If you are using a printed copy of this procedure, and not the on-screen version, then you MUST make sure the dates at the bottom of the printed copy and the on-screen version match. The on-screen version of the Collider-Accelerator Department Procedure is the Official Version. C-A OPERATIONS PROCEDURES MANUAL 18.3.2 Response to Low Oxygen Alarm in Building 912 Accelerator R&D Area Hand Processed Changes HPC No. Date Page Nos. Initials Approved: Signature with Date on File Collider-Accelerator Department Chairman Date A. Etkin / P. Cirnigliaro C-AOPM 18.3.2 Page 1 of 12 Revision 05
18.3.2 Response to Low Oxygen Alarm in Building 912 Accelerator R&D Area 1. Purpose To specify the initial response to a low oxygen alarm at Accelerator R&D Area Facilities, which includes B912, EEBA, NEBA, SVTF, LVTF, ERL accelerator enclosure, and the ERL compressor/vacuum pump/water building. Also discussed are safe entry procedures into ODH Class 0 areas following an ODH alarm in these areas/facilities. The following ODH areas are covered by this procedure: ODH Area ODH Class Main Hazard B912 EEBA 0 when LN line charged Nitrogen B912 NEBA 0 when LN line charged Nitrogen ERL Accelerator Enclosure* 0 when cryogens present Nitrogen, Helium ERL Compressor/Vacuum Pump/Water Building* 0 when cryogen gas present Helium LVTF Enclosure* 0 when cryogens present Nitrogen, Helium SVTF Enclosure 0 when cryogens in enclosure Nitrogen, Helium *These areas have 2 ODH detector divisions, the others have only one division. Note that the Shop Area in B912 EEBAA is not a posted ODH area, since the shop walls are barriers to inert gas intrusion. 2. Responsibilities 2.1. The responsibilities for the installation and maintenance of the Oxygen Monitor and Interface Systems at B912 Accelerator R&D Area are as follows: a) Access Controls Group ODH monitors, interlocks and alarms b) Cryogenic Systems Section 11,000 gallon LN tank isolation valve outside B912 2.2. The Main Control Room Operations Coordinator, or the CAS Watch, or ERL Research Space Manager, is responsible for supervising the execution of this procedure. 2.3 The Cryogenic Section Shift Supervisor, or the local ERL Cryogenic Watch, is responsible for supervising the execution of this procedure at the Cryogenic Complex at the B912 Accelerator R&D Facilities. C-AOPM 18.3.2 Page 2 of 12 Revision 05
3. Prerequisites 3.1 Following an ODH alarm, building entrants shall carry a personal oxygen monitor (POM), and a Self-Rescue Supplied Atmosphere Respirator (SRSAR), when entering the B912 Accelerator R&D Area after the BNL Fire/Rescue Group has verified that oxygen concentration is >19.5%, and until it is confirmed that there is no cryogen leak. The Cryogenic Section, or C-AD Training Office, provides POMs and SRSARs for the B912 Accelerator R&D Area. 3.2 Personnel shall test the operation of their Personal Oxygen Monitor (POM) and verify the readiness of their Self-Rescue Supplied Atmosphere Respirators (SRSARs) before entry. 3.3 The POM shall be calibrated using fresh air and tested using exhaled air for alarm function. It shall be used to test the air at head level ahead of the personnel entering. 3.4 Anyone required to use a POM and SRSAR shall be ODH Class 1 qualified by completing TQ-ODH1, Oxygen Deficiency Hazard - Class 1, AD-ODH-1-TRG, Oxygen Deficiency Hazard - 1 Practical and have current medical surveillance for ODH-1. 3.5 While work is underway and an abnormal condition arises, stop the work, leave the area, and re-review the job against criteria in applicable SBMS Subject Areas, and/or work planning requirements. If unsure of further actions, discuss situation with supervisor. 4. Precautions 4.1 An oxygen-deficient condition shall be assumed to exist if any area, or enclosure fixed oxygen monitor, or any POM, alarms. 4.2 At the B912 Accelerator R&D Area the hazardous oxygen-displacing gas is nitrogen and/or helium. Helium is lighter than ambient air at > 40K. The helium will rise as it warms. 4.3 Great care and diligence must be exercised in the use of this procedure for reentry to prevent endangering personnel. C-AOPM 18.3.2 Page 3 of 12 Revision 05
5. Procedure Cautions: 1. If any building entrant POM indicates < 19.5% oxygen, immediately evacuate the area to an outdoor location. You may not remain in an oxygen deficient atmosphere which is defined by OSHA to be <19.5% oxygen. 2. DO NOT enter any enclosure (i.e., ERL, SVTF or LVTF, etc.), in the Accelerator R&D Area of B912, if there is any ODH alarm at any location of this area, until the alarm condition is investigated and cleared. 5.1 Alarm Response Caution: If it will take longer than one minute to assist, or if someone is unaccounted for, evacuate the alarming area or enclosure immediately. Notes: 1. ODH fans will run for at least 90 seconds following an ODH alarm in the area covered by the fans even if the alarm resets during the 90-second interval. 2. If the ODH alarm clears, the fans will automatically stop 90 seconds after they are started. 3. Attachment 8.2 to this procedure describes the Human Machine Interface (HMI) panel and the ODH system for B912 Accelerator R&D Area. 5.1.1 Upon activation of any B912 Accelerator R&D Area low oxygen monitor alarm, all personnel shall evacuate the area immediately, including all enclosures. Check the area to see if anyone is trapped as you leave. If immediate help cannot be rendered, evacuate and call 2222 or 911 or activate a fire alarm for immediate assistance. 5.1.1.1 The B912 EEBAA Shop should be informed by ERL staff, or the ERL Cryogenics Watch, to leave the shop area as a precautionary action. 5.1.2 After evacuating, call the MCR (4662) to explain the status of the emergency. Ensure that the Cryogenic Group Shift Supervisor in the MCR is also informed (alternate location is the Cryogenic Control Room in B1005S, x3837 or x5308), and the Cryo Watch at the B912 Accelerator R&D Area. If there is any injury, personnel rescue required, or re-entry into the area where the fixed oxygen monitor alarmed or POM alarmed, wait for the Fire/Rescue group to arrive. C-AOPM 18.3.2 Page 4 of 12 Revision 05
5.2 Accountability 5.2.1 If the low oxygen alarm is in the ERL enclosure on Controlled Access, the ERL Operator, or the Accelerator R&D Area Space Manager, shall ascertain if all personnel have exited the area and inform the Fire/Rescue Group upon their arrival. Note: There is a B912 R&D Area ODH alarm repeater in the ERL enclosure that warns enclosure occupants to evacuate the enclosure and B912. 5.2.2 If the low oxygen alarm occurs at any other time, the supervisor for workers in the area, or the CAS Watch, is responsible to determine if all workers have exited the area. 5.2.3 If personnel are unaccounted for or injured, the person in charge shall immediately contact Emergency Services using 2222 or 911. 5.3 Entry and Re-entry into ODH area or enclosure following an alarm. Danger: Initial entry into any area or enclosure that has fixed oxygen monitors alarming, or which has been evacuated because of a suspected release of inert gas or a POM alarm, shall be by BNL Fire/Rescue personnel wearing self-contained breathing apparatus. The Fire/Rescue entrants shall take oxygen readings using their own monitoring equipment, and shall report to the C-AD person in charge at the scene the findings of the oxygen measurement and any problems (e.g. leaks) observed during their initial entry. Note: The audible portion of the B912 ODH alarm system may be silenced as described in Attachment 8.2 5.3.1 Verify that the 11,000 gallon LN Dewar Isolation Valve is closed, or close the manual isolation valve, before any entry into the B912 Accelerator R&D Area is considered. 5.3.2 If the source of the cryogen leak can be located, then the flow should be stopped, if possible, by the Cryogenic Section Staff. 5.3.3 If the cryogen leak cannot be located, then the Cryogenic Group Supervisor (or designee) shall attempt to locate the leak from outside the building by looking through an open doorway to the area. If the leak can be located in this manner, if possible, attempt to stop the flow from outside the building. C-AOPM 18.3.2 Page 5 of 12 Revision 05
5.3.4 If further action can only be made by entering the area, use the following guidance. The supervisor of the work should determine the required emergency actions based upon this guidance and the particular conditions for the actual emergency. Danger: Responding Personnel must request that BNL Fire/Rescue personnel make the initial entry and survey of the area, and any subsequent entries following an evacuation caused by an alarm POM, as per the Danger statement at the beginning of this section. a) Evaluate the results of the observations and oxygen levels as reported by Fire/Rescue. If there was no sign of a cryogen leak by Fire/Rescue, and if the ERL cryogenic staff does not detect a leak on their instrumentation, then the alarm was spurious and routine operations can continue, after a thorough inspection by cryogenic staff. b) As long as oxygen levels are >19.5%, as reported by BNL Fire/Rescue before entering the area, entering personnel shall test the operation of their personal oxygen monitors (POM) and verify the readiness of their Self-Rescue Supplied Atmosphere Respirators (SRSARs). The POM shall be calibrated using fresh air, and tested using exhaled air, for alarm function. When entering the area, the POM shall be used to test the air at head level, held ahead of the personnel entering. Each person entering the area shall have a POM and an SRSAR. Caution: You may never enter an area with oxygen <19.5% without a Self- Contained Breathing Apparatus (SCBA). The 5-minute escape packs are not SCBAs. c) An ODH-1 qualified person shall be stationed at the entrance of the area or enclosure, with an oxygen monitor and an SRSAR, and shall maintain contact with all personnel searching for and repairing the leak (visually and/or by radio or telephone). d) Prior to entry, the supervisor ensures the area exhaust fans (if installed), are running, and that an enhanced work permit is completed for the investigation. The supervisor evaluates the need for extra temporary ventilation to supply fresh air into the area. If oxygen levels on any POM is less than 19.5%, all personnel shall immediately evacuate. The supervisor shall ventilate the area with fresh air for a minimum of 15 minutes C-AOPM 18.3.2 Page 6 of 12 Revision 05
6. Documentation before a second attempt at reentry. If oxygen levels remain less than 19.5%, reentry will require specific work planning, including appropriate Personal Protective Equipment (PPE). e) Personnel search the area for the leak while maintaining constant surveillance of oxygen content of the air with their POMs. f) If personnel do not locate a leak and the detection system is in the alarm state, the supervisor notifies C-AD management. The supervisor initiates a work plan to determine further action. g) If no leak is found and the oxygen alarms automatically reset, then personnel may resume normal operation, but only if the alarms are not again activated. h) If personnel locate the leak and the flow can be stopped, run fixed or portable exhaust fans for at least 15 minutes before personnel entry for repairs. If the cryogen or gas flow cannot be stopped, then run fixed or portable exhaust fans and set up a local fan to supply fresh air into the work area until the alarm clears. i) Repair personnel shall maintain direct contact with personnel outside of the affected area. j) After personnel isolate and repair the leak and oxygen concentrations are above 20%, access to the area can be returned to normal. 5.3.5 If the ODH condition was real, the Cryogenics Group Supervisor (or designee) shall immediately inform the Department Chair, Associate Chair for ESSHQ, and ESSHQ Division Head. The appropriate log shall also record the actions taken. The Cryogenics Group Supervisor shall record actions taken in the Cryo Control Room Log, and in a report (next business day) to the ES&H Coordinator, C-A ESSHQ Division Head, and the Cryogenics Group Section Head. 6.1 Cryogenic Control Room Logbook. 6.2 Report to the ES&H Coordinator, and ESSHQ Division Head. 6.3 Report to the Cryogenics Section Head. 6.4 Enhanced Work Permits (if used). C-AOPM 18.3.2 Page 7 of 12 Revision 05
7. References 7.1 SBMS Subject Area Oxygen Deficiency Hazards (ODH). 7.2 C-A USI Determination, ERL ODH Hazard in NEBA and EEBA from 11,000 gallon LN2 Tank (Revised 5-15-12). 8. Attachments 8.1 Accelerator R&D Area ODH Hazard Description. 8.2 Description of B912 Accelerator R&D Area ODH Alarm System and ERL Control Room HMI Panel Use. C-AOPM 18.3.2 Page 8 of 12 Revision 05
Attachment 8.1 Accelerator R&D Area ODH Hazard Description In order to efficiently supply refrigeration of helium for the prototype Energy Recovery Linac (ERL), in the NEBA portion of B912, and the Large Vertical Test Facility (LVTF), in the EEBA portion of B912, the refrigerator has been combined into one system. Because of this cryogenic plant design, the ODH hazards for the various areas which contain equipment operated by the Accelerator R&D Division has been analyzed to determine the appropriate ODH classifications. The following specific areas were analyzed to determine the proper ODH Controls necessary to protect personnel and to comply with the BNL SBMS Subject Area, ODH Classification and Controls: 1. Building 912 East Experimental Building Addition (EEBA), houses portions of the helium refrigeration system, the LVTF and the SVTF. Based upon the refrigeration design, EEBA is classified as an ODH-0 area. The reason for this is the fact that an 11,000 gallon LN tank, stored outside of B912 can cause the oxygen concentration to be reduced to ~14% inside B912 Accelerator RD Area if the LN pipe in EEBA fails. There are no active exhaust fans to ventilate this area, and natural building volume exchanges were conservatively ignored in the oxygen transient analysis. To protect personnel, oxygen monitors including audible and visual alarms, are installed in this building to alarm when the oxygen concentration falls to 18% (nominal). This will warn occupants to evacuate the area. In addition, if any oxygen monitor fails, or trips at 18% (nominal), then the 11,000 gallon LN Dewar automatic isolation valve located outside B912 will close to isolate the source of LN from B912. Isolating the LN tank will prevent the actual oxygen concentrations from falling below about 17%. 2. Building 912 Northeast Experimental Building Addition (NEBA), houses the ERL accelerator enclosure. Based upon the refrigeration design, it is required to be classified as an ODH-0 area. The reason for this is the fact that an 11,000 gallon LN2 tank, stored outside of B912, has 1 LN piping throughout the north portion of NEBA. A very conservative analysis of a failure of the LN line shows that the oxygen content in the NEBA portion of B912 can be reduced to ~0%. There are no active exhaust fans to ventilate this area and natural building volume exchanges were conservatively ignored in the oxygen transient analysis. To protect personnel, oxygen monitors, including audible and visual alarms are installed in this building to alarm when the oxygen concentration falls to 18% (nominal). This will warn occupants to evacuate the area. In addition, if any oxygen monitor fails or trips at 18% (nominal), then the 11,000 gallon LN Dewar automatic isolation valve will close to isolate the source of LN from B912. Isolating the LN tank will prevent the actual oxygen concentrations from falling below about 17%. C-AOPM 18.3.2 Page 9 of 12 Revision 05
3. The ERL accelerator enclosure, located in the NEBA portion of B912, has a 12,000 CFM exhaust fan, and the oxygen transient following a failure of the 1 LN2 line in this enclosure results in a minimum oxygen concentration of ~15%, with the fan running. Thus, the classification of this area is ODH-0. The ERL accelerator enclosure, and the ERL laser room, have B912 ODH alarm repeaters to warn occupants of an ODH condition outside these rooms. 4. The ERL Compressor/Vacuum Pump/Water Building, which is outside and just north of B912, was reviewed and is classified as an ODH-0 area. This building has a 2000 CFM exhaust fan that starts when the oxygen sensor detects 18% (nominal) oxygen. The conservatively computed minimum oxygen concentration is found to be ~14.5%, with the fan running. 5. The VTF blockhouse in EEBA has no exhaust fan and will never be occupied when the rolling roof is closed. There is an installed oxygen monitor above the personnel platform grating of the blockhouse to warn personnel of an ODH hazard before the rolling roof is opened to allow access at the top of the blockhouse. 6. The SVTF is located in the EEBA portion of B912 near the LVTF and the ERL/LVTF cryogenics plant. This blockhouse has a 1000 CFM exhaust fan that is always on when the facility is occupied and charged with cryogens. The minimum oxygen concentration in this facility, with the fan running, is ~14%. When cryogens are charged in the test Dewar in this blockhouse, it is an ODH-0 area. In addition, the entrance is posted requiring each entrant to wear a portable oxygen monitor (POM), which alarms at 19.5% oxygen concentration. Because the occupants in the blockhouse have POMs when they enter and the exhaust fan is on, the POM will alarm at 19.5% if an ODH condition exists outside the blockhouse, as the makeup air in the blockhouse is B912 EEBA air. This will warn the occupant to exit the blockhouse. 7. The EEBAA shop has barriers that are normally closed, preventing introduction of inert gasses from the EEBA or NEBA areas. This area is emptied of all personnel by the Local ERL Watch as a precautionary step if any ODH alarms trip. C-AOPM 18.3.2 Page 10 of 12 Revision 05
Attachment 8.2 Description of B912 Accelerator R&D Area ODH Alarm System and ERL Control Room HMI Panel use 1. HMI Panel Use (Panel Rack 6680, ERL Personnel Protection System). The flat screen on this panel allows silencing of the B912 audible ODH alarm in order to facilitate communications during the re-entry process. At the panel, from the main menu select BLDG 912 ODH button, which then puts the Bldg. 912 ODH warning system status page on the flatscreen. Note: Silencing of audible alarms from the Main Control Room (MCR) HMI (for example, if the ERL accelerator is being remotely controlled from the MCR) panel should be avoided because the conditions in Bldg. 912 cannot be readily ascertained. Only silence the audible alarms from MCR if advised to do so by emergency responders. Push the Silence Audible Alarm button at the bottom of this page to silence the audible alarm. The visual strobe lights will continue to function. Note: After an ODH sensor trip or hardware fault is detected, the audible-visual alarms will remain non-resetable for 60 seconds. Push the Bldg. 912 ODH Reset button to reset the entire system, both audible alarm and visual strobe lights. The system will not reset itself when oxygen levels return to normal, but must be manually reset as described above. Reset will not be successful if the ODH condition persists. 2. Locations of B912 Accelerator R&D Area ODH Sensors and Alarms and Strobe Lights. 2.1 Sensors a. B912 NEBA between the East building wall and the ERL building near the LN line, as it penetrates the building wall from the 11,000 gallon outside LN Storage Dewar. b. On the B912 EEBA side of the EEBA/NEBA wall on either side of the wide opening near the Cryogenics Plant Equipment. c. At the top of the LVTF. d. Inside the ERL enclosure. 2.2 Strobe Lights and Audible Alarms. a. At the roof in the center of EEBA (strobe and horn). C-AOPM 18.3.2 Page 11 of 12 Revision 05
b. At the NEBA/EEBA wall on the EEBA side (strobe and horn). c. Above the ERL enclosure at the ceiling of NEBA (strobe and horn). d. At the far North wall of NEBA (strobe only). e. In the ERL Laser Room (strobe and horn). f. In the ERL enclosure (strobe and horn). The ERL enclosure ODH system is activated by the B912 Accelerator R&D Area ODH Alarm System. This is in addition to the activation of the ERL enclosure ODH Alarm System if an oxygen deficiency occurred within the enclosure. C-AOPM 18.3.2 Page 12 of 12 Revision 05