MOTIVATION: 3 2. METHODS 10 2.1 CASE STUDY 10 2.2 EMPIRICAL DATA 11 3. THEORETICAL CONSIDERATION 12

MOTIVATION: 3 1. INTRODUCTION 4 1.1 WORKING QUESTION + STEPS: 4 1.2 PROBLEM AREA 5 1.3 PROJECT GUIDE 7 1.4 ABBREVIATIONS 9 1.5 DELIMITATIONS 9 2. METHODS 10 2.1 CASE STUDY 10 2.2 EMPIRICAL DATA 11 3. THEORETICAL CONSIDERATION 12 4. CONTEXTUALIZATION 15 4.1 HISTORY AND STRUCTURE: 15 4.2 UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY: 17 4.3 UN SECURITY COUNCIL: 18 5. ANALYSIS 20 5.1 STRUCTURE 20 5.1.1 A UNIVERSALISTIC UNITED NATIONS IN A PLURALIST WORLD 20 5.1.2 PLURALISM AND SOLIDARISM WITHIN THE UNSC 22 5.1.3 THE ANACHRONISM OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL 24 5.2 POWER 25 5.2.1 POWER IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 26 5.2.2 THE CONTEMPORARY GLOBAL ARENA 27 5.2.3 POWER OF THE UN 28 5.2.4 EMERGING POWERS 29 5.3 LEGITIMACY 31 5.3.1 THE HISTORY OF LEGITIMACY AND ITS MISRECOGNITION 31 5.3.2 IAN HURD S PERCEPTION OF LEGITIMACY 32 5.3.3 HURD S EXPLANATION OF THE WAR IN IRAQ 33 5.3.4 IAN CLARK S PERCEPTION OF LEGITIMACY 35 5.3.5 IAN CLARK S EXPLANATION OF THE WAR IN IRAQ 37 5.3.6 THE TWO UNDERSTANDINGS AND ITS CRITICS 38 5.3.7 LEGITIMACY AND THE UNSC IN RELATION TO THE PLURALISTIC AND SOLIDARISTIC DEBATE 40 6. DISCUSSION 44 6.1 STRUCTURAL CONSIDERATIONS 44 6.2 REFLECTIONS ON THE FUTURE 47 1

7. CONCLUSION 51 8. AFTERTHOUGHTS: 53 BIBLIOGRAPHY 55 BOOKS 55 ONLINE RESOURCES 56 2

Motivation: Our motivation for doing this project, predominantly stems from a collective interest in International Relations, and especially that of the United Nations, as it is the international organ that is supposed to represent much of the world. As such, we found it remarkable that within such an organ, one of the arguably most powerful institutions, the Security Council, has permanent members that can veto any substantive decision made about international peace and security. Especially with new powers like the BRIC countries rising to a projected economic prominence. It seemed an imbalanced approach to international peace and security in the 21st century, and as such we decided it was worth looking into. 3

1. Introduction Since the creation of the United Nations in 1945, and its primary security organ the Security Council, the United Nations has primarily been led by the 5 permanent members of the Security Council. The Security Council has remained in a Cold War era structure that has often prevented United Nations unilateral action. However, in recent times the global order has changed, and a tendency of emerging powers has been observed. With a changing global order, challenges will inevitably present themselves. Through this project, our aim is to attempt to account for the challenges to the United Nations Security Council s legitimacy and power. 1.1 Working question + Steps: How does the changing global order (with new emerging powers) challenge the legitimacy and power of the UNSC? We have devised the three steps below in order to answer our working question: Our first step in providing an answer to our working question will be looking into the Security Council structure. We intent to do this by utilizing Barry Buzan s (2004) work on pluralism and solidarism within English School international relations. Our first hypothesis is that: the current structure of the Security Council is not adapting to a changing global order. Our second step consists of trying to determine what power is, as well as defining how it is manifested in the contemporary global arena. We will attempt to describe how power relations are changing, and who the possible emerging powers are. We will focus on emerging powers, but primarily India in this step. Our second hypothesis is: emergence of new powers are increasingly challenging the permanent members. In our third and last analytical step we will try to determine a contemporary conception of legitimacy, by using both Clark and Hurd s views on the subject. We will apply this to the Security Council and recent events in Iraq, Libya and Syria, in order to gain a thorough understanding of the term and its contemporary application. Furthermore, we will put this into 4

the context of pluralism and solidarism. Our third hypothesis is that: legitimacy is becoming increasingly important in relation to the Security Council. 1.2 Problem Area The United Nations Security Council was formed at the end of Second World War, with the winning nation s leading the council, and having the power to veto questions of global security (UN.org). These countries were the dominating and biggest forces back then, but the world and global order has changed since 1945 (McDonald 2010: 5). During and just after the Second World War, the world was in a state of multipolarity, but power already shifted again when when the Cold War ensued. At the end of the Cold War, the United States of America stood as a unipolar power. History clearly illustrates that power, unlike the structure of the United Nations Security Council, is not static. This makes power a relevenat concept, when writing on the challenges of the Security Council and its permanent members in a changing global order. This is especially true, as our project also takes it point of departure in emerging powers. As mentioned on the structure of the Security Council, the world, and political scene is changing. This brings to the fore, the questions of legitimacy, with emerging powers, and the United Nations as a global organization. We are utilising the concept of legitimacy in relation to the Security Council as we believe that the concept will be increasingly important in the future. What we will look at however, is not legitimacy of the United Nations Security Council on the basis of the Charter of United Nations, but rather one in the context of a changing world arena. Legitimacy itself will also be defined with the help of Hurd and Clark, before working with the concept on relevant examples of Security Council mandated actions, starting with Iraq, in order to establish a baseline for further analysis. In terms of mentioning emerging powers and a changing world and political scene, we find it prudent to introduce our approach to power. An essential element of our research will take point of departure around the concept of power and how we perceive such a debated term in the field of International Relations. Historically there has been a great variety of definitions, however the ability of one state to compel another state to do what it would otherwise not tend to do, has been one which won great acceptance during the cold war era. Furthermore the concept of power highly coexisted with 5

material technologies such as military firepower and the ability to economically out-force others. (Baylis 2011: 157). This assumption is closely related with the neo-realist perception of the term, where they link to the nation-state as the unit of executing power. We will by no means reject that such capabilities do not still play an important factor within the field of International Relations. Power can respectively be regarded in form of norms, rules and institutions in connection with the how states act with each other, in relation to diplomacy in accordance to the international society (Buzan 2004: 6-8). Our research will especially focus on the United Nations Security Council and how they depend on legitimacy, by acting in accordance to the values and norms created in the international society. In dealing with the Security Council it is important to emphasise that it is the highest peace and security organ within the United Nations organisation, are very much dependent on the direct relationship between the perceived legitimacy of their actions, the costs of their actions and their ability to act efficiently, or their inability to. The question however is not solely on power, or on the power of the Security Council, but also on emerging powers, as this pertains to the changing world and political scene. This shift in economic capabilities is going to influence the diplomatic landscape and the norms and values spread through globalisation are going to be contested. This shift however, will not only shift economics, but arguably also power and influence. With the global order changing, the circumstances regarding the legitimacy of the permanent members of the Security Council might also. 6

1.3 Project Guide In writing and researching for our project, our purpose is to illuminate the perceived problem, given above in our working question; In a changing global arena of emerging powers, what are the challenges to the United Nations Security Council? The structure of our project, will start off with an Introduction, that will introduce the our chosen setting, from there on we will move to our Methods segment, that will outline our methodological concerns in terms of approach, but also data. Our Theory chapter will follow shortly after, where we will introduce, and briefly outline the main theorists we are using. All of the points descried in our project guide, is visually represented in the image below. Furthermore, we will focus on the given steps that are attached to our working question. Before setting out to the analyse elements relevant for our steps, we are going to compile a short contextualization chapter, where we will primarily outline the history of the UN as well as outline the General Assembly as well as the Security Council. We will not in any significant degree, write about the remaining organs of the UN. Our first analytical step will focus on the Security Council both in terms of its conceived anachronism, but also more detailed structurally from the point of departure of pluralism and solidarism. Our second analytical step we start out by defining power from the point of view of several theorists, as well as trying to determine what constitutes an emerging power. Another prominent focus of this chapter is that of a changing global arena, with emerging powers. We will primarily be using countries of the G4 in this chapter, and refrain from using other potential emerging powers. Our last analytical segment is that of legitimacy. By using both Hurd and Clark, we will try to determine conceptions of legitimacy, and attemping to do this, we will apply these conceptions to the case of Iraq to get a better understanding of the. Legitimacy will also be used in the context of the Security Council, and lastly will be used in conjunction with pluralism and solidarism. Following our analytical chapters, we will move onto a segment where the relevant data that has been concluded will be entered and discussed. 7

Our project itself will end with a small concluding chapter, where the overall working question will be answered. 8

1.4 Abbreviations EU = The European Union G4 = Brazil, India, Germany and Japan ICISS = The International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty IR = International Relation NATO = The North Atlantic Treaty Organization P5 = The 5 Permanent members of the United Nations Security Council (United States of America, China, France, Russia and United Kingdom) R2P = Responsibility to Protect UK = United Kingdom UN = United Nations UNSC = United Nations Security Council US = United States of America 1.5 Delimitations Throughout our project we have knowingly left out certain aspects. We are aware that UNSC are facing other challenges than the ones we have outlined. Furthermore we have not used incidents such as Kosovo and Rwanda to exemplify because we had to limit our scope of exemplification. Furthermore it is more relevant to bring in more contemporary examples because of the change in the global arena which we argue for. What we have deliberately decided to leave out is the increasing importance of other global actors such as NGO s and other intergovernmental organisations. The UN is a wide spread organisation with a lot of smaller committees, councils etc., but we are not trying to analyse the UN in general, but we will focus only on the UNSC. 9

2. Methods In this chapter we are going to describe our methodological considerations. This will be done in relations to which type of case study we have done, what our case is and our empirical considerations. 2.1 Case Study As we emphasised, our main focus in this project is the challenges of the UNSC due to the changing global arena. Therefore we found it most beneficial to do a case study, with the UNSC as the case, because the intention is to provide and in-depth elucidation of it (Bryman 2008: 54). We are of the conviction that by doing a case study we are delimiting rather than limiting our project, because it helps us manage the empirical data which we needed to gather. In this project the focus will be on the different challenges that UNSC will encounter due to emerging powers, structural problems and their legitimacy. We argue that our choice of case is a unique single case study (Bryman 2008: 55). What makes our case unique? Our justification for stating this is that there is no other actor existing which has the same properties that the UNSC does. There are no other international non-governmental organisations that have a council with the ability to give the mandate to overrule sovereignty. Furthermore the structural setup of the UNSC also makes the Council unique in itself. Our approach in this project has been deductive. Our reasoning for this is because as researchers, we have a basic prior knowledge about the subject and theoretical considerations already in mind. Based on that, it is possible to deduce a hypothesis which can be supported through empirical evidence. The main methodological research strategy that we have found most applicable to our project is qualitative research, which is the emphasis on the role of the investigator in the construction of the meaning of and in text (Bryman 2008: 697). Based on a theoretical background, due to former projects within the same field, we came up with three hypothesises which is then tested empirically. Basically theory and the hypothesis deduced from it come first and drive the process of gathering data (Bryman 2008: 9). 10

2.2 Empirical data In order to conduct our research and answer the problem formulation, we will only make use of secondary data. Due to our methodological stance, we are focusing on only utilizing qualitative data. The secondary data which we will use is articles and books and official documents, e.g. the UN charter. We decided not to do first hand data through interviews or surveys, because we would not get information which was not obtainable through material already written. Furthermore when using theories, we are only utilizing the original texts on the theories. By doing so we are minimizing the risk of misinterpreting the theories. However this is still a possibility when using secondary empirical literature like articles (Bryman 2008: 105). 11

3. Theoretical consideration Our theoretical chapter will primarily consist of the qualifications of the theorists we are using, as well as what primary concepts and works of theirs that we intend to utilize. Our primary theoretical usage lies within our analysis, and as such, we have determined to keep the theories, descriptions, interpretations and all within those same chapters as they are used. Each analytical segment or step will therefore start with an overview and interpretation of the theory that is relevant for application in the given analytical step. We have decided to structure our theory in such a way, as we believe it brings the theory utilized closer to the steps that they are used within. Bringing them closer in this way hopefully also encourages a stronger understanding of our analysis, in terms of the theory that is applied. We have decided not to categorize our theorists within a grand theoretical framework, but instead we will utilize their theory on their own merit. The following theorists have been utilized in our research: Barry Buzan is a Professor of International Relations at the London School of Economics, as well as an Honorary Professor of Copenhagen and Jilin University. He has numerous publications, both as author, co-author and has also edited several works. His research regions are primarily East Asia and the Middle East. Buzan s overall focus is that of conceptual and regional security, but currently his research focuses on the English School within international relations. His main interests within the English School are international and world society, as well as pluralism, solidarism and institutions (lse.uk). We will primarily be using Buzan s conceptions of pluralism and solidarism as described in his 2004 work From international to world society? English school theory and the social structure of globalization. Furthermore the reason we specifically chose Barry Buzan for our theoretical considerations, is that he has focused on trying to make concrete the different aspects of English School theory, as to be able the employ them as a theoretical framework within International Relations. By having what is known as a via medium approach, or the middle way approach, Buzan s theoretical considerations, and that of the English School in general is open to some critique, as it does not commit to any specific position on the International Relations spectrum, which means that while it has the ability to utilize all of the tools of both traditional realist and liberalist, it stands the risk of becoming diluded. 12

In the second chapter of our analysis, we are going to do a theoretical definition of power. We are here going to use Michael Barnett, Raymond Duvall, and David A. Baldwin. Michael Barnett is a university professor of International Affairs and Political Science at The George Washington University s Elliot School of International Affairs. His main field of research has been international affairs, global governance, humanitarianism and the Middle East. He has gained high recognition for his publications within his field of knowledge. We are using his definition of compulsory power in Power in Global Governance which was written together with Raymond Duvall. Raymond Duvall is a professor at the University Of Minnesota Department Of Political Science. His main field of research is international relations, global governance, critical security studies and social institutions of global capitalism. He has not only published together with Michael Barnett, but also with the highly acknowledged Alexander Wendt. David A. Baldwin is a senior political scientist at the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs at Princeton University. His main field of expertise involves international political economy, international politics and American foreign policy. We are using his research on power in international relations, which has been featured in widely acknowledged magazines and journals. We are using his contribution to the Handbook of International Relations, Power and International Relations. We have chosen the theoretical definition of power, coined by Michael Barnett and Raymond Duvall. We have decided to do so as it is a further elaboration on the basic definition made by e.g. Robert Dahl. A reason for choosing this definition is also due to the fact that it acknowledges that power is still present and is influencing others although it is not the intention of the dominator. A critique to us would be that we left out the three other definitions of power which they define. We have however decided to leave them out knowingly, due to the fact that they were not going to be utilized through the analysis. A critique to Barnett and Duvall s effort to define and conceptualize power would be, as they also argue, is that power is a hard term to categorise because it works in various forms and has various expressions that cannot be captured by a single formulation (Barnett & Duvall 2005: 2). We are also aware of this through the project. Therefore we are also bringing in a definition by David a Baldwin and his 5 means of influence as he would rather term it. This will be used to try to define the different forms of means to influence others. 13

Ian Clark, Professor of International Politics at the University of Wales, Aberystwyth. His research combines theory of International Relation and International History. After working with foreign policy of the Soviet Union in relations to nuclear strategy, his main focus shifted to ethics of war. Later he wrote a number of historical and theoretical books on globalisation. For the past decade has his main focus been on international legitimacy, making the case for the importance of term in international affairs. Our research will mainly focus on his book Legitimacy in International Society from 2005. This will be utilised in our analytical chapter regarding legitimacy. Ian Hurd, Professor of International Politics at Northwestern University. His research mainly focuses on theory and practice of the relationship between states, rules, norms and law in International Politics. Further has he written about international organisations, Human Rights law and international cooperation. Our research will mainly focus on this book After anarchy: Legitimacy and Power at the UN Security Council from 2007. This will be utilised in our analytical chapter regarding legitimacy. As there generally are little written research on legitimacy in relation to international politics our range of choice were relatively limited. As both Ian Hurd and Ian Clark have published some of the most contemporary research with somewhat different background of the concept, we will argue for the importance of using both. Where Clark s point of departure stems from a historical perspective, Hurd takes the relationship of sovereignty and the Security Council more into perspective. Even though both publications are relatively new both scholars have been subject to criticism within the field of IR on their utility and interpretation of the term. They have highlighted the complex connection to other social concepts making legitimacy somewhat meaningless to an international setting. This critique is related to the perception of how to identify power, sovereignty, state-interest, norms and values. A further critique will be described in chapter 5.3.6. 14

4. Contextualization In this following chapter, we will attempt to briefly cover the history of the United Nations as well as the structure of respectively the General Assembly and the Security Council. 4.1 History and Structure: While the general idea of the United Nations is doubtfully cast from the memories of the League of Nations (UN.org, A) it was arguably conceived with The Atlantic Charter in 1941 (UN.org, A). This charter contained the ideals of personal freedom, as well as free choice, free movement and general disarmament. The overall idea is depicted as;.. all the men in all the lands may live out their lives in freedom from fear and want. (Yale.edu, A). In 1942, a formal declaration had been signed by leaders of the great non-axis powers of the Second World War, these being The United States, The United Kingdom, The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as well as China (UN.org, A). These four signatories also make up four out of the five permanent countries in the United Nations Security Council. The missing country here is France whom at that point in the war, had been invaded by Nazi Germany, and had signed an armistice (Yale.edu, B). While this can be considered the conception of the United Nations, its actual birth occurred in 1945, when the Charter of the United Nations was ratified by the five great powers (UN.org, A) that are now the permanent members of the Security Council. With the ratification of the Charter of the United Nations, a number of organs where created in order to fulfil the mandate of the United Nations, that mandate, or purpose being in four separate pieces. The first is to maintain international peace and security... to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace (UN.org, C). The second purpose is to develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and selfdetermination of peoples (UN.org). The third aims to achieve international co-operation in solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character (UN.org) The fourth and last part of the first Article that deals with the purpose of the United Nations states that the United Nations aims to be a centre for harmonizing the actions of nations in the attainment of these common ends. (UN.org, C). In the third Chapter of the United Nations Charter, the organs of the United Nations are created. These being the General Assembly, the Security Council, the Economic and Social Council, the Trusteeship Council, 15

the Court of Justice and lastly the Secretariat (UN.org, D). Article 7 of Chapter 3 of the Charter is where the 6 main organs of the United Nations are formulated (UN. org, D). These 6 organs are the Trusteeship Council, the Economic and Social Council, the International Court of Justice, the Secretariat, the General Assembly and the Security Council. It should be noted that according to Article 7 of the UN Charter, all of the founding organs of the UN can form any subsidiary organs that it deems necessary in order to carry out its mandate (UN.org, D) The UN originally consisted of 6 primary organs, but all of these are not directly relevant for our case, and as such will only be mentioned in brief. We do mention them, as we believe that it is beneficial to know of their existence, but not more details on powers or their scope. The UN up until 1994 also consisted of the United Nations Trusteeship Council, which was an organ. It is the only organ that is now defunct. It purposes was to manage Trust Territories within what is known as the Trusteeship System, where it was to help these Trust Territories to gain self-government or independence. The Trust Territories where primarily pre-war colonies. The relevance of this organ can easily be called into question, as it is defunct. However, it provides perspective for later analysis and discussion when it is introduced that the permanent members of the UNSC, the P5 all had permanent seats within this organ as well. (UN.org, E) The UN also encompasses the organ United Nations Economic and Social Council, ECOSOC. Its mandate is the world s economic, social and environmental challenges (UN.org, F) While it is while it is by far the largest organisation of the UN in terms of financial means and personnel, it remains, for the most part irrelevant for our case. According the UN Charter, Article 92 the International Court of Justice is the principle judicial organ of the United Nations, and Article 93 clarifies that all United Nations members are ipso facto parties to the Statute of the International Court of Justice (Un.org, H). Despite that status however, they like ECOSOC remain largely irrelevant for our case. The Secretariat of the United Nations is primarily the administration of the day-to-day work of the United Nations. It is only accountable to the UN itself, and is prohibited by the Charter of the UN to seek guidance from the governments of member states. In relation to the Security Council, the Secretary General can bring to the Security Council matters, which he/she deems 16

a threat to international peace and security (UN.org, J). The Secretary General could then be called Equal parts diplomat and advocate, civil servant and CEO (UN.org, I). 4.2 UN General Assembly: The General Assembly is where all of the member states of the United Nations are represented. By Charter law, each member nation is restricted at five representatives. Article 10 of Chapter 4 in the Charter, describes the role of the General Assembly, as being able to discuss any questions or any matters within the scope of the present Charter or relating to the powers and functions of any organs provided for in the present Charter (UN.org, K). They are also allowed to make recommendations to member states of the United Nations as well as to the Security Council in relation to any questions as covered by Article 10. As with the Secretariat, the General Assembly may also call attention to any situation they deem a threat to international peace and security. The General assembly, on the recommendation of the Security Council, votes in the new Secretary General, it also approves the United Nations overall budget. Each member nation of the United Nations only has a single vote in General Assembly proceedings, and if it does not fulfil its financial duties for two years to the United Nations, that voting right can be revoked (UN.org, L). This only happens however, if the member nation cannot provide evidence that the reason for the neglect in financial duties to the UN, is beyond the member nation s control. As such, by resolution 67/2 of the General Assembly, all member states can vote till the end of the 67 th session (UN.org, L). Voting-wise, decisions are made by a two-thirds majority of the members that are present if it deals with international peace and security, the election of Security Council members as well as the election of members of the Economic and Social Council. For matter not concerning these subjects, then a simple majority vote counts (UN.org, K). While the General Assembly has the power to make recommendations and discussion about the subjects within its purview, it is clearly stated in Article 12 that While the Security Council is exercising in respect of any dispute or situation the functions assigned to it in the present Charter, the General Assembly shall not make any recommendation with regard to that dispute or situation unless the Security Council so requests. (UN.org, K). 17

4.3 UN Security Council: Structurally, the United Nations Security Council is comprised of fifteen member states. Ten of these member states, are voted in by the General Assembly, but are can only sit for one term. While they are voted in, Article 23 of the Charter states that due regard being specially paid, in the first instance to the contribution of Members of the United Nations (UN.org, M). Each member of the Security Council has to have at least one representative, though more is advised, as it is required to have at least one representative present at the UN Headquarters at all times (UN.org, M). Each of the elected member states of the Security Council has a single vote, regardless of size or contribution however. Per Article 30 of the Charter, the Security Council manages its own rules and procedures, also including how it chooses the Security Council President. Any decisions within the Security Council, on procedural matters are subject to a vote, wherein nine votes are required for an affirmative vote (UN.org, M). Per Article 27, third piece, of those nine members required for an affirmative vote on all other matters than the above, five of those votes have to be from the permanent members of the Security Council. In effect, this article has created what is commonly known as the Veto Power, which means that if a single of the five permanent members votes against a motion, it will not pass, even in the case of all the other fourteen members voting something differently (UN.org, M). The powers of the Security Council are quite wide-reaching within the UN, as opposed to certain of the other Charter organs. The Security Council has a lot of power within Chapter 3 of the UN Charter, which provides for the Articles of Membership (UN.org, D). Per Article 4 of the Charter, the admission of any new state to the United Nations, has to happen via the express recommendation of the Security Council, after which it will be put to a vote within the General Assembly (UN.org, K). Per article 5 of the Charter, if there has been taken action by the Security Council, against a member state, that state can have its rights and privileges within the UN taken from them by the General Assembly, on the recommendation of the Security Council (UN.org, M). Along the same vein, in Article 6 it is stated that if a member state consistently violates the principles of the Charter, the Security Council can recommend that state to be removed from the UN by the General Assembly (UN.org, N). Chapter 5 of the Charter is dedicated to the composition and powers of the Security Council. 18

Per Article 24 of the Charter, all members of the United Nations automatically confer the Security Council the responsibility for international peace and security, and that the Security Council is acting on their behalf (UN.org, M). The Security Council is by Article 26 responsible for formulating a system as to how the member states of the UN are to regulate armaments. Per Article 97 of the Charter, the Security Council is responsible for recommending the new Secretary General of the General Assembly (UN.org, J). The more specific duties of the Security Council are described through Chapter 6 to 8 and Chapter 12 (UN.org, B). The main points are divided into three categories; When concerned with a threat to peace the Security Council can set forth principles for an agreement by peaceful means. They can also start an investigation and act as mediators in this dispute, as well as having the ability to create and send a mission. The Security Council can appoint special envoys to settle any dispute and as with all the main organs of the UN, the Security Council can request the assistance of the Secretary General to assists in resolving the dispute (UN.org, O). If a case or dispute leads to open hostilities, the Security Council can issues a ceasefire, with the purpose of limiting any further conflict. They can send military observers or even a peacekeeping force, which can be used for different purposes as the situation warrants (UN.org, O). The Security Council also has more overt means of enforcing their mandate, such as putting sanctions on the economy of the involved parties, they can enforce an arms embargo, they can opt for penalties and restrictions to the parties finances as well as enforcing travel bans. It is also possible for the Security Council to sever any diplomatic relations to the involved parties, and this severance of diplomatic relations, as with all of the actions of the Security Council are to be kept by all of the 193 member states of the UN. A blockade is also a possible and mandated action. The last option, and by far the rarest and most drastic is, that the Security Council has the mandate to demand collective military action against the involved parties (UN.org, O). 19

5. Analysis In this following segment, we will attempt analyse three different subjects, as to be able to illuminate our steps and our working question. The subjects featured in the analysis are Structure, Power and Legitimacy. 5.1 Structure In this first analytical segment, we intend to work with how a universalistic UN can be seen in a pluralist world, as well as look into pluralism and solidarism can be seen within the UNSC. Finally we intend to address the question of the UNSC s anachronism. 5.1.1 A universalistic United Nations in a pluralist world The first Chapter of the Charter of the United Nations is called Purposes and Principles and outlines in its two Articles, what the United Nations is all about. The first Article of the Charter is divided into four small segments, the first of which states that the aim of the UN is to maintain peace and security through collective measures, in compliance with international law and principles of justice. The second segment focuses on the development of friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and selfdetermination of peoples (UN.org, C) and through other measures by which to increase universal peace. The third point promotes co-operation in solving economic, social, cultural as well as humanitarian problems, and the encouragement of human rights and fundamental freedoms for all (UN.org, C). The fourth and last part of the first Article of the UN Charter aims at the UN being a centre for harmonizing the actions of nations in the attainment of these common ends (UN.org, C). Add to this that Article 2 of the Charter, states in its first segment, that The Organization is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its Members. (UN.org, C). It is also worthwhile to notice that the ending segment of the second Article of the Charter puts forth that nothing in the Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state (UN.org, C), that does not mean however, that it can prejudice the application of power by the Security Council, per Chapter 7 of the Charter (UN.org, P). 20

What is being described in this first Chapter of the UN Charter, is an organization which aims at promoting international peace and security through concerted action and consent, through the increase of friendly relations across borders, and most importantly, it aims at providing a global environment where everyone are free, regardless of race, gender or creed. One could argue that it is universalistic in the sense that its scope is that of 193 states, which is the vast majority of recognized sovereign states 1, but also in the sense that the purpose of the UN is global peace and security, not just for the member states, but for everyone. The question then, is how do these ground rules for the purpose and principles correlate with the structure of the Security Council? The main points being universal equality in case of people, it is hard to see how the arguably realist structure of the Security Council fits in, most notably in the case of the five permanent members, the P5. First of all, the temporary members are supposed to be chosen by the General Assembly. They are, but there are other factors that weigh in. As stated in the Charter, Article 23 special attention will be given to those countries that contribute more than others, such as financial contribution, or military contribution. In essence, the Charter makes allowances for being able to pay your way into the Security Council. And as the Security Council s mandate is to not only enforce global peace and security, but also to decide what constitutes a threat to global peace and security, that does not seem to coincide with the purposes and principles of the United Nations, as written down in Article 1 and 2 of the UN Charter (UN.org, C). Furthermore, the power of the UN Security Council also extends to the recommendation of the Secretary General as well as recommending new countries to join the United Nations. It is also worth noting, that if the Security Council are exercising their powers in a dispute or situation, then the General Assembly are per Article 12 (UN.org, K), not allowed to advice or recommend without the express permission of the Security Council. The more realist aspect of the Security Council kicks in when Article 27 (UN.org, M) is taken into account. Article 27 as mention earlier, outline what is popularly called the Veto Power 2, wherein any non-procedural decision in the Security Council cannot be made without the consent of all the permanent members, or the abstinence of some. So while the 1 The reason for not having an exact number of states, is that it is a matter of opinion. Several states are not recognized by single countries, and other states have entire groups that do not accept their sovereignty. 2 There is nothing explicitly called the Veto Power in the UN Charter, but Article 27 in effect, creates one. 21

purposes and principles of the UN Charter promotes the equality of people and of sovereign states, five states have none the less ended up with the deciding power on all matters of international peace and security within the United Nations. These five states, via their permanency also have a large degree of power on the recommendation of countries and Secretary General. Furthermore, while the Trusteeship Council was still active, the permanent five members of the Security Council were also permanently represented in the Trusteeship Council. This arguably gave them power and influence over most of the territories and colonies within their purview. The realist idea comes in, when we consider that this institution was created in 1945, at the end of the Second World War, and that the permanent members of the Security Council, the P5 where the greatest military powers of that time, that came out victorious (UNFoundation.org). It could be argued that the victors of that war, created a system of international peace and security in which they installed mechanisms that would allow them to dictate terms of peace and security indefinitely. 5.1.2 Pluralism and Solidarism within the UNSC We decided early on, that we would not analyze on the theoretical background of Realism on one side or Liberalism on the other, instead we are going to apply Barry Buzan s thoughts on English School theory. Within the English School, there are two separate wings of theoretical thought, the first one is called the Pluralist approach, and the other the Solidarist approach. However, instead of being two separate approaches, Buzan has re-envisaged their modern use. Instead of being a question of this or that Buzan has theorized its use as a scale, or line going from thick to thin (Buzan 2004: 59), and that because there are different elements and situations within international relations, then it stands to reason that some will be thicker and others thinner as there is no universal approach. In the case of the United Nations Security Council, the Council s mandate itself seem quite solidaristic in the sense that it enables and promotes collective action, it promotes intervention. The actual collective nature of the Security Council can of course be disputed due to the presence of the permanent members. They are not elected through the General Assembly, and as such they have given themselves more power in international peace and security, than that of any other state. Why they are there as permanent members will be followed up on at a later point, but it is sufficient 22

for now to point out that the mandate of the Security Council seems much in line with solidarist thinking, even though the structure of the countries within the Security Council does not. It is also worth noting that according to Buzan (2004:148) Convergence in its more advance stages, and in a solidarist context involves accepting responsibility for other states of one s community, something that you could argue the Security Council is doing. While the United Nations has its own peacekeeping forces, and has the mandate to call upon its members for more, it is typically only a handful of nations that supply the actual troops, which they do on the mandate of international security. So while the link is not direct, one could argue that the practical effects are that certain nations take responsibility for the security of the international community, even if it is for ten of these fifteen countries, on an electoral basis. A more direct link that could be made from the Security Council and the more thick interstate relations of the solidarist approach, is that state sovereignty is a cornerstone of the pluralist vision of interstate society (Buzan 2004: 143), but the Security Council has the mandate to supersede sovereignty if it falls within Chapter 7 (UN.org) of the United Nations Charter. As described by Buzan (2004) the relationship between the pluralism and solidarism exists as positions on a spectrum representing, respectively, thin and thick sets of shared norms, rules and institutions (Buzan 2004: 139). The thinner position is that of pluralism, where there is a focus on the more Westphalian model of interstate relations, Buzan (2004: 143) states that in the more pluralistic approach, which is also the more traditional European approach to interstate relations, the first step is that of equal sovereignty in the eyes of the law. Something supported by Chapter 1 of the UN Charter, where it says in Article 2 The organization is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its Members (UN.org). Another traditional institution of pluralism, as mentioned by Buzan (2004: 143) is that of Great Powers. This is an institution that can be seen emphasised clearly within the structure of the United Nations Security Council, where the five permanent members can all be considered the great powers of the Second World War (UNFoundation.org). The fact the these five permanent members all have the Veto power lends more credence to the argument that the Security Council emphasises the Great Powers in its structure. This general structure however, also seems to largely coincide with Buzan s interpretation of the English School two positions, pluralism and solidarism, in the sense that the Security Council has elements that has both a pluralistic as well as a solidarist emphasis. 23

5.1.3 The Anachronism of the Security Council Having looked at the structure of the United Nations, specifically the Security Council, one could argue that its structure seems to be anachronistic. Both the Second World War and the creation of the United Nations, and in extension the Security Council, happened in 1945. This means that the overall structure has not changed significantly in more than 65 years for the permanent members. In 1965, the Security Council expanded the amount of temporary members from five to ten, but in relation to the mentioned Veto power, that arguably does not make much of a difference as none of the temporary members have the Veto power. One could argue this, as the application of the Veto power has the same practical blocking power against one member, as it does 100. This is formulated in the Charter as when a decision on substantive matters has to be made they have to include the concurring votes of the permanent members (UN.org, M). The case however, for calling the Security Council anachronistic is not simply that the structure has not experienced significant change, as much as it is because they originally obtained that power by virtue of being the victorious Great Powers of the Second World War. Their special power comes from an event, that based on the average lifespan of adults in 1945 was around 55 years (Mappinghistory.edu). This means that it is an increasingly slim majority alive today that actually experienced that war that essentially conferred this power to the victorious Great Powers. While it could still be argued that some, if not all of them are still Great Powers, that does not discount that they are arguably not alone in that status. One could ask where the then Axis Great Powers of Germany and Japan fits in to this anachronistic Security Council structure. One could say that it was a given in 1945 when they were not included as permanent members in the Security Council, aside from one country being divided and the other having experienced the first and only application of nuclear weaponry. However, as pointed out, we do not live in 1945 anymore, and hardly anyone from that time still does, which lends credence to the application of the term anachronism. A completely separate concern from that of the argued anachronism of the Security Council is that, other states have developed significantly in power and scope since 1945. The economy of Japan and Germany surpass that of France, The United Kingdom as well as Russia (IMF.org, 2012). The economies of India and Brazil rival that of France, The United Kingdom and Russia, to such an extent, that by 2017, the IMF (2012) projects their 24

economies to surpass these rivals. It is also pointed out that Germany and Japan are respectively, the third and second largest financial contributors to the United Nations budget (UN Foundation.org), a fact supported by the UN s own documents (UN.org, Q). Another factor to consider is that the United Nations Security Council, deals with international peace and security, and that all of the four mentioned countries are on the top ten in terms of military expenditure (Sipri.org), and that, while they do not rival that of The United States, China or Russia, all of them come fairly close to France and The United Kingdom. Having a large military, or a sizable military expenditure does not mean that they are made available to the United Nations however. As of September 2012, Germany has more troops, experts and police within the UN than both the United States and Russia. Japan has more than The United States, The United Kingdom and Russia, while both Brazil and India have more troops, experts and police on UN missions than any of the permanent members of the Security Council. India, actually has more personnel on UN missions than all of the permanent members combined, and are only surpassed globally by Bangladesh and Pakistan (UN.org, R). It should be mentioned at this point that the four countries we have exemplified, and compared the permanent members to, are a group of four countries called the G4, all of whom are supporting each other to a permanent chair within the Security Council. This poses some questions in relation to the Security Council. There are countries that do more for the United Nations both financially and personnel-wise, while also being among the largest nations in military expenditure and some of the largest economies in the world, yet the Second World War/Cold War structure of the Security Council remain. Where do emerging powers stand in relation to this anachronistic structure? And the Charter aside, how legitimate is the structure of the Security Council in the context of the contemporary global arena? These are two salient matters that we will attempt to shed some light on. 5.2 Power In this chapter we are firstly going to define the term power. We are then leading that into an understanding of power within international relations. Afterwards we will try to determine a way of measuring power. This will then lead to a section were we will utilize some examples were power is shown, in relation to the UNSC and some of the emerging powers. 25

5.2.1 Power in International Relations The basic understanding of power has also been coined as the compulsory power, because it sees power as the direct control over another. The formula states that A gets B to do something that B would otherwise not have done. In this formula it is not taken into account what B would have done with the absence of A (Goldstein & Pevehouse 2011:45). Furthermore it is discussed whether A still holds power over B, when B misreads the intentions of A, and therefore changes its actions. As Barnet and Duvall (2005) argue, power is still present although it is not the intention of A. They further argue that power is best understood from the perspective of the recipient, not the deliverer, of the direct action (Barnet & Duvall 2005: 14). A definition derived from the basic one, is that it is instead the ability or potential to influence others (Goldstein & Pevehouse 2011:45). This notion of compulsive power has been very important within the field of international relations and international politics, and has been utilized by many scholars. Compulsive power has been used as a mean to understand how one state is able to use material resources to advance its interests in direct opposition to the interests of another state (Barnett & Duvall 2005: 14). Compulsory power has closely linked to the realist and neo-realist thinkers. They measure a state s power through size of population and territory, resource endowment, economic capability, military strength, political stability and competence (Waltz 1993: 50). For instance, the larger your army is the more power you have over others, or the more economic capabilities you have, the easier you can invest in more military or advanced technology. Compulsory power would be termed as hard power, where your power is defined by material capabilities. However, today the size of your army is not equal to your actual ability to influence or dominate others. Whether A has power over B is no longer static, and can change based on the issue. For instance, Japan would have a lot of power, economically against other actors, but close to none relating military power in comparison to the P5 countries. To make it clearer what means a state has to project its power Baldwin classified 4 types of means; (1) symbolic, (2) economic, (3) military and lastly (4) diplomatic. Symbolic means is the idea that a state appeals to normative symbols as well as the provision of information (Baldwin 2002: 179). The economic mean is the idea that a state can influence other states by either opening up trades, or reducing the willingness to trade. The military mean is, as we 26

have discussed earlier, use of military force. And lastly we have the diplomatic mean, which is based on negotiations and representation. It is easy to say who has the most power if each segment is divided, for instance economy, military or diplomacy. The dilemma within the power discussion is however, how you measure the overall power of a state or actor. Fundamentally, power is a relational concept, therefore it can only be measured between states or actors, which means that the power can only be relative to other states power (Goldstein & Pevehouse 2011: 47). 5.2.2 The contemporary global arena During the cold war, a bipolar system was present with USA and USSR on each side. They balanced each other, upholding a status quo. Both great powers strived to gain hegemony, by seeking more power. Waltz emphasises that states seeking hegemony are doomed to fail (Mearsheimer 2009: 244). In addition to this, Paul Kennedy coined the notion of Imperial overstretch, which was the idea that great powers would take on too many obligations, become too entangled in non-necessary conflicts, and their expenditure on military would be too high (Kennedy 1987). Although this back then was not meant for USSR, this more or less entails the reasons for their collapse. After the collapse of USSR and the end of the Cold War the world experienced a unipolar system. The United States has been the dominator within global politics. There are several incidents showing that they have been acting as the hegemon, for instance Iraq where they acted without a UN mandate. Arguably there are indications that they are making some of the same mistakes as USSR. Instead of just maintaining their supremacy and hegemony, they have been trying to maximise power, as the realist theory argues, is in the nature of a state (Baldwin 2002:178). It is inarguable that the power of USA has been deteriorating (Cox 2012: 369) and by looking at the economic power, the American share of the world GDP has declined (Cox 2012: 373). It is however notable that the USA is still the leading economy today, and as cox emphasises the Texan economy is meanwhile nearly as big as Russia s and just slightly smaller than India s (Cox 2012: 374). This does on the other hand indicate that other states have gained power and influence. So are we moving towards the return of a multipolar system? 27

It can be argued that the world of today depicts a return of the multipolar system in the future. With the rise of countries like China, India, Russia, Germany and Brazil it appears to be the next step in the realist cycle. Especially if you add up China, EU, India, Japan, Russia and USA they are accounted for 75 % of global GDP and 80 % of global defence spending. Although this is very much like the basic understanding of how a realist sees the multipolar system, the system today is not as clear-cut. (Hass 2008) Today power is no longer something that is exclusive to states only. Power is not focused in a few powerhouses, but has become widely spread, and numerous of actors hold power today. We are however mainly focusing on state s power in relations to the UNSC, and the power emerging powers. First it is important to define what power the UNSC actually possesses, how this power is achieved and how it can be projected. We are however not going to analyse the legitimacy of the council in this chapter, this will be done later in the project. 5.2.3 Power of the UN What gives the UN and UNSC its power and mandate, is not founded in their economical capabilities, or their military force. Basically its power is manifested through the charter, which 193 member countries have signed. Earlier we mentioned that in chapter 5 of the Charter the composition and powers of the Security Council is outlined. The members of the United Nations automatically confer the Security Council the responsibility for international peace and security, and accept that the Security Council is acting on their behalf (UN.org, M). This does of course not mean that the UN can act as it sees fit, but it gives the institution a lot of symbolic and diplomatic power. When the UNSC condemns certain actions, it is uses its symbolic means, to influence the actors, since its mandate represents the meaning of the 193 members. The problem with symbolic power and the UNSC is that when they condemn actions, as in the case of Syria, it does not have any real effect unless the receiver feels obligated to do so. In the case of Syria, Assad did not change his course of actions, neither did it change when nations on their own called for a change of course. In the Syria case the UN tried to act as the mediator by sending in Kofi Annan to negotiate peace and ceasefire. This is again an attempt to influence the political actions of Syria with diplomacy. As discussed earlier in the project, the UN in general ascribes to a very universalistic, soldiaristic approach, which this type of power clearly relates to. However as we also 28

emphasised earlier, the Security Council has some pluralistic, and realistic tendencies. It is important to remember that the UNSC has the ability to give the mandate to the use of military means, which enables an overruling of states sovereignty. This sort of influence is of course only available if the council agrees and there are no vetoes from the P5. The question which is being raised is then, are the P5 the states with the most power in the global arena, and are by that the most legitimate to have the final say in such a powerful organisation. 5.2.4 Emerging powers As we argued earlier, when the council was formed, it was clearly with the dominating states in charge. But today the power in the global area the power has become a more diffuse entity. We argue that new states are gaining more and more power, also termed as the emerging powers. In our case we are going to focus on the G4-nations, not to be mistaken by the G4, which is based on economical wealth. The G4-nations consists of the four countries Brazil, India, Japan and Germany (Bundgaard 2005). Before going into detail with the G4-nations and some of their actions, we will use India to exemplify why it is seen as an emerging power. As emphasised through the word emerging these countries of course does not challenge the still dominating USA, but they are predicted to rise to become a great power in the future. By this is meant that it is important to remember that although a country like India may have gained power through different capabilities, which will be touched upon, it still lacks in other areas. Looking back at Waltz definition on how you measure a countries power, important factors such as the size of the population and territory was important, as well as economic and military strength. Bearing these things in mind, India fulfils most of these criteria. India is the country with the second largest population in the world and it is the 7 th largest country (World Factbook 2012). This has been a fact for decades, but the change in India s economic capabilities and their increase in military focus is what have become of great interest in relation to International Relations. India has experienced a vast growth in GDP and has become a more and more important actor on the economic market. By only looking at the annual growth in GDP, USA has had an average increase in 0.54 % from 2007 to 2011. In the same time span India s GDP has grown on an average of 7.68 % (World Bank 2012). This clearly shows that India is gaining economic capabilities. This was also predicted by Goldman Sachs, which in 2001 came with the idea of the BRIC countries (Brazil, Russia, India and 29

China) (Cox 2012: 371). Following in the line of the realist thought on power, military capabilities is of great importance if a state wants to be acknowledged as a great power. In the case of India there are several incidents that indicate a somewhat realistic tendency in their actions. In 2004 India bought an aircraft carrier, several fighters and helicopters from Russia (Politiken 2004). Furthermore India has been investing in Hercules planes and alike, which emphasises that India is now capable of projecting their power far away from their own boundaries. Not only are they arming for external power projection, but are also doing what is known as internal balancing (Giridharadas 2008). They are using their newly attained economical capabilities to invest in forces to protect their own sovereignty. This is needed although they are emerging towards a great power status, because they are still being threatened by the regional hegemon, China, and their neighbour Pakistan (New York Times 2008). Furthermore Waltz emphasised the need for political stability for a state to possess any power. In the case of India, they are acknowledged as the largest democracy in the world (UN Foundation.org 2012), giving them some symbolic power. In relation to the G4 nations, India has been focusing more on their military capabilities than other, but a country like Brazil has increased its military force as well. As we emphasised earlier looking at the P5 and comparing them to the G4 nations, economically there is some misfits. This group as an actor possesses a large amount of both economical and symbolic power. Economically USA is the largest contributor to the UN budget funding 22 % of the totalt budget. However Japan is the second largest contributor to the UN budget giving 12.53% of the total budget (UN.org, Q). Furthermore Germany is the third with about 8 %. The next P5 country comes in as the fourth contributing with 6.6 %. That is also why the G4 has been working towards a restructuring of the Security Council, with them as permanent members, a representative from the African continent. Their proposal has however been turned down by some of the P5 members, e.g. USA. We will go further into the actual proposal of the G4 nations in our discussion. We argue that if the emerging powers sustain their growth annually they will become great powers, which have to be reckoned with. What has not been outlined in the above is, that in the global market economy, countries have become highly interdependent. Especially the emerging powers are dependent on the USA to uphold the balance. This leads us to the next chapter, concerning the legitimacy of the UNSC. Since the UNSC s power is dependent on the member states to conduct their actions, because their actions can 30

only become real when consensus in the Council has been reached. As a powerful mediator for securing world peace and stability it rely on states permission in form of legitimacy and creditability. The concept of legitimacy will be presented and discussed in relation to consensus, power and norms and put into perspective relating UNSC. 5.3 Legitimacy The following chapter will focus on UNSC and its international legitimacy in relation to power and consensus. As we will examine in the following, has the term legitimacy been subject to several controversies and interpretations within the field of IR. Therefore we find it relevant to define the term, exemplify how it works and discuss why it matters in terms of powerful states and the UNSC. Furthermore we will examine some recent empirical cases where the UNSC has been criticised for its failure to respond as a consistent actor. 5.3.1 The history of legitimacy and its misrecognition As we will present in the following, the concept and understanding of legitimacy has not been without disagreements, interpretations and discussions on its relevance and degree of importance in international politics. Historically can the term be traced back to Thucydides s Melian dialogue, which describes the negotiations between Athen and the Melians. Melians differentiated between justice that came from superior power and justice that came from general rules of morality, ultimately stating that some rules of war and diplomacy are legitimate and should be respected. They lost their argument as the war, however is it arguably the first clear example of the debate between legitimacy, authority and power. Later during the Roman Empire, the term legitimus arose simply meaning the lawful or according to law (Clark 2005: 19), since than has the debate continued in a philosophical and sociological setting. Great scholars as Machiavelli, Locke, Rosseau, Marx and Weber have all temporary touched upon the subject however within the field of IR has it rarely received serious attention in regards to analysing international politics (Hurd 2008: 1). Arguably various reasons for the lack of interest in the term in relation to IR and international politics can be explained. Rather than a rejection of the concept of legitimacy, some have argued for it being inappropriate to an international setting characterized by international anarchy and absence of an international 31

government (Clark 2005: 11-15). Further, as some has argued, international institutions are subordinated by the independent desires and self-interest of the sovereign states, which only chooses to assure cooperation in case of own gain(hurd 2008: 1-7). From this perspective the matter and degree of international legitimacy in regard to an international institution as the UNSC not make much sense to elaborate upon, due to their consideration of inappropriateness however we will return to its critique of other perspectives later. In the following we will approach the concept of legitimacy from the perspective of Ian Hurd and Ian Clark, who both have written recent contributions to the debate and argued for the importance of the concept in relation to power and UNSC. 5.3.2 Ian Hurd s perception of legitimacy Ian Hurd starts out defining the concept of legitimacy as a generalized perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions. (Hurd 2008: 30) He hereby argues that the concept of legitimacy to a high extend has been misunderstood as something morally right or desirable which has made the concept a synonym for the good in universalistic terms. On the contrary he claims legitimacy being a subjective matter, which is held in the mind of the actors and not necessarily shared amount others. It is a normative belief, which refers to the actor s belief in a rule, or institution ought to be obeyed, which affect the actor s behaviour since it is internalised and helps to define how the actor sees its interests. The actor s opinion is often caused from either the substance of a certain rule or from the procedure or source by which it was constituted and provides an internal motivation to follow a rule or to comply to an authority (Hurd 2008, pp. 7). In Hurd s opinion is the motive for following legitimacy different from the motives for rule-following, coercion and self-interest and people tend to behave differently towards legitimated power than toward brute force. This according to Hurd explain why even powerful states always are striving to legitimate their dominance, which occur in various relations such as rules and norms on landmines and blood diamonds but also in relation to institutions such as the UNSC. In this sense Hurd argues an institution as UNSC occupies a position of authority over its members 32

with consequences for the power relationship between them, since it makes the states more likely to follow a rule because they believe following it fits their interest or identity (Hurd 2011: 1-2). Hurd does acknowledge that the concept is difficult to study in empirical cases, since it is both internal to actors as well as intersubjective. There exist no direct way of measuring when legitimacy is present or not and the most useful way of studying the concept is by observing how states behave and argument for their behaviour. This is made further problematic since the concept is entangled in other concepts as interest, habits and cultural practice. When legitimacy of a certain rule or institution is commonly shared in the international society, it changes the decision environment for all actors, even those who does not comply with the rule, because it affects the expectations of the likely behaviour of other players. In that sense even those who do not tend to follow the legitimacy of the rule have to take it into account as it has an effect on the reactions from others to their behaviour. This means that legitimated norms does not need to be universally shared to be consequential. Therefore studying legitimacy in relations to UNSC is to a high extend a concern of interstate politics among states, rather than how legitimacy of the council is seen in the eyes of the citizens of those states. (Hurd 2008: 1-12) From this perspective the UNSC makes a crucial test in regards to how legitimacy works in the international society. Hurd among many argues that the Council currently is the most powerful example of an international organisation, which highly depends on its legitimacy due to its structure of a combination of extensive powers and political limitation as we mentioned earlier. Historically has the Council been charged with claims of acting illegitimate more often, than with praise of acting legitimate, which ever since the creation has threatened its credibility. (Hurd 2008) 5.3.3 Hurd s explanation of the War in Iraq One recent example of the criticism toward the Council was in relations to the invasion of Iraq lead by US and its allied in March 2003. The actions were taking place without the permission of a resolution made by UNSC, which started a heavy critique from multiple actors around the world who claimed that the actions were illegal and breaching UN charter (MacAskill 2004). In relation to the discussion of the importance of legitimacy in relation to UNSC Hurd claims that the US before taking drastic measures into use approached the 33

Council seeking approval for the military operation arguably shows signs of recognition of the concept. The fact that even a powerful state as US are willing to concessions over the terms of the mission in exchange for approval show the importance of symbolic value as well as practical concept of Council. Regardless of the actual opinion of legitimacy of the UNSC, the Bush administration must have recognized winning the approval could make a difference in how third parties responded to the conflict. By winning the approval, the likely behaviour of a number of neutral states would shift to one that supported the American plans. Consequently the US placed the Council in a position of power relative to the US, since they controlled the approval they wanted. The potential of an approval would alter symbolic power not just in reactions of other states to that specific operation, but also the US behaviour in relation to the resolution, the status of the UNSC in the eyes of the member states and potentially the outcome of the mission itself (Hurd 2008). Ultimately the Council was not able to agree on a resolution allowing the use of force; however warnings with unspecified consequences were agreed in resolution 1441(MacAskill 2004). That the US and its allied later chose to lead a non-un approved war against Saddam Hussein is widely considered an indication of the Councils lack of power and failure to defend international peace and security. Hurd however justify that it is important to distinguish between what is fair to critique the Council for in terms of what is realistic in relation to its charter and the actor s expectations of the Council. The Council works on the premise of veto power, which negatively influences the Council in a direction of inaction, where the P5 can paralyse those moments of greatest tensions between. However according to Hurd the Council managed to contribute in three ways to its general goals of maintaining international peace and stability. Firstly as mentioned earlier did the legitimacy of the Council make US seek approval at the Council in the first place, this forced the US to justify for its argumentation and find necessary evidence of a threat to international peace and security. Secondly it made many third party countries look at the Council to approve whether it was appropriate to support the use of force. This arguably meant that many countries choose not to follow the non-un approved invasion after being denied at the UNSC, resulting in the military and diplomatic challenges for the US became bigger with fewer possible allies. Thirdly by not approving the use of force the Council accomplished two of its goals regarding P5 disagreement; it reinforced the legal principles of the Charter and it raised the political costs of unilateralism for the hegemon. That the Council did not have either political power nor legitimacy enough 34

to either block the subsequent US action, nor approve it in the face of dissensus, should according to Hurd mere a critique of the vague formulation of the Charter than of the Council it self. Article 2(4) and 51 in the UN Charter provide a legal frame for international action that prohibits the use of force except in case of self-defence, which both critics and supporters of the invasion used for argumentation of their position (Hurd 2008: 190 193). 5.3.4 Ian Clark s perception of legitimacy Ian Clark s point of departure when dealing with legitimacy stems from a historical perspective, which he clarifies throughout the history of modern Europe. How the concept has evolved from the time of the Peace in Westphalian, the Versailles Settlement to the League of Nations and the UN is important for the recognition of the concept. As our focus is on contemporary international society we will merely discuss his argumentation and interpretation of the term from the end of the Cold War. This being said legitimacy from this perspective provides key evidence about the important shifts that have already taking place in the international society. In this regard great wars and the later peace settlement historically have tended to set new principles, procedures or territorial distribution, which have created realms that the peacemakers must operate within (Clark 2005). This brings the UNSC in focus as the historically constructed international organisation created in the aftermath of the Second World War as we have mentioned earlier. As a starting point Clark emphasise that the general discussion of legitimacy are most likely to be present when less confidence in the conditions for its realization are present. This illustrate that present times discussion of the issues of legitimacy indicate that things appear to be wrong, which could result in further fear and anxiety (Clark 2005: 155 158). This would hardly surprise few, as we stated earlier in recent time have the most significant debates has been a result of disagreement and critique of political processes in the UNSC. Where legitimacy and legitimation overlap in the political field is the meeting ground of norms, distribution of power and search for consensus. This Clark suggest reveals itself as a procedural quest for what can reasonably be accepted by international society as a tolerable consensus on which to take action. (Clark 2005: 3). 35

Legitimacy according to Clark is not a concept, which can be reduced to any one institution or norm, neither is it an absolute standard. Norms do however play an important role in the shaping of legitimacy, and it tends to take place within three related concepts being; legality, morality and constitutionality (Clark 2005: 17-20). Legality referring to the cognate relationship between law and legitimacy, this should not seen as two identical terms; rather legitimacy helps redefining legality by appeal to other norms. Further the idea of legitimacy has a great role to play at political moments when legal ground appears least secure due to disagreement reached different interpretation of the language of law, as seen in the vague formulation of the UN Charter in the case of Iraq in 2003. Morality perceived as the understanding that the international society views legitimacy as a political accommodation between competing norms, with no greater prior commitment to any. Morality should further be understood in some cases as a counter-part to legality as there have been examples of legal uncertainty, with predominant acceptance of legitimacy in the moral terms. Constitutionality is illustrated in the political realm in regards to conventions, informal understandings and mutual expectations. Where the norms of legality and morality arguably can change over time do norms of constitutionality have a tendency to change relative often, mostly due to the unclear cut of distribution of power (Clark 2005: 207 226). Clark s argument is that the norms within legality, morality and constitutionality help identify legitimacy, as all of them are closely related to the concepts. However the concept can not fully be understood with the sum of their total as political accommodation, showed in degrees of consensus in recent time (Clark 2005: 207 226). Clark argue that end of the Cold War meant widely recognition of the UNSC as the most appropriate medium for demonstrating the consensus of the international society, due to the end of former deadlock situation of the bipolarity. The newfound confidence in the Council to reach consensus on security matters did however not go unquestioned, as a growing awareness of the unbalanced composition started. The lack of representation and the P5 constellation are among some of the critics, which we already have discussed and will turn to later. However has it arguably been an important issue especially for the P5 member to promote the Councils ability to reach consensus, since they have little interest in inflicting irreversible damage to the current structure and/or question its ability to reach consensus (Clark 2005: 195-197). 36

5.3.5 Ian Clark s explanation of the war in Iraq In the case of the Iraq war in 2003, Clark argues the relationship between consensus and legitimacy in the use of force, somehow took the reverse form from what normally is perceived. Normally perceived legitimacy does in some sense derive from the existence of already established consensus. However in the case of Iraq many argued for the reverse form, namely that that it was seemingly held that it was important to secure legitimacy for armed action in order to facilitate a consensus in favour of it. Instead of legitimacy being the spring of consensus, it was argued that consensus became the spring of legitimacy. As US and UK pushed for a resolution given the authority to all necessary means it became clear that no acceptance would be found within the Council. According to Clark the US hereafter changed strategy in order to test the UNSC s legitimacy, with warnings of possible outcomes of a failures to act toward Saddam Hussein with comparisons to Kosovo and Rwanda. From this logic of rightfulness a consensus outside the Council were established, as US, UK and its allied possessed it own inherent legitimacy, which the UNSC were not able to support. This strategy arguably succeeded in the way that much attention to the legitimacy of the UN became a concern rather than the legitimacy of the war. At the same time, from the opponents of military action, it was claimed that UNSC to some extent endorsed unilateralism or at least failed to condemn it. In the aftermath of the conflict did the attitude however change from a mere criticism to a more purposeful debate, how the UN could in future similar situations support a wider consensus oriented policy and help rebuild Iraq. In this sense the case of Iraq show that legitimacy might issue consensus, as UN had not authorized the war, but approved the postwar administrative arrangements. Clark further argues with reference to the conflict in Kosovo in 1999 that the case of Iraq does not stand alone, where reference of action have been drawn to norms of legality and morality. (Clark 2005: 200 206) The case of Iraq indicates in relations to Clark s notion of norms of legitimacy that the norm of constitutionality arguably failed and can explain much of the crisis surrounding the case. The coalition lead by US and UK tried to sustain the argument that however unconstitutional, the war was still legitimate in legal and moral terms. This position did never win much agreement and later questioning to which degree Iraq were in a posession of weapons of mass 37

destruction or not did not made agreement on common ground easier in relation to its legitimacy. Further did the argumentation of moral issue seem to change as the war progressed, with emphasis on humanitarian concerns rather than a concern for international peace and security. Operation Iraqi Freedom as the military campaign was named, Clark argue were made further complex as evidence of unilateralism by US has started to be evident throughout the end of the Cold War. As US in the case of Kosovo did the US act without the constitutional legitimacy of UNSC, however it was done through NATO. Much of allied Europe at that time accepted the action as legitimate at least in relation to legality and or morality and that NATO was used as common promoter might have influence some legitimacy from an constitutional point of view. (Clark 2005: 220-226). However the constitutional link to the UNSC was missing in the case of Iraq which Clark argue helped trigger it into a legitimacy crisis, which were made further problematic due to US hegemony effectively made the achievement of international consensus much harder to obtain. This has caused a serious setback for all parties involved which Clark argue has played out in domestic political damage, economic costs, US standing eroded, the credibility of the global war on terror and ultimately UN. These cost are a directly attribution to preceding failure of legitimation, and have been incurred because principles of legitimacy did matter to the actors concerned (Clark 2005) 5.3.6 The two understandings and its critics In the following we will compare Hurd s and Clark s understanding of the concept and their interpretation of its role in the case of the war in Iraq. Hereafter we will present how some understandings within the field of IR could argue for their misinterpretation of the concept. In Hurd s opinion is the authority of the UNSC in a position with relative power to states, meaning that state strive to argue for its action in accordance to legitimacy, which differs from that of rule-following and self-interest. This meaning that states are not always the ultimate unit of the international system, as the legitimated power of the Council has important effects on state behaviour, which arguebly redefines the power of the Council(Hurd 2008: 55 62). Clark rather argues for the importance of the UNSC should merely be seen as a historical creation where the P5 have their powerful position due to the settlement of Second World War. Meaning that the Council is in a position of power due its ability to act as forum 38

of superpowers, this power can however most effectively act with consensus. Clark argues that consensus and legitimacy are interlinked however is he not sure, which of the concept reside the other. In relation to the two scholars notion of power and legitimacy, they tend to not fully agree, as Hurd s does not dismiss the Council s collectively material power, but his argument are mere on a focus on the soft powers capacity to persuade actors. Clark tends to take a wider attention to the actors material capabilities in relation to each other as there has been tradition for within the field of IR, however he also plays emphasis on norms, moral and other soft power values. The legitimacy of the Council in recent years has been challenged in several cases, with the war in Iraq, arguebly to be the seen as the most evident case. Hurd argue that episodes like this can ultimately create opportunities for states to promote new interpretations of the Council legitimacy, which could provide a new set of limits and powers for the institution (Hurd 2008: 194-195). He further reasons that the Council did act in a positive manner in 3 ways, as mentioned earlier to secure their ultimate purpose; secure peace and stability. Clark claims the norm of constitutionality failed as US and UK choose to act without the consensus of the Council but rather in a unilateral way. However he emphasise that in the aftermath of the war it was possible to create consensus within the Council to help rebuilding Iraq. In this regard do both scholars acknowledge the Councils important decision in regards to legitimacy. They however slightly disagree on how US policy in the case of Iraq should be internalised in prospect to the UNSC. Where Hurd are highlighting what the Council was able to accomplish and prevent, Clark are more focused on the future danger in US s acting in a unilateral fashion. They further both emphasise the vague language of the UN Charter and resolution to be of high importance for the extend of the crisis. It is notable that both scholars arguably have certain difficulties fully explaining the concept of legitimacy, how it arises and how to measure it, which they both also acknowledge as the concept, are indeed very complex. This obvious would raise criticism in methodological terms from a traditional positivist standpoint, as few would argue that the concept alone is universally measurable, without normative argumentation or fully objective (Bryman 2008: 13). Apart from the methodological critics, unsurprisingly has both scholars been subject to criticism within the field of IR on their utility and interpretation of the term. As we have mentioned earlier has the concept of legitimacy historical and conceptual been widely 39

discussed and some still tend to reject its importance to an international setting. From sceptics of the use of the term to an international setting, there has been highlighted that the complex connection to other social concept makes legitimacy meaningless, as there are no distinctiveness to where the concept might overlap. This according to critics means that a fundamental explanation and clarification of the term always are necessary before an attempt to utilising it in empirical research if even possible. As the concept is a complex understanding which relate to terms as justice, authority, law, morality, democracy, power and so on, critics tends to argue that a base point of departure in each of these concept would be more pragmatic in empirical cases (O Connor 2007: 1 14). This has brought Clark s linkage to morality, legality and constitutionality into the critical spotlight as critics first of all would question the importance of such terms. Secondly argue speaking of the concept of morality in relation to legitimacy weakens the concept recognition as, morality stand stronger alone. The same goes for Hurd s argumentation that the legitimacy helps provide authority to UNSC, critics stress that the wording of legitimacy adds nothing more or less than using the quality of becoming authoritative (O Connor 2007: 7). This paragraph indicates as for most IR theory that there is almost as much critique written about the scholars and their approach as they have published them selves. Even though both publications are relatively new they have not avoided sceptic claims, assumedly for other positions and arguments than the one we have described. As researchers we do acknowledge that the concept of legitimacy is indeed complex and utilizing in empirical cases are with some reservations. However do we still find it as a necessary concept in relation to understand the UNSC is being challenged in recent years. 5.3.7 Legitimacy and the UNSC in relation to the pluralistic and solidaristic debate In the following chapter we will discuss how legitimacy can be perceived within the boundaries of the pluralist-solidarist debate. As we have presented does Buzan take a slightly different approach to the debate within the international society, which will be the premise for this discussion. As for much of the debate in the pluralist/solidarist (thin and thick) discussion has dealt with sovereignty, the utilisation of term legitimacy in relation to the UNSC can draw some 40

comparisons. As mentioned earlier has some of the biggest issue of legitimacy in the Council been on matters of intervention, which pluralist and solidarist tend to disagree on. Where the Westphalian pluralist assumption is that all interventions is both illegal and illegitimate, the thick solidarist international society tend to favour justice and the rights of individuals, which in worst case would make intervention legitimate in cases of broken agreements (Buzan 2004: 219). From this notion acceptance on the legitimacy of intervention should it be rather simple, however according to Buzan does it only apply to a regional setting, and can hardly be used in a single, global-scale phenomenon. Rather each case should be considered in relation to the specific characteristics of it location, regional society and whom should take action for such intervention (Buzan 2004: 220). From this perspective is the pluralist/solidarist discussion hard to make any universal conclusion in regards to whether an interaction from the Council should be regarded as legitimate. However have there in the years after the war in Iraq been indications that could support a movement towards the solidaristic interpretation in cases of whether it would be legitimate to intervene. Or as Buzan labels it cooperative, where war gets downgraded to an institution to reflect a joint project (Buzan 2004: 159-160). Latest seen in the case of UNSC resolution 1973 given authorized member state acting in cooperation with the Secretary-General, to take all necessary measures to protect civilians and civilian populated areas under threat of attack... (UNSC Resolution 1973, 2011) in Libya. The process leading up to the resolution was however not unproblematic, as most condemns towards human right violations was raised from a western position as had been the case in the month leading up to the war in Iraq. It is important to stress that there were several differences between these two conflicts, the most significant being the no present of soldiers on the ground. However, as the war in Iraq created a legitimate setback for both UN and US it arguably influenced the discussion leading up to resolution 1973 (Sands 2011). It is worth noticing that US had a far less prominent role in the argumentation leading up to the resolution as well as their part of taking action than in the case of Iraq (Cooper 2011). This of cause could be explained through the lack of US interest in the conflict, however as both Clark and Hurd emphasise did the war in Iraq became a greater concern in regards to legitimacy and raised cost in both economic and diplomatic terms. Arguably a more multilateral policy was needed from US side especially in regard to rhetorical commitment, in order to get the acceptance from for legitimate actions toward the conflict in Libyan. This combined with the clear emphasis on the acceptance and cooperation with both the Arab 41

League and African Union(UNSC Resolution 1973, 2011), arguably did benefit for the acceptance of the resolution. From this perspective a tendency towards a thicker society can be drawn, with broadly based approvals based on norms and values and with Buzan recognition of regional factors(unsc Resolution 1973, 2011). A broad based consensus on the premise widely recognition of the legality, morality and constitutionality the case of Libya the UNSC seemed to have acted to the norms of legitimacy. It however has to be added that the 5 member-state chose to abstain, with the argument that concerns to the wording of use of force in the resolution (UNSC resolution 1973, 2011). At the time the case of Libya seemed to be widely accepted as a successful example of how the UNSC was able to fulfil their ultimate purpose of defending international peace and security. They had further acted with respect for the regional circumstances and succeeded a wide consensus among the members of the Council with respect for the Charter; little seemed to allure the legitimacy away of their actions. The case of Libya proofed both for the UNSC and US a newfound norm being Responsibility to Protect, legitimising the use of force showing the vital difference to the war in Iraq in solidaristic matter (Hurd 2011). The aftermath of the war however did not end up as ideal in matters of consensus as the UNSC had planned. Jet again did the vague wording of the resolution come into focus as the authorisation gave all necessary means to protect civilians, however did the resolution not mention a mandate to a regime change as critics started to highlight was conducted(weaver 2012). From Clarks perception of legitimacy, the claims of overstepping its mandate specially condemned by Russia and China, would be another violation of the norm of constitutional legitimacy. This has later proved to be a serious obstacle for the prospect of future consensus of action towards human rights violation from the UNSC, which the case in Syria latest has indicated. The conflict in Syria can be compared to the case in Libya in regards to extreme human rights violation, and the norm of acting against human sufferance, indicating the same need for an action in accordance to the norm of Responsibility to Protect. After more than a year of condemning s from outside observers has the consensus however not jet been present in the UNSC, as both China and Russia has been blocking any resolutions, arguably with reference back to the case in Libya. That being said its important to recognise that there are differences in the two conflicts in both geopolitical terms, conflicting national interests and a intervention in Syria presumably would require a larger military involvement (Jawad 2012). With regards to the UNSC s lack of actions, even on matters of non-military involvement, 42

towards the Syrian government, due to difficulties of consensus finding the issue of legitimacy has yet again been questioned. On one hand does is it evident that the P5 countries are aware of the norm of morality, legality and constitutionality to respond to secure peace and stability. However does the fears and anxiety of greater conflict smoulder beneath the surface both in the region and within the Council s members, which so far have made consensus impossible, indicating the difficulties for the Council. Council member have been keen to blame each other for the failure to respond to the people of Syria(channelnewsasia.com), little emphasis has been on the structure of the UNSC, arguably as Clark emphasise are they places in a favourable position, where no reason to undermine the UNSC would be rational. We will continue the discussion on the structure and possible alternatives in the forthcoming chapter. The concept of legitimacy is a complex and difficult term to empirical investigate or measure, it is further interlinked with the concept of norms, power, values and consensus. We have clarified how Clark and Hurd perceive the concept and how they slightly differ in their understanding to how it affects states behaviour towards the UNSC. Some argue that the complexity and linkage to other social terms proof that legitimacy has no decisive importance within the field of IR and rejects the interpretation of the term. Further have the cases of Iraq, Libya and Syria showed how struggle for consensus, power and political interest have limited the Councils actions in recent years. That the Council failed to condemn a unilateral military intervention in Iraq, acted differently to two relatively similar cases in Libya and Syria and widely different interpretations of the wording of constitutions have been argument of action have started to question the ideal composition and structure of the Council. Tendencies towards a more solidarist international society, helps show the limits of the Council and questions have emerged regarding challenges to its legitimacy. 43

6. Discussion Now we will discuss our analytical findings and emphasise some of the main aspects, and bring it into a further discussion with e.g. reformation suggestions. The first point of analysis in our project is also the first point we wish to return to in our discussion. 6.1 Structural considerations The structure of the UNSC in our analysis had many different layers to look at, not in the sense that the structure is self was overly complex, as much as that there was a lot of different ways in which to approach that structure. Those approaches, and the results of those approaches are what we intend to look into now. The primary theoretical approach we had for the analysis of the structure of the UNSC was that of Buzan s pluralism and solidarism. Using that approach meant we were able to look at the structure, from a dual point of view. It was not so much that one element of the structure was this or that, as much as it showed which ties where stronger in terms of the theory. The overall structure of the UN as we briefly outlined in the very first segment, painted a picture of an organization that is very universal, in that it promotes equality, mutual respect and a strengthening of diplomatic relations, as well as solutions. In essence, by way of the General Assembly structure, it also promotes democracy in the sense that; One country, one vote, regardless of size or means. As we also argued, certain parts of the UNSC structure catered to those very same points, such as the temporary members being chosen through the General Assembly, which could clearly be argued to be a democratic approach to the electoral process. In a sense, the fact that the temporary representatives within the UNSC are chosen democratically, would point in the direction of the soldarist approach, as everyone has a voice and a vote, and that it is solved not by merit of power, but of diplomacy. The fact that the UNSC has been assigned the power of determining what constitutes a threat to international peace and security, but also the power to mandate action in order to correct such a threat is perhaps the most direct case of a solidarist approach within the UNSC. This is perhaps best illustrated when by Buzan (2004) when he writes that the traditional pluralist/solidarist debate has been stuck on the subject of sovereignty and intervention. The UNSC has the ability to put forth a mandate that allows direct intervention in a sovereign state. On the other hand, the permanent members of the UNSC are all historically Great Powers, which is part of the more pluralistic approach, but their prime example, as in the case of the solidarists intervention, is 44

the right of veto. As touched on earlier, it is not in fact explicitly named the right of veto or the veto power, but it is what it amounts to when the abstinence or complete agreement is required from the P5 for substantive matters to pass. A significant problem to the solidaristic approach however is revealed, when the Charter of the UN allows for the special consideration of countries that donate money, or make available personnel. In essence this rule allows for countries to pay their way into the UNSC, by means of money or military, at least as temporary members. While this does not eliminate the solidaristic aspects of the UNSC structure, it does put its validity into question. How can the structure of the UNSC be solidaristic, or even the electoral process be called democratic, if the Charter even entertains the idea of the membership being biased towards economy or military power and influence. It seems to be a very pluralistic approach to an otherwise solidaristic process. While it could of course be argued that an organ like the Security Council needs to be able to carry out its mandate without having to deal the concerns of 193 different countries, it is still thought-provoking that where the UNSC and the General Assembly overlap, the UNSC has complete authority, to a degree where the General Assembly by Charter law cannot even make suggestions or recommendations without the wishes of the UNSC. This brings us to the question of the veto within the UNSC structure. One could argue that if the representatives of the UNSC where all democratically chosen by the General Assembly, with little or no considerations to the economic or military contributions, and that these representatives had no veto power, then the fact that they remain completely autonomous in the decision making process where it overlaps with the General Assembly, would be far more acceptable, as the countries that act on behalf of the 193 member states are democratically chosen to be accountable by the members, for the members. More importantly, no one representative would be able to shut down the decision process of the UNSC for whatever reason. This brings us back to the main pluralistic consideration, that the P5 are endowed with special authority by right of victory in the Second World War, that there is special consideration for what is considered as Great Powers. It is highly feasible however, that the argument against simply removing the P5 or their veto right, is that they under any circumstance have an implicit veto. Regardless whether or not they have been granted the right of veto from the Charter, the countries are so powerful that it 45

would be hard to force them to do anything that they would not otherwise do. That conception could be called old fashioned as the global order is changing, and so are the power relations, with emerging powers. The question could be asked, if all of the P5 nations do in fact measure up to the Great Power status afforded them in the Charter of 1945, and if all of these nations then should have the right of veto in this changing global order. While that is most likely still true of today, the changing world structure might prompt that question to be asked in the near future, as the IMF have already made projections as seen earlier in our project, that indicate a sizable shift in the economic order of the largest economies. Regardless of this point, it could be pointed out that all members are in fact subject to the decisions of the UNSC, and that the only way for what not to be true, would be to withdraw from the UN. Granted the Charter, as well as guaranteeing respecting and obeying the decisions of the UNSC, does also guarantee a major role in those decisions for the P5. They may be bound by the decision of the UNSC, but they also happen to be the UNSC, at least to such a degree that they can make sure actions that are against their interests, will not come to pass. While the special role of the P5 can be found several places within the UN structure, such as within the now defunct Trusteeship Council, it need not necessarily be seen as self endowed, it could be argued that the structure of the UN was inevitably, in that if the P5 was not granted special mechanisms for influencing the debate on peace and security, especially in light of the UNSC s possible mandate, that they would simply choose not to be a part of it. And if the P5 were not part of the UN and as such not subject UNSC decisions, then the question of international peace and security would be debatable. We have throughout the project mentioned the term anachronism. We have done this, as we believe it neatly and efficiently sums up a very salient concern in relations to the structure of the UNSC. The main point for saying that the UNSC is anachronistic is simply that it has not changed significantly in the past 60 or so years, and that because of a global change, there is reason to call that fact into question. We briefly mentioned above, that there are emerging powers, and that the P5 nations, while still very powerful and influential, they still are, though to a lesser degree than when the UN was founded. The exception to this rule might be that of China, which also has a significant projected growth according to the IMF. As mentioned earlier on, all of the G4 are economically more capable than several of the P5 countries, or will be within five years. The UNSC structure is not solely anachronistic in the sense that its permanent members are experiencing economic competition, based on our analysis 46

throughout the project, we have pointed out that the world is changing, and we have attempted to describe this tendency from several perspectives. Instead of the more realist or pluralist understanding of the Cold War world, we are slowly but surely moving towards a more solidarist approach to everything from economy to diplomacy, and even in the case of organizations like NATO moving towards a more solidary military structure. With this in mind, the challenge to the UNSC structure seems obvious. Not only are new countries emerging that can rival the P5 in terms of economy, the world is also changing, and seemingly in a direction that challenges the more pluralistic aspects of the UNSC, such as the veto power and the permanency of the P5. Even if we assume that the P5 are there solely to represent the dominating military capabilities of the world, then some of these countries would seem to be falling behind, when mentioned in the context of the G4 countries. As we mentioned earlier, India recently purchased an aircraft carrier, and thus has the potential means to project their power, in much the same way as some of the other P5 nations. Even if the debate falls on the matter of nuclear capability which all of the P5 have, then it still seems to fall flat as Germany has nuclear weapons as part of a NATO deal (Spiegel.de 10/11-2010) and India according to the Federation of American Scientists (2012) also has nuclear weaponry. While Japan does not have any nuclear weapons, their Prime Minister already acknowledged back in 1994 that they did indeed have the capability to produce them if needed (Independent.co.uk 18/6-1994). Per these sources, three of the four countries that make up G4 are nuclear states or nuclear capable states, all with fast growing economies, and significant financial and personnel support for the UN. The case could easily be made that in one way or another, a challenge does exists to the pluralistic part of the UNSC structure, and that, that challenge only seems to be growing. 6.2 Reflections on the future As we have clarified the UNSC power dependent on its members willingness and ability to act, since the Council have no means in form of force by itself. In situations concerning international peace and security it depends on its legitimacy, consensus and credibility as a mediator in international society. A broad unified Council will therefore always be perceived more powerful in symbolic, military and diplomatic terms than a divided Council. In this regard has the Council tried to take regional co-determinations into account as seen in the case 47

of Libya, with emphasis on the Arab League and African Union s opinion (UNSC Resolution 1973, 2011). The representativeness of the Council in regards to military power is still reflected by the P5, and its members are the five countries in the World having the highest military expenditures (Sipri.org). However the Council is far from democratic in relation to the world citizen s representation, where Europe has two permanent members (UK and France) plus generally 3 seats for temporary members. In 2011 the non-permanent members were Germany, Portugal and Bosnia and Herzegovina; thereby a third of all seats in the Council were representing Europe, one could additionally argue to count Russia under the representation of Europe, sitting as permanent member. Europe representing approximately 10% of the world s population (PRB 2012), is heavily overrepresented where Asia, represent over 50% of the world s population (PRB 2012), normally have three countries represented in the Council. There is little news to this lack of representation, which has been discussed on and off for the last decades, however no common solution has been found. As Clark emphasised the discussion of legitimacy is most likely to be present when there is less confidence towards an authority. Since the end of the Cold War there has from time to time, been discussed whether the UNSC needed to be restructured to future-proof its acceptance and legitimacy in a changing world (Staur 2011). In 2001 the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) completed a report which was the first to discuss the concept of Responsibility to Protect in an UNSC context, which later became crucial in the implementation of the concept. The report stated that A common theme in a great many of the Commission s consultations was the democratic legitimacy of the fifteen-member Security Council, which can hardly claim to be representative of the realities of the modern era, so long as it excludes from permanent membership countries of major size and influence, in particular from Africa, Asia and Latin America. The Security Council was also variously claimed to be neither answerable to the peoples of the world, nor accountable to the plenary General Assembly nor subject to juridical supervision and scrutiny. There is no doubt that reform of the Security Council, in particular to broaden and make more genuinely representative its composition, would help in building its credibility and authority (ICISS 2001). One could argue that the report now more than 10 years old, was able to incorporate the concept of R2P in the argumentation of humanitarian intervention, moving towards a more solidarist approach as seen implemented in Libya. However the claims of misrepresentation and the possible danger of mistrust in the Council have not yet been 48

answered. The discussion on how to make the UNSC more representatives in relation to geography and distribution of power does very much correlate with a possible expansion of the Council. However does the Council still have to be more dynamic in its ability to reach consensus on matter of threat against peace and security (Staur 2011). One of the key issues being discussed in relations to make it more representative is how to implement a linkage to the different regions and sub-regions around the world. As the ICISS report clarifies this especially means, how to incorporate Africa, Asia and South America better in the process. As seen in Libya, the argumentation for the discussion was very much based on co-determination from the Arabic League and African Union, the problem however is how to incorporate binding relations to these regions. This is further important as many conflicts have been present in these regions and recognition of their importance in form representativeness in the Council could hopefully prevent some escalation of conflict. A possible expansion or restructuring of the Security Council has yet to be agreed upon, however the P5 member s acceptance is essential. Logically they are skeptical towards the prospect of further members being present with same favorable terms and the veto power against any revision of the UN Charter. The most serious contenders to get permanent status should be found within the G4 countries, they however have agreed on a musketeer-oath, meaning all of them have to be accepted before joining. Further have they expressed importance for two permanent seats to African nations, which arguably would give more representative constellation. The prospect of a G4 + 2 enlargements has however raised objections from several countries due to different reasons. Neither Spain or Italy have showed praise for a German candidacy, firstly as it would prove the idea of the big three being UK, France and Germany controlling Europe, secondly as it would mean their chances for temporary membership would decrease. Further has Pakistan showed little interest in a permanent Indian membership and the same could be said for Mexico s and Argentine s relations to a Brazilian membership. These are among nine countries, which have urged to a larger restructuring of the Security Council, as they are all concerned with the prospect of the regional power being the only voice heard in the Council. Further has the two permanent seats from Africa, not been decided and have resulted in heavy discussions between the leading African countries (Staur 2011: 83-102). 49

An enlargement of the permanent members of the Security Council would result in a discussion of additional states, which should be taking into considerations in order to agree for a consensus, making the process more complicated. However, if it succeeded with broader based decisions and the regional superpowers being present it is likely that the acceptance would have a positive effect on its legitimacy and efficiency. Furthermore it would be easier to make decisions if the strongest economic states, the states with biggest influence in their region and the biggest contributors to economic and military means was present when crucial decision were discussed. 50

7. Conclusion The changing global order, along with emerging powers challenge the legitimacy and power of the structurally static UNSC, specifically in terms of economy and contribution. The UNSC remains anachronistic in a changing global order. In an increasing degree some permanent members do not have the economy and the military that historically gave them their permanency. Furthermore, several of the permanent members are rivalled or superseded in terms of contributions to the UN. Members of the P5, especially France, UK and Russia has economically been surpassed by emerging powers. Furthermore military investments have increased for countries like India in concert with their economic growth. As the power and recognition of the UNSC is based on states belief in the status of the P5, the concept of legitimacy is increasingly getting important, as their status are being challenged, by emerging powers. Examples of their lacking ability to find consensus, and mistrust in recent resolutions has further brought up the relevance of the question of legitimacy. In terms of the UNSC, the power that they wield is primarily symbolic but also diplomatic. This can also be seen in the context of legitimacy, as that symbolic power would wane if their legitimacy was to be questioned. Further as states are bound to UN Charter they subscribe some symbolic power to the UNSC to take actions in cases of threat to international peace and security. We perceive the concept of veto voting, as being one of the greatest structural obstacles within the UNSC. Its practical application allows for the P5 nations to exercise power in a unilateral manner, which potentially marginalises the role of the Council and their mandate. Pluralist elements within the structure of the Charter is emphasised in that decisions on the non-permanent Security Council members are biased towards those that contribute through economics or military. The initiative Responsibility to Protect, or R2P is a move away from the more pluralistic elements of the Security Council, and as such strengthens the solidarist elements of intervention. Its use in the recent case of Libya seems to support this fact, despite claims to the contrary by China and Russia. The Case of Libya and Syria further has illustrated how vague formulations in the UN Charter and Resolutions can be used to different 51

interpretations, resulting in disagreement based on norms of constitutionality. The vague wording, however is crucial for the states willingness to bind themselves into the UN Charter, as it would seem unlikely to meet all 193 countries under a strict formulated treaty. By Charter law, the signatories, that is, the countries that make up the UN are also the ones that through the act of signing provides the UNSC its actual power. Based on the structure that was set forth in 1945, it is the strongest military countries, the Second World War victors that primarily are to provide international peace and security for the 193 members of the UN. However, the world has changed, and new powers have arisen, as well as new ways to define that power. The P5 has their influence through virtue of being great powers, this means that in order to guarantee the future of the UNSC and the P5 countries legitimacy, its structure will have to accommodate the changing global arena. Several suggestions for an eventual reformation have been presented externally through the G4 and others. However the likelihood of such a change within the near future is improbable. 52

8. Afterthoughts: The process of writing any project within a deadline, always mean that there will be considerations for how the project could have evolved further. In our case, some of those considerations are less realistic than others. Something we struggled with, was if our understanding of Buzan and his work was adequate, and the question of whether or not our use of his theoretical work is actually correct. In this sense, an interview, or even guidance in the use of his theoretical work from Buzan himself, arguably would have made our project progress more smoothly, and might even have given us new avenues of analysis. However, in the case of what we would like to do, if we had more time, and maybe resources would be to make an interview with academics that represented the different poles of international relations. In a utopia, that would be Kenneth Waltz or John Mearsheimer representing the realist/neorealist approach, Barry Buzan representing the via medium approach of the English School, Robert Keohane or Joseph Nye representing liberalism/neoliberalism and Alexander Wendt representing constructivism. Being able to make semi-structured interview with these people in the setting of our unique case, would arguably mean that we could employ and compare the different approaches much more efficiently, but also employ them in a more tailor made fashion for our unique case. Asking them questions like how they would explain the continued structure of the UNSC, or how they saw legitimacy and power in relations to it, would arguably be a veritable goldmine of perspectives. However, this represents a dream scenario, the more realistic proposal, would be finding, locally, academics that subscribe to these different international relations points of view, and have the credentials to back up those views. As the project has its focus on UNSC and its structure, as well as the structure of the P5, it would potentially be beneficial to speak to a representative of the UNSC as well as a representative of the General Assembly. This might only give us the official points of view, but there is the chance that we would be able to get some knowledge that is not readily available to the public, especially as the question of reformation has been on the table for years now. Along the same vein, we would also like to talk to someone within the G4 structure, in terms of their thoughts on reformation suggestions, as well as their own justifications for wanting to 53

be part of the permanent members of the UNSC. With more time and resources however, the focus could be widened somewhat, to include other groups that are also dealing with a reformation of the UNSC. Someone who would be incredible relevant to speak to concerning this subject, would be the previous Secretary General Kofi Anan, as he was the person that started the High Level Panel talks concerning reformation. Furthermore, with the knowledge gained through some or all of these possibilities, it could be relevant to look into one or more of the reform suggestions, and from that try to track how its potential implementation would play out in the world. Finally we have throughout the research played with the thought of how the structure of the UNSC would look like if it were constituted today. Which states would be a part of the Council, how their power should be projected instead of in a veto right, how many states should have permanent status and how less developed regions should be represented. It could be interesting to see if the countries of today would be more willing to commit to a charter that was much stricter in its mandate. 54

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