SMERescueLoansProgram APublic PrivateProgramtoSustainandCreateEmploymentthroughIncentivesforPrivateRescueLendingto SmallandMiddle marketenterprises www.smerescueloans.com Summary Asfinanciallyimpairedbankshaveretrenchedfromtraditionalsecuredlendingtosmalland middle marketenterprises(smes)topreservecapitalandrepairbalancesheets,agapingholein ourfinancingeconomyhasbeenshaped.morethaneightypercentofthiscountry sworkforceis housedincompanieswithfewerthan500employees.middle marketandsmallercompanies,the backboneoftheamericaneconomy,havelostaccesstothetraditionalworkingcapitalloansupon whichtheyhavelongdependedformanagingbusinessesintheordinarycourse. Asaconsequencetothesuddendearthofcapitalavailableinthismarket,companiesthatmight otherwiserationalizeandsurvivethecurrenteconomicdownturnarelayingoffworkers layoffs thatwillresultinpermanentjoblossesas,withoutaccesstocapital,thesecompanieshaveno choicebuttoliquidate.thisphenomenonisdrivingnotonlypermanentjoblosses,butalsothe eclipseoftechnologyandthedestructionoftransferableindustrialknowledge,causingirreparable damagetotheamericaneconomy. ThelatestreportfromtheCongressionalOversightPanel( COP )fortarpconfirmsthat commercialandindustriallendinghasbeensignificantlyreducedatlargebankrecipientsoftarp funds.newcommitmentsforcommercialandindustriallendingatthesebankshaveplunged45.4 percentsinceoctober2008. 1 Decreaseddemandistheprimaryreasonprovidedforthesteep descentaccordingtothefederalreserveseniorloanofficerssurvey. 2 However,thecollapsein demandisinextricablylinkedtoreducedcreditqualityofborrowers.addinginsulttoinjury, financialproblemsatsmallerregionalbanksareontherisewithbankfailuresfor2009,asof October2,standingat98banksrepresenting$105.4billionofassets.Thesereports,taken together,donotforetellabrightfinancingfutureforsmes. TheRescueLoansProgram(RLP)willexploitunusedTARPfundingintendedforthePublicPrivate InvestmentPartnership(PPIP)toencouragequalifiedprivateinvestorstoproviderescuefinancing tocompaniesunabletoaccessthebankloanorcreditmarkets.thisprogramwillserveto temporarilyplugthelending/financingvoidleftbybanks,hedgefundsandcollateraldebt obligations(cdos).accesstorescuefinancingwillsavemanycompaniesthatmightotherwise liquidate withadirectandimmediatelyquantifiablesustainmentofemployment andwill simultaneouslyassuagethemosturgentandoverwhelmingthreattooureconomy,rising unemployment.therescueloansprogramisnotabailout;itisadirectinvestmentinamerican jobs. ProgramHighlights TheRLPwillfunctionundertheexistingPPIP. Theprogram sconfigurationwillbebuiltuponstructurespreviouslyannouncedinthe existingppiplegacysecuritiesprogram. TheprogramwillrequirenoadditionalfundingfromCongress. 1 OctoberOversightReport, CongressionalOversightPanel,October9,2009.http://bit.ly/3ewMx 2 JulySeniorLoanOfficerSurvey, U.S.FederalReserve,August17,2009.http://bit.ly/cUpXW
2 TheRLPwillsavejobs,inamannerthatcanbeimmediatelyeffectiveandquantified,by meansofacombinedprivateandpublicsectorsolution. Theprivatesectorequitywillabsorbtheentirefirstloss,inadvanceofboththegovernment loansandthegovernmentequitycontribution,significantlyreducingtaxpayerrisk. Thegovernmentprogramwillbetemporaryandwillbereplacedwithbothprivatesector andbankfinancingasthecreditmarketsrecover. RisingUnemploymentPosestheGreatestThreattoEconomicRecovery Priortothefinancialcrisisoflastfall,availablecredithadreachedthepinnacleofhistoriclevels. However,withtheimplosionofthisnation sfinancialsystem,avastovercorrectionhasensued, leavingsmallerandmid sizedcompanieswithnowheretoturn.thewallstreetjournalrecently reportedthatloanportfoliosatthe15largestbankscontracted2.8percentinthesecondquarterof 2009. 3 Thesystematicliquidationofourmiddle marketeconomythreatenstofurthershrinkthe U.S.andglobaleconomiesandtodrivepermanentunemploymentratestoheightsnotwitnessedin generations. TheimplosionofcreditmarketsbeganasaWallStreetcrisisbutrapidlyspreadtoMainStreet, pavingapathofdestructionalongitsway.creditmarketsseizedandtheglobaleconomyappeared tostandontheprecipiceofcollapse.governmentsrapidlyintervenedwithmyriadprograms designedtoslowthepaceofdamage.thetarpbuttressedstrugglingfinancialcompanies. Liquidityprogramswereoriginatedtoresuscitatemoribundcreditmarkets.Andnewprograms, suchasthetalfandppip,weredesignedtothawfrozencreditmarketsandtoinspiretheprivate marketpurchaseofso calledtoxicassets,respectively. Theseprogramssucceeded,tovaryingdegrees,intheirrespectiveambitionstoprimethepumpsof specificfinancialmarkets.althoughthegraveriskofimpendingfinancialcollapsemaybebehind us,theeconomyremainsfragileundertheweightofsignificantpressure.thefall outfromthe crisisoflastautumnhasgivenwaytothenewanddangerousthreatofextremelyhigh unemploymentandpermanentjoblosses,aprospectmorefrighteningthanotherstomostmain StreetAmericans.Absentanimmediaterescuesolution,unemploymentcouldpeakinexcessof12 percentwithunderemploymentlevelsalreadyapproaching20percent,exacerbatingdemand destructionandfurthereconomicdeterioration. CreditStarvationtoMiddle MarketCompaniesDrivesJobLosses Forlargecompanies,creditconditionshavetightened,butcapitalisclearlyavailable. Improvementsincommercialpaper,equityandhigh yieldbondandloanmarketshaveallowed largecompaniestorationalizeexpensesandoperate,despitedeepdeclinesinrevenues.forvery smallcompanies,sbaloanscanoftenbeaccessed.however,thevastmiddle marketbetweenthe two thetweenmarket whereapproximately40percentofamericansareemployed hasfallen throughthecracksofmyriadprogramsdesignedtoreignitecreditmarkets. Theoftenignoredmiddle market,definedinarecentsurveyofthissectorbyforbesinsightand CITasU.S.companieswithrevenuesbetween$25millionand$1billion,includes106,000 businessesthatemploy32millionpersonswithrevenuesinexcessof$6trillion.accordingtothe survey,60percentofmiddle marketcompaniesaffirmthatthecreditmarketfreezehasbeen detrimentaltotheirbusinesseswhilenearlyoneoutofthree(29%)assertdissatisfactionwith accesstoloans.theoutlookforthefuture,intheviewofthosesurveyed,wasnobrighter 78 3 LoansShrinkasFearLingers, TheWallStreetJournal,July27,2009.http://tinyurl.com/ntvfnc
3 percenteitherforeseeafurtherdeteriorationintheabilitytosecurefinancing(27%)oranticipate thatthecurrentdearthwillremainsteady(51%). 4 Middle marketcompaniesdependonworkingcapitalloansfrombankstooperatetheirbusinesses intheordinarycourse tofinanceinventorypurchasesandtofundpayrollandotheroperating expenses.ineverybusinesstherearetimingdifferencesbetweenthespendofcapitalto manufactureanddeliveraproductorserviceandthepaymentforthosegoodsorservicesby customers.formostmiddle marketcompanies,accesstocreditrangesfromscarcetonone. Batteredbyaperfectstormofdecliningrevenuesandadearthofcredit,companiesareliquidating andterminatingtheirworkforcebythehundredsofthousandseachmonth. Theneedsandperformanceoflargecompaniesgarnersignificantattention,buttheirtotallabor comprisesonlyaverysmallpercentageofournation stotalemployment.companieswithmore than500workersemployapproximately17percentofamerica sworkers.smallandmid sized companies,ontheother hand,employmorethan83percent.middle marketcompanies,those withmorethan50butfewerthan500workers,employ39percentofworkersyetaccountfor44 percentofjoblosses morethananyothergroup. 5 Inanormalrecession,joblosses,whilepainful,areanticipatedandevennecessary.Recessionscull theweakestcompanies,creatingroomforthestrongestandmostinnovativetothrive.theprocess ofcreativedestructionisperceivedasintegraltothesuccessfulperformanceoffreemarket economies.however,thiseconomiccollapseisbynomeansanormalrecession.toomanyjob lossesarearesultofchangesinbanklendingstrategiesandnotdirectlylinkedtounderlying economicforces.companiesthatinpreviousrecessionswouldhaveachievedwork outsolutions andforbearancefrombanks,orrescuefinancingfromalternativelenders,nowalarminglyfind themselveswithoutcapitalandwithnowheretoturnbuttowardslayoffsandliquidation.the economyisnotintheprocessofcyclicalcreativedestruction,butratherinthedeadlygraspof secular,irreparableeconomicdevastation. TheSolution SMERescueLoans Themostdirectandrapidsolutiontostemjoblossesistoincentprivateenterprisetooriginateand monetizerescue financingloansforstrugglingsmallerandmiddle marketcompanies. Funding TheRescueLoanProgram( RLP )willaccessunutilizedtarpfundsalreadysetasideforppip. Treasuryoriginallyintendedthat$75 $100billionofTARPfundsbeusedforPPIPprogramsto purchasetoxicloanassetsfrombankbalancesheets.yet,asoftoday,only$30billionhasbeen allocatedforuseintheppiplegacysecuritiesprogram.theppiprescueloanprogramwill initiallyuse$30billionforequityanddebtinvestments,leavingavailableanadditional$15 40 billionofthefundsoriginallycontemplatedforppip. Structure TheRLPwillbestructuredbaseduponsimilarconstructionstothoseannouncedintheexisting PPIPprograms.Pre selectedinvestmentmanagerswillraiseaminimumof$150millioninequity capital,whichwillthenbeusedalongwith$50millionofequitycontributedbythetreasury. Privatesectorequitycapitalwillserveasthefirstlosslayertoboththeloansandequitycapital 4 U.S.MiddleMarketOutlook2009:NavigatingtheCreditCrunch, ForbesInsight,August2009. http://tinyurl.com/o7a63h 5ADPNationalEmploymentReport,June2009.http://www.adpemploymentreport.com/
4 providedbythetaxpayer.whilethetaxpayerwillshareinthereturns,privateinvestors notthe taxpayers willbearthemajorityoftherisk.additionalleverage,ofuptofourtimesequity,will thenbeprovidedbytarpfunds.itwillberequiredthatatleast$15million(or10%)ofequityin therescueloaninvestmentpartnership(rlip)originatesfromdirectinvestmentbythe investmentmanager sfirmorpartnership. LoanEligibility TheRLPwillbeavailabletocompanieswhohavebeenturneddownbybanks,whoseloansarein defaultwithbanks,whosereservesonloanshaveincreasedover10%inthelast12monthsor companieswhorequiredebtor in possessionfinancingduringbankruptcyrestructuring.allloans willneedtobeseniorsecured,topaycurrentinterestandstandfirstinrightofpayment. InvestmentManagers EligibilityrequirementsfortheRLPwillbelessnarrowthanotherPPIPprogramsinorderto includemanytalentedsmallermanagersandtoencouragesmallandminorityfirmstoparticipate. Investmentfirms,whomanageaminimumof$1billionofgrossalternativeinvestmentassets,to includedistresseddebt,distressedlendingordistressedprivateequity,willbeeligiblefor applicationand,providedthatcriteriaaremet,20%offirmschosenwillbesmallorminorityowned.allfirmsmustdemonstratethatthecapabilitynecessarytooriginate,monetizeandservice suchloanscanbeperformedin house. HowtheRescueLoanProgramWorks Step1: Treasuryselectsinvestmentmanagersthroughacompetitiveapplicationprocess. Step2: Approvedmanagersraiseaminimumof$150millioninequitycapital(10%fromfirm). Step3:Treasuryinvests25%ofadditionalequitycapitaltoresultina75%/25%ratioofequity. Step4: Equityreceivesleverageof4to1. Step5: Privatecapitalservesasafirstlosslayertotheequityprovidedbythetaxpayer. Step6: Theinvestmentmanagerwillthenoriginate,serviceandmonetizetheloanportfolioand thetimingofitsdispositiononanongoingbasis.eligibleassetmanagerswillbeapproved byandsubjecttooversightbythetreasury. ProgramRisk In order to most accurately analyzetherisktorepaymentofgovernmentfunds,thematricesincluded onpages6and7highlightreturnstoequityunderspecifieddefaultandrecoveryrates.tohelp placesuchriskinperspective,s&p,inmay2009,statedthatitspreliminaryestimateforits12 monthtrailingspeculative gradedefaultrateroseto9.2percentinjune,itshighestlevelsofarthis yearandthattheyexpected thespeculative gradedefaultratetoescalatetoameanforecastof 14.3percentbyMay2010,butitcouldreachashighas18.5percentifeconomicconditionsare worsethanexpected. 6 AnS&PreportdatedJanuary2009statesthatrecoveryratesonseniorsecuredloanshave historicallyhadlittlecorrelationwiththeunderlyingcreditratingsofborrowersasseniorsecured loansaremostoftenstructuredtooffsetdefaultriskwithhighrecoveryrates.thereportfurther notedthatrecoveryratesonborrowerswithratingsatthelowerendofthespectrumwouldlikely stillprovidethesamehighrecoveryratesasborrowerswithsuperiorratings.theaverage 6 DefaultsSurgedto Massive Half TrillionDollars, BloombergNews,May13,2009.http://tinyurl.com/lx9dus
5 recoveryrateonseniorsecuredloansduringtheyears1998to2008was82%,withfuture recoveryratesanticipatedonaveragetobe78%. 7 Oursamplerescueloanportfolio,onthefollowingpage,assumesadefaultrateof30percent, significantlyhigherthantheworstcasedefaultratescenarioof18.5percentcontemplatedbys&p. Additionallyweassumerecoveryratesondefaultedloansof60%,significantlylowerthanthose predictedthans&p.evenusingtheseveryconservativeassumptions,ourmodelportfolioproduces returnstothetaxpayeratverylowrisk. 7 MorethanAYearintoTheCreditCrunch,LendersConfrontDiminishedRecoveryProspects, S&P,January7,2009. http://tinyurl.com/mc645k
6 SampleRescueLoanInvestmentPartnership(RLIP) LoanPortfolioSize:$1billion TARPFinancing:$800million EquityCapital:$200million PrivateCapital:$150million($15millionfrominvestmentmanager) GovernmentEquityCapital:$50Million Theexampleprovidesfor40loansof$25milliontoindividualborrowers. TheloanswillpayinterestatLIBORplus800. TheportfoliowillborrowfundsatLIBORplus100. Thespreadissignificant,soastoabsorblossesbasedonriskofrescueloans. Inthisexample,weassumea30%defaultrateonloans,15%inyearsoneandtwo,divided equallyamong24months. Recoveryratesonthedefaultedloansareassumedat60%. Inthisexample,equityupsideis$48millionsplit75%/25%betweenprivateandpublicor $36millionand$12millionrespectively. Completefinancialdetailsprovidedinthematrixincludedonpages6and7.