birmingham and IBM) And maybe one in ZA Thanks to SURFcert! 2010 Annual Meeting of CSIRTs with National Responsibility, Miami, US June, 2010 p. 8/32

Improving cooperation in spam fighting Provide data to trusted parties Help the constituency to identify infected machines Identify malware and scams targeting their constituency Currently providing data about spams coming from networks assigned to JP - to JADAC / IIJ / JPCERT/CC / Min. of Communications had a workshop in Brazil with representatives from these organizations and local ISPs and network providers to discuss how to reduce spam and network abuse TW - to NCC-TW they are using the data to shutdown spammers infrastructures 2010 Annual Meeting of CSIRTs with National Responsibility, Miami, US June, 2010 p. 9/32

New Developments Data capture and collection software rewritten: spamsinkd non-forking multi-threaded event based design using POE framework collect more details about each message store messages in mbox format IPv6 ready spamtestd faster response more control over responses to test messages better data storage design better disk usage facilitate data donation facilitate archival 2010 Annual Meeting of CSIRTs with National Responsibility, Miami, US June, 2010 p. 10/32

Case Study IP from Nigeria abuse SOCKS Proxy in Brazil connects at an ISP in Germany to authenticate with a stolen credential to send a phishing to.uk victims with a link to a phony Egg bank site using a South Africa domain hosted at an IP address allocated to UK s largest web hosting company based in Gloucester 2010 Annual Meeting of CSIRTs with National Responsibility, Miami, US June, 2010 p. 11/32

Case Study (cont.) From: "Egg Bank Plc"<onlinesecure@egg.com> Subject: Online Banking Secure Message Alert! Date: Mon, 19 Apr 2010 14:46:29 +0100 X-SMTP-Proto: ESMTPA X-Ehlo: user X-Mail-From: onlinesecure@egg.com X-Rcpt-To: <victim1>@yahoo.co.uk X-Rcpt-To: <victim2>@yahoo.com X-Rcpt-To: <victim3>@yahoo.co.uk X-Rcpt-To: <victim4>@hotmail.co.uk (...) X-Rcpt-To: <victimn>@aol.com 2010 Annual Meeting of CSIRTs with National Responsibility, Miami, US June, 2010 p. 12/32

Case Study (cont.) X-Sensor-Dstport: 1080 X-Src-Proto: SOCKS 5 X-Src-IP: 41.155.50.138 X-Src-Hostname: dial-pool50.lg.starcomms.net X-Src-ASN: 33776 X-Src-OS: unknown X-Src-RIR: afrinic X-Src-CC: NG X-Src-Dnsbl: zen=pbl (Spamhaus) X-Dst-IP: 195.4.92.9 X-Dst-Hostname: virtual0.mx.freenet.de X-Dst-ASN: 5430 X-Dst-Dstport: 25 X-Dst-RIR: ripencc X-Dst-CC: DE 2010 Annual Meeting of CSIRTs with National Responsibility, Miami, US June, 2010 p. 13/32

Case Study (cont.) <table width="561"> <tbody><tr><td><br><font face="arial" size="2"> You have 1 new Security Message Alert! <br><br> Log In into your account to review the new credit limit terms and conditions..<br> </font><p><font face="arial" size="2"><br><font face="arial"> </font></font><font face="arial"><a rel="nofollow" target="_blank" href="http://www.mosaic.org.za/images/index.html"> Click here to Log In</a></font></p> <font face="arial"> </font><font face="arial" size="2"> </font><p><font face="arial" size="2"><br><br> Egg bank Online Service<br> </font></p> <font face="arial" size="2"> </font><hr> <font face="arial" size="2"> <font color="999999" size="1"> Egg bank Security Department</font></font></td></tr></tbody></table> 2010 Annual Meeting of CSIRTs with National Responsibility, Miami, US June, 2010 p. 14/32

Case Study (cont.) 2010 Annual Meeting of CSIRTs with National Responsibility, Miami, US June, 2010 p. 15/32

Partners/Members Area 2010 Annual Meeting of CSIRTs with National Responsibility, Miami, US June, 2010 p. 16/32

Partners/Members Home 2010 Annual Meeting of CSIRTs with National Responsibility, Miami, US June, 2010 p. 17/32

Statistics last 15 minutes 2010 Annual Meeting of CSIRTs with National Responsibility, Miami, US June, 2010 p. 18/32

Statistics last 15 minutes Country Codes 2010 Annual Meeting of CSIRTs with National Responsibility, Miami, US June, 2010 p. 19/32

Statistics last 15 minutes ASes 2010 Annual Meeting of CSIRTs with National Responsibility, Miami, US June, 2010 p. 20/32

Statistics last 15 minutes ports 2010 Annual Meeting of CSIRTs with National Responsibility, Miami, US June, 2010 p. 21/32

Statistics last 15 minutes CIDRs 2010 Annual Meeting of CSIRTs with National Responsibility, Miami, US June, 2010 p. 22/32

Statistics last 15 minutes IPs 2010 Annual Meeting of CSIRTs with National Responsibility, Miami, US June, 2010 p. 23/32

Statistics MRTG 2010 Annual Meeting of CSIRTs with National Responsibility, Miami, US June, 2010 p. 24/32

Statistics Country Codes Daily 2010 Annual Meeting of CSIRTs with National Responsibility, Miami, US June, 2010 p. 25/32

Mining Spam Campaigns 2010 Annual Meeting of CSIRTs with National Responsibility, Miami, US June, 2010 p. 26/32

Motivation Spampots collect a huge volume of spams (7+ million spams/day) How to make sense of all this data? Data Mining! Cluster spam messages into Spam Campaigns to isolate the traffic associated to each spammer Correlate spam campaign attributes to unveil different spamming strategies Data Mining research conducted by the e-speed Lab, DCC/UFMG 2010 Annual Meeting of CSIRTs with National Responsibility, Miami, US June, 2010 p. 27/32

The Pattern Tree Approach Features are extracted from spam messages (subject, URLs, layout etc) We organize them hierarquically inserting more frequent features on the top levels of the tree Campaigns delimited by sequence of invariants 2010 Annual Meeting of CSIRTs with National Responsibility, Miami, US June, 2010 p. 28/32

Pajek Pajek Data reduction The Pattern Tree grouped 350M spam messages into 60K spam campaigns; Obfuscation patterns are naturally discovered! Automatically deals with new and unknown campaign obfuscation techniques 2010 Annual Meeting of CSIRTs with National Responsibility, Miami, US June, 2010 p. 29/32

Ongoing Work comparing the views provided from different spampots differences according to region/country type of network (academic, commercial, broadband, etc) factorial design experiment to determine effects of spampots parameters investigating the connection between bots and open proxies / open relays 2010 Annual Meeting of CSIRTs with National Responsibility, Miami, US June, 2010 p. 30/32

Looking for Partners Interested in... Hosting a sensor requirements: 1 public IP address, low-end server (or VM), 1Mb/s, no filtering All partners will have access to all data if they want Receiving data spams, URLs, IPs abusing the sensors, etc Helping to improve the technology Analysis, capture, collection, correlation with other data sources, etc 2010 Annual Meeting of CSIRTs with National Responsibility, Miami, US June, 2010 p. 31/32

References Brazilian Internet Steering Comittee CGI.br http://www.cgi.br/ Computer Emergency Response Team Brazil CERT.br http://www.cert.br/ Previous presentations about the project http://www.cert.br/presentations/ SpamPots Project white paper (in Portuguese) http://www.cert.br/docs/whitepapers/spampots/ 2010 Annual Meeting of CSIRTs with National Responsibility, Miami, US June, 2010 p. 32/32